

**Analytical Corrections,
Additions and
Enhancements For
Euwe's
*The Hague-Moscow 1948
Match-Tournament for
the World Chess
Championship***

by Taylor Kingston

The games and note variations in this book were edited using ChessBase, with the analysis engine Rybka 3 UCI running in the background. During this process much of the book's analysis came to be compared to Rybka's. On the whole, Euwe's judgment was upheld much more often than not, but like a sports referee overruled by instant replay, even a world champion can be proven wrong – sometimes dramatically so – by the relentlessly objective scrutiny of an unblinking silicon eye.

We present here the corrections, additions and enhancements thus revealed that we consider significant: not minor half-pawn differences, but cases where an important tactical shot was missed, where a resource that could have changed a loss to a draw or win was overlooked, where a good move was called bad (or vice versa), or where a position was misevaluated. Also some cases where there was no real mistake, but an especially interesting variation, or a much stronger one, was not pointed out. We did not concern ourselves with changes in opening theory since 1948.

Numbers given with some variations represent Rybka's evaluation of the position to the nearest hundredth of a pawn, e.g. a difference of exactly one

pawn, with no other relevant non-material differences, has the value +1.00 when in White's favor, or -1.00 when in Black's. A position where Rybka considers White better by 3½ pawns (or the equivalent, such as a minor piece) would get the value +3.50, the advantage of a rook +5.00, etc. These numbers may vary some from one machine to another, or with the length of time allowed for analysis, but are generally valid and reliable, and serve as a useful shorthand for comparisons that would otherwise require extensive detailed explanation. A position rated 0.00 is usually not only theoretically even, but dead drawn, i.e. Rybka detects a forced repetition, perpetual check or some such.

The one area where analysis engines are sometimes suspect is the endgame, for example positions where one side has a material advantage but the game is a theoretical draw. In such cases we consulted Dr. Stephen B. Dowd, a published study composer and endgame expert, for whose help we are most grateful. Where feasible, in positions with six men or less, we also consulted the Nalimov tablebase at www.k4it.de/index.php?topic=egt&lang=en.

None of this should this be construed as any flaunting of our own chess prowess; we give all credit there to Rybka, Dowd and Nalimov. And it definitely should not be taken as any disparagement of Euwe: our respect for him – both as a player and a man – is extremely high. In frequency and degree of annotation error, Euwe fares no worse, and in some cases better, than other all-time greats – Lasker, Alekhine, Tartakower,

Bronstein, Najdorf, Fine et al – whose works we have analyzed in similar fashion. It simply was not possible in Euwe's time for a single chess master, no matter how great, to come anywhere near the accuracy and thoroughness of today's chess engines, which can analyze thousands of moves in mere seconds. We like to think that Euwe, who was considered one of the most strictly logical of chess masters, would appreciate any contribution to objective chess truth.

It should also be noted that – unlike this writer – Euwe did not have the luxury of a leisurely pace: he generally led a very busy life, filled with – besides frequent serious chess play and its attendant preparations – his teaching duties, exhibitions and lectures, magazine and newspaper articles, organizing and promoting chess events, plus his responsibilities as a husband and father.

A minor trend in Euwe's analytical errors is a tendency to be overly harsh on himself; see for example his game against Smyslov at Groningen 1946, or his 2nd-round game with Botvinnik in 1948. This makes an interesting contrast with Euwe's arch-rival Alekhine, who often tried to portray his games as flawless masterpieces and sometimes overlooked (perhaps even suppressed?) moves that would have undercut that image.

In some cases notes by other annotators were compared, from *Botvinnik's Best Games, Volume 1: 1925-1941* and *Volume 2: 1942-1956* (Moravian Chess, 2000), *The Complete Games of Paul Keres* (Arco, 1977), *Smyslov's Best Games, Volume 1: 1935-1957* (Moravian Chess,

2003), *Reshevsky's Best Games of Chess* (Chess Review, 1948), British IM Harry Golombek's *The World Chess Championship 1948* (David McKay & Co.), and articles by IMs Al Horowitz and Hans Kmoch in various 1948 issues of the magazine *Chess Review*. These present a very mixed picture, sometimes improving on Euwe's notes, more often agreeing with his (whether right or wrong), and sometimes making worse mistakes. For what it's worth, Keres and Botvinnik probably come off best, and Golombek probably worst. However, no fair conclusion can be drawn from this rather casual exercise; that would require a systematic comparison of all the notes in all the books on this tournament by these masters, something we did not attempt.


We do not claim the analysis below is comprehensive; not every variation of every game was examined. Nor do we claim it is inerrant; though today's engines are very strong, they can miss things beyond their analytical horizon. The interested reader is encouraged to examine further on his own.

Games prior to Hague-Moscow 1948

Euwe's notes to these games were deliberately kept brief so as not to subtract from the space for the actual World Championship tournament. Thus what we find here are mainly errors of omission, where moves warranting comment get none.


Game 4, Smyslov-Botvinnik, USSR Absolute Championship 1941: The note at Black's 38th move is correct that 38...♙f1! would have been the strongest move at that point, but it goes

unmentioned that it was also best at move 40, practically winning by force:




40...♙f1! 41.♖g1 (or 41.♙c2 ♙e2--) 41...♙g2+ 42.♖xg2 ♗xg2 43.♗xg2 ♖xd1 44.♖xd1 ♖xd1 45.♙b6 ♖d2+ 46.♗h3 ♖xb2 47.♙xa5 ♖f2 and wins. Instead Black played 40...f6! and drifted back to a virtually even position, finally winning only by virtue of White's blunder at move 50. Botvinnik does point all this out, and Rybka concurs.

Game 8, Smyslov-Botvinnik, Moscow 1943: Two overlooked and very strong moves bear mentioning, moves that would have shortened the game considerably. At White's 29th move, much better than the text 29.♙h5-f3 was 29.♙d2-e3!:




Black then really has no good answer to the threat of 30.♙xc5, viz. 29...c4 30.♙d4, or 29...♖c8 30.♖f1! ♗xf1 31.♗xe5 ♗f6 32.♗xd5+ ♗h8 33.♙xg5+- . About the best Black can do is 29...d4 30.cxd4 ♖xe3 31.♗xe3 cxd4 32.♗b3+ ♗h8 33.♖d1, and White is clearly winning (about +2.66). Smyslov likewise overlooked this in his notes.

36.♙f4! deservedly gets an exclaim, but it would have been far stronger two moves earlier:




34.♙f4!!, and all Black can do is 34...♖de8 (if 34...gxf4?? 35.♙f5+ ♗h8 36.♗xg7#) 35.♙f5+ ♗g8 36.♙g6 ♗xg6 (if 36...♖e7?? 37.♖a8+) 37.♙xe5 ♖xe5 (else 38.♖xg7+) 38.♗xe5, and White is up a whole rook. Smyslov admits he missed this due to time pressure.

Game 9, Smyslov-Botvinnik, USSR Championship 1944: Unmentioned in this game's brief annotations is a great improvement later found by Botvinnik at Black's 29th move.




Rather than the text 29...e5 (undeservedly given a double-exclaim by Euwe), best was 29...♗c7!, threatening 30...♗xf4+. Botvinnik then gives 30.♖hf1 ♗b4! 31.♙xb4 ♙e8, concluding "it is doubtful whether White could have saved the game."

Rybka supports this, giving after 30.♖hf1 ♗b4! the following illustrative variations:




31. Qxc4 (relatively best; if 31. cxb4?? Qe8 wins the queen, and only slightly less bad is 31. Qxb4 Qe8 32. Rxa6 bxa6 33. Qxe7 Qxg6 34. hxc6 Qxe7) 31... Qxc2 (Now 31... Qe8 32. Qxa6 Qxg6 33. Qxb4 bxa6 34. Qxe7 Qxh5 35. gxh5 Qxe7 36. Rxa6 costs too much for the queen.) 32. Qxa6 Qxg6 33. Qxb4 Qe4 34. Qe2 (or 34. Qxe7 bxa6 35. Qb4 Qc4) 34... Qf7 35. Rxa7 Qb8 36. Raa1 Rxf4 37. Rxa8 Qxa8 38. Rxf4,



and Black, with queen and pawn for rook and bishop, should eventually win (about -2.00).


This is especially important in view of the fact that, as Botvinnik points out, after the text move 29...e5,



rather than the losing 30. fxe5?, Smyslov had a much better defense in 30. dxe5. Botvinnik


says then White “would have been by no means bound to lose,” a judgment Rybka confirms, giving two main variations: (1) 30... Qd4 31. Qb4 (unpinning the c-pawn) 31... Qb5 32. Qxe7 Rxc6 33. Rxb1 Qc6 34. cxd4 c3+ 35. Qd1 Qe6 36. Qh4, and (2) 30... Qxe5 31. Qf5 Rf6 32. Qc8+ Qe8 33. Qc5 Qd8 (if 33... Qxc5?! 34. Qxc5 Qd7 35. Qd4 +0.55) 34. fxe5 Rxe5, with approximate equality in both cases.

Game 10, Botvinnik-Smyslov, USSR Championship 1945: The note at move 22 can be improved. If Black plays 22... Rxb2,




best by far for White is 23. g5, forcing 23... Qh5 (if 23... Qd7?? 24. Qxc6, or 23... Qe4?? 24. Qxe4 dxe4 25. Rxc6), and only then 24. Qd3 g6 25. Qg4 etc., with a probably winning attack. The impact of the note’s immediate 23. Qd3 can be blunted by 23... h6!, when if 24. g5 hxg5 25. fxg5 Qd6! – Threatening 26... Qxh2# and showing the key difference from the 23. g5 line . – 26. Rf4 Qe4 27. Qxe4 dxe4 28. Qxe4 Rxf4 29. Qxf4 (or 29. exf4 Qxd4+) 29... Qxf4 30. exf4 Qxd4=.

Game 21, Reshevsky-Botvinnik, Nottingham 1936: At Black’s 39th move, it is not clear what Euwe thought he saw when he wrote “39... Qh8 would be met very strongly by 40. Qd4!.”




Rybka sees that position as dead drawn.

Game 23, Reshevsky-Botvinnik, AVRO 1938: At White’s 37th move,




the text move 37. Qc2 does not deserve the “?” given it, since it is quite good enough to win, and rated better by Rybka than the note’s preferred 37. exf6 (+3.43 to +2.80). Objectively best was 37. Qe4 (intending 38. Qxc6) at about +7.55, a sample continuation being 37... Qh6 38. exf6 gxf6 (or 38... Qxf6 39. Rf1) 39. Qb1 Qh8 40. Qa2+ etc. Reshevsky likewise gives 37. Qc2 a “?” and prefers 37. exf6.


Game 25, Reshevsky-Botvinnik, USSR-USA Match, Moscow 1946: In the note at Black’s 17th move, after 17... Rb8 18. Qf6 Qc6 19. Qxe5,



Black must play 19...♖h7, not 19...♖af8, as in the latter case White plays not 20.♙d5 as in the note, but 20.♙g5!! ,




not only defending the ♙f7 indirectly (20...♖xf7? 21.♙xh8), but forcing a liquidation that leaves him four pawns up (e.g. 20...♙c5 21.♙xe7 ♙xe7 22.♙xe7+ ♙xe7 23.♙xd5). After 19...♖h7 20.♙d5 ♙xd5 21.♙xd5 ♙xd5 Black does win a piece,




though as indicated by the note the endgame is still very problematic due to White's passed pawns. Botvinnik mentions this variation, including the correct move 19...♖h7, but admits he did notice it during the actual game.

Game 32, Keres-Smyslov, Leningrad 1939: At Black's 26th move,




no comment is made on the fact that the text 26...♙d6 is a serious mistake, the decisive one. Black instead could have defended with 26...♙xe3+! 27.♙h2 ♙f6, preventing 28.♙xh5+, and forcing White to take a draw with 28.♖xf6 ♙xf6 29.♙f1+ ♙e7 30.♙f7+ ♙d6 31.♙xb7 ♖f8 32.♙f7+ ♖xf7 33.♙xf7 ♙d4 34.♙f8+ ♙d7 35.♙f7+ etc. Keres does give this variation, though he starts with the equally good 26...♙f6, eventually transposing to the same line.

Game 37, Keres-Smyslov, USSR Absolute Championship 1941: The notes are mistaken to consider 55...♙g6 the game's decisive error.




While it was not as good as Euwe's recommended 55...♙h6, it still does not lose the game, nor is the advantage conferred by 55...♙h6 necessarily great enough to win (only about -0.83). Euwe makes no comment on a more serious mistake a few moves later, after 56.♙e5+ ♙g5 57.♙f7+ ♙xg4 58.♙xd6,




when Black played 58...♙xd5?, when instead he could have forced a draw with 58...♖c1+! 59.♙g2 (59.♙f2?? ♙d1+) 59...♖c2+ 60.♙f1 ♖c1+ 61.♙g2 (61.♖e1?! ♖xe1+ 62.♙xe1 ♙xh5+) 61...♖c2+ etc.

Game 40, Keres-Smyslov, Moscow 1947: The note to White's 22nd claims that White could have forced a win with 22.a3! ♙d3 23.♙xd3 ♙xd3 24.h5:




This works if Black now makes the note's move 24...g5, but not if he plays 24...g×h5!. The crucial difference is that in the likely continuation for either move, 25.♙c8! (Euwe's recommendation) 25...♙d7 26.♙xg5+ ♙g7 27.♙xg7+ ♙xg7 28.♖c6 f4 29.e×f4 ♖xf4 30.♖×e6 ♖xd4,



White does not have 31.h5-


h6+!, while if 31.♖e7+ ♜h6 and Black's king is out of jail. Rybka's evaluation of the position with a white pawn on h5 is about +2.50 to +3.00, but with a black pawn it is practically 0.00.

Thus after 24...g×h5, best is probably 25.♜×h5,




when White has a definite advantage (about +1.25), but not any immediate win as claimed in the note.

Game 41, Reshevsky-Smyslov, Leningrad-Moscow 1939: At move 32,




while the text move 32.♗d6+ is good, it goes unmentioned that White missed a stronger and more decisive continuation in 32.♖×e8+ ♜×e8 33.♜e2+ ♖e7 34.♜c4! (threatening 35.♜g8#) 34...♜f8 35.♖×b5 c×b5 36.♗e6+ ♜f7 37.♜×c7 ♖×c7 38.♗×c7,




with an easily won ending.

A more serious omission is seen at move 34,




where the inadequacy of the text move 34.♜f5? (which allowed Black equality) elicits no comment, and the recommended 34.♖×b5 is none too good either. Instead, quickly decisive is 34.d5!, a sample continuation being 34... ♗d6 (34...c×d5?? 35.♖×b5) 35.♖bc1 a6 36.♜c5+-.

Game 44, Smyslov-Euwe, Groningen 1946: Euwe's evaluation that White is winning at move 34 is probably overly pessimistic, and the ?-marks he gives to the text moves 33...♗d2 and 34...♗e1 undeserved (Rybka considers them both the best available moves). Euwe opines that 33...♗g5,




intending 34...♗×h5, would have saved the draw, but Smyslov presents lengthy analysis disputing (and probably refuting) that. Rybka considers it better for Black to retain his bishop, and indicates the game was not clearly lost until several

moves later:




Here, with 39...♗a5 or ♗b4, Black could have maintained equality. Instead he continued 39...♜g6?! 40.♜b3 ♜g5?? (better to backtrack with 40...♜f7), and after 41.♜a4! the c-pawn could no longer be defended and Black was lost.

Game 46, Keres-Reshevsky, Stockholm Olympiad 1937: The note at White's 20th move is correct that 20.♗×d4 would have been ill-advised, but does not give the correct refutation.




The recommended 20...♗×b3 fails to 21.g4! ♗×d4 22.♗×d4 ♗f4 (if 22...♗f6?? simply 23.♗×b3+-) 23.♜f3! (not 23.♗×b3? ♜×c1 24.♜×c1 ♖×c1 25.♖×c1 ♗×b3 26.♗×b3 ♗e2+ and Black gets the better endgame of rook vs. two knights) 23...♗×c2 24.♜×f4 b3 25.♗d×c2 b×c2 26.♖×c2 and material is equal with White slightly better positionally. Correct is 20...♗×b3! 21.♗×b3 ♜×c1 22.♜×c1 ♖×c1 23.♖×c1 ♗×b3 24.♖b1 ♗×a4 25.♖×b4 ♗b5,




and Black is up a pawn, though it may not be sufficient to win. Keres analyzes this variation correctly, though he stops after move 23.

Game 60, Euwe-Keres, 3rd match game, 1939-40: At White's 31st move, the strongest continuation is overlooked both in the game and the notes.




Far better than the text move 31.h5 is 31.♖g5!, threatening 32.♙xf6+ ♜xf6 33.♖xd5, and Black has no good answer, viz. 31...♙c4 32.♞f3, or 31...♙e4 32.♙c5! ♙f5 33.♞b3 ♖c6 34.♞xb7 etc., White winning easily in all variations.

Game 66, Euwe-Keres, 9th match game, 1939-40: At Black's 21st move,




Euwe faults the text move 21...d4 and recommends

21...♖e7. Neither comment is particularly justified: the former move is not bad and the latter not especially good. Best actually is 21...♙d4!, blocking the rook's action on the d-file and threatening 22...♖f6 and 22...♖d6. Rybka then sees best play as the rather wild line 22.♙f4 dxc4 23.♖h5 ♖f6 (not 23...g5? 24.♙f5) 24.♙f7 ♞e5 25.♙g6+ ♖xg6 26.♙xg6 ♞xh5 27.♙xh5 ♙xb2,




which it considers probably winning for Black (about -1.80). 21...♙d4 is also recommended by Keres, though with only general considerations in support.

Game 67, Keres-Euwe, 10th match game 1939-40: It can hardly be called a mistake, but the note at Black's 16th move overlooks the strongest move in one of its variations. After 16...dxc5 17.♖d8+ ♙e8,




much better than 18.♙c4 is 18.♙xg7! ♖xd8 (if 18...♞xg7?? 19.♖xe7 wins the queen) 19.♞xd8 ♞xg7 20.♙c4+ ♖f8,




and White has the luxurious choice of winning with either 21.♞xe8+ ♖xe8 21.♞xg7, or 21.♞xg7 ♖xg7 22.♞xe8 when Black's bishop will soon be lost.

Game 68, Euwe-Keres, 11th match game 1939-40: The note at White's 21st move claims that White has attacking chances after 21...♙e2 22.♙f6+ gxf6 23.♞g3+ ♖h8 24.♙h6 ♙h5 25.♙g7+ ♖g8 26.♙h6+ ♙g6 27.f3:




If so, they must be deeply hidden, as Rybka does not agree, rating the position at about -1.70. A sample line is 27...♞c8 28.♞c1 (28.h4? ♖xc3) 28...♖c4 29.♖b1 ♖h8 30.h4 ♞g8, and Black has both defense and counterplay.

Further on, the note at Black's 23rd move gives 23...♞xg7 24.♞xg7 ♖xg7 25.♖e7+ ♖g8 26.♖xf6! [sic] as good for White,




but Rybka considers this line Black's best defense, and indicates that after 26...♖×e4 Black stands somewhat better (about -0.60).

Game 71, Keres-Euwe, 14th match game 1939-40: The note to Black's 21st move misses the correct line in one variation. After 22.g×f3 ♖×h3 23.f4,




not 23...♙×b4?!, which yields only a small advantage after 24.♙d2! instead of the note's 24.♖×b4?. Best instead is 23...f5! (intending 24...♗f6 and mate shortly), forcing 24.♗d3 ♗f6 25.e4 ♗g6+ 26.♗g3 ♙×b4 27.♖×b4 ♗×g3+ 28.f×g3 ♖×g3+ 29.♖f1,



and now Black decides matters with 29...♖f3+ 30.♖e1 (if 30.♖g1 ♖d1+ 31.♖g2 ♗c2+ etc.) 30...♖h1+ 31.♖d2 ♖g2+ 32.♖e1 ♖g1+ 33.♖e2 ♗c2+ 34.♙d2 ♖×a1-+.


Game 73, Euwe-Reshevsky, Stockholm Olympiad, 1937: Several errors of both commission and omission here. White's 18th move does not deserve the "?" given to it, but his 19th move, a fairly serious mistake, gets no comment, nor

does the fact that Black failed to capitalize on it. After 18.♙c4 ♙c5 19.e4? (better 19.♗g1),




rather than 19...♙c3, best was 19...♙f4!. Black need not worry about 20.♙b6, viz. 20...♙fd3+ 21.♙×d3 ♙×d3+ 22.♖d2 ♙×b2 23.♙×a8 ♗×a8 24.♗hb1 ♙f6 25.♗a2 ♗d8+ 26.♖e2 ♙d3-+. Other moves are no better, e.g. 20.♗g1 ♙fd3+ 21.♙×d3 ♙×d3+ 22.♖f1 ♙×b2 23.♙×b2 ♗c3-+, or 20.♗d1 ♙×b3 21.♗g1 f6 22.♗d7 (22.♙b6? ♗c2) 22...♙×e2 23.♖×e2 ♖f8 24.♙b6 ♗c2+ 25.♖d1 ♗×b2 26.♙×a8 ♙c5-+.

Later in the game, two moves get undeserved ?-marks. Black's 39th move, 39...h4, which Euwe calls "something of a blunder," is not at all.




Rybka rates it as almost equally good as Euwe's recommendation 39...c2 (-3.47 to -3.94). And at Black's 41st move,




Reshevsky's 41...h2 is fine (-3.47), virtually as good as Euwe's preferred 41...♖f5 (-3.66).


The two moves that actually do let Black's win slip to a draw elicit no comment. First, at move 42,



best was 42...♖f4!, which would have wrapped up the game in short order, e.g. 43.♖h3 ♖e3! 44.f4 (44.♖g3 ♖d2!-+) 44...♖×f4+ 45.♖h4 ♖×e5-+. Instead Black played 42...♗×f3?!, which lets the evaluation drop to -1.79. However, Black could still have won if at move 44,




instead of 44...c2, he had played 44...♗d1! forcing 45.♗c7 ♗c1 46.♖f3 ♖f5, and either 47.♗c5 c2 48.♖e2 ♗h1 49.♗×c2 ♗h2+ 50.♖d3 ♗×c2 51.♖×c2 ♖×e5-+, or 47.♖e3 ♖×e5,




which Nalimov says is a win for Black. Interestingly, Fred Reinfeld mentions 42...♖f4 in the March 1938 *Chess Review*, but not 44...♖d1.

Game 74, Euwe-Reshevsky, AVRO 1938: Two errors in succession, one of omission and one of commission, at move 51.



No comment is made on 51.hxg4, but it was a serious blunder (about -5.88). What little chance White had left lay in 51.♖d1 g3+ 52.♖h1 (about -1.71).

Then the note to Black's move says that after 51...hxg4 52.♖d5 "White would still have gotten drawing chances."




In fact Black then has a forced mate: 52...g3+ 53.♖h3 ♖c8+ 54.♖xg3 ♖g4+ 55.♖h2 ♖h4+ 56.♖g1 ♖f2+ 57.♖h1 ♖h4#. Reshevsky annotated the game but makes no comment on either move.

Games from Hague-Moscow 1948


These games were annotated in much more detail and depth than

those above, and so this section is much longer than the preceding one, even though fewer total games were involved (50 vs. 75).


Game 3, Keres-Smyslov, round 2: In the note to move 19, in the variation 19...♖f8 20.f4 exd4 21.f5 ♖xc5 22.♖h3 h5,



White is said to have "a choice of three favorable continuations": 23.♖xd4, 23.♖xf7, and 23.g4. In fact only the first of these is playable, but it leads to no advantage (about -0.09), while the other two are nearly disastrous for White. After 23.♖xf7? ♖xf7 24.fxg6 ♖xf1+ 25.♖xf1 ♖f8 26.♖xf8+ ♖xf8 27.♖xh5 ♖g7,




Black is in no immediate danger and his extra piece should be decisive. And after 23.g4 (undeservedly given an exclamation), Rybka gives best play as 23...♖xa2 24.gxh5 ♖b3! 25.♖h4 (25.♖xb3? ♖xb3 26.hxg6 fxg6 27.♖e6 c5 28.♖xf8 ♖xf8 29.fxg6 c4++) 25...gxh5 26.h6 ♖f6 27.♖f4 ♖e6 28.♖xe6 ♖xe6 29.♖xd4 ♖xd4+ (also good is 29...♖h7 threatening 30...♖g8+) 30.♖xd4 ♖h7 31.exf5 ♖xh6,




and Black's passed queenside pawns give him a probably winning edge. Golombek examines this line, but goes wrong by having Black play 22...h6? instead of 22...h5, which is the only defense.

The note at Black's 21st move can be improved considerably in variation (4c1). After 21...♖xc5 22.e5 d3+ 23.♖h1 ♖c2??,




the move given, 24.♖xf7?, turns out actually better for Black after 25...♖xb3 26.gxh7+ ♖h8 27.axb3 ♖be8 (about -0.97). Instead White has the decisive 25.gxf7+! ♖f8 (if 25...♖h8 26.♖xc2 dxc2 27.♖xd7! c1♖ 28.♖xc1 ♖xb2 29.♖xe7+-) 26.♖xh7+ ♖g7 27.♖xe5+ ♖xe5 28.♖xb4! ♖xf7 (28...♖xb4?? 29.f8♖+) 29.♖xb8+- (about +6.33).

The text move 21...♖xc5 is erroneously called the decisive error; in fact it is about as good as 21...♖xc5 and better than almost any other. The true losing move came two moves later:




Here Black played 23...♘h6?? and was then truly lost. Instead, he had two promising alternatives:

(1) 23...♘xf6! 24.♞xf6 ♘d7 25.♞d6 (or 25.♞g3 ♘xf6 26.♞xb8+ ♘e8!=, says Rybka) 25...♞xg5 26.♞xd7 ♞xd7 27.♞xd7 c5,




with some counterplay and drawing chances. Golombek mentions this variation but stops at 25.♞g3, apparently assuming White is winning.

(2) Or, from the previous diagram, the surprising 23...♘xe4! 24.fxe7 ♞xg5 25.♞d7 ♞e3+ 26.♞h1 ♘f2+ 27.♞xf2 ♞xf2 28.♞d8+ ♞h7 29.♞xb8 ♞e2 30.♞c1 ♞xe7,



when, despite White's extra rook, Black has decent drawing chances.


Game 4, Botvinnik-Euwe, round 2: In the note after White's 20th move,




Euwe dismisses as inadequate what were actually his two best moves. (1) After 20...exf3 21.♘b1 Black is fine as long as he avoids the note move 21...h6?? in favor of 21...♞e8!, both defending his queen (so that if 22.♘h7+ ♘h7 is possible), and giving the king a flight square in the event of 22.♘xf6 ♞xf6 23.♞xh7+ ♞f8 24.♞xf3 ♞h6, with an even game. Botvinnik also overlooks 21...♞e8!. (2) Also playable is 20...♘e6, if after 21.fxe4 ♘a2 22.♞xf6 Black avoids the given move 22...gxf6?? in favor of, say, 22...b5, 22...♞fd8, or 22...♞fe8, any of which ensure equality.

Golombek examines both these variations and wrongly concludes White has a forced mate in each, overlooking Black's best moves in favor of unforced blunders. Knoch, on the other hand, assesses both moves correctly, and proposes still another playable variation in line (1), 20...exf3 21.♞g3 ♘e6 22.♞xf3 ♘e8 23.♘b1=.

The note line at Black's 22nd move, 22...♘g4 23.♞f4 ♘h5 24.g4 ♘g6 25.h4 h5 26.♞h2 ♞h7,




does not defend as well as Euwe believed, if instead of 27.♞g1 White plays 27.♞ef1! (also overlooked by Botvinnik), when a likely continuation is 27...f6 (if 27...h×g4 28.♘xf7 ♞h6 29.♞g3 ♘h7 30.♞xg4+-) 28.g5 b5 29.gxf6 gxf6 30.♞xf6 ♞xf6 31.♞xf6 b4 32.♘d4 (not 32.a×b4? a×b4 33.♘×b4 ♞×a2) 32...b×a3 33.b×a3,




and White is winning (about +1.75).

(6) **Reshevsky-Keres, round 3:** The note at move 22 is correct that Black need not fear 23.♘d5, but gives an incorrect refutation. After 23...♘xd5 24.exd5,




Euwe's 24...♞xd5?! actually leads to some advantage for White, viz. 25.h3 ♘f6 26.♞b3 ♞c5 27.♘e3 e4 28.♘xc5 bxc5 29.♘d2 (about +0.60). Much stronger is 24...e4!:




It's mate if the attacked knight moves, so White is forced into 25.g3 ♖c5! (the immediate 25...exf3 is also good) 26.♙e1 (or 26.♞f1) 26...exf3 27.♙xf3 ♗e5, and Black is up a piece.

Game 7, Botvinnik-Reshevsky, round 4: The note at Black's 28th move is correct to fault the text 28...♙c5, but its claim that 28...♗g5 "would have won quickly and convincingly" is questionable. After 29.♞xe6 ♗xf3+ 30.♖g2 ♗xd4 31.♞xd4 ♗g4, as in the note,




White replies simply 32.hxg4 and while Rybka sees some advantage for Black (about -1.12), there is no quick or convincing win on the horizon.

No mention is made of the fact that White's 31st move was far from best and could have endangered his win.




The text move 31.♞h2?! could have been met by 31...♗h5! (instead of 31...♞cc6?), and White's advantage would have been small (about +0.73). Instead there was the decisive 31.♗f4!, when about the best Black can do is 31...♗g4+ 32.♖h1 ♙xa3 33.♗d5+ ♖h8 34.♙g1 ♗xg1+ 35.♖xg1 ♙xc1,




and White is up queen for rook.

Game 8, Euwe-Smyslov, round 4: An extremely difficult game, perhaps the most tactically complex of the whole tournament, and so it is not surprising to find analytical errors, especially in the variations stemming from the knight sacrifices at moves 33 and 34. But first, in the note to Black's 26th move, after 26...♙xd5 27.exd5 ♗xd5 28.♙e4 ♗ce7 29.♙xd5 ♗xd5 30.♗xe5 (variation 2b),




White is said to stand better due to "various threats, for example 31.♗c6 or 31.♙xh6+." But after 30...♙c7! Rybka finds the position even, with neither of the putative threats amounting to anything, viz. 31.♗c6 ♗b7=, or 31.♙xh6+ ♖xh6 32.♗xf7+ ♖g7 33.♗g5 ♙d6=.


At White's 33rd move, the alternative variation 33.♗g4 is stronger than Euwe believed,



at least in the line given. After 33...♗f6 34.♗g3 ♗xe4 (better probably 34...♗c6 or ♖g8, though White then still has a good advantage) 35.♗e3! f5,




not only is the note line 36.♗exg6 good enough to win (e.g. 36...♙f7 37.♗e6! ♙xg6 38.♗f8+ ♖g8 39.♗xh6+-), but White can also win decisively with the other knight: 36.♗fxg6! ♙g5 (if instead 36...♙f7?? as after 36.♗exg6, then 37.♗f8+ ♖g8 [or 37...♖g7 38.♗ed7+] 38.♗xh6+-) 37.♗f3 ♗d6 38.♗h5 ♙f7 39.h4 ♙f4 (or 39...♙f6 40.♗g4 ♗xf4 41.♙xf6+-) 40.♙xf5 ♗xf5 41.♗xf5,




and Black is crushed (at least +13.67). Golombek also examines this line, but makes it too easy for White with 35...♖d6?? 36.♕exg6 ♟xg6 37.♖e5+-.

However, this does not mean that 33.♖g4 wins for White. In this position,




Rybka indicates that Black has an adequate defense in 33...h5. White then seems unable to gain more than dynamic equality, viz. 34.♖g3 h4 35.♖f3= (or 35.♖g4 ♖h6 36.♖f3=), or 34.♕xh5!? ♖c6 (of course not 34...g×h5?? 35.♖xh5+ ♖g7 36.♕xc4+ etc.) 35.♕xc6 ♖xc6 36.e5 ♖a6 (intending ...♖a1 at an opportune moment) 37.♕f4 ♖h6 (if 37...♖a1?! 38.♖d1 ♖h6 39.e6 with attack) 38.♖d1=. Golombek does not consider 33...h5, while Kmochn does not even consider 33.♖g4.

Reaching the most exciting point of the game, Rybka indicates that had White not sacrificed the second knight, he could indeed have won, but by no means “almost effortlessly” as claimed; Black had more defensive resources than Euwe suspected in variation (1) of the note to White’s 34th move. After 34.♖g4 (instead of 34.♕xg6) 34...♖f7 35.e5 ♖e7 36.e6, instead of 36...♖e8? as given, correct is 36...♖g8!,




The crucial difference is that this prevents 37.♕h5, now answered by 37...♖xe6! and White’s attack is stymied, e.g. 38.♕f6+ ♖g7 39.♕d5+ ♖f7 40.♖f3+ ♕f5 (about -2.64). After 36...♖g8 Rybka gives best play as 37.h4 ♖ac6 38.h5 ♕xd4 39.h×g6+ ♖h8 40.c×d4 (if 40.♖h5? ♕df5 41.♕xf5 ♕xf5 42.♖xf5 ♕e7+-) 40...♕c7 41.♖h4 ♕xf4 42.♖xe7 ♕g5 43.♖d7




43...♖g7 (also playable is 43...♕xe6 44.g7+ ♖xg7 45.♖xe6 ♖c7 46.♖xb3 ♖c1+ 47.♖h2 ♖f4+ 48.♖g3 [if 48.♖g1 ♖c1+ etc., draw] 48...♖xd4=) and White has nothing better than perpetual check: 44.♖c8+ ♖g8 45.♖d7 ♖g7 etc., draw.

To win after 34.♖g4 ♖f7 35.e5 ♖e7, Rybka indicates White has only one option: not Euwe’s 36.e6 (also recommended by Golombek and Kmochn), but 36.h4!!,




intending to augment the pressure on g6. Black cannot adequately meet this pressure because his g-pawn is pinned, and cannot be safely unpinned (36...♖g7?? 37.e6+, or 36...♖g8 37.e6! ♖e8 38.♕xg6 etc.). The main variations, some of which are long and intricate, and require great precision, are:

- (1) Of course if 36...h5?? 37.♖xh5+-.
- (2) 36...♖g8 – The saving move after 36.e6, but it does not work here. – 37.h5 ♖f7 38.♖d7! (strongest, though 38.h×g6+ or 38.♕xg6 also win) 38...♖ac6 39.h×g6+ and the avalanche crashes down.
- (3) 36...♖g8 37.e6 ♕xe6 – The lesser evil; if 37...♖e8? 38.♕xg6 ♕xg6 39.♕xg6 ♖xe6 40.♕f5+ – 38.♕xe6 ♖ac6 39.h5 g5 40.f4 ♕xd4 41.c×d4 (not 41.♕xd8?? ♖xf4 42.♖xf4 ♖e2+ and Black wins) 41...♕b6 42.f×g5 and again an avalanche;
- (4) 36...♖e8 37.e6! ♖ac6 38.♕xg6 ♕xg6 39.h5 ♖ce7 40.♖f4 ♕b6 (forced, else 41.♖f6+- in most variations) 41.♕xb6 ♕xe6 42.h×g6+ ♕xg6 43..♕d4:




Material is technically equal, but White’s more active pieces and the vulnerability of Black’s king are decisive now. Relatively best for Black is 43...♖f7 (if instead, say, 43...♖g8 44.♖f6 ♖f7 45.♖e7 and Black is practically in *Zugzwang*) 44.♖b8 – One of several paths White can take, and for our illustrative purposes probably the clearest. White

threatens 45.♖h8#, therefore Black cannot defend the b5-pawn. – 44...♗g8 45.♗xb5 ♕f7 46.♗e5 ♕c4 47.♗f6 ♕f7:



With all Black's pieces tied down to defensive tasks, White need merely push the c-pawn. 48.c4 b2 (48...♕xc4?? 49.♕xg6+ ♗xg6 50.♗h8#) 49.c5 ♕e8 50.c6 ♕f7 51.c7 and wins.


(5) 36...♖ac6 – Probably the most stubborn resistance. – 37.h5 (not 37.e6? ♗g8=) and:



(5) 37...♗g8? 38.e6 ♗e8 39.♕xg6 ♕xd4 40.♕xe7+ ♗f8 41.♕g6+ ♗g7 42.♕f4+ ♕g5 43.cxd4+-;

(5b) 37...♗g8?? 38.♕xg6 ♕xd4 39.♕xg6+ ♗h8 40.e6+ ♗g7 41.♕xg7+;


(5c) 37...♗e8 38.♕xg6 ♕xd4 39.cxd4, reaching a position where though White is still down in material, his pieces are much more active and threatening, and his pawn preponderance is telling:



However, against best defense the win is still a lot of work. There are now two main branches, 39...♕c6 and the longer and more complex 39...♕g8:

(5c1) 39...♕c6 40.d5 ♕xd5 (if 40...♕b4 41.♕f8+ ♗h8 42.♗f5+-) 41.♕e7+ (not 41.♕f8+? ♗h8 42.♗f5? ♗f7+-) 41...♗h8 42.♕xd5+- ♗xe5 43.♗g6 ♗g7 44.♗e8+ ♗g8 45.♗xc6+-;

(5c2) 39...♕g8 40.d5 ♗g7 41.♕f4+ ♕g5 (only playable move) 42.♕e6+ ♗h8 43.♗e4 (threatening mate) 43...♗e7 44.♕f8,



and now with his options severely limited (e.g. 44...♗xf8?? 45.♗h7#), Black is down to two moves with any practical chance:


(5c2a) 44...♕xd5 45.♕g6+ ♗g7 46.♗xd5 ♗a3 47.♗f3 ♗c1+ 48.♗h2 ♗c5 – The best fighting chance; if 48...♗xb1?? 49.♗f8+ ♗h7 50.♗f7#; or 48...♗c8 simply 49.♗xb3. – 49.♗f5 (not 49.♗xb3? ♗xf2 and White's advantage is greatly reduced) 49...b4 50.f4 ♕d8 51.♗d7+ ♕e7 52.f5 b2 53.♗e6 b3 (else 54.♕a2 is crushing) 54.♕xe7 ♕xe7 55.f6+ and wins.

(5c2b) 44...♗g7 45.d6 ♗f7 46.♕d7 ♗h8 (46...♗xd7?? 47.♗h7+) 47.e6 ♕xe6 48.♕e5 ♗f5 49.♗xf5 ♕xf5 50.♕xf5 b2 51.d7 ♗g7 52.♕c6 and White eventually wins the endgame.

So the correctness of the first knight sac is established, but against best defense the win was much harder than Euwe (or any


other annotator we have seen) believed.

After the second knight sac, 34.♕xg6, the note to Black's 34th move says that the alternative 34...♗f7 (instead of 34...♗xg6) would lose to 35.♗d1!! (Euwe's punctuation),



giving 35...♗xg6 36.e5+- . However, 35...♕e6! holds, e.g. 36.e5 ♗g7 37.♗d3 ♕c6=, or 36.♕e5 ♗c7 37.♗h5 ♕f6 38.♗g6+ ♗h8=.

Finally, the note to White's 35th move is overly pessimistic. After giving the very accurate analytical sequence 35.♗f3 ♕e6! 36.♗f8! ♗h7 37.♗xd8 ♕c6 38.♕f6 (threatening 39.e5+ and mate next) 38...♕f5!! (the only saving move for Black),




Euwe concludes "White will be unable to make progress," but overlooks that Black cannot either, e.g. 39.♗d5 ♕g6 (or 39...♕xf6 40.♗xf5+ ♗g7 41.e5) 40.♕d4 and the position is virtually even (-0.28). Golombek thought White would lose but failed to examine 38.♕f6, while Kmoch thought 35.♗f3 would still likely win for

White, though he gave no supporting analysis.


A legendary game, one both very difficult and quite fascinating to analyze. In conclusion, two long-standing verdicts are at least partially overturned: (1) the first knight sac does win, but with much greater difficulty than believed, and (2) the second knight sac, though neither necessary nor winning, need not have lost the game.

Game 9, Reshevsky-Euwe: The note at Black's 35th move says that after 35...♖f8 36.♗xh5 ♕d7 or 36...♗d6 "Black would have retained good drawing chances." This is true for the former move, but in the latter case,




White need merely play the simple 37.♗xb5 to be winning (if 37...♗d1+ 38.♖h2 ♗xb1 39.♗xb7). One wonders if this was a typo and, say, 36...♗e6 was meant, though we note that Golombek also gave 36...♗d6 with the same assessment as Euwe.

Game 10, Keres-Botvinnik, round 5: The note at move 45 is incorrect to claim that White could force a draw after 45...♗xa6 46.♖a2+ ♖b6 47.♖b2+.




Rather than the note's 47...♗a7? which does allow the draw by 48.♖xb7+, Black can simply play 47...♗a5!, and despite appearances his king is in no danger, viz. 48.♖a2+ ♖b4 49.♖b2+ ♖c3 50.♗e2 ♗f3+, or 48.♗d1 ♗f3+, or 48.♗g2 ♗a6 49.♖a2+ ♖b6 50.♖b2+ ♖c6 etc., winning in all cases. Botvinnik annotated the game but did not mention this particular variation, nor did Golombek or Horowitz.

Game 11, Keres-Euwe, round 6: The note at Black's 29th move considers 29...♗xc3 "too risky," but it was actually the best move by far. The analysis goes astray in variation (2), after 29...♗xc3 30.dxe5 ♖xe4 31.e6:




Rather than the two weak alternatives given, 31...♖f8 and 31...♖f6, Black wins with 31...♖xg3+! 32.hxg3 ♖f6 (threatening 33...♖h6+ 34.♗g1 ♗e3+ 35.♗f1 ♖f6+ etc.) 33.♗d8+ ♖f8,




and either (1) 34.♖d1 ♗e1+! 35.♖h2 ♗xe6 36.♗xc7 and Black is up two connected passed pawns, or (2) 34.e7 ♗xa1+ 35.♖h2 ♗f6 36.exf8 ♗+ ♗xf8, with the same material plus for Black, or (3) 34.♗d1 ♗c6 35.e7 ♗h6+ 36.♗g1 ♗e3+ 37.♖h2 ♗xe7 38.♖xa6 ♗c5, and Black is yet again up two connected passed pawns. Golombek makes the same mistake, considering only 31...♖f8 and missing 31...♖xg3+.

By an odd coincidence, variation (1a) of that same note also misevaluates the ♖e4xg3 capture, but in a different way. After 29...♗xc3 30.dxe5 ♖d7 31.♗f1 ♖xe4 32.e6 ♖e7 33.♖xa6,




the note continuation 33...♖xg3+?? is disastrous for Black (about +4.66). Instead 33...g5!, giving the king *Luft*, maintains approximate equality (about -0.36). Again, Golombek makes the same mistake, considering only 33...♖xg3+. Of course, in view of the advantage Black gains in line (2), variation (1) becomes moot.

Game 13, Smyslov-Keres, round 7: One of the lines in the note to White's 44th move can be greatly improved. After 44.h3 ♖xf2 45.♗xf2,




rather than 45...♖f7+ 46.♔g1 bxc4 (only about -1.10), best is 45...♗f7+ 46.♔g1 bxc4 (about -3.22). The difference is that in the latter line White's queen is kept on its back ranks, whereas in the former it becomes active with 47.♗b6 and wins either the a- or e-pawn.

The notes after Black's 46th move begin with a hypothetical line to illustrate Black's impending threats. Giving Black an extra move, it proceeds 47...♕h2+ 48.♔g1 ♕f3+ 49.♔f1,




but then gives the relatively weak 49...♕xd4?! (only about -0.93). Instead, decisive would 49...♕h4!, when White has only a choice of deaths, e.g. 50.♔e1 ♕xg2+ 51.♔d1 ♖xf2 52.♖xf2 ♕e3+ 53.♔e2 ♗xf2+ 54.♔xf2 ♕d1+ 55.♔f3 ♕xb2 56.♖xb2 b4, or 50.♕h1 ♖df8 51.♗a2 (there is nothing better) 51...♗h3+ 52.♔e1 (if 52.♔g1 ♖f4 and ...♖g4+) 52...♗xh1+ 53.♔d2 ♖xf2 etc. It is interesting that Euwe saw the effectiveness of the ♕h2-f3-h4 maneuver in another note variation, but not here. Golombek, in contrast, did this time.

Game 14, Euwe-Botvinnik, round 7: The note at move 28 goes badly wrong four times in one sub-variation. After 28.♕f4+ ♔b6,




White must not play 29.♖b4+??, since rather than 29...♔xa5?? as given, Black has 29...♕b5! winning at least the exchange. (Golombek missed this also.) Furthermore, after 29.♖b4 ♔xa5,




the note move 30.♖b7, which supposedly forces mate, does nothing of the sort, losing to 30...♖e1+ 31.♔d2 ♖e2+ and 32...♕xc5 (about -9.00). White *can* mate, but only by 30.a3 or 30.c3, protecting the rook, when Black cannot stop all three of the threats – ♕c7#, ♕b3#, and ♕b7# – and has only a few spite checks to delay mate. (Golombek got this one right.)

The best move after 28.♕f4+ ♔b6 goes completely unmentioned, to wit, 29.♕d7+!:




If then 29...♔xa5?? 30.♕c7+ ♔b5 31.a4#, ergo 29...♔b7 (if 29...♔a7 30.♕e3 forces the king to b7 anyway) 30.♕xf8 ♖xf8 31.♖b4+ ♕b5 (if 31...♔c8? 32.♖c5 ♔d7 33.♖b7+ etc., winning),




and either 32.a4 ♔b6 33.♕d2 c5 34.♖g4 ♕c6 35.♖xg7, or 32.♕e3 ♖fe8 33.a4 ♖xe3 34.a5 ♖e7 35.bxa6+ ♔a7, with definite if not great advantage for White in either case.

Game 15, Botvinnik-Smyslov, round 8: The note at Black's 32nd move can be improved some. After 32...♖xd4 33.♕xd4 ♕xd4 34.♕d6 ♔d7,




the given move 35.♗f2?! costs White a pawn needlessly, viz. 35...♕xc2 36.♕xc8 ♕xa3. Better 35.♗d1 ♕xc2 36.♕xc8,




and either 36...♖xc8 37.♖xc2, or 36...♖xd1 37.♖xd1 ♜xa3 38.♖d8+ ♜f8 39.♜xa7 ♜xc4 40.♜xc6, with White only one pawn down for the exchange, instead of two as in the note line. Botvinnik likewise failed to consider 35.♖d1.

The note at move 74 says that with 74.fxe5 “White would still have won,” but this seems doubtful.




Euwe considers only 74...♖xe5 and 74...♜xe5 in reply, but there is another possibility, 74...♖f4+!?, when a plausible continuation is 75.♖h3 ♖f3 76.♖d7+ ♖h6 77.e6 ♖e3 78.e7 ♜d6+ 79.♖xh4 ♜xe7,




and it's unlikely White can win. Botvinnik says 74.fxe5 would have retained “some minimal winning chances,” but then seems to endorse Keres' opinion that 74...♖xf4 would draw, which is also Golombek's opinion.

Game 17, Reshevsky-Botvinnik, round 9: Important possibilities were overlooked here, in both the game and the notes. In the note to White's 18th move, variation (2), after 18.♖xd6 ♖ad8 19.♖b4,




the note line 19...♜d4+ is OK, but best by far is 19...♖d1!, viz. 20.♖xd1 ♖xe4 21.♖d6 (other moves are no better) 21...♜d4+ 22.♖xd4 ♖xd4+ 23.♖g2 ♖e8, and White is doomed. (Golombek and Horowitz also missed this.)

In the note to Black's 23rd move, variation (2a) can be greatly improved for White. After 23...♜f5 24.♜e5 ♜xe5 25.♜xf5 ♖d6 26.♜xh7+ ♖h8,




not 27.♖c2?? as in the note, but 27.♖xe5! ♖xe5 28.♖xd6 ♖e2 29.♖d8+ ♖xh7 30.♖h4 ♖xh4 31.gxh4 with equality.


No comment is made on the text move 25...♖h5-c5, but it was actually a mistake that could have cost Black the game. Correct instead was 25...♖d8-d7!,




which allows Black to force a draw, viz. 26.♖c8+ ♖d8 27.♖c7 (27.♖xb7?! ♜d4) 27...♖d7 etc. This is important, because after 25...♖c5? 26.♖be1 Black compounded his error with 26...♖f8?,



(better 26...♖c8 27.♖xb7 ♜d4 28.♖b3±). Had Reshevsky not been in his usual *Zeitnot* he might then have improved on his actual move 27.♖xb7, and found the decisive 27.♜d5+!!:




Obviously if 27...cxd5?? 28.♖xc5, therefore forced is 27...♖h8, when follows 28.♖g2 (unpinning the rook and threatening 29.♖e8+-),




and then the best Black has is either 28...♜h5 29.♜f3 ♜xf3+ 30.♖xf3 ♖xc4 31.♖xb7 ♖xa2 32.♖b3 ♖xb3 (32...♖xb2?? 33.♖f7!) 33.♖xb3, or 28...♜d8 29.♖b8 ♜h5 30.♖e5 ♜a5 31.♖xh5 ♜xe1 32.♖xe1 cxd5

33.♖e8 h6 34.♖xf8+ ♖xf8
35.cxd5 with an easily won
ending for White in either case.
All of this escaped Golombek
and Horowitz as well.

In the note to White's 28th
move, line (3), the sub-variation
28.♖b3 ♖d8 29.♗g2 ♗xe3+
30.♖xe3? ♖d1+ 31.♗f1 ♗h3,




it is claimed that 32.♖b8+
forces mate for White. This is
not so; after 32...♗f7 33.♖e8+
♗f6 34.♖e5+ ♗g6 35.f5+ ♗h6
36.♖f4+ g5 37.fxg6+ ♗xg6
38.♖e4+ ♗g7




White is out of checks and
Black wins, viz. 39.♗f2 ♖xf1+
40.♗e2 ♖f7+. Rather than
32.♖b8+?, correct is (from
previous diagram) 32.♖xd1
♖xe3+ 33.♗h1 ♖e4+ 34.♗g1
♖e3+ etc., draw.

The note at Black's 28th move
claims that after 28...♖a5
29.♗f3 ♖d2+ 30.♖1e2 ♗xe3+
31.♗g2 "White retains his
advantage."




In fact Black has a forced win:
31...♗xf3+ 32.♗xf3 ♖d3
33.♖xe3 ♖f1+ 34.♗g4 (if
34.♗e4?? ♖e8+ 35.♗d4 ♖f2
36.♖b3 c5+ -+) 34...h5+
35.♗h4 (if 35.♗xh5?? ♖h3+
36.♗g5 ♖f5+ 37.♗g6 ♖g4#)
35...♖f2,



and 36.♖xc6 ♖xe3 is about the
best White can do, since trying
to save the rook allows mate:
36.♖e4 (or 36.♖a3 ♖xf4+ etc.)
36...♖xh2+ 37.♗g5 ♖xg3+
38.♗xh5 ♖f5#.


Golombek went so far as to say
White wins in this line, but his
justification proves rather
flawed. After 31.♗g2 he went
beyond Euwe's analysis with the
further moves 31.♗g2 ♗xf3+
32.♗xf3,




and now, instead of 32...♖d3, he
gave the incomprehensible
32...♖e8?? (which of course
allows 33.♖xd2),
incomprehensibly followed by
33.♖b3. A typesetter's error
seems the only plausible
explanation for such an obvious
gaffe.

Game 18, Smyslov-Euwe,
round 9: Unmentioned at
Black's 55th move is an

improvement that might have
salvaged a draw.




The text move, 55...♖c4, is a
clear loser (about +1.81). Any
remaining hope lay in the
surprising 55...♖a4!?, sacrificing
the bishop for counterplay. More
or less forced then is 56.bxc5
♖xc5 57.♗f3 ♖xe6 58.dxe6 d5!
59.exd5 ♗xd5+ 60.♗e3 ♗xa2,



when Black is still worse, but
not nearly so bad as in the game
continuation. Like Euwe, neither
Smyslov, Golombek nor Kmochn
mention 55...♖a4 either.


The final note, after White's
70th move, rather understates
the case when it says 70...♗c6
costs a piece.




White then actually has a choice
of forced mates by advancing
either of his passed pawns, viz.
71.e7+ ♖g8 72.♗f6 ♖h8

73.♖h6 ♔e8 74.g7+ ♖h7
75.g8♖+ ♖xh6 76.♗h8#, or
71.g7+ ♖g8 72.♖f6 ♔e4
73.♕e7+ ♖h7 74.g8♖+ ♖h6
75.♗g5+ ♖h7 76.♗h5#.

Game 19, Euwe-Reshevsky, round 10: A surprisingly high number of problems in this game. In the note to Black's 11th move, after 11...♕b4 12.♖b3 ♖f5 13.♗d2 ♕d3+ 14.♖f1,




Euwe says "Black does not have a good defense against 15.♖c2." Yet this move does not seem to pose any threat. Even if White could play it immediately, Black would simply reply 15...♕b4!. And in the variation given, 14...c5 15.dxc5 ♖c8 16.♖c2 ♕xc5 17.♖xf5 ♕xf5 18.♕c3,




any advantage seems to be Black's after 18...♕e4!, when if 19.♗xd5 ♕xe3+ 20.fxe3 ♕g3+ 21.♖g1 ♕xh1 (at least -1.25); or 19.♗d3 ♕xe3+ 20.♗xe3 ♔c5 21.♕d4 0-0 (-1.04); or 19.♕xe4 dxe4 20.♕d4 ♕xe3+ 21.fxe3 (-1.06).

In the note at Black's 36th move, variation (2) can be improved at several points. It

branches after 36...♖xg4 37.fxg4 ♕e7 38.♕f6 into two lines.




In line (2a), after 38...gxf6 39.♗xh6+ ♖g8 40.dxe6 ♗d1+ 41.♖g2 ♗d5+ 42.♖g1 ♗xe5,



while the given move 43.exf7+ is advantageous for White, strongest is 43.g5!, and if 43...fxg5 44.♖g3 etc., or 43...f5 44.exf7+ ♖xf7 45.♖e3 ♗f4 46.♗e6 ♖g7 47.♖g3+- (+6.26); or 43...♕f5 44.♗xf6 ♗xf6 45.gxf6 fxe6 46.♖xc6+-.


Line (2b) continues (from previous diagram) with 38...♗d8,



and now Rybka does not see Euwe's 39.♖d3 as granting White any advantage at all. Instead, 39.♗d3!, threatening mate, is practically decisive, viz. 39...gxf6 40.dxe6 ♗xd3+ 41.♖xd3 fxe6 (41...fxe5?

42.♖d7+-) 42.♖d6 fxe5 43.♖xe6 ♕g8 44.♖xc6+-.

The note at White's 44th move is correct that 44.♖e2? was a mistake, and 44.♕f6! the best move, but the analysis goes awry in some of the complications. First off, in variation (2), after 44.♕f6 ♕f4 45.♕e4 ♕h3! 46.♖xh1 ♗xh1+ 47.♖e2 ♖b8, it is said that 48.♖c3




"will not yield anything in view of 48...♖h7 49.e6 ♖b1!." Except for being correct about the inutility of 48.♖c3, this is wrong on every point:

(1) Rather than 48...♖h7?!, Black should force perpetual check by 48...♗h2+ 49.♖f1 (if 49.♖d3?? ♕f4+ forces 50.♗xf4, since if 50.♖c4 ♗a2+ etc.) 49...♗h1+ 50.♖e2 etc.

(2) The refutation of 48...♖h7 is not 49.e6, but 49.♖d3! ♖b1 (if 49...♖b7 50.♖d8+-) 50.♖d7 ♗f1+ 51.♖e3 ♗c1+ 52.♖d4 ♗d1+ 53.♖c5+-.


(3) After 49.e6 Black should not play 49...♖b1?!, the only move with even a shred of hope is 49...♗h2+, though then White escapes perpetual check with 50.♖d3, because now 50...♕f4+ doesn't work like before: 51.♗xf4 ♗xf4 52.♕f6+! and White wins back the queen.

(4) After 49.e6 ♖b1 does not deserve an exclamation,




because White has a forced mate: 50.f6+ g7 51.d7+ g7 52.f8+ g8 53.exf7+ gxf8 (if 53...gxf7 54.gxg6+ etc.) 54.c8+ gxf7 55.e8#.

In the main line of variation (2), 44.f6 f4 45.e4 h3! 46.h1 h1+ 47.e2 b8 48.g3, in branch (2a), after 48...b1,




the recommended 49.d2! gives White only a paltry advantage (about +1.00). Decisive instead is 49.e6!, when about the best Black can do is 49...f4+ 50.d2 ex6 51.c2 xe1 (else 52.c3+ 52.h1 xf3 53.f3 d4+ 54.d3 xf3, and White's extra rook decides).

Most importantly, going back toward the start of the note variation, Black's best reply after 44.f6 f4 45.e4 may have been overlooked. Euwe considers only 45...xg1 and 45...h3, but Rybka recommends 45...b8:




If then 46.e6 h3! forces White to take perpetual check with 47.h1 h1+ 48.e2 h2+ etc. Draws are similarly forced after 46.g3 or 46.d2. White's only winning chance is 46.f2 xg1+ 47.xg1 hx4,



but his superiority then is not great (about +1.00) and any path to victory will be tricky and difficult. Golombek reaches the above position and opines that White wins, but his supporting analysis includes a grossly inferior move by Black, continuing with 48.h1 g5?? (correct is 48...h1+ 49.h1 b1±) 49.e4+-.


Game 20, Botvinnik-Keres, round 10: The note at move 15 claims White will have "some slight advantage" in the variation 15...c8 16.xd4 a4 17.a1 c5 18.e5,



but it is hard to agree after the forced continuation 18...b3 19.xd6 xc1 20.xc1 d5 21.xd8 exd8, when Black has won the exchange for a pawn. Botvinnik in contrast recommends 15...c8, but does not analyze the variation past move 17. Golombek varies with


18.e3, which avoids the knight fork and is certainly preferable to 18.e5.

Game 21, Euwe-Keres, round 11: In the note to White's 11th move, line (2) has several problems. In variation (2a), after 11.h5+! d7? 12.f7 e8,



the given continuation 13.e5+?! gives White only a one-pawn advantage. Obviously better is 13.f5+ e7 14.xh8, and White will be up at least a rook.


Variation (2b) goes astray after 11...g6 12.f3 f6 13.xe3+ de7 14.e6.




Rather than 14...xe6+ 15.xe6 h6 16.xg7+ etc., Black can do better with 14...f5! 15.f6 gxf6 16.f3 g8 and 17...0-0-0, with compensation for the pawn. Keres does not examine this line past 14.e6 but seems to agree with Rybka, saying "these variations are not too convincing since Black always obtains a dangerous initiative in return for his pawn."

And the concluding punctuation of variation (2c), 11...g6 12.f3

♖f6 13.♗xe3+ ♕ge7 14.♕f3?
♗e4 15.0-0 0-0 16.♕e5 g5!,




would seem to indicate it is good for Black, but the last move is actually a mistake, which White can exploit by the forced continuation 17.♕d2! gxf4 (or 17...♗f5 18.fxg5 ♖e6 19.♕df3 and White stands much better) 18.♕xe4 dxe4 19.♗xe4 ♕xe5 20.♗xf4 ♖g7 21.dxe5 ♗xe5 22.♗xf8+ ♗xf8 23.♗xe5 ♗xe5 24.♗h6,




and with an extra pawn and the bishop pair, White has all the winning chances.

Rybka considers 11...g6 as best against 11.♗h5+,




giving best play then as 12.♗f3 ♗e7 13.♗xe3 ♗xe3+ 14.♗xe3 ♕f6 15.0-0 0-0=.

The next note, at White's 12th move, is perhaps correct to dislike the variation 12.♗xd5,




but gives invalid reasons. Probably best for Black now is the unmentioned 12...♕ge7 13.♗f3 ♗g6. The note instead gives 12...♗xf4 13.♕f3?,



a poor move refuted best not by the note's 13...♕ge7, but by 13...b5!, when White has only a choice between losing material immediately by 14.♗xb5 axb5, or slightly later by 14.♗d1 ♕ge7 15.♗b3 ♕a5 16.♗a3 ♕c4 17.♗b3 ♗g6 18.0-0 (not 18.♕a3?? ♗xg2 and mate shortly) 18...♗xb1.


Rather than 13.♕f3?, best for White here is the intriguing 13.♗f1!?:



If then (1) 13...♕ge7?! 14.♗f7! ♗xf7 15.♕xf7 ♖xf7 16.♗xf4±;


or (2) 13...♗xg5 14.♗xc6+ bxc6 15.♗xc6+ ♖e7 16.♗c5+ ♖f6 17.♗c6+ ♖e7 18.♗c5+ etc. forcing a draw; or (3) 13...♗d3 14.♗f3 ♕ge7 15.♗f7+ ♗xf7 16.♕xf7 ♗f8 17.♗xf4 ♕d5 18.♗f3 ♗xf7 19.♗xf7 ♖xf7 20.♗b3 ♗e4 21.♗xe3 ♗xg2, with an even game. Of this whole line, Keres merely opines that 12.♗xd5 ♗xf4 is "too dangerous" for White.

In its original form, the note at White's 15th move gave as one of its variations 15.♕f3 ♗e4 16.♕e5 ♗xe5,



and now continued 17.fxe5 ♗g6. In view of the fact that 17.fxe5?? is actually best met by 17...♗xf1#, we considered it a typo, and changed the move to 17.dxe5, in which case 17...♗g6 makes sense. Amazingly, Golombek falls into the same obvious mistake; only Knoch gets it right.


The note at move 18 claims that 18... h6 19.♕gf3 ♗xf4 20.gxf4 ♕xf4 would win for Black, but this is not at all true.



White has two ways to stay alive: (1) 21.♖h1 ♕h3 22.♗g2 ♗xe1+ 23.♕xe1 ♗f5 24.♕df3

♙e4 25.♙xh6 ♙xf3 26.♙xf3 ♙xf3 27.♙xf3 ♙xf3 28.♙g2 ♙d3 29.♙c1 and Black has only a small edge; (2) 21.♙xe8 ♙h3+ 22.♙g2 ♙xf2 23.♙xf8+ ♙xf8 24.♙xf2, and with two knights and a rook for the queen, White should draw.

What may be Black's best at move 18 goes unmentioned by Euwe, Keres, Golombek and Kmochno: 18...♙xf4!.




If then 19.gxf4? ♙xf4 20.♙df3 (not 20.♙xf4?? ♙xe1+) 20...♙g4+ 21.♙h1 ♙xe1+ 22.♙xe1 ♙xf3-+. Therefore 19.♙xe8 ♙xe8 and:

(1) 20.♙de4 ♙e2+ 21.♙xe2 dxe4 22.♙d1 ♙f5 with much the better game for Black (about -1.50);

(2) 20.gxf4 ♙e2 and:

(2a) 21.♙g3 ♙xf4 22.♙de4 ♙xe4 23.♙xe4 ♙xe4 24.♙xf4 ♙xf4, with much the better endgame for Black;

(2b) 21.♙h4 ♙xf4 22.♙df3 ♙xg5 and:




(2b1) 23.♙xg5? ♙g2+! 24.♙g2 ♙f1+ 25.♙g3 ♙e1+ 26.♙h3 ♙f1+ 27.♙g4 h5+ 28.♙xh5 ♙e2+ 29.♙f3 ♙xf3+


30.♙xf3 ♙d1+ winning the queen.

(2b2) 23.♙xg5 ♙xf3 24.♙d8+ ♙f7 25.♙xc7+ ♙g6 26.♙g3+ (necessary or mate soon) 26...♙xg3+ 27.hxg3.

Critical for the assessment of the 18...♙xf4 line are the endgames reached in line (2a):



and (2b2):




Both are clearly better for Black, but are they winning? Consulting Dr. Dowd, we got this reply:

"I'd hate to be the weaker side of either position. In the first I think Black wins because he can keep harassing the white king and pulling away pawns. The attack with batteries of rook and bishop don't mate but they encourage weaknesses. And those can be exploited. In the second certainly an endgame technician like Maróczy would have great chances once the rooks are forced off. But the pawns are not that great. In any case, White can't do more than squeak out a draw and I just don't see it as easy at all under tournament conditions. With adjournments, you have a


chance but only if you have the better analysis team. I would say White is 'winning' although certainly GM quality technique is needed in either case. You or I could certainly blow either side. Karpov would win both of those against ordinary GMs every day."

The note at White's 20th move says 20.♙e6+ ♙xe6 21.♙xe6 ♙e3+ 22.♙h1 ♙f1+! 23.♙g2 ♙f2+ wins a piece, but this is an understatement.



Forced then is 24.♙h1 ♙xd2 25.♙c5 (25.♙xd2?? ♙e4#) 25...♙d1+ 26.♙g2 ♙e4+ 27.♙xe4 dxe4 28.♙xe3 ♙xa1, and Black is up a whole rook.


White's best try at move 20 goes unmentioned.




There is no panacea, but 20.♙h3!? ♙d6 21.♙f2 ♙f5 gives White material equality and some hope. It is this possibility that caused Rybka to prefer 18...♙xf4 over 18...♙xe1.

Game 24, Botvinnik-Euwe, round 12: In the note to Black's 14th move, the line 14...♙b7 15.♙e1 0-0 16.♙f4 ♙fd8 17.♙e5 ♙xe5 18.♙xe5 f6

19.♖h5 fxe5 20.♗xh7+ ♕f8
21.h4 is seen as good for White.




This may not be as fearsome as Euwe thinks; perhaps quite the opposite. Rybka rates the position at about -1.75, a sample continuation being 21...♙d5 22.h5 ♖b7 23.h6 ♙f6 24.♗g6 ♕e7 25.h7 ♖xa2 26.♖xa2 ♙xa2 27.g4 ♙d5 28.g5 ♙h8 29.♗h6 e4 30.♙f1 (30.g6? exd3 31.g7 ♕f7!-+) 30...♗c7,



and Black is clearly winning.


The note at Black's 16th move cites analysis by P. Schmidt (probably the Estonian-American IM Paul F. Schmidt, 1916-1984), including the variation 16...♙d5 17.♙e5 ♙xe5 18.♙xe5 ♖g8 19.g3 ♖g7 20.♗h5,




and now 20...♗b7 gets an exclamation. Instead it deserves a "?" in view of the fact that it loses to 21.♙xh7, when if 21...♙h1? 22.♙e4! ♙xe4 23.♗h8+ ♕e7 24.♗xg7 ♙d6 25.♙g6+ ♕d8

26.♙f4, covering the mate threat. Correct instead is 20...♙xd3 21.♙xd3 with approximate equality.

The note at move 18 states that it is too late for Black to castle, saying White would win with 19.♙g5,




giving the continuation 19...h6 20.♙h7+ ♕h8 21.♗h5! followed by several variations all good for White. However, a saving line may have been overlooked: 19...♖xe5! 20.♙xh7+ (if 20.♗h5? ♖xe1+ 21.♖xe1 h6-+, or 20.♖xe5 ♙xe5 21.♗h5 ♕g7=) 20...♕h8 21.♖xe5 ♙xe5 22.♗h5 ♕g7 23.♙b1 ♙d7,




and rather than White winning, Rybka considers it advisable for him to take a quick draw, for example by 24.♙xe6+ fxe6 25.♗h7+ etc.

Botvinnik also considers 18...0-0 unplayable, but for a different reason, giving 19.♙xg7 ♕xg7 20.♙e5 ♙xd3 21.♗xd3




21...♕h8 (if 21...f6 22.♖c7+! ♗xc7 23.♗g3+ etc.) 22.♗f3 (22.♗h3 may be even better) 22...f6 23.♗f4 intending 24.♗h6 and wins. Rybka mostly agrees, but does come up with an improvement: 21...♖g8! 22.♗f3 ♖xe5 23.♗g3+ ♕f8 24.♗xe5 ♖xg2+, when Black stands worse but has some counterplay.

The note at Black's 19th move can be improved, in the line 19...0-0. The given move 20.♖e5xd5 is good, but best by far is 20.♖g5+!,




and either 20...♕h8 21.♙xh7 ♖xg5 (21...♕xh7?? 22.♙e5 and mate next) 22.♙xg5 ♙d7 23.♗h5 ♕g7 (23...♙f6 24.♗h6+-) 24.♗g4+-, or 20...♙xg5 21.♙xg5 h6 22.♙h7+ ♕h8 23.♗xd4+ f6 24.♖xc5 hxg5 25.♙d3+-.

Game 25, Smyslov-Botvinnik, round 13: The note at White's 25th move goes wrong late in variation (2b), after 25.♙c3 ♖xf3 26.♖xf3 ♙c6 27.♙e4 ♖e8 28.♖e3 ♗e7 29.♖ae1 ♙e5:




Here the note, for reasons not at all clear, continues with 30.g4, and after 30...d4 correctly states that “White is tied hand and foot.” But 30.g4? is by no means necessary; instead White has several good alternatives, best of which is probably 30.f3e2 when Rybka sees no way for Black to make progress, rating the position dead even.

By the way, the flaw in 30.g4? is revealed by the variation 30...d4 31.f3e2 e5 32.g2 f4 – Using the square left undefended. – 33.h3 h5,




and White’s position collapses. In contrast, after 30.f3e2 the same approach does not work: 30... d4 31.g2! e5 32.h3! f5+ 33.g4 d5 – If now 33...f4 34.g5! shows the crucial difference. – 34.g3 f8 35.f5,




and White holds. Botvinnik does not examine this line at all, mentioning only 25.c3 c6 26.g2 d×g3, Euwe’s line (1c). Golombek does mention it but stops after 30.g4? d4 31.f3e2, mistakenly concluding that “White can just defend himself.”

Game 26, Reshevsky-Keres, round 13: The note at White’s 27th move says that 27.g4 h×g3 28.f×g3 h4 29.g2 gives White “good attacking chances.”




However, the first attacking chance goes to Black: 29...h5, winning the exchange because the rook on g3 is pinned. Instead of 29.g2? White should probably play 29.f2 or 29.e2.

The note at White’s 32nd move greatly understates matters when after 32.d×f5 f×f5 33.f×h4 d3 34.f×h5 d×c5! 35.d×c5 d4 it concludes that White “will just be able to defend” with 36.d×d4.




In fact White is winning handily, the best Black can do being 36...b3+ 37.f1 c×a3+ 38.c2, which Rybka rates at about +4.50. In this line, rather

than giving up his knight by 33...d3??, Black should save it by 33...h5-f6,




with about an even game.

In that same note’s other sub-variation, 36.e×d4? (instead of 36.d×d4) 36...f×e1 37.d×e1,



Black must not play 37...d4+? as given, since it is in White’s favor after 38.d×c3 f×g1 39.g4 f6 40.d2 (about +1.68). Instead Black should take the draw by 37...b3+ 38.f1 f×a3+ etc.


The note at move 45 says that White “could have retained some initiative” with 45.fg2 h3 46.f1 f7 47.fg1,




giving the further moves 47...h7 48.h2. However, Black could nip the initiative in the bud with the surprising

47...♖xd4! 48.exd4 ♖b3+ etc., forcing a draw.

The note at move 47, in variation (3), is correct that after 47.♖xc6 bxc6 48.b7 ♖e8 49.♖xf5+ ♖g7 50.♖c3 White can, in most lines, win back the rook he had sacrificed,




by means of his dual threats 51.♖d7+, and 51.b8♖ ♖xb8 52.♖e5+. However, the note seems to imply that White is winning by virtue of these threats, but this is not the case if Black plays 50...♖e2!. Then if 51.b8♖?? ♖c4+! 52.♖b2 ♖xb8+ and Black wins since the new queen is captured with check. And if 51.♖d7+ ♖e7 52.♖xe8 ♖c4+ 53.♖b2 ♖b3+




and White must accept perpetual check by 54.♖c1 ♖c4+ etc., since if 54.♖a1?? ♖d1+ 55.♖b2 ♖xd2+ 56.♖a1 ♖c3+ 57.♖b1 ♖b3+ 58.♖a1 ♖xa3+ 59.♖b1 ♖b3+ 60.♖a1 ♖xb7+.

Game 27, Botvinnik-Reshevsky, round 14: In a game where all the other annotations are basically sound, the note to one single move has a remarkable number of errors, missing some surprising and crucial resources.


The note to White's 34th move examines the variation 34.♖d2-d1, which is labeled "insufficient." However, the variations given do not prove this at all, and in fact it was White's best defense.



To begin with, it goes unmentioned here that Black should play, say, 34...♖f7, so that if 35.♖h1 ♖g6 defending the h-pawn. As will be seen, defending this pawn and keeping the h-file closed is very important in some lines. Instead, the note continues 34...♖b3 35.♖h1 ♖f7:




Now Euwe dismisses 36.♖xh5 as failing to 36...♖xd3, even giving the latter move an exclamation. This overlooks that White can play 37.♖h7+!



and Black has no good way out of perpetual check! If 37...♖g8


38.♖dh1! and 39.♖h8+ etc. with a draw. If 37...♖g6?? 38.♖dh1 and Black has to give up major material to avoid mate. Also losing is 37...♖e8 38.♖h8+ ♖d7?? ♖xd3+ etc., while if Black tries first to defend his advanced rook and then take his king queenside with, say, 37...♖f8 38.♖dh1 ♖d2+ 39.♖e1 ♖e8?, he loses his bishop to 40.♖xa7 (threatening mate) 40...♖2d7 41.♖a6; therefore he again must settle for the perpetual with, say, 39...♖2d7 40.♖h8+ etc. All this explains why Black needed to defend his h-pawn at the start of the variation.

Instead of 36.♖xh5!, the note continues 36.♖hg1 ♖b7 37.♖h1 ♖g6 38.♖hg1 h4:




This probably deserves a "?". Now 39.g4! would throw the initiative to White, viz. 39...h×g3 (forced; if, say, 39...♖f7 40.g×f5 e×f5 41.e6+ ♖×e6 42.♖×f5+ and wins, or 39...♖h7 40.g×f5 ♖c1+ 41.♖×c1 ♖xd3 42.♖d5!+-) 40.♖×g3+ ♖f7 41.♖dg1 and Black is suddenly on the defensive, perhaps even losing.

But instead, the note continues 39.♖h1 ♖h5:



Here again another surprising resource is missed: 40.♔d5!, threatening the deadly 41.♔f6+. Then if (1) 40...exd5? 41.♔xf5 ♖g7 42.g3 ♖g4 (forced; if 42...♖xg3?? 43.♖xh4+ ♜xh4 44.♖h1+ ♖h3 45.♖xh3#) 43.♜f2! – Stronger than the immediate ♔xg4. – 43...d4 44.♔xg4+ ♜xg4 45.♖xh4+ ♜f5 46.cxd4 ♔xd4 47.♖h5+ ♜g6 48.g4+-; or (2) 40... ♔xd5 41.cxd5 ♖xd5 42.♔c4 ♖d2+ (42...♖xd1? 43.♖xd1 ♖xd1 44.♜xd1 ♔a5 45.♔xe6) 43.♖xd2 ♖xd2+ 44.♜e3 ♖c2 45.♜d3 ♖d2+ 46.♜e3 ♖c2 etc., draw.; (3) Black's only other playable move is 41...♜g6, when White can either start repeating moves with 42.♔e3, or force a draw with 42.♖xh5!, 43.♖dh1, 44.♖h6+ etc., as seen in the 36.♖xh5 line above.


Also reasonable in the above position is 40.♔c2, ending Black's pressure on the d-file and leading to a probable draw. Instead, the note gives the egregious 40.♖hg1?? ♔c1+ 41.♖xc1 ♖xd3 42.♖cd1,




and now at the end it makes one last mistake, recommending 42...♔e4, which leads to only a small advantage and a difficult endgame. Instead Black has the quickly decisive 42...♖xd1 43.♔xd1 (if 43.♖xd1 ♖xd1 followed by 44...♔xg2! no matter how White recaptures on d1) 43...♖g8! and whether White tries 44.♜f1 ♖f4 or 44.♔e3 h3! his position falls apart.

Golombek's analysis of the 34.♖d2-d1 line is similarly flawed, whereas Kmoch correctly says "After 34.♖d2-d1, the last part of the battle would only just begin," though he gives no supporting analysis.


Game 29, Reshevsky-Euwe, round 15: The note to Black's 16th move goes wrong at two points. After 16...♔xb1 17.♔d5 c6 18.♔xc6 ♔d3,



19.♔g5 deserves at best a "?!" instead of the exclamation given it; better either 19.♔d5 or 19.b5. The reason is soon apparent: after 19...♜d6 comes 20.♔e7??,




doubling down on the mistake (better 20.b5 or 20.♖e1, though Black will stand better after either). The overlooked refutation is 20...♜xc6! 21.♜xd3 (or 21.♔xf8 ♔xf1 -+) 21...♜d7!,




and White cannot play 22.♔xf8 or 22.♔g5 because of 22...♔xf2+ winning the queen. Therefore he must move his queen, king, or rook, and allow 22...♜xe7-+. It is strange that this was overlooked, since the possibility had just been pointed out in the note to the previous move. Golombek falls into the same mistake.

Game 31, Keres-Euwe, round 16: The note to Black's 23rd move overlooks an important resource in one sub-variation. After 23...♖c8 24.♜d6 ♜c7 25.♖c2! ♜xd6 26.exd6 ♖xc2 27.♔xe6,




rather than the recapture 27...fxe6, which loses, Black has 27...♖xb2! 28.d7 ♖b1+ 29.♜h2 ♖b8 30.d8♜+ ♖xd8 31.♔xd8 a5 32.♔c6 a4 33.♔b4 a3,




which Dr. Dowd says is a draw, with "no winning plan for either side." In any event, it is certainly a better practical try than the lost Q-vs.-R ending Black gets after 27...fxe6?. Golombek likewise overlooked this.

The note at Black's 32nd move says 32...♙e6 was better than the text 32...♙e4,




but in that case White plays 33.♖c6, winning at least the a-pawn and probably the game with it (if 33...♙b7 34.♙d8+ ♖h7 35.♙f6 ♙e7 36.♙xg6 ♙xg6 37.♖xa6!).

The note to Black's 33rd move goes wrong on two consecutive moves. After 33...♖h7 34.♖c8 ♙e7,




rather than the given move 35.e6, White should play 35.♙c6 as in the game, when after 35...d4 36.♙xd4 ♙xc6 37.♖xc6 he is still winning. 35.e6?! is met not by the note's 35...f6?, but by 35...♙f6!,




when the best White can do is 36.♙c6 d4 37.♙xd4 ♙xd4

38.♙xd4 ♙d5, and Black is OK for the time being.


Game 32, Reshevsky-Smyslov, round 16: An interesting subtlety in the note to White's 28th move bears mentioning. In variation (2), after 28.b3 ♙c3 29.♖xb7 ♙f8! 30.♙d5,




if Black wants to ensure a draw, he must avoid the note move 30...♙e1+, because it allows White an interesting possibility to create an unbalanced position: 31.♖h2 ♙e2+ 32.♙g2 ♙xg2+ (not 32...♙a6?? 33.♖xf7+! ♖xf7 34.♙xa8) 33.♖xg2 ♖c8 34.♙d3 ♖xc1 35.♙c4 ♙g8 (relatively best) 36.♙xf7+ ♖h8 37.♖xa7,




and with two connected passed pawns for a piece, White can still try for a win. To ensure the draw, correct is 30...♙e6,



now White cannot prevent the perpetual: 31.♙xe6 ♙e1+ etc., or 31.♙e4 ♙e1+ 32.♖h2 ♙e2+,




and White must keep moving his king, since if 33.♙g2? ♙xg2+ 34.♖xg2 ♖c8,



and he loses a bishop under more unfavorable circumstances than in the 30...♙e1+ line, e.g. 35.♙xg6 ♖xg6 36.♙a3 ♖c3 and Black should win.


Game 34, Euwe-Botvinnik, round 17: In the note to White's 14th move, it is claimed in line (1b) that after 14.♖d1 0-0-0 15.♙xg7 ♖hg8 16.♙f6 ♖d6 17.♙h4 ♖xg2 18.♙g3 ♖f6 19.♖f1 ♖xf2+ 20.♙xf2 ♖xf2+ 21.♖e1 "White will emerge victorious."




This is true if Black plays the given move 21...♙e5??, but he has a much better move in

21...♖b4!?, attacking the c-pawn, and after either 22.c3 (22.♖c1? ♗e3-+) 22...♗c2+ 23.♕d2 ♗e3 24.♗dg1 (about +0.57), or 22.♗d2 ♗e3 23.c3 ♗f3 24.cxb4 ♗d2+ 25.♕xd2 ♗xb3 (+0.86), things are neither very clear nor all that advantageous for White. Golombek examines the latter variation and says White wins, but he bases that on Black playing 23...♗d2+? instead of 23...♗f3.

Game 35, Botvinnik-Smyslov, round 18: The note at Black's 22nd move says that 22...♖c8 23.e5,




followed by 24.d6, “would be extremely dangerous.” However, Rybka doesn’t see Black in any danger after 23...♗c7!?, viz. 24.d6 exd6 25.exd6 ♗e6, with almost deadeye equality. Golombek mistakenly claims that White then wins with 26.d7,




somehow overlooking that this just puts the pawn *en prise*, and Black is fine after 26...♗xd7.

In the note to Black’s 28th move, line (2a) can be improved. After 27.♗c7 28.♖xc5 ♗bxd5 29.♗xe4?,




the recommended 29...♖b2+ ends up only winning the exchange after 30.♖c2 ♖xb5 31.♖xd5 ♖xd5 32.♖xc7. Better is first 29...b6 30.♖c4 and only then 30...♖b2+ 31.♖c2 ♖xb5 winning a clear piece,




since now if 32.♖xd5?? ♖xd5 33.♖xc7 ♖xe4 and Black is up a rook.


At White’s 33rd move,




the recommended 33.♖c4 is probably not as good as believed. Rather than 33...♖f6 as given, Black can try 33...♖a1!?,



when best play proceeds along the mostly forced lines of 34.♖c8+ ♖xc8 35.♖xc8+ ♖g7 36.♖e6 (else 36...♖e1 in most lines) 36...♖f6,




and now if 34.♖e4 or ♖e1 White is not making any progress, while if 37.♖d7 Black has the surprising 37...♖xg3!! 38.♖xg3 ♖c3+ 39.♖h4 ♖xd2 40.♖xe7+ ♖g8 41.♖e4 ♖xa2,




and things are very messy, with a draw by perpetual check likely.

What is probably the best 33rd move for White goes unmentioned: the subtle 33.h4!?,




giving the king an outlet square to escape checks on the back ranks. Rybka then gives the plausible illustrative continuation 33...♖xa2 34.♖xa2 ♖xa2+ 35.♖h3 (the point of

33.h4) 35...♖f6 36.♞c7 ♞d2
37.♞xe7 ♞d4 38.♖e6 ♖f5+
39.♖xf5 gxf5 40.♞e5 b5
41.♞xf5 b4 42.♞f8+ ♖g7
43.♞b8,




and Dowd says White should win. None of the other annotators caught this, either.


Game 36, Keres-Reshevsky, round 18: The note at White's 15th move is seriously mistaken about the correct reply to 15...♞e7.



16.♞xb5 is given an exclamation mark, viz. 16...axb5 17.♖xb5 ♞xa1 18.♞xa1 (if 18.♖xc6+?? ♞d7) 18...♖d7 19.♞a6 ♞d8,




and White is probably lost. Correct instead is the straightforward 16.♞xd5 ♞xd5 17.♞xd5,




winning a pawn free and clear. One therefore wonders if 16.♞xb5 was a typo and 16.♞xd5 was intended, though then it's hard to understand why an exclamation was awarded to a rather obvious move. Also, Golombek (yet again) makes the same mistake, recommending 16.♞xb5, though at he least he gave it no exclamation.

The note at White's 28th move says that 28.♖g3 ♖c6 leads to "an important advantage for Black,"




giving the further moves 29.♖f4 ♖e6, but White seems to come out no worse than even after 29.♞b4!? ♖f3 (if 29...♖b7?! 30.c3 ♞b6 31.♖f4 ♞e6 32.♞xa6±) 30.♖xf3 gxf3 31.♞xa6.

An interesting possibility at Black's 32nd move bears mentioning.




Instead of the text 32...♞xc3 (rated about -0.96), Rybka considers 32...♞b6! by far best (about -2.67), a sample continuation being 33.♞e1 ♞d2 34.♞f4 (if 34.♞xg4 ♖xg2+ 35.♞xg2 ♞xb2 etc.) 34...♞xb2 35.♞xf7 a3! 36.e6 a2 37.e7 ♞e2 38.♞f8+ ♖a7,




and Black wins.


Game 37, Reshevsky-Botvinnik, round 19: In the note to White's 29th move, variation (2) goes astray at a couple of points. After 29.♞ee3 ♞c4 30.♞ef3 ♞xa3 31.♞h3 a5 32.♞fg3,



the given move 32...a4 is a serious mistake, for reasons given below. Much better is 32...♞c4, when Rybka considers Black no worse than even (about -0.42). The problem with 32...a4 is that rather than the note continuation 33.♞h4, White has the much stronger 33.♞xg6+!,




and Black is busted, viz. 33... ♖xg6 (33...h×g6? 34.h7 is even worse) 34.♙f6+ ♜xf6 (34...♙×f6 35.♜xg6 is no better) 35.e×f6 ♖×f6 36.♙a6! ♜d8 (else 37.♙a8 is crushing in most lines) 37.♜g7 ♜c7,



and White has the choice of winning by 38.♙×b6 or 38.♜hg3.


Game 38, Smyslov-Euwe, round 19: The note at Black's 14th move, line (1b), says that after 14...♙d8 15.♜×d8+ ♜×d8 16.♙g5+ ♙e7 17.♙c3 White has "a winning attack."



Any such win must be more than a few moves away; after 17...♙×g5 18.♙×g5 ♜e7 Rybka rates the position dead even and sees no win or even advantage for White in the near future. Smyslov examines other 14th moves but not 14...♙d8, while Golombek (and also Horowitz) varies with 17.♙a3, followed by flawed analysis erroneously claimed to show a win for White.


Game 41, Euwe-Keres, round 21: It is unclear why line (1b) of the note to Black's 12th move is

so generous with exclams to black moves, giving 13.♙g3 ♙×d5 14.♙×d5 e×d5 15.♜×d5 ♙a4! 16.♙c4 ♙a5!:




Rather than Black having any advantage here, it is White who comes out clearly better after 17.♙d4! (threatening both 18.♙f5 and 18.a3) and either (1) 17...♙b6 18.♜d6 ♙e4 19.♜×b6 ♙d2+ 20.♜a1 a×b6 (20...♜×c4 21.♙×c4 a×b6 22.♙d5 is no better, probably worse) 21.♙×c8 ♜×c8 22.♙d3, or (2) 17...♙e4 18.♜×a5 ♙×a5 19.♙×c8 ♜×c8 20.♙d3, and White's up a solid pawn in either case.

The note at Black's 26th move goes astray at several points. In line (2a), after 26...♙e2 27.f3 ♜cc7




a winning move is overlooked: note 28.♙d4?! but 28.♙e5!, when a likely continuation is 28...♜b7 29.♙c3 (threatening 30.♙e4),




and if, for example, (1) 29...♜b4 30.♜b1 ♜×g4 31.♜b8+ ♜f8 32.♜×f8+ ♜×f8 33.f×g4 and Black can't stop both 34.♙d4 and 34.♙×g7; (2) 29...♙c8 30.♜b1 ♜×b1+ 31.♙×b1 ♜f8 32.♜d4 (threatening 33.♙d6; 32.♙×a5 is simpler and also probably good enough to win) 32...♜d7 33.♙d2 ♙b5 34.♙d6 ♙c8 35.♙c2 ♜×d6 36.♜×d6+-; (3) 29...♙b5 30.♙g6 ♜fd7 31.♜c1 ♜d5 32.♙×g7! (not 32.e4? ♜×e5 33.♙×e5? ♙b3+-) 32...♜×g7 33.♙h7+ and mate shortly.

Variation (3a) of that same note also goes awry, after 26...h5 27.♜×g7+ ♜×g7 28.♙×g7 ♙×g2 29.♜b1:




Now the note gives 29...♙×g7 30.♙×g7+ ♜×g7 31.♜×b5, "with advantage for White." However, Black can improve with the surprising 29...♙d3!, a remarkable saving move, forcing 30.♙×d3 ♙×d3,




and now White had probably best surrender the exchange by 31.♙e5 ♙×b1 32.♙×b1 (about -0.95 but with drawing chances), since if 31.♜d1 ♜c2 32.♙f6 ♜×f2 33.♙×e6+ ♜×g7 he stands

in some danger of losing (about -1.47).

The note at Black's 27th move is probably correct to prefer 27...♖d3, but errs in saying that then 28.♞x♖d3




should be met by 28...♞xc2?. That would allow 29.♞d8+ ♖h7 30.♞xg7 (threatening 31.♞h8#),




and either (1) 30...♞xb2+ 31.♞xb2 ♖g7 32.♞xg7+ ♖xg7 33.♞xg7 ♖xg7 with an easy win for White, or (2) 30...♞e8 31.♞xe8 ♞d1+ 32.♞b1+ ♞xb1+ 33.♞xb1 ♖xg7 34.♞xg7+ ♖xg7 35.g3 with an easily won rook ending. Relatively best is (from previous diagram) 28...♞x♖d3 29.♞x♖d3 ♞c1+ 30.♞xc1 ♖xc1+ 31.♞b2 ♖c5 32.♞d4 ♖xf2+ with some drawing chances (+1.64).

The note at White's 28th move is correct that 28.♞x♖d3 was the strongest continuation, but goes wrong a few moves later, after 28...♞x♖d3 29.♞x♖d3 ♖b7 30.♞c3! ♞d5,




and now not 31.♞d4 (another undeserved exclamation), but the crushing 31.♞xg7 ♖xg7 32.♞c8+ ♖f7 33.♞f4+ ♖e7 34.♞f8+ ♖d7 35.♞xg7+ ♖c6 36.♞xb7+ ♖xb7 37.♞e4,



and Black can resign. Golombek also misses this.


The note to White's 31st move can be similarly improved after 31.♞d8+ ♖h7 32.♞c8 ♖c5? 33.♞xg7+ ♖xg7,



and now while White could probably win the Q-vs.-R+R ending created by the note's 34.♞xc6, he can be sure of winning with 34.♞b1+ ♖g6 35.♞xc6 ♖xc6 36.♞b7+ etc., netting a whole rook more.


Game 47, Botvinnik-Reshevsky, round 24: The note at Black's 18th move includes the sub-variation 18...♞xf3 19.♞e2 ♞f6

20.♞c4 ♞e6, labeling the last move a blunder with "??", adding 21.♞g5 as its supposed refutation.




Yet Black is fine; after 21...♞f3 the queen is no immediate danger, e.g. 22.♞e3 ♞h5, or 22.♞f1 ♞xe4, or 22.♞e2 ♞xe4.

The note at Black's 29th move is correct that 29...♞gh4+ "will rapidly lead to defeat," but goes astray after 30.♞xh4 ♞xh4+:



The note continuation 31.♞h3? lets the win slip; Black replies not 31...bxc4 but 31...♞xf3!, when a likely continuation is 32.♞e7 ♞xg5+ 33.♞g4 bxc4 34.♞xc4 ♖f8 35.♞xc7 ♞e4,




to be followed by ♞e4-d6, and Black is fine. Correct instead (from previous diagram) is 31.♞g3!, saving both the f- and g-pawns, and after 31...bxc4


32.♙e4! ♖g6 33.♖ac1 White is winning. One wonders if 31.♙h3 was a typo.

Botvinnik does not look at 29...♖gh4+, mentioning only 29...♖xg3.

Game 48, Euwe-Smyslov, round 24: The note at White's 35th move seems to miss the best continuation in the variation 35.♙e3 ♖d3+ 36.♙e2.




The note's line 36...♖c3 does not accomplish much, viz. 37.♖xa2 bxa2 38.♖a1 ♖c2+ 39.♙e3 and Black can't keep the a-pawn (only -1.07). Best instead is 36...♖xb2+ 37.♖xb2 g5! (to prevent waiting moves like f3-f4 or h2-h4) 38.♖b1 ♖c3 39.♖b2 h5 40.h3 b5,




and Black is winning with a slow but relentless squeeze (-2.85). Smyslov's notes do not consider any alternatives at move 35.

Game 49, Reshevsky-Euwe, round 25: In the note to White's 15th move, the variation 15...♙g4 16.♙xc6 bxc6 17.♙e4,




it is true that White "can choose which pawn he wants to capture on his next move." However, it bears mentioning that after 17...♙g5!? 18.♙xc6 ♖fc8 19.♙e4 ♖d8 Rybka thinks that Black has adequate compensation and considers the game even.

The note at White's 23rd move says winning the exchange, starting with 23.♙a6, "would not have been good," even going so far as to give the move a ?-mark. However, Rybka considers 23.♙a6 probably among the three or four best moves on the board, and after 23...f5 24.♙xa8 ♖xa8,




it indicates that White is OK in the note continuation 25.g3 ♙h5 if he forces the exchange of queens by 26.♙c4+ ♙h7 27.♙h4 (about +1.36).

Variation (1) in the note to Black's 24th move can be greatly improved. After 24...♙g4 25.♙b3+ ♙h7 26.♙xa8 ♙xd1 27.♖xd1 ♖xa8,




not 28.♙c3 (only about +0.97) but 28.♙b7! winning at least a piece in all variations. Golombek likewise misses this, though he does see it a move later, giving 28...e4?? (correct is 28...♙h5, preventing 29.♙b7) and now, finally, 29.♙b7.

The note after Black's 25th move says "Now 26.♙xa7 would be met by 26...exf3 and wins." It does indeed win, but not for Black.



Overlooked was 27.♙c3!, combining defense (giving an escape square to the king) with attack (pressure on g7). Relatively best then is probably 27...♙h7 28.♙a6, when if 28...♙g2+?! 29.♙e1 ♙g1+ 30.♙f1+- . If Black attacks immediately he still comes up short: 27...♙g2+ 28.♙e1 ♙g1+ 29.♙d2 ♙xf2+ 30.♙c1 ♙g2 31.♙xe7 f2 32.♙xg7+ ♙xg7 33.♙xg7 ♙xg7



34.♖c2!+- . An important last
finesse; if, say, 34.♞f1? ♞b6!
35.♜c4 ♞c8 and the knight is
lost, or if 34.♖b1? ♞bd8
35.♖a2 f1♜ 36.♞xf1 ♞xd6. But
34.♖c2 forestalls all such traps.

Golombek, to his credit, does
see 27.♜c3!, but he strays into a
much weaker variation with
31.♜d4? (instead of 31.♜xe7!)
31...f2 32.♜c4+ ♜h7 33.♜f1,
when Black still has drawing
chances.