Analytical Supplement to Emanuel Lasker's

The International Chess Congress St. Petersburg 1909

by Taylor Kingston

"This is a book in which analysis is accurate." Thus famously begins Emanuel Lasker's preface to the St. Petersburg 1909 tournament book. I had long looked on this bold claim as a challenge. Having already published computer-assisted analyses of works by Alekhine, Euwe, Tartakower, and Najdorf, plus two others by Lasker himself (*Common Sense In Chess* and *Lasker's Manual of Chess*), and seeing there the fallibility of even great players compared to the lidless silicon eye, I was keen to put Lasker's claim to the test.

Now, having spent nearly two months analyzing all the tournament's 175 games, along with all of Lasker's notes, I present the results, which frankly were quite surprising, even shocking sometimes. Before getting to that, some explanation of how these results were obtained.

Methodology

Compared to my previous efforts, the analysis here is considerably improved, thanks both to:

(1) Better hardware, a Dell Inspiron 17 7000 Series with an Intel Core i7-7500U CPU running at 2.90 GHz with 16 GB RAM and a 64-bit operating system, and

(2) Better software. Instead of Rybka 3 UCI, rated 2995 Elo (and probably performing below that on my ten-year-old HP a6838f), I used Komodo 11.2.2, at the time of this writing (September 2017) generally considered the strongest of all chess engines, about 3400 Elo.

It often took Rybka quite a while on my old machine to get as deep as 16 ply (a ply being a half-move, i.e. one move by White or Black), whereas Komodo gets there almost instantly, as deep as 25 to 30 ply in a few minutes, and sometimes nearly to 50 ply in relatively simple positions. Stockfish 8 (Elo 3387) was also consulted quite a bit, especially in endgames, and Fritz 15 (3187) on occasion. For comparison, World Champion Magnus Carlsen is rated "only" 2826. In endgames with six men or fewer, the Nalimov tablebases at http://chessok.com/?page_id=361 were an invaluable resource. Usually when not stated otherwise, variations and evaluations come from Komodo; I have tried to specify when using another engine, or Nalimov. The games were accessed via ChessBase 14 with the engine running in "kibitzer" mode.

Rather than the usual, somewhat vague annotation symbols (+−, −+, ±, ∓ etc.), I have generally used the engine's numerical assessment to indicate the status of a position, as I consider this more precise and informative. A position where White is up knight for pawn, and another where he's up a queen, would both get a "+−" in the usual symbology, but there is obviously a big difference.

The numbers represent Komodo's and/or Stockfish's evaluation of the position to the nearest hundredth of a pawn, *e.g.* a difference of exactly one pawn, with no other relevant non-material differences, has the value +1.00 when in White's favor, or -1.00 when in Black's. A position where White is considered better by 3½ pawns (or the equivalent, such as a minor piece) would get the value +3.50, the advantage of a rook +5.00, etc. These numbers should not always be taken entirely at face value, especially to the right of the decimal point, and they may vary some from one machine to another, or with the time allowed for analysis, but they are generally valid and reliable, and serve as useful shorthand for assessments and comparisons that would otherwise require extensive detailed explanation.

Usually anything around +/-2.00 or more indicates a winning advantage, though there can be exceptions; for example in an endgame with opposite-color bishops, a two-pawn advantage may not be enough to win, and an ending with a bishop and an a- or h-pawn against a lone king may be drawn if the bishop is not the same color as the pawn's queening square. However, I found that Komodo and Stockfish were much more cognizant of such things than Rybka, giving assessments at or close to 0.00 where Rybka would say one side was winning.

I looked for corrections, additions and enhancements that were significant: not minor half-pawn differences, but cases where an important tactical shot was missed, where a resource that could have changed a loss to a draw or win was overlooked, where a good move was called bad (or vice versa), where a position was misevaluated, or an unsound variation was proposed. Also cases where there was no real mistake, but an especially interesting variation, or a much stronger one, could be highlighted. I was not concerned with changes in opening theory since 1909. I looked for errors both of commission and omission. Since Lasker often left long stretches unannotated, the latter were at least as frequent as the former.

Some positions required much more analysis than others. As the proverb (either ancient Hindu, Russian, or modern apocrypha) says, "Chess is a sea in which a gnat may drink and an elephant may bathe." In high-level chess one sometimes comes across a game in which several elephants could drown, the complexity being too great for even a 3400-rated engine to fathom. Such positions, though unresolved, are presented when their unresolvability contrasts with a definite statement by Lasker.

If a game is not mentioned, no significant error or improvement was found. There were 48 such games. The player seen least in these pages (not counting Nenarokov, who withdrew after four rounds) turned out to be Richard Teichmann, with only seven of his 18 games discussed. However, this was not due to any special accuracy in his play, but rather his propensity for quick, perfunctory "grandmaster draws." The lethargic one-eyed German seems to have come to St. Petersburg to collect an honorarium with as little effort as possible, and most of his games have a "let's get this over with" quality.

When the "editorial we" is used here, it means I am speaking for both the analytical engine(s) and myself, otherwise "I" means myself alone. On occasion, I have offered comments of my own, usually of a strategic nature, as supplemental to the engines' tactical evaluations. These are based on my own general chess knowledge, and long experience as both a Correspondence Master and Class A over-the-board player. I certainly claim no infallibility for those, but I felt they were necessary, or at least desirable, to explain, expand on, moderate, or interpret some of the purely numerical electronic verdicts. See for example the discussion of 34.♘f3! in Game 75 (Cohn-Schlechter), or 34...c5! in Game 76 (Bernstein-Speijer).

How to Use this Supplement

Complete games are not given here, just fragments showing errors, corrections and improvements. This work is intended to be used in conjunction with a printed copy of Lasker's book, either the algebraic edition from Russell Enterprises (2008), or the Dover reprint of the original 1910 edition in descriptive notation, along with a board and pieces. Or one can also bring up the games on a computer, from a database or web-site.

However, diagrams are frequent, and so the starting position of each discussed variation is readily apparent, as well as positions further along various continuations. Players with good powers of visualization may well be able to follow the analysis without a chess set, either material or digital.

Motivations

Before getting to the results of the analysis, let me make several things very clear, so that no one misunderstands my motivations for this work.

(1) I did not undertake it to diminish Lasker. As much as I wanted to test his claim about the accuracy of his analysis, I had no envious, sinister desire to knock this chess great off any pedestal. I have far too much respect for him to want that.

(2) Neither did I want to aggrandize myself. All credit for these findings goes to the analysis engines and tablebases; I merely served as their amanuensis. I received no pay for this work; I did it purely out of chess interest. Most people would probably consider it unpleasant, and more than a little eccentric, to spend eight hours a day, almost every day, for nearly two months, sitting at a computer and watching chess pieces and analytical numbers jump around on the screen, but I find it fascinating. As Carlos Castañeda wrote in *The Teachings of Don Juan*, "there I travel looking, looking breathlessly."

When the computer suddenly reveals a hitherto unsuspected brilliancy, or a deeply hidden, subtle, winning idea in a difficult endgame, I feel joy, like a miner who has struck gold, or like Nabokov had in mind when he defined "stratagem" as "a jewel found in a cave." And such revelations did occur, for example in Game 16 (Perlis-Teichmann), Game 17 (Burn-Nenarokov), Game 47 (Salwe-Speijer), Game 53 (Perlis-Freiman), Game 62 (Rubinstein-Mieses), Game 72 (Mieses-Freiman), Game 75 (Cohn-Schlechter), Game 76 (Bernstein-Speijer), Game 91 (Dus-Chotimirsky–Freiman), Game 106 (Mieses–Znosko-Borovsky), Game 157 (Freiman-Bernstein), Game 159 (Dus-Chotimirsky–Perlis), Game 167 (Salwe-Freiman), and Game 172 (Perlis-Cohn), among others. On the other hand, one revelation was saddening: that Schlechter's brilliancy prize game with Salwe (Game 145) had a fatal flaw.

(3) Lastly, there are few if any chess players I admire more than Emanuel Lasker, and few men period. I am hardly alone in this. Consider these glowing appreciations by prominent players and writers:

"His exploits may be summed up in one sentence: For thirty years Lasker was the superman of the chess world." — GM Reuben Fine in *The World's Great Chess Games* (1951)

“Lasker was my teacher, and without him I could not have become whom I became. The idea of chess art is unthinkable without Emanuel Lasker.” – World Champion Alexander Alekhine

“The years came and went, new stars appeared in the chess firmament; but age had no effect on Lasker. His dazzling command of every style, every technique, every phase of the game not only stayed with him but was even enhanced ... He seemed to defy the inexorable biological law that all living creatures grow, mature and decay.” — Fred Reinfeld in *The Human Side of Chess* (1952)

“That [Lasker] was a great endgame player is unquestionable; in fact, he was the greatest I have ever known. But he was also the most profound and imaginative player I have ever known.” — World Champion José Raoul Capablanca, quoted by Irving Chernev in *Twelve Great Chess Players and Their Best Games* (1976)

“But Lasker! His eyes, his thoughts are everywhere. I speak from experience, for I have frequently tried to analyze with him. The result was really discouraging for me; no sooner had I hit on a good idea or a pretty combination, than Lasker waved it aside; for he had long ago already discarded it in his thoughts.” — Rudolf Spielmann, quoted in *Lasker’s Greatest Chess Games 1889-1914* by Reinfeld and Fine (1935)

“There is no master, living or dead, whose maneuvering ability approaches that of Lasker.” — Aron Nimzovich, again from *Lasker’s Greatest Chess Games 1889-1914* by Reinfeld and Fine

“Lasker’s own psychology was in perfect order: he possessed, in spades, the will to win, stubbornness, cool-headedness, and the ability to react flexibly to a sudden change in circumstances. In short, he had all the best qualities that characterize a great sportsman.” — famous trainer and International Master Mark Dvoretsky, in the chapter “Lasker the Great” from *Dvoretsky’s Analytical Manual* (2008)

“Wisdom, a mighty intellect, deep belief in himself, in his common sense, and, of course, his enormous natural gift for chess enabled Lasker to compete successfully with the strongest players in the world almost to the age of 68! Before him history knew of no such examples, and in subsequent years only the names of Smyslov and Korchnoi come to mind.” — Garry Kasparov in *My Great Predecessors, Part I* (2003)

And of course Lasker’s record speaks for itself: World Champion 1894-1921, winner or co-winner of sixteen tournaments and winner of twenty matches: a record unmatched, nor even closely approached, in his time.

Lasker as Annotator in *St. Petersburg 1909*

But all this refers to Lasker as a player, not as the annotator of this specific book. It is with that alone that we are concerned here.

I contacted several historian friends, trying to find contemporary reviews of *St. Petersburg 1909*, without success. There were brief mentions in the *British Chess Magazine* and the *Wiener Schachzeitung*, but no proper reviews and no examinations of Lasker’s analysis, as far as my contacts could find. The one definite statement I could find was this, from Dr. J. Hannak’s biography *Emanuel Lasker: The Life of a Chess Master* (1952):

> "It is probably no exaggeration to say that, to this day, that particular tournament book remains the most lucid and erudite of its kind; and Alekhine — himself one of the greatest annotators of all times — proclaimed more than once that as a young student of chess on his own way to mastership he learned more from that book than from all the others he studied."

Dr. Hannak's attitude toward Lasker sometimes verges on worshipful, and nowhere, alas, more so than in that statement. After examining *St. Petersburg 1909* in probably more detail than anyone else has ever done, I have been unhappily and reluctantly forced to the conclusion that it is a badly flawed work, and that Lasker's opening boast is hollow.

Lasker's errors tend to fall into several categories:

Superficiality

Lasker repeatedly gives summary judgements of short variations, judgements easily proven wrong by looking just a move or two deeper. A prime example is in a note from Game 65, Salwe-Vidmar. In this position,



Lasker believes that 17...♕h4, threatening both 18...♕×h2# and 18...♕×a4, must be answered by 18.f4, after which Black happily recaptures on d5 and avoids losing a pawn. This overlooks that White can play 18.g3! and the queen must beat a sheepish retreat to d8 or e7, since if 18...♕×a4?? 19.♗c2,



and she is trapped. Surely a world champion should see this. More instances of superficiality can be found in Game 38 (Duras-Nenarokov), Game 59 (Teichmann-Cohn), Game 75 (Cohn-Schlechter), Game 148 (Bernstein-Burn), and quite a few others.

Analysis by Result

This is a common failing among annotators, which one would expect a world champion to avoid. The loser's moves tend to be undeservedly censured, and the winner's unduly praised, without really examining their objective worth. Or a drawn game is presumed never to have been

winnable at any point. Lasker shows himself surprisingly susceptible to this foible. An example is Game 150, Salwe-Forgács. Lasker extols 26.♖c6-e6 as "an elegant move, which decides the game at once."



Yet it is not. It only seemed decisive because Black then blundered with 26...♕×h2+??. Had he simply played 26...♖×e6! 27.♕×e6 h6, the game would have been even. Other examples of analysis by result are games 7, 20, 21, 55, 58, 64, 70, 75, 88, 91, 96 and 174.

Mishandling of Tactical Complications

Lasker seems genuinely confused in some tactical situations, overlooking moves that undercut, or even completely refute, a point he is trying to make. Probably the worst example is the note at move 26 in Game 161, Teichmann-Speijer. Of this position,



Lasker writes "26.g6 was tempting, but Black would have replied 26...f×g6 27.h×g6 h6 28.♗×h6 e×d4 29.c×d4 d×e4 30.♗×e4 ♗d5 and though White would have gained a pawn his position would be insecure and his attack would have been beaten off."

Lasker seldom uses annotative punctuation (!, ?, !?, ?! etc.). If it were to be applied objectively here (in **red** for emphasis), and an accurate assessment given at the end, the note would read: "26.g6**?!** would have been far inferior to the text, but if play had continued 26...f×g6 27.h×g6 h6**?** 28.♗×h6**?!** e×d4**??** 29.c×d4**?!** d×e4**??** 30.♗×e4**?!** ♗d5**??**, the fact that White's three consecutive dubious moves were answered by black blunders, would have allowed White a decisive combination." For details see the full analysis in the main body below.

There are many other instances in other games; see for example Game 5 (Schlechter-Lasker), or Game 150 (Salwe-Forgács). Two recurring failings are (1) automatic recaptures, especially of or by pawns, without regard for possible *Zwischenzüge* (intermediate threats and checks), and (2) unawareness of relevant candidate moves. Very often Lasker makes a strategically or tactically valid point, but then spoils it by invalid supporting analysis. See for example Game 33 (Lasker-Freiman), Game 34 (Vidmar-Rubinstein), Game 44 (Rubinstein-Perlis), Game 45 (Freiman-Vidmar) Game 74 (Dus-Chotimirsky–Forgács), and Game 151 (Tartakower-Schlechter).

Errors of Omission

This is perhaps the most frequent kind of error in the book, and there are so many that they can be further subdivided:

Missed Resources

Lasker often overlooks important middlegame possibilities, on both attack and defense. An example of each is seen in consecutive moves of Game 53, Perlis-Freiman. At Black's 46th move,



Freiman had to play 46...♕×e7, when after 47.♕×c8+ ♔h7 he would have been down the exchange but in no real danger of losing, given his pawn surplus. Instead he played 46...♕g8??, after which White could have won with 47.♕g6!!:



Lasker gives no indication that he considered these moves at all.

Unannotated Endgames

Lasker often leaves long stretches unannotated, especially with endgames. He seems to think that, having pointed out what he considers the decisive crux of a game, the outcome is a foregone conclusion and no further comment is necessary, even over a span of 20, 30 or more moves. Yet again and again it turns out that a game was actually decided later, in such a neglected stretch, or that a move that could have changed the supposedly foreordained outcome was overlooked.

An example is Game 67, Znosko-Borovsky–Speijer, a 54-move draw. Lasker makes no comment on the last 25 moves. Thus the reader is not told that at move 36,



Black had to play 36...c5 or he was lost. Speijer played 36...h6??, to which Znosko-Borovsky replied innocuously with 37.♔f4?!, when he could have won with 37.b4!.

Another case in point is Game 174, Mieses-Duras. Lasker makes much of a dubious move by Mieses at move 16 that lost a pawn, but then no comment on the remaining 16 moves, apparently deeming Duras' victory inevitable. Thus the reader gets no indication that Duras actually frittered away his advantage, that Mieses soon fought back to equality, and that the decisive mistake did not come until move 28,



when Mieses blundered with 28.♕d6??.

Failure to Point Out Decisive Moves

The above example, Mieses-Duras, highlights a recurring shortcoming in Lasker's analysis, to my mind the most serious of all: failure to point out the actual move or moves that were crucial, that in fact decided the game. This is, in my opinion, the annotator's primary job, especially for one who, like Lasker, boasts of his accuracy. A book like *St. Petersburg 1909* is supposed to be not only the record of a tournament, but something educational and instructive for the average player. More than anything else, it is the annotator's duty and responsibility to show the amateur reader how and why a game had whatever result it did.

Lasker himself claimed to be fulfilling that responsibility. In his preface he wrote "the commentary has been intended to guide the thought of him who plays over these games so that he may perceive weakness and merit. Notes have been made solely for that purpose." But it's apparent that Lasker's own perception of weakness and merit was highly inconsistent.

Some commentators have tried to explain away or excuse this deficiency in Lasker's work. Tim Harding, in his foreword to the Russell Enterprises edition of *St. Petersburg 1909*, writes "The depth of annotations by today's standards may seem slight, but ... Lasker does not comment on every critical moment ... Indeed one of the values of this book, especially for a player hoping to improve their game, is that it will turn up many situations, either in the actual play or Lasker's notes, where you can try to solve for yourself the unanswered questions that may arise when playing through a game."

And Fred Reinfeld, in an introduction to the 1947 David McKay Co. edition of *Lasker's Manual* wrote: "Lasker wanted his students to develop the same sturdy self-reliance which features his own games; he did not want to carry the reader on his back. Hence his notes are often short, mere hints; they point to the crucial factor in a situation, and the rest is left to the reader."

These apologia fit *Lasker's Manual* well, but not this tournament book. Encouraging "sturdy self-reliance" is all well and good, but Lasker's method in *St. Petersburg 1909* is often like a

swimming instructor who takes his students a mile out to sea in a boat, tosses them in the water, and says "Now, get back to shore!"

What Reinfeld and Harding say no doubt explains, perhaps even excuses, some of what have been flagged here as errors of omission. But it definitely does not excuse the many instances where Lasker *has claimed something to be crucial that ultimately was not*, and then *completely failed to point out the truly crucial move(s)*. He does not fulfill the task Reinfeld claimed for him. Mieses-Duras, cited above, is far from the only instance. See for example Game 3 (Nenarokov-Perlis), Game 52 (Vidmar-Spielmann), Game 53 (Perlis-Freiman), Game 55 (Mieses-Forgács), Game 63 (Freiman-Burn), and Game 106 (Mieses–Znosko-Borovsky). Others we "leave to the reader" to discover.

Howlers

No doubt some readers will object that it is not fair to compare analysis coming from Lasker's human (or as Nietzsche might say, all too human) brain, to that produced by relentless, near-infallible electronic monsters capable of processing untold thousands of moves in minutes or even seconds. One must certainly make allowances for the fact that Lasker, unlike this writer, did not have tireless superhuman analysis partners that almost instantly detect brilliancies and blunders, winnow out good moves from bad, and give a continuous running numerical assessment of their findings. This is a reasonable point, to which I have two responses:

(1) Some corrections and improvements discovered by Komodo and Stockfish here would indeed be very difficult, perhaps even impossible, for even the best human players to find unaided, let alone examine adequately, even analyzing at leisure. Lasker can hardly be blamed for not seeing or exploring, for example, the terrific complications that could have arisen in Game 47 (Salwe-Speijer), or Game 75 (Cohn-Schlechter). Such cases are dwelt on here not particularly to prove Lasker was mistaken, but simply out of chess interest, to delve into the labyrinthine possibilities in detail.

(2) It is inevitable that any unaided human player, no matter how skilled, will make a number of mistakes in a book of this length. Our analyses of Alekhine's *The Book of the New York International Chess Tournament 1924* and *My Best Games of Chess 1908-1937*, Euwe's *The Hague-Moscow 1948*, Najdorf's *Zürich 1953*, and especially Tartakower's *My Best Games of Chess 1905-1954*, showed this long before we looked at *St. Petersburg 1909*.

However, I believe that the cause of objective chess truth requires pointing out such errors dispassionately. And I have to believe that Lasker, who was not only a chess master but a philosopher and Doctor of Mathematics, would endorse the search for objective truth. Otherwise, on the basis of his famous statement — "On the chessboard lies and hypocrisy do not survive long. The creative combination lays bare the presumption of lies; the merciless fact, culminating in checkmate, contradicts the hypocrite." — he would himself be guilty of hypocrisy.

Lasker was not a liar or hypocrite, but in *St. Petersburg 1909* he was guilty of negligence and overconfidence, perhaps even hubris. If his errors had been mostly of the kind described in point (1) above, I would not say this, and would not adopt the harsh tone taken sometimes below. But all too often he committed major blunders, made unsound recommendations, and overlooked things many club players would see. In short, the sort of gross errors that in chess slang are called "howlers."

Consider, for example, the note at move 28 in Game 50, Speijer-Tartakower. In this position,



Lasker strangely claims that "Black could here already win a piece by 28...♘ef6," but obviously White can reply 29.♗g6, losing nothing.

Or the note at move 26 in Game 172, Perlis-Cohn, where in this position,



Lasker unaccountably gives 29.♘h6+??, which obviously loses to 29...♔×e8. One has to wonder if Lasker even played these out on a board. In such cases we checked the old Dover edition, thinking perhaps typos had crept into the later Russell Enterprises version, but the same moves were in both.

One further example. In Game 166, Bernstein-Mieses, the note at move nine says that after 9.♕×b7,



Black draws by 9...♘b4 10.a3 ♖b8 11.♕a7 ♖a8 etc. Surely most players would prefer 9...♘a5 winning the queen.

Here is a list of most of the other howlers we discovered, all instances where Lasker either overlooked an important and not-too-hard-to-find resource, or recommended a grossly unsound move:

Game 8, Freiman-Tartakower, move 28
Game 21, Cohn-Duras, move 28

Game 44, Rubinstein-Perlis, move 15
Game 51, Lasker-Salwe, move 38
Game 62, Rubinstein-Mieses, move 37
Game 65, Salwe-Vidmar, move 26
Game 88, Burn-Tartakower, moves 35 and 36
Game 91, Dus-Chotimirsky–Freiman, moves 23 and 26
Game 99, Tartakower-Mieses, move 39
Game 106, Mieses–Znosko-Borovsky, move 39
Game 117, Znosko-Borovsky–Duras, move 22
Game 124, Duras-Speijer, move 31
Game 125, Dus-Chotimirsky–Znosko-Borovsky, move 40 and moves 45ff
Game 132, Spielmann-Schlechter, moves 8 and 27
Game 139, Rubinstein-Bernstein, move 31
Game 143, Cohn-Speijer, move 18
Game 146, Forgács-Spielmann, move 8
Game 150, Salwe-Forgács, move 26
Game 159, Dus-Chotimirsky–Perlis, move 25
Game 161, Teichmann-Speijer, move 26
Game 166, Bernstein-Mieses, move 27
Game 173, Burn–Dus-Chotimirsky, move 24

Such errors are not just unworthy of a World Champion, they would come under fire in a club newsletter. And they are certainly not the sort of moves Lasker himself often — if ever — actually played in serious games, or he never would have gotten far in chess, let alone hold the world title for 27 years. And one must wonder why Teichmann, a GM-strength player himself, did not catch at least some of these glaring errors in the process of translating the German version into English.

It's interesting that with none of his own games did Lasker make such analytical mistakes, and with only two of Rubinstein's. As I played through the book, it became clear that Lasker had given extra attention to Rubinstein, in whom he recognized a future title challenger. And of course he had already given his own games a great deal of thought, simply from having played them. He does not seem to have put the same interest and effort into many of the other games, especially those of players low in the standings.

Analytical Debacles

Furthermore, with some games, it is not just with one or two moves that Lasker goes wrong. Some games are analytical debacles, outright fiascoes with more errors than a dog has fleas. These include Game 45, Freiman-Vidmar; Game 55, Mieses-Forgács; Game 64, Spielmann-Perlis; Game 65, Salwe-Vidmar; Game 88, Burn-Tartakower; and Game 161, Teichmann-Speijer.

Explanations?

The frequency and level of error in *St. Petersburg 1909* left me groping for explanations. How could the man who held the world title longer than anyone else in history make so many mistakes? One wonders if, like Tal with the book about his 1960 title match with Botvinnik, or like some say Alekhine did with *New York 1924*, Lasker did all or at least some of his analysis

sans voir. If so, it was not a wise decision; unlike Alekhine, Lasker was never much of a blindfold player, and Alekhine, even with his high level of skill in that kind of chess, made many mistakes in *New York 1924*. (On the other hand, Tal's book is remarkably error-free.)

The press of other affairs would not seem to be much of a factor. The St. Petersburg tournament ended on 12 March 1909. Lasker finished the German edition of the book, I believe, later that same year (the English edition came out in mid-1910). During the rest of 1909 he stayed about two more weeks in Russia giving a few simuls, and he played two informal series with Janowski: one of four games in May, and one of ten games from 19 October to 9 November. Other than that, Whyld's *Collected Games of Emanuel Lasker* shows nothing that year, though his title match with Schlechter began on 7 January 1910, and presumably Lasker devoted some time to preparation before that. At a conservative estimate, Lasker had a good six months to devote to the book, a pace of about one game per day.

How much time Lasker actually did devote is, of course, unknown. Pertinent to that question, another possible explanation was suggested by British historian Bernard Cafferty, who heard it from the late David Hooper of *Oxford Companion* fame. Hooper knew Lasker in the mid-1930s, and got the impression that he was rather lazy! In the absence of real evidence, this hypothesis must be considered speculative, and Lasker in his early 40s was probably more energetic than in his mid-to-late sixties. Still, this would definitely fit what we see in *St. Petersburg 1909*.

Well, that's enough bloviation from me. We'll let Komodo and Stockfish do most of the talking now. Games are discussed in the same order as in the tournament book.

Analytical Corrections, Improvements and Enhancements for *St. Petersburg 1909*

***Game 2, Cohn-Burn*:** We start modestly, with just a few tweaks.

The note at Black's 15th move understates the danger of one variation, and overstates another. After 15...♕g616.f4 f5, the move 17.♘c5 deserves a ??:



It not only "would have created interesting complications, which would probably have turned out in Black's favor," it lets Black win outright, either by Lasker's 17...♘×e3+ 18.♕×e3 ♘d5 (-2.16), or by 17...♘cb4 18.♗g1 b6 19.♘b3 ♕c6 20.h4 (if 20.c3?? ♘e3+ 21.♔f2 ♕g2+ 22.♔×e3 ♘d5#) 20...♘×c2 (-2.80).

Conversely, the note's other line, 17.♘c3 ♖ad8,





is seen by Komodo as dead even after 18.♘×d5 ♖×d5 19.f×e5 ♖×e5.

After 15...♕g6, rather than Lasker's 16.f4, Komodo sees 16.♘c3 as best,



avoiding any "interesting complications" and maintaining equality (about -0.14 at 24 ply).

***Game 3, Nenarokov-Perlis*:** A difficult game with some interesting misjudgements, by both Lasker and the players.

The note at move 11 has two errors. After 11...a6 12.♗b1 d4? is a mistake;



better is either 12...♗d6 or 12...♖c8. White can capitalize on 12...d4 not with Lasker's 13.♘a4, but by 13.♘e4!,



which wins at least a pawn, *viz.* **(a)** 13...♗e7 14.♘×d4 ♘×d4 15.e×d4, or **(b)** 13...♘×e4 14.♗×e4 ♗a7 15.e×d4 ♘×d4 16.♗×b7, or even worse, **(c)** 13...♗a7 14.♘×f6+ g×f6 (if 14...♕×f6?? 15.♗g5 wins the queen) 15.♘×d4 ♘×d4 16.♕h5 f5 17.♖cd1 ♕f6 18.e×d4 (about +2.00).

In the note at move 12, it is not correct that after 12...♕e7 13.♗g5 ♖fd8 14.♕d3 h6 "the checks would have done Black no harm,"



viz. 15.♗×f6 ♕×f6 16.♕h7+ ♔f8 17.e4! ♘d4 (the threat was 18.e×d5, and if 18...♗×d5 19.♘×d5 ♖×d5 20.♕h8+ +−) 18.♘×d4 ♗×d4 19.e×d5:



Black must retreat with 19...♗d7 and lose a pawn, since if 19...♗×d5 20.♘×d5 +− .

In the long portions of this game on which Lasker makes no comment, a few things bear mentioning. At White's 30th move,



instead of the text move 30.♗d6, worth considering was 30.♕d4!? intending 31.♗d2 and 32.♗c3. If then 30... 30...♔g8 31.♗g5 with strong pressure (+1.67, compared to +0.85 for the text).

At White's 47th move, Lasker does not give a clear verdict on the "trap" 17.♕h6 ♖×d6,



not saying whether it would win for Black, or just draw. Komodo finds it good only to draw, though it gives both sides a chance to go wrong, *viz.* 48.♕×h7+ (not 48.c×d6?? ♕g3+ 49.♔g1 ♕e1+ 50.♔h2 ♕e5+ and 51...♕×b2−+) 48...♔f6 (or 48...♔f8 49.♕h8+ ♔f7 50.♕h7+ etc. also

draws, but if 48...♔e8?? 49.♖e2+ White wins) 49.c×d6 ♕g3+ 50.♔g1 ♕e1+ 51.♔h2 ♕e5+ 52.♔g1,



and now Black must keep checking, since if 52...♕×b2?? 53.♕e7#.

In the note at move 51, Lasker calls 51...♗c6-b5 "an altogether faulty maneuver,"



but Komodo finds it no worse than alternatives such as 51...h5, 51...♕d8, 51...♕e7 or 51...♕f7, all around +1.35 at 27 ply. After 51...♗b5 52.♗h6+ it goes unremarked that Black should have played 52...♔f7 instead of 52...♔h8; why will be shown in the next paragraph.

The truly crucial mistake came unnoticed at move 53:



53...♘g8?? was a blunder; better was 53...♕d7, 53...♕b8, or 53...♔g8. Lasker's suggested 53...♗c6 is playable, though after 54.♗g5 ♕e7 55.♕d4 forcing 55...♔g7, it becomes clear why 52...♔f7 was preferable.

However, White failed to take full advantage of 53...♘g8. Much stronger than the text 54.♕d4+ was 54.♗×d5!:



If now **(a)** 54...♘×h6 55.♕d4+ ♔g8 (or 55...♖e5 56.f4) 56.♕f6+− (+6.48), or **(b)** 54...♕d7 55.♕b3 and either **(b1)** 55...♘×h6 56.♗×e6 (+4.67), or **(b2)** 55...♖e5 56.♕c3! (not 56.♗×g8? ♕d4+ 57.♔g2 ♖e1 58.♖f2 ♕×f2+! 59.♔×f2 ♖e2+ 60.♔f1 ♖e6+ 61.♔f2 ♖e2+ etc., draw) 56...♕×d5 57.♗f4 (+5.13). The text move is still probably good enough to win, but gets an evaluation of only about +1.70.

After the further text moves 54.♕d4+ ♘f6 55.h4?! (better 55.g4) 55...♖e2+ 56.♔g1 ♖e1+ 57.♔h2 ♖e2+ 58.♔h3, a possible saving resource for Black is overlooked. Instead of 58...♕e8-e6?? as in the game, 58...♕e8-e5! might have held,



e.g. 59.♕×e5 ♖×e5 60.♖d2 ♗c6 and Black has decent drawing chances (+1.04).

And after 58...♕e6?? White again missed the strongest continuation, which instead of 59.♗g5 (about +2.20) was 59.♗×d5! (at least +5.50),



viz. 59...♖×b2 (of course not 59...♕×d5?? 60.♕×f6+ ♔g8 61.♕g7#) 60.♕×b2 ♕e7 when the straightforward 61.♗g5 ♔g7 62.♕×f6+ ♕×f6 63.♗×f6+ ♔×f6 64.♗×b7 is simplest.

***Game 5, Schlechter-Lasker*:** A very interesting game, a fighting draw between Lasker and the man who would nearly take his title the next year. Some important possibilities went unnoticed.

Lasker believes his 27...♘c6-d4 should have been "decisive,"



apparently because then, as happened in the game, there seems to be no way for White to avoid losing a pawn. Lasker's one comment, that now 28.♘de3 g5 29.♗g3 h5 would get White "into

difficulties" is correct. However, he and Schlechter both overlooked a surprising resource: 28.♘gf6+! (the same result also comes from 28.♘df6+ or 28.♘×h6+) 28...g×f6 29.♘×f6+ ♔g7 30.♘×d7 ♕×d7 31.c3,



and now any of the five playable moves by the knight leaves White standing no worse than even, *e.g.* 31...♘b3 32.♕e3 (intending 33.♗e7) 32...♔f7 33.♕f4+ ♔g8 34.♕g3+ ♔f7 35.♕f4+ and a draw by repetition or perpetual check is likely. Black can keep trying, but White's more active pieces, his command of the d- and e-files, and the vulnerability of Black's king, all compensate for the nominal ♖-vs-♗+♘ material disparity. It is perhaps somewhat surprising that Lasker missed 28.♘f6+, since it's played two moves later, though under circumstances more favorable for Black.

It goes unremarked that at White's 32nd move,



32.f4?? was a serious mistake. Relatively best was 32.♖d1 or 32.♗f2, both about -0.90. Lasker was correct to fault his reply 30...♗g7, and Komodo validates his note line of 32...d5! and 33...d4, when the advance of the queenside pawns will be decisive, *e.g.* 33.♖d1 d4 34.♗f2 ♕d5 35.♖d3 ♗g7 36.♕d2 c4 37.♖g3 d3 etc. (-3.69).

At White's next move,



33.h3? was another unmentioned mistake that should have lost the game. Best was 33.♗f2, and if 33...c4 as in the game, 34.♕d2 minimizes White's disadvantage (about -0.90). The text move gave Lasker another chance to win, which he correctly points out that he missed by later not playing 34...f×g4.

The note at move 39 goes astray after 39...♔h8 40.♕e2 ♗d6:



Lasker mentions only the dreadful 41.♔g3??, which indeed loses as the note states (-3.94). Much better though is 41.♗g3 (-0.63 at 27 ply), and better still 41.♕e3 (-0.46).

Lasker misevaluates the two variations in the note at Black's 42nd move. After 42...♔h7,



he says that 43.♕×f7+ ♖×f7 44.♗c3 gives White a "strong defensive position," but in fact White is lost after 44...♖d7!,



viz. **(a)** 45.f5 h5 46.♔g3 ♗h6 47.♔h4 ♖d5 48.♔×h5 ♖×f5+ 49.♔g4 ♔g6 etc. (if 50.♗×d2?? ♖d5−+), or **(b)** 45.♖×d2 (of course not 45.♗×d2?? ♗g7−+) 45...♖×d2+ 46.♗×d2 ♗g7 47.♗c1 (if 47.♗c3?? ♗×c3 48.b×c3 a5−+) 47...♔g6 48.♔g3 h5 49.♔f3 ♔f5,



and White will be squeezed into submission (-6.17 at 30 ply).

Lasker's negative verdict on the alternative 43.♕f5+ comes from an error further on in the variation.



After the forced moves 43...♔g8 44.♖g1+ ♗g7 45.♖×g7+ ♕×g7 46.♗×g7 d1♕,



White need not, as Lasker thought, play 47.♔g3?? and allow Black to "get out of the checks and win." Instead after the forcing 47.♕f8+! ♔h7 48.♕h8+ ♔g6 49.♕×h6+ ♔f5 (49...♔f7 allows perpetual check) 50.♕h7+ ♔e6 (50...♔×f4 again allows perpetual check) 51.♕g6+ ♔d5 52.♕g2+ ♔c5 53.♗c3,



it will be much more difficult for Black to win (about -0.87 at 20 ply).

Komodo finds no significant flaws in the one remaining note, nor in the unannotated moves 46 to 71.

***Game 6, Forgács-Speijer*:** A game with little energy or inspiration by either player. Its main interest lies in the unplayed sacrificial possibilities starting at Black's 19th move.



Here, Black played the humdrum 19...♖ad8. Lasker says "Black could here give the game a turn in his favor" by 19...♗×h3. This is quite correct, though the subsequent analysis can be improved. After 20.g×h3 ♘×h3+ 21.♔h2,



instead of the note's 21...♕h4?!, best is 21...♘×f2! 22.♕d4 ♘g4+ 23.♔h3 ♘e5,



when White will be forced to give back material, *e.g.* **(a)** 24.♘c4 h4 25.♘f1 (if 25.♘e2?? ♕f3+ 26.♔h2 ♘g4+ 27.♔g1 h3 and mate very soon) 25...♕f3+ 26.♔h2 ♘g4+ 27.♔g1 h3 28.♕d2 d5 29.♘a5 ♖×e4 30.♖×e4 d×e4 31.♘c4 ♖e8 etc. (-8.71), or **(b)** 24.♖f1 ♕g5 25.♕f2 ♕g4+ 26.♔h2 h4 27.♘e2 ♕×e4 28.♔g1™ ♕g4+ 29.♕g2 ♕×g2+ 30.♔×g2 ♘g4 and White must lose either the exchange or the ♘e2.

Lasker's 21...♕h4 hits a snag in the form of 22.♘f5! (instead of the note's 22.♕f1),



viz. 22...g×f5 23.♕×h3 ♕×f2+ 24.♕g2+ ♕×g2+ 25.♔×g2 f×e4 26.♖e3,



when though Black has (at least temporarily) four pawns for the piece, and there is a lot of play in the position, Komodo sees any attempt to win as ultimately objectively futile (0.00 at 41 ply). This is considerably better than the evaluation after the note line 22.♕f1 ♘×f2+ 23.♔g2 ♘g4 24.♕g1 ♕g5 (-1.65). In view of all this, White may well be better off accepting the loss of the h-pawn and declining the 19...♗×h3 sac with 20.♕e3.

At Black's next move, Lasker again recommends the bishop sac, saying that "Black would rather easily get four pawns for the piece with a good position." Komodo agrees that 20...♗×h3 is again Black's best move,



but after 21.g×h3 ♘×h3+ 22.♔h2 ♘×f2 23.♕d4! it does not see Black getting four pawns for the piece, preferring to continue attacking maneuvers with 23...♘g4+ or 23...♕h4+. Also it considers declining the sac by 21.♕e3 an even better idea than on the previous move.

Lasker makes no comment at move 21, but it was Speijer's last chance to show some balls. This time after 21...♗×h3! 22.g×h3 d5!,



Black has serious threats, *viz.*:
(a) 23.e×d5?? ♘f3+; or
(b) 23.♘cd2 d×e4 24.♕e3 ♖e6 (to allow 25...♖d3) 25.♘h2 ♖d3 26.♕c5 (if 26.♕e2 ♘×h3+ 27.♔f1 ♖g3!−+) 26...e3 27.♘g4 (if 27.f×e3 ♘×h3+ 28.♔h1 ♖×d2 and mate shortly; or 27.♘df1 ♕×f2+ etc.) 27...♕f4 28.♔f1 e×d2 and wins.
Therefore White must play:
(c) 23.♖e3, and after the likely continuation 23...d×c4 24.♕×c4 ♕f4 25.e5 ♕×c4 26.b×c4 ♖×e5 27.♖×e5 ♘f3+ 28.♔g2 ♘×e5 Black should eventually win with his sound kingside majority (about -1.95).

An interesting possibility goes unmentioned at White's 39th move.



White may have missed his only winning chance with 39.♘e4+ ♔f5 (not 39...♔g6? 40.♘e5+ ♔h5 41.♘c6 ♖d3 42.♘×a7) 40.♖b1 (intending 41.♖b5+) 40...a6 (or 40...♗a6 41.♘e3+ ♔g6

42.♘c5 +1.86) 41.♘e3+ ♔g6 42.♖b8 and Black will have to be very careful if he is to draw. (+1.44 at 26 ply).

***Game 7, Rubinstein–Znosko-Borovsky*:** At first glance this game seems an easy walk-over for Rubinstein against the eventual tail-ender, but a crucial chance for Znosko-Borovsky goes unnoticed.

The note at move 13 neglects one move worth mentioning. After 13...♘d×c5 14.♘×d5,



Black need not play either of the note's lines 14...♗×d5? (+2.73) or 14...♗×g5? (+2.04), both of which lose. Relatively best is 14...♘×g5 15.h×g5 ♘×d3 16.♕×d3 ♕×d5 17.♕×d5+ ♗×d5 18.♖×d5, and while Black is down a pawn he is not yet lost (+1.19).

The comment at White's 21st move says "White calculates every possibility with the outmost accuracy," but in fact Rubinstein erred the move before in a way that could well have let his opponent escape. At move 20,



the text 20.♔a1?!, though natural-looking, allows Black considerable counterplay by letting his queen invade at c2. Two moves prevent this and maintain White's winning advantage: **(a)** 20.e4!, *viz.* 20...f×g2 21.♖g1 ♖ab8 22.♕c7 (+3.97), and **(b)** 20.♔c1! (+4.11 at 22 ply), *viz.* 20...♖ab8 21.♕d5 f×g2 22.♕×g2 h6 23.f4!,



and if 23...h×g5 24.h×g5+ ♔g8 25.♕h3 and mate shortly.

The drawback of 20.♔a1 is seen a variation arising from 20...♖ab8 ♕d5:



Now 21...♖bd8! gives Black considerable counterplay, *e.g.* 22.♖d7 ♖×d7 23.♕×d7 f×g2 24.♖g1 ♕c2! Showing why 20.♔c1 was preferable. 25.f3 ♖b8 26.b3 c4 27.♕d6 ♖c8 28.♕d1 ♕f2= (+0.29 at 25 ply).

The decisive mistake actually came at Black's 24th move.



Here he played 24...♖c2? and was lost (+1.90). Lasker claims that if instead 24...♖b×b2 25.♖f8+ ♖×f8 26.♔×b2 White also wins,



but Komodo thinks Black can still play on, *viz.* 26...♖f2+ 27.♔b3 ♔g8 etc. (just +0.78 at 27 ply).

***Game 8, Freiman-Tartakower*:** A tactically flashy game with two serious oversights in the notes. First, a minor addition. In the note at move 12, it bears mentioning that after 12.♕c2,



Black need not play the risky 12...♘cb4; he can reply simply 12...♘f6 which prevents 13.♗×h7+ and maintains equality.

At Black's 19th move,



Komodo considers the text move 19...♕b6 best, while Lasker faults it and recommends instead 19...♗×c5, giving the continuation 20.d×c5 ♕×d1 21.♖a×d1 f5 as winning for Black. Perhaps it is (though rated only about -0.84 at 27 ply per Komodo and Stockfish), but that issue is moot because this is a classic case of "wrong rook"! Instead, after 19...♗×c5 20.d×c5 ♕×d1 21.♖e×d1! it's dead even:



With the rooks on e1 and d1, 21...f5 22.♖d4 does not work very well because the knight can be defended by 22...a5, and if 23.♖a1 ♘a6 24.♗c2 ♘×c5∓. With the rooks on a1 and d1, however, 21...f5 22.♖d4! works much better, *viz.* **(a)** 22...a5 23.♖×b4 a×b4 24.♖×a7 f×e4 25.♖b7=, or **(b)** 22...f×e4 23.♖×b4 ♖c8 24.♖×e4 ♖×c5 25.♖×e6=, or **(c)** 22...♖c7 23.♖×b4 f×e4 24.♖×e4 ♖×c5 25.♖×e6=. All these lines get near 0.00 evaluations.

However, this does not mean that Lasker's recommended 19...♗×c5 20.d×c5 is bad.



Followed up correctly, by 20...♖c7 or 20...♕e7 (instead of 20...♕×d1?!), it yields a position still in Black's favor, about -1.25, only slightly less favorable than 19...♕b6 receives.

Definitely bad, however, is the note at move 28, which we must reluctantly deem the book's first howler. After 28.♖×a6 ♖c1+ 29.♔f2 ♖c2+ 30.♔f1,



Lasker inexplicably gives 30...♖×g2? 31.♖×a7 ♕×a7, when after 32.♔×g2 White is just fine and Black has thrown away the win:



Perhaps Lasker thought Black would still win by grabbing White's b-pawn, but that does not work, *viz.* 32...♕a2 33.♕e8 ♕×b2+ 34.♘f2 ♕b3 35.♕e6+ ♔h8 36.♕e8 ♔f8 37.♕e6+ etc., draw. And if, say, 32...♕e7 or ♕d7 to prevent 33.♕e8, then material and the position remain even.

Correct instead is (from previous diagram) 30...♖×a6! 31.♖×c2 ♕e4!,



and Black wins in all variations, *e.g.* **(a)** 32.♖c1 ♕h1+; **(b)** 32.♖f2 ♖a1+ 33.♔e2 ♖b1 and mate soon; **(c)** 32.♖c7 ♕f3+ 33.♔e1 ♖a1+ etc. **(d)** The best White can try is the desperate 32.♘h6+ g×h6 33.♖c7, but after 33...♔h8 (33...♕d3+ or 33...♖a1+ also win) 34.♖c8 (if 34.♕f7 ♕f3+ 35.♔e1 ♖a1+ 36.♔d2 ♕d1+ 37.♔c3 b4#) 34...♔g7 35.♖c7+ ♗e7 Black is safe and winning (-4.60).

***Game 9, Spielmann-Salwe*:** This game offers an instructive illustration of how an evaluation based on general principles can be trumped by specific, concrete tactical analysis.

Komodo, which has a more strategic, positional style than most other engines, quite agrees with Lasker that 14...h5 is "a splendid strategical idea." However, while Komodo finds no particular error by either side in the next seven moves, it does not agree with the note at move 21 that after 21...♗d7-e6 "White would have been at a loss what to do."



This is the kind of position where in terms of general considerations, Black seems to have a clear advantage, and it is apparently on those terms that Lasker bases his judgement that "the advance of [White's] f-pawn would then only open lines for Black's rooks and bishops." However,

Komodo sees the two sample lines he gives — 23.♕d3 d5 24.♕a6 (slightly better is 24.♗a3= (0.00)) 24...♗c8 (0.26 at 24 ply), or 22.♖f1 ♔h8 (+0.36 at 25 ply) — as leading to no ultimate tactical win or even advantage. For example, playing out the latter line, after 23...g×f3 24.♘×f3 h×g3 25.h×g3 ♕g6 26.♘×e5 d×e5,



while Black does have pressure on the g-pawn, Komodo can find no way to capitalize on it, and White has potential counterplay on the h-file.

Going back to move 22 (previous diagram), Komodo actually sees no need to prepare f2-f4 by 22.♖f1, even though at first glance it seems to lose a pawn. The immediate 22.f4 is quite playable,



Komodo giving 22...g×f3 23.♘×f3 h×g3 24.♘×g3 ♗×g3 (if 24...♘×g3 25.♘×e5) 25.h×g3,



and now if 25...♘×g3?? 26.♔f2 ♘h5 27.♖h1 ♘g7 (or 27...♗g4 28.♖dg1 ♕g6 29.♖×g4 ♕×g4 30.♖g1+−) 28.♖h6 ♕e7 29.♗b2+−. The attempt to add pressure on the pawn by 25...♕g7 is thwarted by 26.♕g5 ♕×g5 27.♗×g5, when again taking the pawn is dodgy: 27...♘×g3?! 28.♔f2 ♘h5 29.♖g1,



when White threatens 30.♗e7+ ♔h7 31.♖h1 ♔h6 (or 31...♔g6 32.♖dg1+ ♔h6 33.♖g5 and mate soon) 32.♗g5+ ♔g6 33.♖dg1+−. If 29...♘g7?? 30.♗f6+−, so relatively best is 29...♔h7 30.♖h1 ♗g4 31.♖dg1 ♖×e4 32.♘d2 ♖e2+ 33.♔f1 f5 34.♖×g4 f×g4 35.♔×e2,



when White is up a piece for two pawns and has all the winning chances (+1.20 at 29 ply).

***Game 10, Duras-Bernstein*:** Only one correction here, though an important one. In the note at move 29, Lasker is correct that the text move 29.e×d5? loses and that 29.c×d5 is preferable (the unmentioned 29.♕×d5 is also playable), but his follow-up is flawed. After 29.c×d5,



his recommended 29...c4, "threatening to establish a most dangerous passed pawn at c3," fails to the unnoticed 30.♕c2! when Black has nothing better than liquidating with 30...c×b3, since if 30...c3? 31.♘e2 ♕b4 32.♖ec1 when the pawn cannot be held and the game turns slightly in White's favor (about +0.50). Rather than 29...c4?, better are 29...a4, 29...♕b4, 29...f5 or any of several other moves.

***Game 11, Tartakower-Spielmann*:** Another fighting draw with some unmentioned possibilities worth pointing out.

At White's 24th move,



Lasker makes no comment on the text move 24.♘a3, but Komodo considers it a first step down a fairly slippery slope (-0.84). It prefers instead 24.♘d2, 24.♕d3, or 24.♕e3, *e.g.* 24.♕e3 ♖b2 25.♖c1 ♕d7 26.♘d2 ♗b7 27.♘e4 ♕d5 28.f3= (-0.24 at 24 ply).

After the further moves 24.♘a3 ♖b3,



it goes unmentioned that White compounded his error with 25.♖ac1, which merits a question mark, if not two. Relatively best is 25.♕c2, *e.g.* 25...♖c3 26.♕d2 ♖×h3 27.♘b5 ♕c6 28.♘d6 (-0.71 at 24 ply).

To give praise where it is due, we should also mention that at Black's 25th move,



the analysis Lasker quotes, by Spielmann and E. Cohn, in support of 25...♕e7!, is excellent. Komodo finds Black winning in all variations, all -2.70 or better. It also finds that 25...♕d8 wins as well.

Despite missing 25...♕e7, Black may have had one last chance to win. Instead of the text move 27...♕d7-d5, 27...♖b3-b4!, attacking the d-pawn, was worth a try.



Komodo gives the long and interesting variation 28.♖d3 (not 28.♖d1? ♕a4 29.♕g4 f5 30.e×f6 ♖×f6 31.♖g3 ♖g6 32.♕e2 ♕×a3 −+) 28...f6 29.f3 ♗a6 30.♖d2 ♖b3 31.♘c4 ♕a4 32.♘d6 f×e5 33.♕×e5 ♖b×f3 34.♔h1



Now not **(a)** 34...♖×h3?? 35.♕×e6+ ♔h8 36.♘f7+ etc. with smothered mate, nor **(b)** 34...♕a3?

35.♖g1 ♖3f6 36.♖f2, when the threat of 37.♖×g7+ ♔×g7 38.♘e8+ forces Black to sue for peace with 36...♕×d6 37.♕×d6 ♗b7+ 38.♖fg2 ♖g6 39.♕g3 ♖×g3 40.h×g3 ♖f2 41.♔h2 ♖×g2+ 42.♖×g2 ♗×g2 43.♔×g2=. Correct instead is **(c)** 34...♖3f6 35.♖g2 ♕b3 36.♖cg1 ♖g6 37.d5 ♕f3 38.♕e4 (if 38.d×e6?? ♕×g2+ 39.♖×g2 ♖f1+ 40.♖g1 ♖g×g1#) 38...♖×g2 39.♖×g2 ♕×e4 40.♘×e4 e×d5,



and Black is the only one with winning chances (-1.40 at 30 ply). This analysis is long and not entirely forced, so we do not consider it conclusive, but it was probably Black's best practical chance, and its many pitfalls make it quite interestingly double-edged.

***Game 12, Znosko-Borovsky–Freiman*:** This game between the two eventual tail-enders yields some interesting positions.

The note at move 14 recommends 14...d6-d5,



"to open the files in the center, where [Black] is strong," continuing 15.d×e5 ♘×e4 16.♘f5 ♕f8, "followed soon by ...f7-f6, with a good position." Komodo disagrees, rating that position as somewhat better for White (+0.85). More importantly, after 14...d5 15.d×e5 ♘×e4, it finds the improvement 16.c4!:



In view of this, Black's opening up of the center would be premature, *viz.* **(a)** 16...d×c4 17.♕e2 ♘4g5 (or 17...♘c3 18.♕×c4 ♘d5 19.♘f5 ♕c7 20.♘d6 ♘e7 21.♗g2±) 18.♘f5 ♕f8 19.♗g2± (about +1.30), or **(b)** 16...♘c7 17.♕h5 g6 18.♕h6 ♘c3 19.♘f3 ♕f8 20.♕h4 ♘e6 21.♗h6 ♕e8 22.♗h3± (+1.42).

The note at Black's 15th move is correct to advise against 15...d5, but after 16.d×e5,



Black is by no means obliged to continue with the losing 16...♕×e5?? (+3.03). Much better is 16...♘×e4 (only +0.64).

At Black's 19th move,



Komodo thoroughly endorses Lasker's recommendation of queenside counterattack starting with 19...b4. Had Black done this rather than 19...♘g5, the game could well have turned in his favor.

At White's 20th move, rather than the unassuming text move 20.♕f3-e3, Komodo prefers the more aggressive 20.♕h5,



which gives White a strong initiative and leads to interesting play, for example 20...h6 21.g4 ♘ce6 22.♘f5 ♕f8 23.h4 ♘e4



24.♖×e4!? (also good is 24.♗×e4 d×e4 25.g5) 24...g6 (if 24...d×e4?? 25.♗×e4 followed by 26.♗×h6 or 26.♘×h6 is crushing) 25.♕×h6 g×f5 26.♕×f8+ ♔×f8 27.♖e3 f×g4 28.♖g3 ♘g7 29.♗g5



and Black is forced into 29...♗e6 30.♗×d8, if 29...♖d7?? 30.♖×g4 ♘e6 31.♗f6 and the h-pawn will roll merrily along. This is only one sample possibility, not conclusive proof of a win, but it's clear that 20.♕h5 was White's best bet.

Lasker's note at Black's 30th move is quite correct that 30...♘e4×c3 would be a blunder. Perhaps that is why, when Black does actually play it, he makes no comment. But it should be pointed out that 33...♘×c3 was the losing move, and though Black was definitely in an inferior position by then, he would have survived much longer with 33...♖e6-g6:



Komodo then sees best play as continuing 34.♖g4 ♕e8 35.h4 ♘e6 36.♗×h6 ♖d7 (not 36...g×h6?? 37.♘×h6+ ♔g7 38.♘×f7) 37.♗g5 ♘f8, when Black is hard pressed but not immediately lost (about +1.50).

***Game 13, Speijer-Rubinstein*:** Rubinstein steamrolls his overmatched opponent in the middle game, then conducts an exemplary rook-and-opposite-colored-bishops ending. Only a few minor corrections were found.

The note at move 15 can be improved. After 15...♘×d4? 16.♘×f6+ ♗×f6,



White's best move is not 17.♕e4, but 17.♕h5, when after the forced continuation 17...g6 18.♖×c7 ♖×c7 (not 18...g×h5? 19.♘×d7 ♖×c7 20.♘×f6+ ♔g7 21.♘×h5+ ♔g8 22.♗a5 +3.78) 19.♕d1 ♗×e5 20.♗a5 ♖cc8 21.♗×d8 ♖×d8,





White has queen for bishop, knight and pawn (+1.37). In the note variation, after 17.♕e4 ♘e2+! 18.♔h1 ♘×c1 19.♕×h7+ ♔f8 20.♗b4+ ♕c5 21.♗×c5+ ♖×c5 22.♘×d7+ ♖×d7 23.♗c2 ♗×b2,



Black is not so bad off, with a rook, knight and pawn for the queen (about +0.50).

At White's 19th move,



it should have been mentioned that 19.g4? was a serious mistake that, as much as any other, lost the game. At least a half-dozen moves were better, notably 19.♖ce1 and 19.♗c2 (both around -1.20).

***Game 14, Lasker-Forgács*:** From a tactical standpoint, it is difficult to comment on specific moves in this game; there seem to be none that can be called especially good or bad. The crucial stretch seems to be moves 21 to 31, during which Lasker makes only one brief comment, yet the position goes from a nearly even evaluation at move 21,



to all but lost at move 31 (+1.98). Black makes no particular mistake, just a series of less-than-best moves that Lasker gradually exploits expertly. The downward slide starts from the above position. Instead of 21...♘×d3?!, Komodo recommends kingside counterplay starting with 21...g4. The interested reader may explore further from there.

***Game 15, Vidmar-Schlechter*:** A well played, well annotated game. Only one minor comment.

In the note at move 15, the line beginning 15...♗d6×h2+ may be better than Lasker thought.



After 16.♔×h2 ♕e5+ 17.f4 ♕×d4 18.♗f2,



rather than 18...♕d6, which does favor White as Lasker thought, Black can try 18...♘g4+ 19.♔h1 (not 19.♕×g4?! ♕×d3 20.♖e1 ♘f6∓) 19...♘×f2+ 20.♘×f2 ♖e8, which seems to be slightly in his favor, though White certainly has compensation for his pawn (-0.41).

***Game 16, Perlis-Teichmann*:** A long game, with long unannotated stretches hiding some interesting possibilities.

Lasker makes no comment on moves 49-56, giving the impression that the advantage earlier ascribed to White still existed. However, Komodo sees the game gradually turning in Black's favor over this span. In particular, at move 54, there was a missed opportunity for counterplay. Rather than the defensive text move 54...a6-a5, Black could have tried 54...♗f7-d5!?,



which yields some amazing variations. The position is too complex for exhaustive analysis, but here are some sample lines:

(a) 55.♖×d6+ ♔e5 56.♖×a6 ♖d2 57.♔g1 (this or 56.♔h1 is forced) 57...♖d1+ 58.♔f2 ♖×b1



and **(a1)** 59.♖×h6 59...♖b2+ 60.♔e3 (if 60.♔e1 ♖×g2) 60...♖×b3+ 61.♔d2 ♗×g2 and Black should win (-4.01); **(a2)** 59.g4 ♖b2+ 60.♔e1 ♔f4 61.♖a5 (if 61.♖×h6?? ♔e3 62.♔d1 ♗e4 and mate shortly) 61...♗e4 62.♖c5 ♖×b3 63.f6 ♔e3 64.♖c1 ♖b2 65.♔d1 ♖f2 66.♖c3+ ♗d3 67.♔c1 ♖×f6 (-6.00).

(b) 55.♔g3 ♖d2 56.♔g4 ♗×g2



and **(b1)** 57.♖×a6?? h5+ 58.♔g3 (if 58.♔×h5 ♗f3+ 59.♔h6 ♖d4 mates in ten at most) 58...♗b7−+ , Komodo foreseeing mate in 19 at most; **(b2)** 57.♖b8 ♗d5 58.♖d8 ♖d4+ 59.♔g3 ♖d1! 60.♖×d6+ ♔e5 61.♖×a6 ♖×b1 62.♔g4 ♗×b3 63.♖×h6 ♖g1+ 64.♔f3 ♔×f5 (about -4.00),



and Black retains the one pawn he needs to win (if 65.h4 g4+; about -3.91).

(c) Relatively best is 55.♖×a6 ♔e5 56.f6 ♖d2 57.♗g6 ♖×g2+ 58.♔h1 ♖f2+ 59.♔g1 ♖×f6 60.♗h5 (not 60.♗c2? ♖f3 and 61...♖×h3 -3.14) 60...♗×b3,



and Black is certainly better, perhaps with winning chances.

At Black's 56th move, Komodo dislikes the text 56...♔f6-e5?!, recommending instead the unnoticed 56...g4+:





A likely continuation then is 57.h×g4 ♗d5+ 58.♔e3 ♖×g4 59.♖×d6+ ♔e5 60.♖h6 (or 60.♖g6 ♖×g6 61.f×g6 ♗×b3=) 60...h4 61.♖h5 ♗f7 62.♖h7 ♗×b3 63.♖e7+ ♔f6=.

This game featured a lot of indecisive and aimless maneuvering, dragged out through two adjournments and 73 moves. In the ending, Perlis might have let himself and Teichmann call it a night and adjourn to the bar a bit sooner. Here,



rather than the wood-shuffling retreat 64.♔f2, he could have wrapped it up with 64.♗b5! ♔×f5 (if 64...♗b7 65.f6 ♔×f6 66.♔d4 etc.) 65.♔d4 ♔f4 66.♔c5 ♔g3 67.♗c6 and the a-pawn will soon queen. Perlis didn't get the right idea until seven moves later.

***Game 17, Burn-Nenarokov*:** All indications are that the English master Amos Burn was indisposed in this game (and much of the tournament), he displays such a lack of energy and alertness. Lasker correctly points out how he missed an elementary combination at move 27. Komodo also found a harder-to-detect missed opportunity next move, which leads to some fascinating possibilities.



Here Burn played the uninspired 28.♘×e7+. Instead, far more aggressive was 28.h4!, intending the further h4-h5 or ♘f3-g5 as circumstances dictate. Some sample variations:

(a) 28...♘f6 29.e5 d×e5 (if 29...♘d7?? 30.e6+− ; if 29...♘d5 30.h5 ♘gf4 31.c4 ♘c3 32.♕c2 ♘fe2+ 33.♖×e2 ♘×e2+ 34.♕×e2 +1.77) 30.h5 ♗×f3 31.♕×f3



31...e×d4 (if 31...♘f8 32.♕g3 g6 33.♘h6+ ♔g7 34.♘×f7 ♕a8 35.♗h6+ ♔g8 36.♘×e5+ and mate soon, or 31...♘h8 32.d×e5 ♘d7 33.♕g3 g6 34.e6 etc.) 32.h×g6 h×g6 33.♘×d4, and with careful play White's extra piece should decide.

(b) 28...♕a8 29.h5 ♘gf8 30.h6 g6 (if 30...♗×e4 31.♘×g7) 31.♘×e7+ ♖×e7 32.♘g5 and pressure on the f-file will decide,



e.g. 32...♗b7 (or 32...♗×e4 33.♗×f7+ ♖×f7 34.♖×e4+−) 33.♖f1 d5 34.♕f3 f6 35.e×d5 ♔h8 36.c4 (+4.50).

(c) Black's best bet may be to go into a full defensive crouch with 28...♘h8, *e.g.* 29.h5 ♗f6 30.♗c2 ♘f8:



Here Stockfish and Komodo disagree:

(c1) Komodo likes 31.e5 (31.♕d2!?) 31...d×e5 32.♘×e5 ♗×e5 33.♖×e5:



Now 33...♖×e5? loses a piece: 34.d×e5 ♕×d1+ 35.♗×d1, and to avoid smothered mate Black must play a knight to g6, losing it to 36.h×g6, or to e6 or d7, losing the bishop to 36.♘e7+. However, 33...♗d7 may just allow Black to hold. Komodo rates it at about +1.45, but material is equal and there's no clear win in sight for White.

(c2) Stockfish prefers keeping more tension in the position with 31.♕d3, when one plausible line is 31...♗d7 32.g4 h6 33.e5 d×e5 34.d×e5 ♗g5 35.♘×g5 h×g5 36.♗a3 g6:



Now White has the decisive 37.♘h6+ ♔g7 38.♘×f7! ♔×f7 (or 38...♘×f7 39.♗×f8+ ♔×f8 40.h×g6 ♘×e5 41.g7+ ♔×g7 42.♕h7+ and mate soon) 39.♖f1+ ♔g7 40.♗×f8+ ♖×f8 41.♖×f8 ♔×f8 42.e6 (+2.79).

Overall, the position at White's 28th move is highly complex, an "elephant-drowning" position one could examine for days. Since we have not spent *that* much time on it, we do not claim the above analysis to be conclusive. Nevertheless, it's clear that on both objective and psychological grounds, 28.h4! offered far more dynamic potential, and would have set Burn's opponent far more difficult problems, than what he played.

***Game 19, Duras–Dus-Chotimirsky*:**

At White's 12th move,



Komodo indicates that Duras might have safely won a second pawn, with 12.♖he1. Instead with 12.h3?! he began a series of less-than-best moves that allowed Black equality by move 24.

The note at move 25 is confusing.



It is correct in recommending 25...♗×h3 over the text move 25...♗b7, but then gives a "?" to 26.♖g3, leading one to think that Lasker's assessment at the end of the note — "with advantage" — refers to Black. Yet at the end of the line, after 26...♗f4 27.♖×h3 ♗×e5 28.♗×e5 ♖×e5 29.g5 ♘e4 (better 29...♘g4 30.♖g1 ♘f2 31.♖f3 ♘e4 32.♘×e4 ♖×e4 +0.39) 30.♘×e4 ♖×e4 31.♖dh1 ♖f8 32.♖×h7 ♖×f5 33.g6 ♔f8 34.♖h8+ ♔e7 35.♖b8 ♖e6 36.♖g1,



Stockfish rates it +2.12 at 32 ply.

***Game 20, Bernstein-Salwe*:** One omission needs rectifying. At Black's 26th move,



nothing is said about 26...♖ac8??, which was the crucial error that lost the game. Instead, Black could have played 26...b5, when if 27.♘ce3 ♕b6 with equality. Or if 27.b4 ♕c7 28.♘×e5 need not be feared, since after 28...♘×e5! 29.♖×c7 ♘g×f3+ 30.♗×f3 ♘×f3+ 31.♔g3/♔h3 ♘×d2 32.♖×d7 ♘×e4, the dust settles with Black a pawn up.

***Game 21, Cohn-Duras*:** The number and degree of errors of omission by Lasker in this game are disturbing.

First off, the note at Black's 13th move is correct to label 13... ♘e4? a blunder, since it loses a pawn. Best instead was probably 13...♖fe8 intending 14...e5 (-0.65). But in suggesting 13...g5 as the best alternative, Lasker overlooked a very worthwhile and interesting possibility.



White need not retreat the knight with 14.♘hf3; instead 14.♘g6!? introduces exciting complications, some favorable to White and probably none injurious to him.

(a) 14...f×g6?! gives White an attack: 15.♕×g6+ ♔h8 16.♕×h6+,



and now:
(a1) 16...♔g8? 17.e4! d×e4 18.♕g6+ ♔h8 19.♘×e4 ♘×e4 20.♖×e4! ♗×e4 21.♗×e4 ♘b6 (or 21...♘f6 22.♗×a8 ♖×a8 23.♕×f6+ etc., winning) 22.♗×g5 ♕g7 23.♕h5+ ♔g8 24.♗h6 (+1.96);
(a2) 16...♘h7 17.e4 ♖f6 (if 17...d×e4 18.♘×e4 ♘df6 19.♗×g5±) 18.♕h5 ♖ff8, and now White can either play for a draw with 18.♕h6 ♖f6 etc., or try for more with 19.e5, leading to complications neither Komodo, Stockfish, nor Fritz could resolve.

(b) If 14...♖fe8 15.f4!,



and:
(b1) 15...f×g6 is perhaps worse now than the move before, *viz.* 16.♕×g6+ ♔h8 (not 16...♔f8? 17.e4 ♘×e4 18.♘×e4 d×e4 19.f×g5 ♔e7 20.g×h6 ♘f8 21.♗g5+ ♔d7 22.♕h5 (+1.91)) 17.♕×h6+ ♘h7 18.f×g5 with three pawns and an enduring initiative for the piece;
(b2) 15...♘e4 16.♘e5 f5,



when the white king's knight is much better posted and supported than in the position Lasker's note envisioned. Komodo sees no clear advantage for either side (-0.21).

No comment is made on moves 14 to 22, yet over this span White fritters away whatever advantage he had from winning a pawn at move 14. One wishes that some better alternatives were suggested. For example, at move 19,



rather than 19.♗d2, White could have tried 19.a4 to activate the ♖a1 (which ends up never moving the whole game). If then, say, 19...b×a4 20.♖×a4 ♘b6 21.♖a5 and White can either target g5, or augment queenside pressure with ♗c1-d7 and ♖f1-a1.

After 21.f2-f4,



a good alternative for Black goes unmentioned: instead of 21...g4?!, Black would have had an even game with 21...e×f3 22.♖×f3 ♘e4:



White would have a devil of a time trying to maneuver his knight to d2 or f2 to trade off Black's well-posted knight on e4, and his very bad bishop would remain so indefinitely. These and other factors more than compensate Black for the pawn minus.

Lasker praises 27.h3 highly,



but it is effective only because Black replies 27...g×h3?!. Instead 27...♘f6 maintains the pawn on g4 and keeps the game even whether White exchanges on g4 or not (0.01 at 23 ply).

There is a serious inconsistency between Lasker's calling 13...♘e4 "a gross blunder," and the lack of any comment on what was ultimately the real losing move, 28...♘h7-g5??. Instead, 28...♖d5-d6! (just the sort of move Lasker himself might have made) would have resisted stubbornly:



White can't really get much going, *viz.* 29.♘×h5+ ♔h8 30.f6 ♗×f6 31.♘×f6 ♘×f6 32.♖f5 ♔g7= or 29.a4 ♘g5 30.a×b5 ♘f3+ 31.♔h1 ♖h6 32.♗c1 ♕×b5 33.♖×a7 ♖e8 34.b4 ♕×f5=. Lasker's silence at this crucial point might well be called a howler of omission.

***Game 23, Teichmann-Burn*:** Komodo found one middling improvement and two major oversights.

At move 24 for White, the text move 24.♗g5×f6 worked only because Black's reply was a blunder. More interesting and promising was 24.♘f5×g7!?:



If then **(a)** 24...♔×g7?? 25.♕×f6+ ♔g8 26.♗×f7+ ♔f8 27.♗b3#, or **(b)** 24...♕e2 25.♕×f6 ♖e7 (not 25...♕e7?? 26.♘e6+) 26.♗h6 ♗e5 27.♘f5+ ♔e8 28.♕g5 ♖ed7 29.h4 and White is definitely better (+1.34). **(c)** Relatively best for Black is 24...♘d5 25.♗×d8 ♗×d8 26.♗×d5 c×d5 27.♘×e8 ♕×e8 28.♕×d5,



when with rook and two pawns for the bishop and knight, White has good winning chances. (+0.88 at 21 ply).

After Black's blunder at move 24, Lasker made no further comment on the remaining 27 moves, thus overlooking two major mistakes. At move 42,



Teichmann, in a winning position, erred with 42.g5?. Instead, several other moves would have kept the win in hand, notably 42.♘e7 or 42.♘g3.

Yet after 42.g5?, Burn failed to capitalize, playing 42...f×g5 43.f×g5 ♔a5??. Instead, with 43...♖g8! he could have drawn.



Komodo then gives best play for both sides as 44.♖g3 b3 45.♖×c3 ♖×g5+ 46.♔f2 ♖×f5+ 47.♔e2 b2 48.♖b3 ♖h5 49.♔d2 ♖×h6 50.♖×b2,



reaching a book draw. One can only presume that Lasker, generally considered the best endgame player of his day, paid little or no attention to the last half of the game.

***Game 25, Forgács-Vidmar*:** Only one minor correction. In the note at move 18,



it is said that 18...♘d7 would lose a pawn, but that is not the case. After 19.e×d6 ♕×e1+ 20.♕×e1 ♖×e1+ 21.♘×e1 f6 the only way to prevent ♘d8-f7-×d6 is 22.f5 ♘f7 23.♗f4 ♗×f5, which is even worse than losing the d6-pawn.

***Game 26, Rubinstein-Lasker*:** Only two minor comments on this first encounter between these two chess titans, a game well played by Rubinstein and well annotated by Lasker.

In the note at Black's 16th move, after 16...♔b8 17.♖c5,



rather than 17...♕f4, Komodo prefers 17...♕×c5 18.d×c5 ♖×d1 19.♖×d1, rating the resulting position at only +0.48, as compared to about +1.25 for the note line.

In the note at Black's 18th move,



Lasker thought 18...♖e5 19.♕×c6+ ♔b8 20.d×e5 ♕×e5 21.♖c1 offered Black "a better chance," but Komodo does not agree, scoring the resulting position at +1.79, versus about +1.05 for the text continuation.

***Game 27, Freiman-Speijer*:** An ineptly played game between two of the tournament's also-rans. Apparently Lasker did not spend much time on it.

The note at move nine is correct that 9.♘×d5 could have been safely played, but in the variation continuing 9...♘e4,



rather than Lasker's odd 10.♗e3?!, White is much better off with 10.e3, since if 10...♘×g5 11.♘×g5 ♕×g5 12.♘c7+ as in the note's other variation.

A notable error of omission occurs at move 24. Lasker makes no comment on the position (nor on any of moves 21 to 28),



but Black's preceding move, 23...b7-b6, was a blunder (better 23...♕b6±). Yet White failed to capitalize fully, playing 24.♘g5. Instead 24.b4! would have won, forcing on Black an ugly choice between **(a)** 24...♗×e3 25.f×e3 (+2.05), or **(b)** 24...a×b4 25.a×b4 ♗×b4 26.♖d1 ♗×c3 (worse is 26...♕e7 27.♖×d8+ ♕×d8 28.♕×b4 +4.38) 27.♖×d6 ♖×d6 (+2.27).

***Game 28, Spielmann–Znosko-Borovsky*:** A game noteworthy mainly for the fine endgame by Spielmann, which Lasker considered so well played and clear that he made no comment on the last 23 moves. We found only a few improvements.

At Black's 30th move,



it should have been mentioned that 30...♔g6? was a fairly serious mistake, because it allowed White to capture Black's a-pawn without giving up his own a-pawn. Better either 30...♘b3 or 30...♘c6, so that if 31.♘×a6 ♘×a5 and Black still has drawing chances (about +0.66 versus +1.52 after the text).

At Black's 37th move,



Komodo dislikes the text 37...♔d4, dropping its evaluation to +3.16. It prefers 37...♖a8 or 37...♖d7, though White is still in good shape after either (about +1.85).

At White's 41st move,



Spielmann's 41.f4 was not at all bad, but best probably was 41.♖c3+, *e.g.* 41...♔b4 42.♖c7 ♔b3 43.♖b7 b4 44.g3 and Black will soon run out of waiting moves (+3.92 at 23 ply). Spielmann had several chances to play ♖a3-c3+, but never did, making the win a bit more difficult and lengthening the game.

***Game 31, Znosko-Borovsky–Salwe*:** A game not particularly well played, nor all that well annotated. We cannot help but recall the movie title *A Series of Unfortunate Events*.

The note at move five would have done well to point out that in this position,



White need not worry about defending the b-pawn, but can play 6.♘c3!, since if 6...♕×b2? 7.♘b5 c×d4 (or 7...♔d8 8.♖b1 ♕×a2 9.♗c7+ ♔d7 10.♘c3 ♕a3 11.♖b3 ♕a6 12.c×d5+−) 8.♗e2! ♗b4+ (if 8...d×e3 9.♘c7+ ♔d8 10.♘×a8+−) 9.♔f1 ♘f6 10.♘c7+ ♔e7 11.♘×a8 (+1.42). Relatively best for Black after 6.♘c3 is 6...c×d4 7.e×d4 ♘f6 8.a3 d×c4 (not 8...♕×b2?? 9.♘a4+−) 9.♗×c4 ♗e7 10.b4, and Black's queen sortie turns out to be just a waste of time.

A missed opportunity goes unremarked at Black's 23rd move.



Rather than the tepid text move 23...d×c4 (-0.15), much more interesting and energetic was 23...d4!?, *e.g.*
(a) 24.♗g3 d3 25.♖f1 (Black threatened 25...d2 26.♖c2 ♕×d1+) 25...♘e4 26.♗f4 (Black threatened 26...♘×g3 27.f×g3 d2 28.♖cd1 ♕e2−+) 26...♘g5 27.♗×g5 ♕×g5 28.f4 ♕g6 (-1.33);
(b) 24.e×d4 c×d4 25.♖e1 d3 26.♗×f6 ♕g6 27.f3 g×f6 28.♕f2 e5,



and Black is clearly better: White is cramped, and Black can both push his central pawns and pressure g2 on the open file and long diagonal (about -0.70). The pressure on g2 is an advantage Lasker mentioned in his note to move 23.

At the risk of seeming superfluous, we will point out that the note at move 25 can be improved. After 25.♗×g7,





the note's 25...e5 does win (-2.28), but much stronger is 25...♕g5 (threatening mate) 26.f3 ♕×g7 27.♕×g7+ ♔×g7 28.♖×c4 ♘e5 (-4.42).

Lasker is full of praise for the last phase of the game, saying "The finish is vigorously played by Black," but in fact moves 33-35 are a particularly bad stretch for both the players (who were probably under time pressure) and Lasker (who was not). No comment is made on the many inferior moves. At move 33, for example,



White's 33.g4? is a mistake; better was 33.e4 or 33.♖c1. Instead of 33...♗g6?! (another move wrongly praised), Black could have exploited the error with 33...♘d5!, when a likely continuation is 34.♕e1 ♗g6



and **(a)** 35.e4 (if 35.♗×g6 h×g6 36.♕c1 e4 37.f4 (or 37.f×e4 ♕×e4 38.♗f 2 ♖e7−+) 37...♘b4 38.♕c3 a6 and the advance of the queenside majority should decide, plus the knight can be posted at d3 (-2.12); **(b)** 35.e4 ♘b4 36.♕e2 ♘c6 37.♗f2 ♗f7 38.♖d1 ♘d4 39.♗×d4 c×d4 (-2.30).

Next move White erred again.



Instead of 34.♗d1?, 34.e4! offered much more resistance, *e.g.* 34...♕d6 35.♗f2, or 34...♗f7 35.♗g3, both about equal according to Komodo. Black will have more trouble exploiting the holes at d4 and f4 than in the previous variation.

But yet again, Black failed to exploit his opponent's mistake, which he could have done with 34...♘d5!:



A plausible continuation then is 35.♕c4 e4 36.f×e4 ♕×e4 37.♕×e4 ♗×e4 and something's gotta give,



viz. 38.♗f2? ♘c3−+, or 38.♔f2 ♘c3 39.♔e1 a5 (to relieve the rook from defense of the a-pawn) 40.♗g5 ♖d3 41.♗c2 ♖d5 42.♗×e4 ♘×e4 43.♗f4 ♖d3 44.♖b1 g5 45.♗c7 ♖×e3+ 46.♔d1 ♖×h3−+.

Instead Black played the inferior 34...♗d3 (about -1.00),



to which White could have best replied with 35.♗c2, 35.b4 or 35.e4, but instead he played 35.♗g3?. Black finally got the right idea with 35...e4!, by which time it didn't much matter what White played.

***Game 32, Speijer-Spielmann*:** Only a minor correction to be offered here. At Black's 19th move,



Lasker correctly faults Spielmann's 19...♕g6, recommending instead 19...♖fe8 as the way to retain Black's advantage. But Komodo gives both moves a near 0.00 evaluation. Instead it prefers 19...♗×f3!? and either **(a)** 20.♘×f3? ♕g6 (threatening 21...♘h3+ 22.♔h1 ♘e×f2+) 21.g3 ♘g5 22.♘d4 ♕×c2 23.♘×c2 ♘f3+ (-1.75); or **(b)** 20.g×f3 ♘g5 followed by 21...♘ge6, with a strong knight outpost on f4 (-0.69).

***Game 33, Lasker-Freiman*:** An interesting, complex game Lasker might well have lost. While his notes need some correction and improvement, they indicate he clearly understood this.

The note at move seven is correct that complications stemming from 7.♘db5 d4 8.a3 can turn out in Black's favor, but not with the continuation Lasker gives.



His recommended 8...♗a5 9.b4 e5 leads only to material and positional equality after 10.b×a5 e×f4 11.♘d5 ♕×a5+ 12.♕d2 ♕×d2+ 13.♔×d2 ♔f8 14.♘×f4. Instead, some advantage can be gained by 8...♗×c3+ 9.b×c3 e5



10.♗×e5 (or 10.♗g3 a6 and the knight is lost) 10...♘×e5 11.♕×d4 (if 11.c×d4? ♘×c4) 11...♕e7 12.f4 ♘g6 13.♘d6+ ♔f8,



and Black should be able to untangle his position and win with his extra piece, especially since White's nominal two-pawn compensation is a doubled isolani on an open file (-0.66).

Move 25 was an important turning point.





Lasker is quite correct that 25...♗×d5 (rather than 25...b5) was indeed strongest, though after 26.e×d5 b5 27.f4 b×c4 28.f×e5 ♕×d5,



White need not play the note's 29.♖d1? (rated about -3.21 after 29...♖d8 30.♔f1 f×e5). At least half a dozen moves are better, notably 29.♔h1, 29.♕e1, 29.♕f2 or 29.♕e3, though Black still is clearly better in all of them (about -2.00 at 24 ply). It is a pity for Freiman, to whom Dr. Elo gave an historical rating of 2420 (300 points below Lasker), that he failed to play 25...♗×d5. It could have led to a major upset he could have cherished all his life, and would probably have prevented Lasker from tying Rubinstein for first place in the final standings. As it was, Freiman finished 18th, a mere half-point from the bottom.

The next note, at move 26, seems to imply that 26...♗×d5 would no longer be good, but that is not the case; it is equally as strong as the text move 26...b4. After 26...♗×e5 27.f×e5,



Black is not obliged to play the note's 27...♖×c4?! (-0.41); instead 27...b4! 28.♖d3 f×e5 29.e×d5 ♖×c4 retains some advantage (-1.20).

Lasker's note at move 30 seems to disparage 30...♖c2, but it was at least as good as the text move 30...♖c1 and probably Black's best bet. After the further 31.♕d2-g5,



the note is correct to give 31...♕×d5 a question mark, but it overlooks that 31...♘e2+! retains

some advantage for Black, *viz.* 32.♔h1 e4 33.♖dd1 ♘c3 34.♖d4 h6 35.♕g4 ♖d8 36.♖×b4 ♘×d5 (-1.14).

The note at White's 31st move is correct that 31.♗g3×e5 would be a mistake, but then gives an invalid refutation.



Lasker's 31...♖×e1+?! leads to little or nothing, *e.g.* 32.♕×e1 ♖c1 33.♖d1 ♘c2 34.♖×c1 ♘×e1 35.♖c8+ ♕f8 36. ♖×f8 ♔×f8, and White has whatever advantage there may be with bishop-for-knight in an open endgame with pawns on both wings. Instead 31...♖8c2! is decisive: 32.♗×d4 (if 32.♕e3 ♘e2+ and mate shortly) 32...♖×d2 33.♖×c1 ♖×d3 34.♖c8+ ♕f8 35.♖×f8 ♔×f8 36.♗c5+ ♔f7 37.♗×b4 ♖×d5 and Black will win the exchange-up ending (-3.63).

The next note is perhaps ambiguous, saying that after 31.d6,



White "threatened" 32.d7 ♕×d7 33.♖×c1. Presumably Lasker meant that in a position where Black stands better, White threatened to force a draw, since after 33...♖×c1+ 34.♕×c1 ♘e2+ 35.♔f2 ♕×d3 36.♕c8+ ♔f7 37.♕c7+ etc., that's all there is.

The note at Black's 33rd move is a very mixed bag of good and bad analysis.



It is correct to fault Freiman's 33...♕d7, which let Black's winning chances disappear for good, the evaluation going from about -1.00 to +0.76, a near two-pawns-worth swing. It is also correct to advise against 33...♖c2? 34.♕×c2 ♘×c2 35.d7+− . But while Lasker's recommended line 33...♖c6 is better than either of those, his supporting analysis has errors.





First, his 34.♗f2? is a serious mistake and not at all forced; better is 34.♖e3 ♖×d6 35.♕×b4 and White is not too bad off (-0.63). The reason 34.♗f2? is bad is that after 34.♗f2 ♖×d6 35.♗×d4,



rather than the note's 35...♖×d4, Black can play 35...♕c4! 36.♕e3 ♖d5!,



when he will soon capture the bishop and also retain a winning two-pawn advantage (-2.15). Instead (from previous diagram), after the note's 36.♖×d4? e×d4 37.♕×d4 ♕×a2?!,



rather than 38.♕×b4, which leads to a very problematic queen ending where only Black has winning chances, White can immediately force a draw by 38.♕d8+ ♔f7 39.♕d7+ ♔f6 40.♕d4+ etc. It is not mentioned that Black could avoid an immediate draw by 37...h6 and only then 38.♕×b4 ♕×a2, but then his winning chances are far smaller (about -0.67), and the win would be far more difficult, than in the aforementioned 35...♕c4! line.

Finally, going back to Black's 33rd move, best is probably the unmentioned 33...♖c1-c4,





when after either **(a)** 34.♕e3 ♕d5 35.d7 ♕×d7 36.♕×e5 a5 37.♕b8+ ♖c8 (-1.16), or **(b)** 34.♖e3 ♕d5 35.d7 ♖c2 36.d8♕+ ♕×d8 37.♕×b4 ♕c7 (-1.06), or **(c)** 34.♗g3 h6 35.♕e3 (not 35.♗×e5?? ♖c1+ 36.♕×c1 ♘e2+) 35...♕d5 36.d7 ♖c2 (-1.60), Black retains fair to good winning chances, though the game remains quite complicated.

***Game 34, Vidmar-Rubinstein*:**

The note at move 17 is correct to point out that 18...♗d6-b4 was a threat,



but White need not reply with 19.♗a3? ♗×a3 20.♖×a3 a×b5 (-3.17). Instead 19.♖ac1 a×b5 20.a×b5 ♖ac8 (not 20...♗×c3 21.♗×c3 ♗×b5?? 22.♗×f6+) 21.♘db1 (-1.16) is not nearly so egregious.

Komodo takes issue with the move 22 note at several points.



In the first place, it does not see the text move 22.f3 as at all bad; in fact it considers it best at this point, about which more below. Lasker preferred 22.♖×b4,



by which he believed "White might have saved the game," but this is open to question, and his supporting analysis is flawed. For example in the sub-variation 22...♖×b4 23.♗c5+ ♔d8 24.♗×b4 a×b4,



rather than 25.♘c5?!, which turns unfavorable after 25...b6 26.♘a6 b3 27.♖b1 ♖c8 28.h3 ♖c4 (about -0.95), White should play 25.♖b1 ♖×a4 26.♘c5 ♖a8 27.f3 ♗c8 (if 27...♗×b5 28.♖×b4 ♗c6 29.♘×b7±) 28.♖×b4 and Black's advantage, if any, is negligible (about -0.33).

In the main (and supposedly saving for White) line of the variation, after 22...a×b4 23.♗c5+ ♔d8 24.♗b6+ ♔e7 25.♗c5+ ♖×c5 26.♘×c5,



Black need not go into Lasker's drawing line with 26...b6?!. He can retain an advantage with 26...♖c8!, when if **(a)** 27.♘×b7? b3 28.♘a5 b2 29. ♘b3 e5 (intending 30...♗e6) 30.b6 ♖c3 31.♘d2 ♔d8−+ ; or better **(b)** 27.♘×d7 ♔×d7 28.♖d1+ ♔e7 29.♔f1 (if 29.♖b1 ♖c4 -1.59) 29...♖a8 and either **(b1)** 30.♔e2 ♖×a4 31.♔d3 ♖a2 and Black has the more active rook (-0.92), or **(b2)** 30.♖a1 ♔d6 31.♔e2 ♔c5 32.♔d3 ♖d8+ 33.♔c2 ♔c4, when Black has the more active rook and better king position (-1.27). This does not prove that Black still would have won against best play after 22.♖×b4, but it makes the claim that it would have saved the game for White look tenuous, especially considering that it was Rubinstein with the black pieces.

Returning to the actual game line,



22.f3! was actually the best move on the board, and after the reply 22...f6 (slightly better was 22...♖ac8), White now indeed could have forced a draw with 23.♖×b4!:



The crucial difference is that now, unlike the move before, White need no longer worry about back-rank mate. So after 23...a×b4 24.♗c5+ ♖×c5 25.♘×c5 then **(a)** Black cannot play 25...♖c8 as before, since White can proceed merrily with 26.♘×b7! b3 27.♖b1 ♖c3 28.♘a5, when *he* has the winning chances. Or if **(b)** 25...b6 26.♘a6 b3 27.♖b1=, or **(c)** 25...♗c8 26.♖b1=. And if (from original diagram) Black chooses 23.♖×b4, then 24.♗c5+ ♔d8 25.♗×b4 a×b4 26.♖b1 ♖×a4 27.♘c5 ♖a8 and White is fine whether he plays 28.♖×b4, 28.♘×b7+, or 28.♖d1 b6 29.♘×e6+ (all at or near 0.00).

Lasker's note at move 23 merely says "23.♖×b4 was still feasible," not making clear how truly efficacious it would have been, and making it seem like it was equally efficacious the move before, which it was not. Of course, since Vidmar played 23.♖fd1?, it all became academic.

Except for saying "with infinite cleverness Black avoids giving the slightest chance to his opponent," Lasker makes no comment on the remaining 55 moves. There appears to be at least one point where Rubinstein's cleverness was less than infinite. At move 39,



he played 39...♗d4?!, which could have allowed White some small chance with 40.♗d2! ♔×d5 41.a5 ♖b2 42.b6 (-1.57). Instead 39...♖f2+! 40.♔e1 ♖×f3 (-4.11) would have ended the game much sooner.

***Game 37, Mieses-Teichmann*:** A game that packs a lot of interesting tactical possibilities into its 25 moves. Lasker seems to have missed several.

The note at move 11 is perhaps misleading toward the end. After 11...♕×e7 12.♘×d4 ♖d8 13.c3 ♖×g7 14.♕a4 ♔f8,



rather than 15.♘×c6??, which allows mate in a few moves starting with 15...♖×g2+!, White can simply win a pawn with 15.♘×e6+ f×e6 16.♕×c4 (+0.83). Presumably Lasker mentioned only 15.♘×c6 to illustrate the tactical potential of Black's position, but objectively it would have been better to mention it the move before,



when instead of 14...♔f8? Black could play the Morphyesque 14...♖×g2+! 15.♔×g2 ♗h3+! 16.♔×h3 ♕×e1 17.♕×c4 (if 17.♘×c6 ♕f1+ 18.♔g3 ♖d3+ etc.) 17...♘×d4 18.c×d4 ♖d6 etc. (-3.30). Also instead of 14.♕a4??, White would have been better off with 14.♕f3, 14.g3, 14.♘×e6 or several other moves.

White's crucial mistake occurred at move 20, and the position merits more examination than Lasker gave it.



Instead of 20.♕d2? he unenthusiastically recommended 20.a4, but at least two other moves were viable:
(a) 20.♘h4 ♖g4 21.g3 ♘×d4 22.♘×d4 ♖×d4 (if 22...♕×d4?! 23.♖×c7) 23.♕e3 ♔g8 24.♖×c7 (about -0.45);
(b) 20.♕e3!? a4 21.♘c5



21...♘×d4 (if 21...♗h3 there is the surprising 22.♘d3! ♗×g2 23.♘f4 ♗×f3+ 24.♘×g6+ h×g6 25.♕h6+ ♔g8 26.♖ce3 ♖f8 27.♖e8 ♕d6 28.♖1e6! f×e6 29.♕×g6+ etc., draw) 22.♘h4, and after either 22...♖g4 23.♕h6+ or 22...♖g7 23.g3, the position is complex but dynamically equal. The above is neither conclusive nor comprehensive, but it indicates that White's position had more resilience than Lasker suspected.

After 20.♕×d2? Mieses may have been objectively lost, but he had one chance to offer more resistance that both he and Lasker overlooked. At move 22,



instead of 22.♘×e6+?? (-3.62) he should have played 22.♕×d4!? ♕×d4 23.♘×d4 ♖×d4 24.♘×e6+ ♖×e6 25.♔f1 with drawing chances, especially considering that "all rook endgames are drawn" (-1.22).

***Game 38, Duras-Nenarokov*:** A difficult game to analyze by computer, because the cramped, crowded position required slow maneuvering and offered few tactical opportunities. There were several points where Komodo disagreed strongly with the move played, by as much as +/– 1.50, but in playing through its recommended variations we could seldom reach a position where there was a clearly visible reason for its evaluations. We give here only lines where the reason was clear.

At move 27,



Lasker says 27.♗×b5 would be faulty, giving 27...c×b5 28.♕×b5 ♖×b7, which indeed is bad for White (-2.44). However, 27.♗×b5 is in fact the best move if followed up the right way, which is 27...c×b5 28.♕a6!:



If now **(a)** 28...♖×b7 29.♕×f6 ♘h5 (worse is 29...♘e8 30.♕f4) 30.♕a6 when the b-pawn will fall and ♘f3-e5 looms (+1.88); **(b)** if 28...♕e7 simply 29.♖×b5; **(c)** 28...♗d8 29.♖×b5 ♗b6 30.c×b6 ♖×b7 and either 31.b×a7 or 31.♘e5 lead to a clear advantage for White (at least +1.70). The latter line includes this interesting possibility, after 31.♘e5 ♕d6?:



32.♕×b7! ♗×b7 33.b×a7 ♗a8 34.♖b8+−. Better would be 31...♕f5, to threaten back-rank mate in some lines, but then 32.h3! would renew White's threats.

After White's 34th move, 34.♕d2-a5,



Lasker says "White threatens 35.♗f4 ♘de6 36.♗e5," but just as Game 8 featured a case of "wrong rook," this is a case of "wrong knight." Entering a null 34th move for Black and playing 35.♗f4, Komodo strongly prefers the reply 35...♘ce6:



Presumably Lasker discarded this move because it left the a-pawn insufficiently defended, but if now 36.♗e5 ♗×e5 37.♘×e5 ♕e7 38.♖×a6 (not 38.♗×a6? ♖ca8) 38...♖×a6 39.♕×a6 (again not 39.♗×a6? ♖a8) 39...♖c7



40.♘f3 (else 40...♘×d4) 40...♖a7 41.♕b6 ♖×a4, and both material and the position are even. Going back to the previous diagram, Komodo says White's best course is to move the bishop back to e3 and find a different plan, indicating that 35.♗f4 was never a threat to begin with.

Little comment, and no valid comment, is made on a series of mistakes that actually decided the game. At move 39,



Black stood clearly worse, very likely lost (about -1.90). Still, he could have maintained that

status quo with 39...♔g7, 39...♔h8, or 39...♖c8, but he made matters much worse by playing 39...h6??. However, White replied weakly with 40.♗d2?!. Instead he had the winning 40.♖×c7!:



If now:

(A) 40...♘×c7 41.♕×c7 and:



(A1) 41...a5 (to prevent ♗×a6 if the black rook is moved) 42.♗f4 ♕c8 (or 42...♕e6 43.♗d6 ♖c8 44.♕×a5+−) 43.♗×h6+! ♔×h6 44.♕×f7 and mate soon;
(A2) 41...♖b8 42.♗×a6 ♖b1+ 43.♔h2 leads to no counterplay for Black (+4.45);
(A3) 41...♖c8 42.♕f4 a5 (if 42...h5 43.♗×a6+−) 43.♕×h6+ ♔g8 44.♘g5 ♗×g5 45.♗×g5 ♕f8 46.♕h4 f5 47.♗f6 (+6.33).

(B) 40...♗d8:



Lasker rejected 40.♖×c7 because of this move, evidently thinking the pin would immobilize and win the rook. But the rook can move, and with decisive effect. 41.♖×f7+! and:



(B1) 41...♔×f7 42.♕b1! ♔g7 43.♘e5 g5 44.♗g6 ♕e7 45.♗h5 (also good is 45.♘×c6 ♕c7

46.♕f5+−) 45...♘f8 46.♘g6 ♕f7 (if 46...♕e8 47.♕b7+) 47.♘×f8 ♕×f8 (if 47...♕×h5 48.♘e6+ ♔f6 49.♕b7), and now White can win with either **(B1a)** 48.♕b7+ ♗e7 49.♕×c6 ♖b8 50.♕×d5 or **(B1b)** 48.♕g6+ ♔h8 49.♕×c6 ♖a7 50.♕×d5.
(B2) 41...♕×f7 42.♕×c6 and either **(B2a)** 42...♘c7 43.♘e5 ♕e6 44.♕b7 g5 45.♘c6 ♕d7 46.♘b8) 42...♖a7 43.♘e5 ♕g8 44.♘×g6, or **(B2b)** (42...♘c7 43.♘e5 ♕e6 44.♕b7 g5 45.♘c6 ♕d7 46.♘b8−+ .

Duras, knowing he had a winning strategic advantage, may not have wanted to risk unclear tactical complications with 40.♖×c7. Even so, he might have found them forced upon him anyway.



Much better than Duras' 40.♗d2?! were 40.h4 (+2.58) or any of several non-committal moves such as 40.♗e2 or 40.♔h2. The text move gave Nenarokov one last chance to muddy the waters with 40...♘b5!?,



when after 41.a×b5 a×b5 42.♖a7 ♘×d4 43.♖×a8 ♕×a8 44.♘×d4 ♗×d4 Black has two passed pawns for the piece and there is still a lot of play in the position (about +1.11). But instead he played 40...♔h7?? and Duras finally capitalized with 41.♖×c7 and won.

***Game 39, Dus-Chotimirsky–Cohn*:** An exciting attacking game with some complex, interesting variations overlooked by both the players and Lasker.

The note at move 11 goes astray in the sub-variation 11.g4 b5 12.g5 ♘e8 13.♕h3 g6 14.♘×g6.



Lasker considered only 14...h×g6, which is definitely to White's advantage (at least +0.90). But the knight sac is refuted by 14...f×g6!, when if 15.d×c5 as in the note there is no mate threat at

h8, and Black can safely play 15...♘×c5 16.♗×g6 ♕d7 (-0.89). Or if 15.♗×g6 h×g6 16.d×c5 d4 17.c×d6 (if 17.♗×d4? e5) 17...♗×h1 18.♕×e6+ ♖f7 19.♕×g6+ ♘g7 20.♗×d4 ♘f8, when with careful play Black's extra rook and knight should more than compensate for White's six extra pawns (-1.61 at 28 ply).

A strong, probably winning move went unnoticed by both Lasker and Cohn at Black's 18th. Rather than 18...♕d7-c7?!, Cohn should have played 18...d4!:



Among other things, this threatens 19...♖e3 20.♕f2 ♗b4+ 21.♔c1 ♖fe8 and White is about to have the roof fall in on him. White's best defensive tries are:
(A) 19.♖ae1, when best play might continue 19...g5 20.♖hf1 ♖×e1 21.♔×e1 ♖e8+ 22.♔d1 ♖e3 23.♕f2 ♗×f4 24.♖e1 ♔g7 25.♖e2 ♕d5 26.♗c1 ♕e5 27.♖×e3 (not 27.♗×e3?? d×e3 28.♕e1 ♕a1#) 27...d×e3 28.♕e2 ♗e4 and Black's advantage is obvious (-1.77).
(B) 19.♔c1 ♖e3 20.♕f2 ♖c8 and:



(B1) 21.♔b1 ♗e4 22.♗×e4 ♖×e4 23.♖d1 ♕g4 24.♕f3 ♕×f3 25.g×f3 ♖e2−+;
(B2) 21.♖d1 ♖×d3! 22.♖×d3 ♗e4 23.♔b1 (if 23.♖d2 d3−+) 23...♗×d3 24.c×d3 ♕g4 (threatening mate) 25.a3 ♕d1+ 26.♔a2 ♕×d3 (-1.88).
(C) 19.♗×d4 ♖e4! and:



(C1) 20.♗×e4 ♗×f4+ 21.♕×f4 ♕×d4+ 22.♔e2 ♖e8−+;
(C2) 20.♗e3 ♗b4+ and:





(C2a) 21.c3 ♖d8 22.♗×b6 ♕c6 23.c×b4 ♕×b6 24.♖hd1 ♖×d3+ 25.♕×d3 ♖d4−+;
(C2b) 21.♔c1 ♖fe8 and:



(C2b1) 22.♗×e4 ♗×e4 23.♕f2 (if 23.♖d1?? ♗a3+ 24.♔b1 ♕×d1+ 25.♗c1 ♕×c1#) 23...♖c8−+;
(C2b2) 22.♗f2 ♗a3+ 23.♔b1 ♕c8 24.♗c4+ (if 24.♗×e4 ♗×e4 and mate shortly) 24...♔h8 25.♖d1 b5 26.♗f1 ♕c7 (-5.59).

After the further text moves 19.♖af1 g5 20.♕g4, no mention is made of the fact that Black erred with 20...♗×f4+?!:



Instead of 21.♔d1?!, which let Black retain some advantage (about -0.80), White could have forced equality with 21.♖×f4! ♕×f4+ 22.♕×f4 g×f4 23.♖f1, when his active bishops and the vulnerability of Black's pawns compensate for the exchange sac.

In the note at Black's 23rd move, Lasker is correct to fault 23...♖fe8, but after his recommended 23...♗c8-e6,



the only reply he considers is the egregious 24.g3??, which loses quickly in the manner he describes (-3.83). There are several moves not nearly so bad, chiefly 24.♖f3 (-0.93), and 24.♖×f4 ♖×d3+ (not 24...g×f4?! 25.♖f1 ♖c8 26.♖f2=) 25.c×d3 ♕×f4 26.h3 (-1.07).

It also bears mentioning that besides 23...♗e6, Black had other ways to keep trying for a win, notably 23...d4 and 23...♖×d3. Furthermore, after he blew it with 23...♖fe8?,



White might well have tried for more than a draw with 24.♖×f4!? g×f4 (not 24...♕×f4?? 25.♕×h7+) 25.♗×f6 ♖×d3+ (more or less forced) 25.c×d3 ♕c7 26.♕g5+ ♕g6, when there is still some play in the position. After the text 24.g3 Black played correctly to force the draw.

***Game 42, Schlechter-Mieses*:** A spritely attacking game by Mieses, with some surprisingly flawed annotations.

At White's 11th move, Lasker's recommended 11.♕d2 is fine, but the rest of the note is rife with errors.



First off, rather than 12...e5?, Black has several better alternatives such as 11...e6, 11...♘c6, and 11...♕f5, all of which keep the game more or less even. After the further 12.a3,



the note's 12...♘c6? takes Black from bad (+0.95) to worse (+2.15). Instead 12...♘bd5 minimizes the damage, *viz.* 13.d×e5 (not 13.b4?! ♕b6 14.♘×d5 ♘×d5 15.d×e5 ♘×e3 16.♕×e3 ♕×e3 17.f×e3=) 13...♘×c3 14.♕×c3 ♕×c3 15.♘×c3 ♘g4 (+0.95).

Continuing in the note line, after 13.b4 ♕b6,





Lasker's 14.d×e5? would throw away White's advantage. Correct is 14.d5! ♘d4 15.♘×d4 e×d4 16.♗×d4 ♕a6 17.♕g5, when White is up a pawn with advantages in space and development as well (+1.83).

After the note's 14.d×e5?,



rather than Lasker's 14...♕a6?, Black can turn the game around with 14...♖×d2! 15.♗×b6 ♘g4 16.♗e3 (or 16.h3 ♘g×e5) 16...♖×c2 17.♗f4 ♘g×e5,



when Black is a pawn up and White has no prospect of trapping the wayward rook (-1.10).

Over the rest of the note variation, 15.b5 ♕a5 16.b×c6 ♖×d2 17.c×b7+ ♔×b7 18.♖ab1+ ♔c8, Komodo finds no serious objection until the end.



Here 19.♗×d2 should lead to equality, *e.g.* 19...♕×e5 20.♖b5 ♕d6 21.♖fb1 ♕×d2 22.♖b8+ ♔d2 23.♖d1 ♕×d1+ 24.♘×d1. Instead, the final move of the note variation, 19.♖b5,



far from giving White “a good game,” consigns him to an uphill battle after 19...♕×b5! 20.♘×b5 ♖×e2 21.♘×a7+ ♔d7 22.e×f6 ♖×c2 23.f×g7 ♗×g7 (-1.27):



It is surprising to see a World Champion make so many errors in the space of nine moves.

The note at move 23 goes badly awry. Had White played 23.h3,



Black’s best is probably 23...♗h2+ 24.♔h1 (if 24.♔f1 simply 24...♘f6 with a two-pawn advantage) 24...♕h4 25.h×g4 ♗f4+ 26.♔g1 ♗×c1 27.♘×c1 h5 28.♖h3 ♕e1+ 29.♕f1 ♕×f1+ 30.♔×f1 ♖×d4 31.♘f2 g6, and the ♘+♘-vs-♜+♟+♟+♟ material imbalance is probably even more in Black’s favor than Komodo’s -1.30 evaluation indicates.

Continuing with the note line, Lasker’s 23...h5 is probably the second-best move,



but his continuation 24.♖b3?? is positively atrocious. Instead, though White will still stand worse, he has two much better continuations: **(a)** 24.d×e5 ♘×e5 25.♕e4 ♘×f3+ 26.♕×f3 (-1.50); and **(b)** 24.h×g4 h×g4 25.♖fc3 ♗h2+ 26.♔f1 ♗d6 27.g3 ♖h1+ 28.♘g1 ♕f5+ 29.♘f2 ♖h2 30.♖1c2 (-1.30).

After 24.♖b3?? Lasker’s 24...♗h2+ 25.♔h1 ♗d6 is quite good enough to win (about -2.00), but best is 24...♕d2!:





25.♘f2 (Black threatened 25... ♕e1#) 25...♘×f2 26.d×e5 (or 26.♔×f2 ♗×d4+ 27.♔g3 ♗×b2) 26...♘d3 27.♖cc3 ♘×e5 (-4.42).

***Game 44, Rubinstein-Perlis*:** A game well-conducted by Rubinstein until he missed a winning move twice in a row, and again probably a third time later. Lasker's notes are rather hit-or-miss.

In the note to Black's 11th move, the second variation can be improved at several points. After 11...♕b6 12.f5 ♘×e5,



rather than 13.♘a4, much better is 13.f×e6!. The two main variations then are **(a)** 13...f×e6 14.♘a4 ♕c7 15.d×e5 ♕×e5 16.♗f4 ♕f5 17.♗d6 ♕×f1+ 18.♕×f1 ♗×d6 (+2.08), and **(b)** 13...♘eg4 14.h3 ♘h6 15.♗×f6 ♗×f6 16.♖×f6! g×f6 17.e7 ♖fe8 18.♘×d5 ♕d6 19.e4 (+1.37).

13.♘a4 only seems effective in Lasker's note because he gives the reply 13...♕a5? (about +2.42). Instead, Black can resist much more effectively with 13...♕c7,



when play continues 14.f×e6 ♘eg4 15.e×f7+ ♖×f7 (+1.09).

Continuing the note line, after 13...♕a5? 14.d×e5 ♗d7 15.e×f6 ♗×a4,



stronger than Lasker's 16.b3 (only +0.67) is 16.f×e7! ♗×d1 17.e×f8♕+ ♖×f8 18.♖a×d1 and White has ♖+♗+♗ for the queen (+1.78).

Finally, after the note's 16...b3,



rather than 16...g×f6? (+2.04), Black can play 16...♗c5+! 17.♔h1 ♗c6 with reasonable hope of survival (only +0.65).

At White's 15th move,



Lasker is correct that the text move 15.b×c3 is better than 15.♗×f8, but his supporting analysis is seriously flawed. After 15.♗×f8 c×b2 16.♗×e7 ♕×e7 17.♖b1 c3 18.♕c2



the note's 18...♕c5+ is ineffective (better 18...♕b4, about which more below). The note continues 19.♔h1 ♖d8,



where Lasker now incomprehensibly gives 20.♖bd1?? ♖×d1 21.♖×d1 ♗×a2 (-4.87). Instead, White can save himself with 20.♖×b2! ♖d2 (of course not 20...c×b2?? 21.♕×c5) 21.♕×d2 c×d2 22.♖d1=. We must label this another howler.

Instead, with 18...♕b4!?,



Black retains winning chances, *e.g.* 19.a3 ♕×a3 20.♗e4 ♕b4 (20...♗a2?! 21.♖bd1 is less effective) 21.e3 a5 and the advance of the a-pawn should decide.

The note at move 20 is wrong to say that after 20...♗×e4 "White has the best of it." After 21.♗×e4,



instead of Lasker's 21...♕×h6?, which does give White the best of it (+1.39), correct is 21...f×e4!, when best play continues 22.♖d7! ♖×d7 23.♕g4+ ♕g6 24.♕×d7 ♗c5 25.♗g5 e3 26.♕×b7 ♖e8 27.♖e1 h6 28.♗h4 ♕d3,



and Black is definitely better, probably winning (-1.90).

At move 25, Lasker is entirely correct that Rubinstein missed a winning move by playing 25.♖f4-g4 instead of 25.♖f4-h4, but he was wrong to call this "White's only mistake in the game." In fact Rubinstein made the same mistake twice! Lasker neglects to point out that Black's reply gave Rubinstein the same opportunity next move.



Here, Perlis played 25...♖g8??, which again loses to 26.♖h4. Relatively best was 25...♗c5, when after 26.♗e3 ♖ad8 27.♗d4 ♖×d4 28.♖×d4 e3, Black is down the exchange but still has some fight left in him (+1.41). Whereas after 25...♖g8 26.♖h4 he would have been crushed (+5.17).

Even after missing the two chances for 25/26.♖h4, White still stood much the better, probably winning. It required one more mistake by Rubinstein to let it slip to a draw. That came at move 32.



Rubinstein played 32.♔g2?!. Much stronger was 32.♕×f7! ♗×c3 33.♖e2 ♗d2 34.♕×b7,



when though winning might still be difficult, White has all the chances (+3.48).

***Game 45, Freiman-Vidmar*:** Another tragedy for Freiman, losing a won game just as he did in the previous round (see Game 33). Lasker's annotations have their own tragic flaws.

No comment is made on move 17, but Komodo indicates that Black's game started heading downhill at that point.



He played 17...♘d7?! and the evaluation suddenly goes from about even to +1.05. There was no immediate need for him to defend the b6-pawn, and he could have played 17...d×c4 18.♗×c4 ♖ad8 19.♗e2 (not 19.♘×b6? ♕c5) 19...♘d5 with only a slight advantage for White (+0.61).

At move 20, Lasker criticizes the text 20.♗×d7, but it is actually by far the best move on the board. His recommendation 20.♖ac1 is supported by very sloppy analysis in which he has Black playing blunder after blunder.



The note's reply 20...♕d6? is terrible; much better is 20...d4! and either 21.♕×d4 ♘c5 with only a slight disadvantage (about +0.50), or 21.e×d4 ♗×g2! 22.♗×h7+ (not 22.♔×g2? ♕g5+ 23.♔f1 ♕×f5 -1.52) 22...♔×h7 23.♔×g2 ♖h8, with kingside attacking chances for the pawn (-0.40).

Continuing with the note line, after 21...♕d6? 21.♕d4 (slightly better is 21.♗×d7 ♖×d7 22.♕d4 +2.00) 21...♕×a3,



Lasker gives the inferior 22.♖c7?! (better simply 22.♗×d7 ♖×d7 23.♘×b6), and then tops it all off with 22...♘c5?? (+4.68) when Black might hang on with 22...♗c8 (+1.31).

There is no note at White's 22nd move,



but it bears pointing out that while the text 22.♘a4 was not at all bad, even better was 22.♕d4 ♕c7 23.♘c4 ♖h6 24.♘e5 with a safe extra pawn and positional superiority (+2.29).

Lasker fails to point out a serious mistake at White's 26th move.



Instead of 26.♖4d3?, which could have thrown the win away, White had 26.♕b3!, when a

plausible continuation is 26...h6 (else ♘a4-b2-c4 may be feasible in some lines due to the possibility of back-rank mate) 27.♘b2 ♕b6 28.♕d3 ♖e6 29.a4 ♖e7 30.♕f5 ♕e6 31.♕f3 ♖ec7 32.♘d3,



and White is in fine shape (+1.80).

As it turned out, after 26.♖4d3 Black failed to capitalize, playing 26...h6?. Lasker's recommendation 26...d4! was indeed best, but yet again his supporting analysis is flawed.



Instead of Lasker's dreadful 27.g3?? or 27.♕×d4??, relatively best is 27.e4 ♗×e4 28.♕×d4 ♖×g2+ 29.♔f1 ♗×d3+ 30.♔×g2 ♖d8 31.♕h4, when though White is definitely worse he's not yet totally lost (-1.33). After 27.g3 Lasker's comment that "Black would at least force a draw" is a considerable understatement, as Black has a forced win by 27...♖×g3+ 28.f×g3 ♕×g3+ 29.♔f1 ♕×h3+:



Lasker's analysis ends here, but Komodo gives these further, mostly forced moves: 30.♔e1 ♗f3! (threatening 31...♕h1+ 32.♔f2 ♕g2+ 33.♔e1 ♕g1+ 34.♔d2 ♕×d1#) 31.♕f2 ♗×d1 32.♔×d1 (if 32.♖×d1 d×e3) 32...♕h1+ 33.♔e2 ♖c2+ 34.♖d2 ♕h5+ 35.♔d3 ♖c8! 36.♘b2 ♕×b5+ 37.♔e4 ♖e8+ 38.♔×d4 f5 39.♕f3 ♖d8+ 40.♔c3 ♖c8+ 41.♔d4 ♕b6+ 42.♔d3 ♕a6+ 43.♔d4 ♕d6+ 44.♕d5+ ♕×d5+ 45.♔×d5



45...♖d8+−+.

As for the note's other variation, 27.♕×d4 ♖×g2 28.♔f1 ♖×f2+ 29.♔e1,



Lasker now gives "29...♖e2+ etc.", but that would only draw, the king and rook going back and forth to threefold repetition. Instead, Black has 29...h6!, which by preventing back-rank mate unleashes multiple threats that force White into ruinous material loss (-5.19).

At move 27 Lasker comments "If 27.♖c3, then 27...♖×g2+",



leaving unclear whether that would win for Black or only draw. It does in fact lead only to equality, *viz.* 28.♔×g2 d4+ 29.♖c6 ♗×c6+ 30.b×c6 ♕×c6+ 31.♔h2,



and either 31...♕×a4 32.♖×d4= or 31...d×e3 32.♖d4 e×f2 33.♕×f2=.

Over moves 28 to 30, Freiman made several less-than-best moves but still had a definitely better position. Lasker failed to point out how this changed drastically at move 31.



Here, threatened with mate, he played 31.f4?!, taking his advantage down a full pawn's worth. Instead 31.g3! would have retained good winning chances (+1.70). One would suspect Freiman was in *Zeitnot*, especially since he blundered into mate next move, but the book shows him with nearly an hour left to reach time control at move 37.

***Game 46, Spielmann-Lasker*:** A rather even and uneventful game throughout. We make only one minor observation. After Black's 51st move, 51...g4,



Lasker wrote "Now Black threatens to decide the game by ...♔g5 and ...♘e4 in his favor." This threat turns out to be illusory. Even giving Black an extra move it falls short: 52...♔g5 53.♗e6 ♘e4 54.d5 ♘×g3 55.d6 ♔f6 56.♗c8 ♘e4 57.♗×f5 ♘×d6 58.♗×g4=.

***Game 47, Salwe-Speijer*:** A game with some very interesting elephant-drowning possibilities, unsuspected by either the players or Lasker.

At move 19,



White could safely have played 19.♗×h7, since if 19...♔×h7?? 20.♕×f6 (+7.79). Probably best then would have been 19...♘e7 20.♖d7 ♗×f3 21.g×f3 ♖a7 22.♖×a7 ♕×a7 23.♗e4, when it's not clear whether White's extra, isolated h-pawn would be of much account.

At Black's 26th move,



Lasker considers Speijer's 26...♕c7 a mistake which gives White "already the superior game." Komodo, on the other hand, considers it as good or better than any other move on the board,

evaluating the resulting position as dead even. The reasons behind this do not become apparent until two moves later, and then only under deep analysis.

The critical point in the game came at Black's 28th move.



Lasker makes no comment on Speijer's 28...♗b7, which was the game's most serious mistake. Instead Black should have played 28...♖a8!, which makes his a-pawn more of a threat than White's b-pawn, and leads to amazing complications that tend to favor Black. We will examine at some length Komodo's top three replies.

a) 29.b5 a3:



(a1) 30.♖a1? a2 31.e4 ♗c4 32.♕c3 ♖d8



33.♘c2 (if 33.♘c6 ♕b6+ 34.♔h1 ♕f2 35.♕e1 [or 35.♕×c4 ♖d2 36.♕f1 ♕×f1+ 37.♖×f1 ♖b2 etc.] 35...♕×e1+ 36.♖×e1 ♖d2 37.♘b4 ♖b2 and 38.♘×a2 ♖×a2 is forced) 33...♖d3 34.♕e1 ♕e5 35.h3 ♖c3 36.♘b4 ♕c5+ and the sky starts falling (-7.07);
(a2) 30.♖c1 ♕e5 31.♕c3 a2 32.e4 ♖d8! 33.e×d5 ♖×d5 34.♖d1 (not 34.♘b3?? ♕e2 35.♖e1 ♘f4! −+) 34...♘h4 35.b6 ♘f5 36.♖e1 ♕×d4+ 37.♕×d4 ♖×d4 38.♖a1 ♖b4 39.♖×a2 ♖×b6 and while Black may not be able to win, he is in no danger of losing (-0.90).

(b) 29.♖c1 ♕e5 30.♗f1 (30.b5 a3 transposes to variation (a) above) 30...a3 31.♖a1 a2 32.♕d2 ♘e7 33.e4 ♘c6! 34.e×d5 ♕×d5 35.♘×e6+ f×e6





36.♕f4 (if 36.♕×d5?? e×d5 37.b5 ♘b4 38.b6 ♖b8 39.♗e2 ♖×b6 40.♗d1 d4 (-3.76)) 36...♕d4+ 37.♕×d4 ♘×d4 38.♗c4 ♖c8 39.♗×a2 (neither will 39.♗×e6 hold the b-pawn, *viz.* 39...♘×e6 40.♖×a2 ♖c1+ 41.♔f2 ♖b1 42.♖a4 ♖b2+ 43.♔g3 ♔g6 etc. -2.11) 39...♖a8 40.b5 ♘c2 41.♖b1 ♖×a2 (-1.32).

(c) 29.♗f1 This and 29.♖c1 are probably White's best bets. 29...a3 and:



(c1) 30.e4 ♗c4 31.♕c3 a2! 32.♗×c4 ♖c8 33.♖a1 ♕×c4 34.♕×c4 ♖×c4 35.♘e2 ♖c2 36.♘c1 ♘f4 37.♔f1 (not 37.♘×a2? ♘×g2) 37...♖b2 38.♘×a2 ♘×g2 39.♘c3 ♘h4 40.♘d1 (if 40.b5? ♘×f3 41.h3 ♘d4 (-2.34)) 40...♖×b4 41.♔f2 (-1.15);
(c2) 30.♘b5 ♕e5 31.♖a1 a2 32.♕c3 ♖d8 33.♕×e5 ♘×e5 34.♘d4 f5 (-0.95).

At most points in the above analysis we have played Komodo's #1 move for both Black and White. There were sometimes other playable moves, so the variations here should be regarded as illustrative rather than conclusive. But they do indicate strongly that Black objectively had a much better position than Lasker realized, perhaps not good enough to win but certainly not lost. Practically speaking, one may doubt whether a minor master like Speijer could have coped with the elephant-drowning depths of the complications Komodo reveals, but then Salwe, no giant himself away from the coffeehouses of Lodz, might well have stepped into one of the many pitfalls.

Returning to the actual game, after 28...♗b7??, Salwe failed to capitalize fully.



His 29.♗b5 was not bad, the second-best move, but far better was 29.♘b5! ♕b6 30.♗×b7,





and Black has only a choice of ways to lose the exchange: 30...♕×b7 31.♘d6 ♕b8 32.♘×c8 ♕×c8, or 30...♖b8 31.♘d6 ♖×b7 32.♘×b7 ♕×b7, both about +2.25.

The seeming effectiveness of 29.♗b5 derived from the fact that Speijer again blundered in reply,



with 29...a3??, allowing 30.♘×e6+ f×e6 31.♖d7+. Instead, 29...♕c3!? saves the queen and gives Black a fighting chance, *e.g.* 30.♗×a4 ♕×e1+ 31.♖×e1 ♘e7 32.♖b1 ♘d5 33.♗d7 (if 33.e4? ♘c3 34.♖a1 ♖a8−+) 33...♖c4 (not 33...♖c7? 34.♗×e6) 34.b5 ♘×e3, and while Black stands worse (about +0.77), that is much better than after 29...a3?? (about +3.00).

***Game 48, Tartakower–Znosko-Borovsky*:** A mostly even, overly drawn-out game where the players might have spared themselves the last 30-odd moves. We note one minor improvement and one major oversight.

In the note at move 15, after 15...♘g4,



Lasker's recommended 16.♗d5 is strong, but a more direct and better approach was possible: 16.♖×f7! ♔×f7 17.♗d5+ ♗e6 (if 17...♔f8 18.♕×g6, or 17...♔e7 18.♕×g6) 18.♘×e6 ♖×e6 19.♗×e6+ ♔×e6 20.♕×g6+ ♘f6 21.♕×g7, and White is up two connected, passed pawns and wins easily. Instead after 16.♗d5 ♖f8 17.♕×g6 ♘e5 18.♕c2 White is only one pawn up and Black might fight on.

It escaped everyone's attention that White blundered at move 34 and Black failed to capitalize.



Necessary here was 34.♖e8+ ♔h7 (if 34...♔g7?? 35.♕f8+ ♔h7 [or 35...♔f6 36.♕h8+ ♔g5 37.♕h4#] 36.♕×f7+ ♔h6 37.h4 threatening 38.♖e7, and mate can be stopped only at serious material loss (at least +3.40)) 35.♘d5 ♖b5 (or 35...♖b1+ 36.♔f2 ♕d2+ 37.♖e2 ♕c1 38.♘f6+ ♔g7 39.♘e8+ ♔g8 40.♘f6+ etc., draw) 36.♘×c3 ♖×c5=.

But White played 34.♕e7??, to which Black replied unimaginatively with 34...♕×e1+?! 35.♕×e1 ♖b1 36.♔f2 ♖×e1 37.♔×e1, simplifying into a boring and equal minor piece ending. Instead he could have won with 34...♕d2!:



This threatens 35...♗h3 and several other nasty things. White cannot try to block on the second rank, *viz.* 36.♕e2?? ♕d4+ 37.♔h1 ♖×e2, or 36.♖e2?? ♕d4+ 37.♔h1 ♖b1+ etc. Relatively best is 35.♔h1, when Black has the forcing line 35...♗h3 36.♕e4 (if 36.♖e2?? ♖b1+, or 36.♖g1?? ♗×g2+ 37.♘×g2 ♕d5 intending ♘c4-e5-f3) 36...♗×g2+ 37.♘×g2 ♕f2 38.♖g1 ♘d2 39.♕e8+ ♔h7 40.♕e1 ♕f3 41.♕e5 ♘e4 42.♕×b2 ♘f2+ 43.♕×f2 ♕×f2,



with a clearly won game (-3.98).

***Game 49, Cohn-Bernstein*:** A surprisingly poor game by Bernstein, on which we have only two minor comments.

Komodo comes up with an interesting alternative at Black's 17th move.



Rather than 17...♗×g5 18.♘×b7, which it views as the start of Black's downward slide, it prefers to keep the light-squared bishop on the board with 17...♗c6!?, even at the cost of the exchange. If then 18.♘×e8 ♗×g5 19.♘d6 ♘f4 20.♕f1 ♗×f3 21.g×f3 Black has considerable compensation

with his well-posted knight and White's ruined kingside pawn structure. The main alternative for White is 18.h4 h6 19.♗×e7 ♖×e7 20.g3 (to prevent ♘d5-f4) 20...♖d7 21.♗e4 f5 22.♗×d5 ♗×d5,



when Black's bishop has nice range, and he may yet evict the ♘d6 by ♘f8-g6-e7-c8, or perhaps simply ♖×d6. Komodo views both lines as dynamically equal.

It is perhaps superfluous to mention that at move 23,



23...b4? made a bad situation worse. Relatively best was 23...♘e6 24.♕×d5 ♖d7, limiting the damage to a single pawn. Presumably Bernstein was hoping to muddy the waters, but Cohn capitalized adroitly.

***Game 50, Speijer-Tartakower*:** Yet another game where serious mistakes and missed opportunities are not even pointed out, much less corrected. There is also one error of commission.

The note at move 28 is perhaps the strangest in the whole book.



Lasker makes the bizarre claim that "Black could here already win a piece by 28...♘ef6," but obviously White can reply 29.♗g6, losing nothing. (British historian Bernard Cafferty informed us that this error was pointed out by Eugene Znosko-Borovsky, who discovered it preparing the Russian edition of Lasker's book.)

Lasker further asserts that Black avoided 28...♘ef6 because "he did not want to give his opponent the opportunity to break up the queenside pawns" by 29.b×c5 d×c5 30.♗a5:



But in that case Black simply plays 30...♘×h5 31.♖×b6 ♕c8 and he is winning (-1.86).

No comment is made on moves 29-40, thus several important mistakes are overlooked. At move 35,



Speijer's 35.♔h1? was the beginning of the end for him. Two moves might have retained fighting chances and near-equality, both of them leading to some interesting variations:

(A) 35.♗e2 ♖fg8 36.♔h1 ♘×e4 37.♕×e4 ♖×g2 38.♕×g2 ♖×g2 39.♔×g2 e4:



and now:
(A1) 40.♖b7? f3+ and wins;
(A2) 40.♘×e4 ♕h3+ 41.♔h1 ♗×b2 42.♖×b2 ♗g4 (-0.55);
(A3) 40.♖b3 ♗d4 (not 40...f3+?! 41.♗×f3 e×f3+ 42.♖×f3 ♕×c4=)



41.♘d2 (not now 41.♘×e4?? f3+ 42.♔h1 [if 42.♖×f3 ♕×e4−+, or 42.♗×f3?? ♕h3+ 43.♔h1 ♕×f1#] 42...♕g4 43.♘fg3 f×e2 44.♘f2 ♗×f2 45.♗×f2 ♕×c4 46.♔g1 ♕×d5 -4.09) 42...♕g5+ 43.♔f1 ♗×f2 44.♗×f2 ♘f6,



reaching a highly imbalanced, murkily complex position that not even Komodo can fully fathom, but which it judges nearly equal (-0.51 at 24 ply).

(B) Best perhaps is 35.♗d1 ♖fg8 36.♔h1:



(B1) 36...♘×e4 as in variation (A) is not quite so effective here: 37.♕×e4 ♖×g2 38.♕×g2 ♖×g2 39.♔×g2 e4 40.♖b7! — White can play this now because with the bishop at d1 instead of e2, 40...f3+ has no sting. — 40...♗h3+ and:



(B1a) 41.♘×h3? f3+ 42.♗×f3 e×f3+ 43.♔×f3 ♕×h3+ 44.♘g3 ♘g7∓ (-0.94);
(B1b) 41.♔h1 ♗×f1 42.♖b8 and it looks like the best either side can do is force a draw, for example by 42...♗g2+ 43.♔×g2 f3+ 44.♔f1 ♕g5 45.♖×e8+ ♔h7 46.♖b7+ ♗g7 47.♗×f3 e×f3 48.♗c3 ♕c1+ 49.♗e1 ♕×c4+ 50.♔g1 ♕×d5 51.♖ee7 ♕g5+ 52.♘g4 ♕×g4+ 53.♗g3 ♕d4+ 54.♗f2 ♕g4+ etc.;
(B2) 36...♗d8 37.♕c2 ♘h7 (not 37...♘f6?? 38.♘d3 winning the queen) 38.♗f3 ♘ef6 39.♖b8 ♕g5 40.♖1b7,



and White's b-file sortie counteracts Black's g-file pressure in another unclear but dynamically even position. As in some of our other analyses the above lines are more illustrative than comprehensive, but it's clear that, contrary to Lasker's assessment, White's position was still reasonably defensible.

At move 37, Black misses the best continuation.



Tartakower's 37...♕g5, moving the queen from the bishop's line of fire, was not at all bad, but he need not have been so concerned about her safety. Strongest was the counter-threat 37...♗g4!, *viz.* 38.♗×h4 ♗×f3 39.♗×f6 ♘×f6 40.♘g3 ♗×g2+ 41.♔×g2 (41.♖×g2 f×g3 is worse -2.79) 41...f×g3 42.h3 ♘×e4 (-2.11).

Reprieved by 37...♕g5, White might have survived if instead of 38.♗c3?? he had played 38.h3,



which was necessary to prevent 38...♗g4. White would still have stood worse (about -1.50) but not yet lost.

***Game 51, Lasker-Salwe*:** A game that has long been one of my favorites, ever since my teens, when I found it featured in R.N. Coles' engrossing book *Dynamic Chess* (London, 1956), and played through it many times. Coles considered Lasker's deliberate acceptance of a permanent positional weakness (with 16.f4-f5), in exchange for greater space and maneuvering ability with which to threaten both Black's d-pawn and his kingside, as signaling "the birth of the dynamic idea" that was soon to inspire the Hypermoderns. Under Komodo's scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent that the game, and Lasker's notes, are better models in the strategic sense than the tactically concrete.

First, a matter of merely passing interest. A problem for Lasker through much of the game was his backward e-pawn (knowingly self-inflicted, as mentioned above, by 16.f5), which Black pressured on the half-open file. Lasker took care never to leave it insufficiently guarded. However, there was at least point where he might have. At move 24,





rather than 24.♘h5, he might have played 24.♘f3!?, since if 24...♖×e4?? 25.♖×e4 ♖×e4 26.♘h5 and mate is forced in at most 13 moves. Relatively best for Black would be the retreat 24...♖5e7.

Neither Komodo nor Stockfish particularly like Black's ♕e8-b8-b4-c3 sortie over moves 29-33. In particular, at move 33,



Komodo flags 33...♕c3 as a definite mistake. Relatively best was 33...♗e8, maintaining the *status quo ante*. It considers Lasker's reply 34.♕h4 rather lukewarm (about +0.42), preferring instead 34.♕g3!?,



which takes us into a thicket full of thorny complications. The threat is obviously 35.♖×g7. Only three replies offer Black any chance; we examine them in order of increasing worth.

(A) 34...♘e5 allows Spielmannesque sacrificial revels. 35.♘×f6! and:



(A1) 35...♕c2 36.♘×e5! ♕×d1+ 37.♔h2 d×e5 38.♘×h7! g5 39.♘×g5 ♖gg7 40.♕h4+ ♔g8 41.♘h7! ♖×g4 42.♘f6+ ♔f7 43.♘×g4 ♗×f5 44.♕h5+ ♗g6 45.♘h6+ ♔g7 46.♕×d1 (+8.42);
(A2) 35...♘×g4 36.♘×g8 ♖×e4 (if 36...♔×g8 simply 37.♕×g4) 37.♕×d6! ♘f2+ 38.♔h2 ♘×d1 39.♘e7 ♖×e7 40.♕×e7 h6 41.♕×d7 ♘e3 (or 41...♘b2 42.♕×a7 +4.13) 42.♕e8+ ♔h7 43.♕g6+ ♔h8 44.f6 g×f6 (if 44...♕×f6? 45.♕e8+ ♔h7 46.♕×e3) 45.♕×h6+ ♔g8 46.♕g6+ ♔f8 47.h4 etc. (+4.00).

(B) 34...♕c2:



(B1) not 35.♖×g7?! ♕×d1+ 36.♔h2 ♘h6 37.♖×e7 ♖×g3 38.♔×g3 ♗×f5 39.♖e8+ ♘g8 40.e×f5 (+0.53);
(B2) Correct is 35.♖g1 ♘h6 (if 35...♘e5 36.♘×e5 f×e5 37.♘f6 (+4.64), or 35...♘d8 36.♘×f6 (+7.50)) 36.♕×d6 ♖f7 37.♖h4 ♗×f5 (relatively best) 38.♘e1 (not 38.e×f5?! ♘×f5) 38...♕×a2 39.e×f5 ♘×f5 40.♕e6 ♘×h4 41.♕×f7 (+2.72).

(C) Probably the toughest resistance is offered by 34...♘h6, when best is 35.♕×d6! and:



(C1) 35...♘×g4 36.h×g4 ♖f7 (if 36...♖×e4 37.♕×d7 ♖×g4 38.♕d2 ♕×d2 39.♖×d2 +2.48) 37.e5 ♗e8 38.e6 ♖b7 39.♘g3 (+2.06);
(C2) 35...♖f7 36.♖h4 (threatening 37.♘×f6 g×f6 38.♖×h6) 36...♗×f5 (as in variation B2, again relatively best) 37.e×f5 ♘×f5 38.♕×c6 and:



(C2a) 38...♘×h4 39.♘×h4 g6 40.♘f4 reaches a problematic position assessed by Komodo at about +2.10 against best defense.



Pawns are even for the moment, but White has two knights for a rook and probably the safer king. Black cannot play 41...g5? 42.♘d5 ♕e5 43.♘f3 etc. An immediate win is not in sight, and to reach a definite conclusion would require several pages of intricate analysis, but clearly the position favors White.
(C2b) After 38...♕c2 39.♖e1 ♘×h4 40.♘×h4 ♕×a2 41.♘f5 ♕d2 (if 41...♕×b3?! 42.♘d6 ♖ff8 43.♕×c5 +3.34) 42.♕e6,



we reach a similar position, with a similar evaluation, about +2.20 at 28 ply, again with no clear win on the horizon.

Assuming Lasker considered 34.♕g3!? in the first place, it is not surprising he chose not to go into these manifold murky complications, when instead he could maintain a positional superiority with simpler moves. Still, objectivity required that we enter the thicket, and from a practical standpoint the onus would be very much on Black to find the one or two viable moves at each point, while White would have more leeway.

The note at White's 38th move is seriously flawed, so much so that in current slang it might be termed a "hot mess," or in military parlance a word we can't use here (begins with "cluster").



Lasker is correct that his text 38.♖h4 was the better move (in fact the best on the board), but his line purporting to show the inferiority of 38.♖g4, to wit 38...♘h6 39.♖h4 d5 40.c×d5 c×d5 41.♖×d5 ♗c8, is wrong at almost every point, and ends up proving the opposite of what he intended.



First off, rather than the note's 38...♘h6, better is 38...♘e5 39.♘×e5 ♕×g3+ 40.♖×g3 d×e5 41.♖gd3 ♗e8 42.♘g3 and there is still some life in Black's position (+1.30). After 38...♘h6,



the correct reply is not Lasker's 39.♖h4, but 39.♕×d6! ♘×g4+ 40.h×g4 ♖f7 41.e5 ♗e8 (if 41...f×e5?? 42.♘×e5 ♗e8 43.♖d3 ♕c1 44.♕e6 ♖b7 45.♖d8 etc.) 42.e6 ♖b7 43.♘g3 ♕a5 44.♖d2 ♕c7 45.♘e4 ♕×d6+ 46.♖×d6



and it's obvious Black is helpless (+3.39).

After 39.♖h4?!,



rather than 39...d5, much better is 39...♗×f5!? 40.e×f5 ♘×f5 41.♕f4 ♘×h4 42.♕×h4 ♖d8, and Black is not too bad off (+0.78).

After 39...d5? 40.c×d5 c×d5,



instead of the note's 41.♖×d5, strongest is 41.♕d6 ♖ge8 42.♖×d5 ♘f7 43.♕g3 ♘h6 44.♕f2 ♕b4 45.♕×c5 ♕×c5 46.♖×c5 ♖×e4 47.♘×f6 g×f6 48.♖×h6 (+2.30).

Relatively best after 41.♖×d5 is not 41...♗c6 but 41.♗e8,



when Black is definitely inferior but still lives (about +1.50).

In contrast, 41...♗c6,



with which Lasker concludes his analysis, leaving the impression that White must move his rook and Black is OK, actually loses to 42.♕d6! ♗×d5 43.♕×e7 ♗f7 44.♘f4,



and White is clearly winning (+3.17 at 26 ply).

In a note at White's 39th move,



Lasker comments "39.♖g4 was useless because of 39...♗e8." This is completely mistaken. 39.♖g4! is actually the best move, and after 39...♗e8, White wins with 40.♖×d6! ♘×d6 41.♕×d6 ♗×h5 42.♕×e7





and either **(a)** 42...♗×g4 43.h×g4 (threatening 44.e5) 43...♖g7 44.♕f8+ ♖g8 45.♕d6 ♖e8 46.e5 (anyway!) 46...♕e3 47.♕×f6+ ♔g8 48.e6 ♖f8 49.♕×g5+ ♕×g5 50.♘×g5 (+10.00); or **(b)** 42...♖e8 43.♕×c5 ♗×g4 44.h×g4 ♕c1 45.e5 ♕f4+ 46.♔g1 ♕e4 47.♕×a7 ♖×e5 48.♕f7 ♕e3+ 49.♔h2 ♖e8 50.♕×f6+ ♔g8 51.♕×c6,



and while Komodo rates this relatively low at +2.33, with four passed pawns for the exchange, it has to be a win for White.

At move 40, Lasker seems to praise Salwe's 40...f6-f5,



saying "If he allows White to play ♖f4 before this, he will ultimately lose the f-pawn." Yet in fact 40...f5? was a serious mistake. Much better was 40...♖e8, when if White tries too hard to nab the f-pawn he can land in major trouble, *e.g.* 41.♖f4 ♖eg8 42.g3 ♖h6 43.g4 ♖×h5 44.g×h5 ♘g5 45.♘×g5 ♖×g5 46.♖×f6?? ♕×h3#.

Lasker's reply 41.♘f4 was not bad, but 40...f5? could have been more directly refuted with 41.e×f5!,



viz. 41...♗×f5 42.♖f4 ♗e4 43.♖e1 d5 44.♘h4 ♖g5 45.♕×c5 ♕d2 46.♖g4 ♖×g4 47.h×g4 ♕g5 (if 47...♕×e1 48.♕×e7 and mate quickly) 48.♘f3 ♕×g4 49.♕×e7 ♕×h5+ 50.♔g1 (+5.48).

***Game 52, Vidmar-Spielmann*:** Two serious tactical flaws in the notes here.

The note after Black's tenth move, 10...e6-e5, says "Black plays very well," but his premature, overly aggressive central advance violates the principle that it is usually bad to open up the position when one is behind in development (not to mention when one's king is still in the center). Black would have been exposed to serious danger if, instead of 11.f2-f4?!, White had played 11.♗c1-g5!:



Some sample lines:
(a) 11...h6 12.♗×f6 ♕×f6 13.d×e5 d×e5 14.f4 0–0 15.e×f5 ♗×f5 16.f×e5 ♕×e5 17.♗×f5 ♖×f5 18.♘f4 +2.00 (not 18...♖×f4?? 19.♕×g6+ ♔f8 20.♕×h6+);
(b) 11...f×e4 12.♗×e4 ♕f7 13.♗×f6 ♕×f6 14.d×e5 ♕×e5 (not 14...d×e5? 15.f4 +3.88) 15.♗d5, and Black is undeveloped with his king unable to castle and exposed in the center (+2.86);
(c) 11...0–0 12.e×f5! — One of the main points of 11.♗g5! is that here it enables this move, which previously had been inhibited by the threat of e5-e4 winning the bishop on d3. — 12...g×f5 (if now 12...e4? 13.♗×f6 and either 13...e×d3 14.♗×e7 d×c2 15.♗×f8+−, or 13...♕×f6 14.♗×e4+−) 13.d×e5 d×e5 (if 13...♕×e5? 14.♖ae1 ♕e7 15.♘g3 ♕g7 16.f4 and 17.♗×f5 (+3.31)) 14.♗×f5 simply winning a pawn, besides dangerously exposing Black's kingside;
(d) 11...c×d4 12.c×d4 and:



(d1) 12...0–0 13.d×e5 d×e5 14.e×f5 g×f5 15.♗×f5 ♗×f5 16.♕×f5 and White has again simply won a pawn, not to mention other advantages (+1.79);
(d2) 12...f×e4 13.♗×e4 0–0 14.♗d5+ ♔h8 15.♘g3 (+2.12);
(d3) 12...h6 13.♗×f6 ♕×f6 14.e×f5 ♗×f5 15.♗×f5 ♕×f5 16.♕b3 ♘d7 (if 16...♕f7 17.f4 e×d4 18.f5 +3.24) 17.♘g3 ♕e6 18.♕×b7 0–0 19.d5 (+2.11);

The other flaw comes well into the endgame. Lasker gives the impression that White lost the otherwise drawn, opposite-color bishop ending when he failed to play h2-h4 around moves 31-34. However, both Komodo and Stockfish indicate the game remained a theoretical draw up until move 39.





Here Vidmar played 39.♔f6?, sending his king in the wrong direction on a fool's errand that would ultimately leave him unable to stop Spielmann's queenside pawns. Instead, either 39.♗e7 or 39.♔d4 would have retained the draw, a plausible continuation being 39.♔d4 ♔g4 40.♔c3 ♔f3 41.♗e7 h6 (or 41...g4 42.♔b4) 42.♗f8 h5 43.♗e7 ♔g2 44.♗×g5 ♔×h2 45.♗f4 ♔g2 46.♔b4 ♗d7=.

***Game 53, Perlis-Freiman*:** A game with several major, winning combinational opportunities missed by both the players and Lasker. At least Freiman caught a lucky break, compensating somewhat for his tragic losses in the two previous rounds.

At move 31, White's positional superiority was already so great that he had a decisive tactical stroke.



Instead of 31.♗e3, White could have broken the game open with 31.♗×h6! g×h6 (if 31...♖g8 32.♗g5 with the terrible threat of 33.♕h4+ ♘h7 34.♗×e7+−) 32.♕h4



and:
(a) 32...♘h7 33.♕×h6 ♖f6 34.♖ag1 ♖×g6 35.♖×g6 ♘d7 if (35...♕f8 36.f6 ♕×h6 37.♖×h6 (+5.20)) 36.e×d7 ♖×d7 37.f6 ♕f8 38.♕h4 ♖f7 39.♖h6 and the threat of ♗f3-g4 f5 can be stopped only at grievous material loss;
(b) 32...♕d8 33.♖×h6+ ♘h7 34.♕×d8 ♖×d8 35.f6 and the two passed pawns advance decisively, *e.g.* 35...♘c8 36.♖g1 ♖f8 (if 36...♖e8 37.♗h5, or 36...♖g8 37.♖×g8+ ♔×g8 38.f7+ etc.) 37.e7 ♖×e7 (if 37...♖e8 38.♖g7 and mate next) 38.f×e7 etc.

At White's 33rd move,





Perlis' 33.♗h4?! was rather tepid. Komodo prefers pressuring the d-pawn with 33.♕d2 or 33.♖d1, both leading to lines rated at +2.00 or more. Besides its tepidity, the main problem with 33.♗h4?! is that it allows Black a chance for counterplay that neither the players nor Lasker noticed. Instead of 33...♘c8?, Freiman could have struck back with 33...♘d5!?:



(a) Left unmolested the knight will head to f4, *e.g.* 34.♕d2 ♘f4 35.♖ag1!? (better than 35.♖g3 ♖c6 36.♖ag1 ♖g8)



35...♘×g6 (not 35...d5? 36.e×d5 ♘×g6 37.♖×g6 ♖×f5 38.d6 ♖×f3 39.d×c7 ♕×g6 40.c8♕+ +2.60) 36.♖×g6 ♘g5 (if 36...♖c6? 37.♗h5 ♕a8 38.e7 ♖e8 39.♖×g7! ♔×g7 40.f6+ etc., or 36...♕c8? 37.e7 ♖e8 38.♕×d6 +6.43) 37.♗×g5 h×g5 38.♕×d6 ♕d8 39.♕×e5, reaching a position Komodo rates at about +1.17, which is far less bad for Black than 33...♘c8 gets (+2.74);
(b) After 34.e×d5 ♖×f5,



White's material gain proves temporary, *viz.* 35.♖g3 (if 35.♕g3?! ♖×f3 36.♕×f3 ♕×g6) 35...♖f4 36.♗g4 h5 37.♕e2 h×g4 38.♖×g4 ♖×g4 39.♕×g4 g5 40.♗g3 (or 40.♗×g5?! ♖g7 41.h4 ♘×g5 42.h×g5 ♕g6=) 40...♖g7,



and while Black may ultimately succumb to the passed e-pawn, his king is out of immediate danger, which is not at all the case in the game continuation 33...♘c8?.

Just how much danger actually threatened Black would have been apparent if instead of 34.♕g3, White had played the stronger 34.♕d2:



Play might then continue 34...b×c3 35.♕g2 ♘f6 — It may be best just to give up the exchange by 35...♖f6 36.♗×f6 ♘×f6 37.♖g1 ♕f8 though then White is still clearly winning (+2.91) — 36.♖g1 ♕e7 37.♗e2 (intending ♗b5-d7 with lethal effect):



37...♘a7 (if 37...♖g8?? 38.♗×f6+−) 38.♗c4 d5 — There is nothing better, Black has no good defensive moves. If, say, 38...a4 39.♖×g7 ♕×g7 40.♕×g7+ ♖×g7 41.♗×f6 ♖×f6 42.♖×g7 ♔×g7 43.e7 ♖f8 44.f6+ ♖×f6 45.e8♕ and mate soon. — 39.e×d5 ♘c8 40.♗b5 ♘d6 41.♗d7 (+12.73).

Still, Perlis's 34.♕g3 was good enough to win, and Lasker, to his credit, does correctly point out a missed opportunity for him at move 35. However, the truly decisive point in the game, an exchange of blunders, completely escaped him.

At Black's 46th move,



Freiman had to play 46...♕×e7, when after 47.♕×c8+ ♔h7 he would have been down the exchange but in no real danger of losing, given his pawn surplus. Instead he played 46...♕g8??, after which White could still have won with the not very obvious but deadly 47.♕g6‼:



There is then nothing Black can do against invasion of the sixth rank and attack on the h-file, *viz.* 47...♖e8 (47...♕h7 48.♕f6 just transposes) 48.♕f6 (not 48.♕×h6+?? ♕h7 49.♖g6 ♖×e7 and Black wins) 48...b×c3 49.♔h2 (both to defend the h-pawn in lines involving ♕×h6+ and ...♕h7, and to avoid the inconvenience incurred by 49.♖g6 ♕d5+, when White must backtrack with 50.♖g2) 49...♕h7 50.♖g6,



and Black is forced into either 50...♔g8 51.♕e6+ ♔h8 52.♕×d6 ♔g8 53.♕e6+ ♔h8 54.♕f7 ♕×g6 55.♕×g6 ♖×e7 56.♕×h6+ (+3.10), or 50...♕×g6 51.♕×g6 ♖×e7 52.♕×h6+ (+2.70). Instead (no doubt to Freiman's joy) Perlis played 47.♕d7?? and the game was finally irrevocably lost.

***Game 55, Mieses-Forgács*:** An analytical fiasco. It is amazing how many mistakes Lasker packs into a mere 13 moves.

At Black's tenth move,



Lasker chides Forgács for not playing 10...♗×c3 11.b×c3 ♕×c3, believing it safely wins a pawn. But it backfires after 12.♖c1 ♕a3 (Lasker's move; better probably is 12...♕a5) 13.♖×c6! b×c6 14.♘e5 ♗×e2 15.♕×e2:



Now if:
(a) 15...♕f8?? 16.♕a6+ ♔b8 17.♘×c6+ ♔a8 18.♕×a7#, or
(b) 15...♖f8?? 16.♖b1 ♕a4 17.♕g4+ f5 18.♕×g7 ♘f6 19.♕e7,



and Black is forced into either 19...♖e8 20.♕×f6, or 19...♕×a2 20.♕b4 ♕×b1+ (if 20...♘d7 21.♕b7+ ♔d8 22.♘×c6+ ♔e8 23.♕c8+ ♔f7 24.♕×d7+ and mate in ten at most) 21.♕×b1+−. 15...♘e7 16.♘×f7. Therefore Black is best advised to give back the exchange, either by (from previous diagram):
(c) 15...♘e7 16.♘×f7 etc., when material is equal but Black's doubled, isolated c-pawn and more vulnerable king give him the worse game (about +1.00), or
(d) 15...♘f6 16.♘×f7 with the same assessment. In this line Komodo also finds interesting possibilities with 16.♕c4 and 16.♘×c6.

So Forgács had good reason to avoid 10...♗×c3.

Things get worse at Black's next move.



Forgács' 11...♘d5 was not at all "an immediate decisive blunder" (about which more below), and the alternative Lasker pessimistically dismissed, 11...♗e6, is one of Black's best choices, especially if White tries Lasker's suggested refutation 12.♗c4 ♖he8 13.♘g5?,



which is itself refuted by 13...♗×c4 14.♕×c4 ♖×e3 15.f×e3 ♕×g5, with two pieces for a rook and other advantages (-1.73).

Finally, 11...♘d5, though perhaps not as good as 11...♗e6 or 11...♖he8, is perfectly playable as long as after 12.♘×d5 Black recaptures correctly, not with 12...♖×d5?? but 12...♕×d5.



The supposedly winning line Lasker gives, 13.♗c4 ♕a5 14.♘g5,



fails to the straightforward 14...♘×d4 15.♗×d4 ♖×d4 16.♘×f7 ♖e8, when material is even and Komodo definitely likes Black (-1.50). Going back to the previous diagram, rather than 14.♘g5, better is 14.♘e5 (not 14.♗×f7?! ♗×f3 15.g×f3 ♘×d4) 14...♘×e5 15.d×e5 ♖he8 16.♗×f7 ♖×e5, which Komodo considers nearly dead even (+0.24).

***Game 58, Bernstein–Znosko-Borovsky*:** Two more strange tactical oversights in a case of analysis by result.

At White's 22nd move,



Komodo prefers 22.♖e1, 22.♖d1, or any of several other moves. It does not agree that the text move 22.g4 should lead to "a glorious attack," evaluating the resulting position as slightly better for Black. The reason is seen in the note variation of the next move. Lasker correctly faults the text 22...♕×h4, and correctly recommends 22...♔h8 instead. But the note then continues 23.g5? (better 23.♖h2 or 23.♘h5) 23...♖g8 24.♔h1,



and now Lasker incomprehensibly gives the defensive retreat 24...♕f8?!. Instead it would seem obvious, not only to Komodo but most good players, that Black should react aggressively with 24...f×g5 25.♘g2 g×h4 26.♘f4 (if 26.♘×h4?? f5 and 27...♕×h4+, or 26.♕×h4? ♕×h4+ 27.♘×h4 ♘f6 -2.63) 26...♖cc8 27.♖g1 ♖g3 28.♘e2 ♖cg8,



and it is Black who has a "glorious attack" (-2.62).

At Black's 24th move,



it should have been mentioned that 24...f×e6?? was an unnecessary blunder. Black could have tried 24...f5 25.♘×g5 (if, say, 25.♕e2 Black can reply 25...f×e6 with impunity) 25...f×e4 26.♘×e4 ♔g7 with an inferior but by no means lost game (about +1.20).

***Game 59, Teichmann-Cohn*:** A relatively uneventful draw, with however one very erroneous annotation.

In the note to White's 14th move, the sub-variation 14.c4 ♗a6,



Lasker says "not 15.♘d2 on account of 15...♘e5." He must have thought that after 16.d×e5 Black simply recaptures on d2 with queen or rook and is fine, but this assessment is superficial, as in both lines it overlooks 17.♕f3!:



White threatens 18.♕a8+, to which Black has no good parry. If 17...♖hd8 18.♖ad1 and Black cannot save himself whether he exchanges rooks or not, *e.g.* 18...♖×d1 19.♕a8+ ♔d7 20.♖×d1+ and the queen must give herself up to prevent mate, 20...♕d5 21.♖×d5+ etc., or 18...h6 19.♖×d2 ♕×d2 20.♕a8+ ♔d7 21.♗c6+ ♔e7 22.♕×a7 ♗×c4 23.♕a3+ and 23...♖d6 is forced.

Capturing on d2 with the queen is no better:



If now 17...♕d4 18.♖fd1 ♕e4 (if 18...♕c5 19.♕a8#) 19.♕a3 ♕×c4 20.♗f1 (+4.89), or 17...♕a5 18.♖ad1 and 18...♖d5 is forced (+8.32), or 17...♕×c2 18.♕a8+ ♔d7 19.♕×a7 ♔e7 20.♕×c7+ ♖d7 21.♕×b6 ♕×c4 22.♗c6 ♖d2 23.♖ac1,



and Black must let the bishop hang by 23...♕d4 24.♕×a6, since on other queen moves such as 23...♕e2, 23...♕d3 or 23...♕×a2, there comes 24.♕b4+ and mate soon.

***Game 60, Schlechter–Dus-Chotimirsky*:** Again, some faulty annotations.

The note at White's 19th move was correct that 19.♗g5 was feasible, but goes astray on how White wins after 19...♗×g5 20.♕×g5 ♕×a2?? 21.♕h6 ♕×b2:



Lasker gives 22.♖e3, but that fails to 22...♕×d4 23.♖h3 f5!, and the black king lives on to enjoy

his extra pawns (-2.41). Instead White wins with 22.♘f3! f6 (else 23.♘g5+−) 23.e×f6 ♘f5 (or 23...♕×f6/♖×f6 24.♘g5) 24.♗×f5 (simply retreating the bishop to g4, a3 or d3 is also good) 24...♕×f6 (not 24...e×f5?? 25.♕g7#) 25.♘g5 and either 25...♕e7 26.♗×e6+, or 25...♖f7 26.♘×f7 ♕×f7 27.♗g4, White winning in both cases.

The note at Black's 19th move is correct that Black must avoid 19...♕×a2,



but then gives 20.♗c3?!, which yields White just a meager profit after 20...b4 21.♖a1 ♕×a1 22.♖×a1 b×c3 (only +0.66). There is no need to defend the b-pawn, and White can proceed directly with 20.♖a1! ♕×b2 21.♖eb1, netting the queen for a rook and two pawns (+3.05).

At move 23, the suggested 23...♔f7 would not "still have availed."



White plays 24.g4! and the best thing Black can do is move the king back to g8, otherwise he gets in serious trouble, for example: **(a)** 24...g×f4? 25.♗×f4 ♗c5 26.g×f5 e×f5 27.e6+, **(b)** 24...f×g4? 25.♗×h7, **(c)** 24...♗e8 25.g×f5 e×f5 26.f×g5, **(d)** 24...♔e8 25.g×f5 e×f5 26.e6 ♗c6 27.f×g5 f4 28.♗f2 ♗b7 29.♗×h7, all of these lines winning for White.

At move 26,



it would have been worth mentioning that 26...♖f7? was, as much as any other, the losing move, of which Schlechter took expert advantage. Black might have avoided the worst with 26...♗e8 or 26...♕d8, both about +0.90.

***Game 61, Forgács-Duras*:** Again no comment is made on the game's decisive mistake. At move 25,



White stood worse but not yet lost. That changed with his blunder 25.♗d4?? (about -2.50). Instead with 25.f5, 25.♗d2 or 25.♗c1 he might have fought on.

***Game 62, Rubinstein-Mieses*:** Another exemplary Rubinstein endgame, of a kind somewhat difficult for a computer to evaluate. We offer some tentative improvements and corrections.

In the note variation at move 19, after 19...♖c4 20.b3 ♖d4 21.♔e3 f6 22.♘a4 ♔e7 23.♘c5,



rather than Lasker's 23...♖×d5 which leads to advantage for White in the way he describes, Komodo suggests 23...♘b4!?, forcing 24.♖×d4 e×d4+ 25.♔×d4 ♖d8+ 26.♔e3 (not 26.♔c4?? ♘×a7 and the threat of 27...b5# wins the rook) 26...♘×a2, leading to material and positional equality.

In the note at move 28, in the sub-variation 28.b3 ♘b5 29.♖×b7 ♖d4+ 30.♔c2 ♖g4 31.♖b6+,



Komodo does not find convincing the counterattack Lasker claims Black has after 31...♔c5, giving the further moves 32.♖c6+ ♔b4 33.♘×b5 a×b5 34.g3 with advantage for White (+1.49). Instead, it prefers 31...♔c7!?, *viz.* 32.♖×a6 ♔b7 33.♖a5 (not 33.♖c6? or 33.♖e6? ♘d4+) 33...♖×g2+ 34.♔d3 ♘×c3 35.♔×c3 ♖×h2,



leading to a wildly asymmetrical position it considers relatively even.

At move 33, on which Lasker makes no comment,



both Komodo and Stockfish think that rather than 33...♖×a2?!, Mieses should have played 33...♔c7 so that if 34.♖h7+ ♔b6, instead of having the king forced to the back rank as actually occurred. The a-pawn would still be there for the taking later.

Lasker's note at move 35 says only "White threatened ♘f6 and ♖b8 mate."



This is true, but it leaves unmentioned a very interesting possibility we found only after extensive probing with Stockfish. Mieses played 35...♘b5?, which Stockfish immediately pegged at +2.45. Offering better resistance, though probably not ultimate salvation, was 35...♘e6!?. If 36.h4 it looks like Black can draw with 36...♖a4 37.♔e3 ♖d4,



and either **(a)** 38.♖h5 ♔d7 39.♖×e5 ♖d1 40.h5 ♖h1 41.♖f5 (or 41.♖d5 ♔c6) 41...b5, which Stockfish puts at 0.00 at 35 ply; or **(b)** 38.♔f3 ♖d1 39.♖×b7 ♖e1 (threatening 39...♖×e4 40.♔×e4 ♘c5+) 40.♘g5 ♘×g5+! 41.h×g5 ♖g1 42.♖g7 ♖d1 43.♖g6 ♔d7=.

If instead 36.♘f6 as Lasker indicated, Black has the surprising 36...e4+!,





with three main branches:

(a) 37.♘×e4 ♖a4 (threatening 38...♖×e4 39.♔×e4 ♘g5+) 38.♘f6 ♖d4+ 39.♔e3 ♖×d6, eliminating White's most dangerous pawn and probably enabling Black to draw;

(b) If 37.♔c3, Black must walk a tightrope of "only" moves but may just come out all right at the end: 37...♔c8 38.♖e7 ♘d8 39.♘d5 ♘c6 40.♖c7+ ♔d8 41.♘f4 ♖a3+ 42.♔b2 ♘d4!?



43.♔×a3 (if 43.♖×b7 ♖f3 is equal) 43...♘b5+ 44.♔b4 ♘×c7 45.d×c7+ ♔×c7



and if now, say, 46.♔c5 a5 47.♔d4 a4 48.♔×e4, the game is a theoretical draw according to the Nalimov tablebases.

(c) Best for White is 42.♔c4 ♔e8,



and though the process is long and fraught with pitfalls, it looks like he can win:
(c1) Not 43.♖×b7?? ♘a5+ 44.♔b4 ♖b3+ 45.♔×a5 ♖×b7−+;
(c2) 43.♖g7! ♖a4+ (if 43...♔d8 44.♘e6+ ♔c8 45.♖c7+ ♔b8 46.♖×c6 b×c6 47.d7 ♖d3 48.d8♕+ ♖×d8 49.♘×d8 and wins) 44.♔c5 ♖a5+ (44...♖b4?? 45.d7+ ♔f8 46.♘e6#) 45.♔b6 ♖e5 46.♔c7 ♔f8 47.♖g2



47...♖f5 (47...♔f7 48.♖c2 ♖e8 49.d7 ♖d8 loses) 48.♔×b7 ♘a5+ 49.♔c7 (not 49.♔×a6? ♖×f4 50.♔×a5 ♖f6 51.♖d2 ♔e8=) 49...♖c5+ 50.♔b6 ♖c6+ 51.♔×a5 ♖×d6 52.♖e2 ♔f7 53.♖×e4 ♖h6 54.h3,



reaching a position which has one man too many for Nalimov to evaluate, but if we remove the black pawn, it indicates a theoretical win for White. Stockfish pegs it at +3.30 at 39 ply, and it is hard to see how Black can both retain his own pawn and prevent the advance of White's. So while 35...♘e6!? might have failed against best play, it was Black's best practical chance and would have been a stern test even for such an endgame genius as Rubinstein.

Finally, the note at move 37 goes humorously awry at the end. After 37.♔c4-d5,



Lasker says Black can play either 37...♘c7+ or 37...♘d4+, but the latter move backfires in ghastly fashion: 38.♘c5! and the threat of 39.♖h8# forces Black to play 38...♖×c5+ 39.♔×c5 after which White mates in at most 22 moves.

***Game 64, Spielmann-Perlis*:** Another game in which Lasker packs a surprising number of mistakes into just a few moves.

In the note at move eight, in the sub-variation 8...♗b4 9.d4 ♗×b3 10.a×b3 g5 11.♘×g5,



Black should not play Lasker's 11...♘×e4?, which gives him nothing after 12.♘g×e4 ♕×h4 (+0.39). Instead he can win with either 11...h×g5 12.♗×g5 ♘×d4 (-2.68), or 11...e×d4 12.♘h3 d×c3 13.0–0 c×b2 (-2.21).

At Black's 11th move,



no comment is made on the fact that 11...♘d4?! turned the game from Black's to White's advantage. Better instead was 11...♘×g3, and if 12.f×g3 then 12...♘d4, or if 12.♖h4 ♕d7 13.f×g3 0–0–0 with a quite playable game for Black in either case (about -0.50)

The problem with 11...♘d4?! would have become apparent had White replied with 12.♗g3×e5!?:



Not then 12...d×e5? 13.♗×f7+!, so instead 12...♗×f3 13.g×f3 d×e5 14.♖×h5 ♖g8 15.♔d2 h×g5 16.♖h7 with some advantage for White (+0.65).

After Spielmann's actual move 12.♘d5,



Perlis, instead of playing 12...c6, could have capitalized with 12...♘×g3! 13.f×g3 ♗×f3 14.g×f3 ♕×g5:



Best now is 15.♖h3 (definitely not 15.♘×c7+?? ♔d8 16.♘×a8 ♕e3+ 17.♔f1 ♘f5 18.d4 ♘×g3+ and mate soon) 15...0–0–0, and Black has somewhat the better game (about -0.65).

Lasker's note at move 13 is badly mistaken.



First, it fails to point out that the text move 13...c×d5 is a serious mistake. Secondly, the correct reply to the alternative 13...♗×f3 is not the note's 14.♘f6+?! which yields White only a paltry advantage after 14...♕×f6 15.g×f6 ♗×d1 16.♖×d1, but 14.g×f3! c×d5 15.♗×d5 ♘e6 (after most other moves the knight is forced there by 16.c3 anyway) 16.♗×e6 f×e6,



and now simplest is 17.g×h6 with a clearly winning advantage (+2.52); even stronger is 17.c3 intending 18.d4 (+3.30).

Thirdly, it fails to point out that Black's best continuation (from previous diagram) is 13...♘×f3+ 14.g×f3 ♗×h5 15.♘f6+ ♔f8 16.♘×h5 h×g5,



and Black will recover his piece with about an even game.

At move 18, no comment is made on another serious mistake.





After 18...d×e4? Black was irrevocably lost. Instead with 18...h5!? 19.♕f3 0–0–0 20.♖×f7 h4 he would have had some counterplay and a fighting chance (about +1.00).

***Game 65, Salwe-Vidmar*:** Yet another analytical debacle for Lasker. One mistake could be excused as beyond normal human detection, but not the others, some of which qualify for howler status.

Both assertions in the note at move 16 are wrong. 16.♗×f6 ♕×f6 17.c×d5 is perfectly fine for White.



17...♕h4?, which Lasker thinks is a refutation, is itself refuted by 18.g3! and the queen must beat a sheepish retreat to d8 or e7, since if 18...♕×a4?? 19.♗c2 and she is trapped.

If instead 17...e×d5, the correct is continuation is 18.♗×h7+ ♔×h7 19.♕c2+ ♗f5 20.♕×c7±.
In contrast Lasker's recommendation 18.♕h5?! accomplishes nothing. As with the above variation the queen is forced to retreat back the way she came after 18...g6!, since if 19.♕×d5? ♗e6,



and now:
(a) 20.♕c6 ♖ac8 21.f4 (not 21.♘×b6? ♗×h2+) 21...♕d8 22.♖fd1 ♗×f4 etc. (-2.18);
(b) 20.♕e4?? ♗f5 21.♕c4 ♕d6 22.♖fc1 ♕×h2+ 23.♔f1 ♗×d3+ 24.♕×d3 ♖fd8 25.♕c2 ♖ac8 (-3.32);
(c) 20.♕b7 (relatively best) 20...♕e5 21.f4 (if 21.g3?? ♗d5 traps the queen) 21...♕×e3+ 22.♔h1 ♕×d3 23.♕×c7 ♖ab8 24.♕e5 (if 24.♘×b6?? ♕d4 wins the knight) 24...♖fe8 25.♕b2, and though material is even Black has the better game (about -1.50 per both Komodo and Stockfish).

In both these variations Lasker could not have looked deeper than three or four ply.

At the next move,



Lasker again advises against 17.♗×f6, saying it "would again have been of no use because of 17...♕×f6 18.c×d5 ♗×h2+ 19.♔×h2 ♕h4+ 20.♔g1 ♕×a4," but again his refutation is refuted, this time by 21.♖c4!:



and:
(a) 21...♕×b5?? 22.♖×c8+−;
(b) 21...♕×a3 22.♗×h7+ ♔×h7 23.♖h4+ ♔g8 24.♕h5 ♔f8 25.♕g5 f6 26.♖h8+ ♔f7 (if 26...♔e7?? 27.♕×g7+ and mate soon) 27.♕h5+ ♔e7 28.♖×d8 ♔×d8 29.d×e6 ♕c5 (intending 30.♕d5+ etc.) 29...♕c5 30.♕f7 ♕d6 (anything else allows mate in at most 16 moves) 31.e7+ ♕×e7 32.♕d5+ ♔e8 33.♕×a8 and the dust settles with White up rook for bishop;
(c) 21...♕b3 22.♗×h7+ ♔f8 (if 22...♔×h7 23.♕h5+ ♔g8 24.♖h4 again as in (b) above) 23.d6! ♕×b5 24.♗g6! (intending 25.♕f3) 24...f×g6 25.♖f4+ ♕f5 26.♖×f5+ e×f5 with ♕-for-♜+♝ plus a nasty passed pawn on the sixth rank (+3.74).

It is understandable that Lasker might not find variations (b) and (c) here, but one wonders if he even looked at the possibilities after 20...♕×a4.

By the time of White's 21st move, Lasker declares "The game is lost,"



but it is not at all, neither after the text move 21.♘b3 (-0.01), nor 21.♘a6!? intending 22.b6 (+0.58). The only alternative Lasker considers, 21.♗a3,



does indeed lose, but is best exploited not by Lasker's 21...♖ac8, when after 22.h3 e4 23.h×g4 e×d3 24.♕×d3 ♘×g4 25.g3 (if 25.♘a6?? ♗h2+ 26.♔h1 ♕h4 and mate soon) 25...♖×c5 26.♗×c5 ♗×c5 Black has the problematic advantage of ♗+♞+♟-for-♖ (-1.30). Instead after 21...e4! 22.♗e2 ♗×e2 23.♕×e2 ♘d7 24.♘×d7 ♗×a3 25.♘b6 ♗×c1 26.♘×a8 ♗a3 27.♘b6 ♗c5,



the knight has no escape route and must give it self up by 28.♘×d5 ♖×d5 and Black has bishop for pawn (-2.19).

In the note at White's 22nd move, Lasker's variation is fine up through 22.♕d2 ♗b4 23.♗c3 ♖×c3 24.♖×c3 d4 25.e×d4,



but now his 25...e×d4?! would throw away much of Black's advantage (-1.30). Instead 25...♘d5! wins at least a piece (-2.91). Further on in the note variation, after 25...e×d4?! 26.♘×d4,



Lasker's continuation 26...♕d6 27.♘c6 ♗×c3 28.♕×c3 ♕×d3 29.♕×d3 ♖×d3 is not nearly so good for Black as he supposed, because after 30.f3 ♗e6 31.♘×a5 Black has lost his a-pawn and the endgame will be rather difficult to win (about -0.85 at 24 ply). Instead with 26...♗×c3! 27.♕×c3 ♕e5 28.b6 ♕×d4 29.♕×d4 ♖×d4 30.b7 ♖d8 Black keeps his a-pawn and should win much more easily.

Lasker makes no further comment on the game. Komodo does not at all agree with his assessment that White was lost by move 21, and it finds two important improvements for White in the subsequent moves. At move 23,



rather than Salwe's 23.♗c2, it prefers 23.♖×c8 ♖×c8 24.♗c2, and if, as in the game, Black continues 24...♗e2, then 25.♗×f6 ♕×f6 26.♖c1 and now 26...♗×h2+ fails to 27.♔×h2 (+3.60).

The actual losing move came just after this,



when White played 24.♖fe1??, and quickly succumbed to 24...♗×h2+ 25.♔h×2 ♘g4+ etc. (though even stronger was 25...♕d6+! and mate in at most 13). Yet White could easily have avoided this with 24.♗×f6!, eliminating the dangerous later knight check, and then 24...♕×f6 25.♖fe1 and 25...♗×h2+ is only good for a draw. Black could keep trying with 25...♗f3, when a likely continuation is 26.♗d1 ♖×c1 27.♕×c1 ♕h4 28.♗×f3 ♗×h2+ 29.♔f1 e×f3 30.g×f3 ♕×a4 31.♘d4, which Komodo rates dead even.

It is just amazing that Lasker would overlook such an elementary saving resource as 24.♗×f6, especially when that move had figured so prominently in other variations, and he even recommended it (correctly!) for White at move 19.

***Game 67, Znosko-Borovsky–Speijer*:** A drawn game with three opportunities to win, two for Black and one for White. Lasker missed two of them.

Lasker makes no comment on White's 21st move.



He should have pointed out that 21.f4? was a mistake, and that 21.♔g2, 21.a3, 21.♕d2 and 21.♘e2 were all preferable.

That oversight is followed immediately by another. After 21.f4?,



Lasker does comment on the text move 21...♘d7, but only to commend it. He did not see that with 21...♘×e4! Black could have started winning, *viz.* 22.♘×e4 ♖ae8 (not 22...d5? 23.♕d2 ♕×a2 24.♘c5 +0.80) 23.♕f3 (if now 23.♕d2 ♕×d2 24.♖×d2 ♖×e4) 23...d5 24.♘f6+ ♗×f6 25.♖×e6 ♖×e6 26.♗×f6 ♖×f6 (-1.28); Also good was 21...♘d5 22.♘×d5 (if 22.♕f3 ♘×c3 23.b×c3 ♗×c3) 22...c×d5 23.e5 d×e5 (-1.35).

Lasker does correctly point out that a few moves later Black could have won with 24...d5!,



viz. 25.♕d2 d×e4 26.♗f4 ♕b6+ 27.♗e3 ♕b5 and White does not have enough compensation for his two-pawn deficit (-1.82).

The third and final winning opportunity came much later, buried in the middle of the last 30 moves, on which Lasker makes no comment. But the ever-awake lidless eye of Komodo saw almost instantly that at move 36,



Black had to play 36...c5 or he was lost. Instead Speijer played 36...h6??, to which Znosko-Borovsky replied innocuously with 37.♔f4?!. One wonders if he, Speijer or Lasker ever found out that he could have won with 37.b4!:



This gives White the final say in waiting moves, and eventually forces Black into *Zugzwang*, *e.g.* 37...♔f6 38.h4 ♔e6 39.a4 a6 40.♔d4 ♔d6 41.a5 g5 42.h5,



and now either 42...♔e6 43.♔c5 ♔d7 44.c4 ♔e6 45.♔×c6 and White breaks through on the queenside, or 42...c5+ 43.b×c5+ ♔e6 44.c6 ♔d6 45.♔e4 ♔×c6 (if 46...♔e6 47.c3 etc.) 46.♔f5 and White breaks through on the kingside.

***Game 68, Lasker–Znosko-Borovsky*:** Of all the competitors at St. Petersburg 1909, probably none make a sorrier impression than Znosko-Borovsky, who blundered as early as move four (against Spielmann) and move five (against Schlechter). While he avoided such early blunders here, this game is a case of Lasker simply waiting for his overmatched opponent to make a mistake, which he did. Only one note requires correction.

The note at move 17 is strange.



In lieu of Black's text move 17...h6, it recommends as "far stronger" 17...♗×f3 18.♕×f3 e5 (better either 18...♘f6 or 18...♖fe8=), then continues with 19.♕g3 yet gives it a "?" (though it is probably White's best move), and then finally 19...f5,



giving the impression Black is in good shape. But he is not: White simply plays 20.d×e5 and Black cannot win back the pawn. One can only think that Lasker believed Black would recover it with 20...f4 (on most other moves, simply 21.f4 protects the pawn),





but that is thwarted in at least two ways, by **(a)** 21.♕g5 and either 21...♖de8 22.e6 or 21...h6 22.♕h5 (both about +1.80); or **(b)** 21.♕h3 ♖fe8 (not 21... ♘×e5?? 22.♖×d8 ♖×d8 23.♕e6+) 22.♕f5 ♖e7 23.e6 ♘f8 (if 23...♘f6? 24.♖×d8+ ♕×d8 25.♕×f4) 24.♖×d8 ♕×d8 25.♕d5 (also about +1.80).

***Game 69, Vidmar-Tartakower*:** A game well played by Tartakower and decently annotated by Lasker. We can offer only two improvements.

There is almost no comment on moves 28-51. At Black's 29th move,



where he played 29...♘×f6, better was 29...♖×a2 and then 30...♘×f6 (-1.95). White had no way to defend the f6-pawn. Somehow the a-pawn remained *en prise* and yet uncaptured from 24 until White finally defended it at move 32.

At move 49, White took his position from bad to worse by playing 49.g2-g4? (relatively best was 49.♖d3).



There was nothing wrong with Tartakower's reply 49...f×g4 50.h×g4 ♔g5 (-2.35), but best was 49...♖d2+!:



If then:

(a) 50.♔f1?? ♖×c2 51.♖×c2 ♘e3+;
(b) 50.♔g1 f×g4 51.h×g4 ♘e5 and the g-pawn cannot be defended (-3.05);
(c) 50.♔f3 ♔e5 51.g×f5 g×f5 52.♗b1 (52.h4? ♔d4 -4.38) 52...♖b2 53.♗c2 ♖×b4 (-3.27);
(d) 50.♔e1 ♖h2 51.g×f5 g×f5 52.♗b3 ♘e5 and Black has a mobile passed f-pawn, while White's h-pawn is merely a defensive burden for his rook (-3.16);
(e) 50.♔g3 ♘e5 51.g×f5 g×f5 52.h4 ♖d4 53.♖b3 ♖g4+ 54.♔h3 ♘g6 and the h-pawn is toast (-3.37).

***Game 70, Perlis-Salwe*:** Yet another game annotated by result, full of tactical errors made by the players and overlooked by Lasker. In mitigation, it should be noted that several variations are quite complicated.

Unmentioned is the fact that White already had a nearly winning opportunity at move 14. Instead of 14.♗b3+, he should have struck at once with 14.f4!:



And now:
(a) 14...♔g7 15.f×e5 ♘g6 (forced) 16.♘×f5+ ♗×f5 17.e×f5 ♘×e5 18.♗b3 (+1.68);
(b) 14...e×f4 15.♖×f4 ♕e8 (not 15...f×e4?? 16.♖×f8+ ♕×f8 17.♖f1 ♕d8 18.♕g5+ ♔h8 19.♗b3 and mate in at most six) 16.♗b3+ d5 (if 16...♔h8 17.♕h6 +3.24) 17.♕×e8 ♖×e8 18.e×f5 (+1.67);
(c) 14...f×e4 15.f×e5 ♗e6 (if 15...d×e5?? 16.♕g5+ and Black can only choose which way to die: 16...♔h8 17.♕×e5+ ♔g8 18.♗b3+ etc., or 16...♘g6 17.♖×f8+ ♕×f8 18.♘×g6 h×g6 19.♕×g6+ ♕g7 20.♗b3+ ♗e6 21.♕×e6+ etc., both about +12.50) 16.♖×f8 ♕×f8 17.♖f1 ♕g7 18.e×d6 (+2.50);
(d) 14...♗e6 15.f×e5 f×e4 16.♖×f8+ ♕×f8 17.♖f1 ♕g7 (if 17...♕d8 18.♗b3 ♗×b3 19.c×b3 ♕e8 20.♕g4+ ♔h8 21.e×d6 +4.49) 18.e×d6 and we have transposed to variation (c).

14.♗b3+ only seemed as strong as it did because Black played the egregious 14...d5?, which Lasker failed to flag as a serious mistake. Necessary and much better was 14...♔g7!,



when about the best White has is 15.♕g5+ ♘g6 16.♕×d8 ♖×d8 17.♘×f5+ ♗×f5 18.e×f5 and after 18...♘e7 or 18...♘f4 White's advantage is not nearly so great (about +0.55) compared to the 14.f4 lines above.

Even so, White did not capitalize fully on 14...d5?:



Rather than the text move 15.f4, better alternatives were:
(a) 15.e×d5 and:
(a1) 15...♘×d5 16.♖ae1 ♕f6 17.♖e3 ♔h8 (else 18.♖g3+ ♔h8 19.♘g6+ etc.) 18.♗×d5 c×d5 and White happily plays 19.♖×e5! (+1.54), since if 19...♕×e5?? 20.♘g6+;
(a2) 15...c×d5 16.♖fe1 e4 17.c4 ♔g7 (if 17...d4? 18.f3, or 17...d×c4 18.♗×c4+ ♔g7 19.♖ad1 +1.67) 18.c×d5 ♘g6 (not 18...♘×d5?? 19.♗×d5 ♕×d5 20.♖e3 etc. +5.72) 19.♘×g6 h×g6 20.♕d1



when White has an extra, passed pawn and much the safer king (+1.22).
(b) 15.♖ad1 f×e4 16.♕×e5 ♕e8 and:
(b1) 17.♕×e4 ♘g6 18.♕×e8 ♖×e8 19.♘×g6 h×g6 is OK but not as strong as:
(b2) 17.c4! ♘f5 (if 17...♘g6 18.♘×g6 h×g6 19.♕g3 ♗e6 20.c×d5 c×d5 21.♗×d5 ♗×d5 22.♖×d5 and White is obviously much better (+1.70), or 17...d×c4?? 18.♗×c4+ ♘d5 19.♖×d5 ♕×e5 20.♖×e5+ +5.87) 18.♕×e8 ♖×e8 19.♘×f5 ♗×f5 20.c×d5 c×d5 21.♗×d5+ ♔g7 22.♗×b7,



and White is two pawns up (+1.61).

At White's 16th move,



Perlis' 16.f5 is given high praise by Lasker, but undeservedly, as will be shown below. Best by far was 16.f×e5!, after which 16...♗e6 17.♕h6 ♕d7 (if 17...♗f7 18.♖f6 as well) 18.♖f6 is more or less forced:



Now every black move has an evaluation of +4.65 or worse, except for these three:
(a) 18...♘g6 19.♘×g6 ♖×f6 20.e×f6 h×g6 21.♕×g6+ ♔h8 22.♖f1,



and though White is up only a pawn he is clearly winning (+1.84);
(b) 18...♖×f6 19.e×f6 (not 19.♕×f6?! ♖f8 and White's attack is repelled) 19...♘f5 20.♕g5+ ♔h8 21.♘×f5 ♗×f5 22.f7!



22...♕×f7 (if 22...♗g6?? or 22...♖f8?? 23.♕f6#, or 22...♕e6?? 23.♖f1 ♗g6 24.f8♕+) 23.♖f1 ♖f8 24.g4 winning the bishop;
(c) 18...♘f5 19.♘×f5 ♗×f5 20.c4!



(much better than 20.♕g5+ ♗g6 21.c4 d×c4 22.♗×c4+ ♔h8 23.c3 ♖×f6 24.e×f6 (only +1.16)) 20...♖×f6 (if 20...♕g7 21.♕h4 ♖×f6 22.e×f6 ♕g4 23.♕×g4+ ♗×g4 24.c×d5 etc.) 21.e×f6 ♗e6 22.c×d5 c×d5 23.♗×d5! ♗×d5 24.♖d1,



and the threat of mate at g7 means the bishop cannot be defended. All Black has left are a few spite checks after which White starts closing in: 24...♕c7 25.♖×d5 ♕b6+ 26.♔f1 ♕b1+ 27.♔f2 ♕×c2+ 28.♔g3 ♕c7+ 29.♔h3 etc. (+5.77).

The flaw in Perlis' 16.f5 becomes evident a move later, after 16...♖f6 17.♖ae1:



Salwe's 17...♔h8 was not all that bad, but he probably could have attained clear equality, or perhaps even clinched a draw, with 17...♕d6! 18.♖×e4 (if 18.c4 ♗d7 19.c×d5 c×d5 20.c4 ♖af8=) 18...♗d7 19.♖g4+ ♔h8:



And now:
(a) 20.♘g6+ ♘×g6 21.f×g6 ♖×g6 22.♖×g6 ♕×g6 23.♕×e5+ ♕g7 with equality, or
(b) 20.♖f3 ♘×f5! 21.♘×f5 ♗×f5 22.♖×f5 ♖×f5 23.♕×f5 ♖f8 24.♕g5 ♕c5+,



and 25.♖d4 is forced, and White is the one who must sue for peace: 25...e×d4 26.♕e5+ ♔g8 27.c×d4 ♕c3 28.♕g5+ ♔f7 29.♕f5+ ♔e7 30.♕e5+ etc., draw.

In the above lines we have presented what Komodo and Stockfish both considered best play for both sides. White has more leeway than Black and can vary at several points, but in each case the engines rated such alternatives as at least slightly favorable for Black. Perhaps some winning line for White stemming from 16.f5 ♖f6 17.♖ae1 ♕d6 lurks in the complications, and the reader is welcome to hunt for it, but we doubt it's there. In any event, since White could have won with 16.f×e5, the question is academic.

After 16.f5 ♖f6, the only line with any real promise for White appears to have been not 17.♖ae1 but 17.♕g5+,



with best play proceeding 17...♔f7 18.c4 ♗d7 19.c×d5 c×d5 20.♖ad1, when Komodo and Stockfish both see only a slight advantage for White after 20...♗b5 or 20...♕a5 (both about +0.50).

Returning to the actual game, after 17...♔h8 18.g4 Black was as yet by no means lost.



Salwe's 18...♗d7?! was a relatively poor, fourth-best choice. Instead he had several moves that would have maintained equality:
(a) 18...a5 19.a4 ♕g8=;
(b) 18...♕g8, when if 19.♖×e4 ♗e6!=, since 20.f×e6? ♖×f1+ 21.♔×f1 d×e4 22.♕×e5+ ♕g7 23.♕×e4 ♕×c3 boomerangs on White (-1.13);
(c) 18...b5 (dashing any hopes of an eventual c3-c4), when if 19.g5? ♕g8!



and then 20.♖×e4 ♘×f5∓, or 20.g6? ♕g7 21.♔h1 ♗d7 22.♖g1 ♗×f5; 20.♔h1 ♖×f5! 21.♘×f5 ♗×f5



when Black's extra pawns and White's bad bishop more than compensate for the sacrifice of the exchange (-0.84).

Lasker's note at move 19, that "White is not satisfied with 19.g5 ♕g8 20.♔h1 ♖×f5" rather understates the case,



since after 21.♘×f5 ♗×f5 we have a position much like variation (c) in the previous note, definitely in Black's favor (-1.43).

Lasker calls White's 19th move, 19.♘h4-g6+, "powerful and elegant," but while it was White's best at that point, its success was due much more to poor defense by Black than any such qualities.



Salwe played the natural-looking but losing 19...♘×g6?. He had to try 19...♔g7!? 20.♘×e5 ♗e8 21.♕h3 ♕d6 22.♕g3 (forced, since the knight has no retreat) 22...b5,



when it is hard for White to make progress, he has a very bad bishop, and Black should be able to untangle himself by ...♗d7 when his long dormant queen's rook can get into the action. The

engines peg White's advantage at no greater than about +0.75, as compared to about +2.65 after 19...♘×g6?.

Black hurt himself even more after the further moves 20.f×g6 ♖×g6 21.♖f7,



when he played 21...♕b6+??, which prompts Stockfish to announce mate in 32 (!). But other desperate tries also fail: 21...♖×g4+ 22.♔h1 ♖g7 23.♖×g7 ♔×g7 24.♖g1+ and mate in at most nine, or 21...♖g7 22.♕×e5 ♕g5 23.♕×g5 ♖×g5 24.♖×d7+−.

***Game 72, Mieses-Freiman*:** A sort of tragi-comic farce in which Freiman yet again snatches defeat from the jaws of victory. Mieses starts out abominably, but ultimately gets away with a lucky swindle. Lasker's notes start out quite good, but ultimately several key possibilities get away from him too.

The notes are good up to Black's 19th move.



There Lasker criticized Freiman's 19...♘e2+ for opening the long diagonal to White's bishop, when in fact it was the best move on the board (-3.04 at 29 ply per Stockfish). Lasker's suggested alternative 19...h6 is, as he says, "good enough," but it rates almost a full pawn's worth lower (-2.12).

No comment is made on the fact that 20...♔b8?! squandered much of Black's advantage. Much stronger instead was 20...♘f4!:



If then:
(a) 21.♕×h7?? ♕d5 22.f3 (or 22.♕×g7 ♖g6) 22...♕d2 (-7.24);

(b) 21.♕f3 f6 and the supposedly dangerous bishop bites on granite (-2.71);
(c) 21.♕g3 ♖g6 (-2.96);
(d) 21.♕b3 ♕c6 22.f3 ♘×g2 23.♔×g2?? ♖d2+ etc.;
(e) 21.♕g4 g6 (-2.80).

Black was still winning when he wasted still more of his advantage with 22...♖×g7?!, on which Lasker again does not comment. Better instead was 22...♕e6-d5!:



More or less forced then is 23.f3 ♖e6 24.♕f2 ♘f4,



when White has several options but none good, *e.g.*:
(a) 25.♕h4 ♘×g2 26.♔×g2 ♖g6+ 27.♔h1 ♖×g7 (-2.57);
(b) 25.♗c3 ♖e2 26.♕g3 ♘×g2 (-2.45);
(c) 25.♖g1? ♕g5 26.♗c3 ♘e2 (-3.58);
(d) 25.a4 ♖g6 26.♕e3 ♘×g2 27.♕c3 ♘f4 (-2.85). Other alternatives are all as bad or worse.

The most tragic (and comical) scene is saved for last, however. Lasker is correct that at Black's 32nd move,



32...♕e2? was a serious mistake in a winning position, and that 32...♖d5 would have maintained Black's advantage (back up to about -3.33 at that point), as would, we add, several other moves such as 32...♖e5, 32...♖e7, and 32...♔b7.

Yet even after 32...♕e2 was summarily punished by 33.♖d8+ ♔b7 34.♕g2+, Black *still* could have won:



Freiman, who played 34...♔a6?? (probably in time pressure) and Lasker (who had all day), should have remembered that moving the king is not the only way out of check! Salvation, yea, even victory was at hand, in the form of 34...♖e4!!:



This puts an end to the threat of 35.♕a8+, and while Black is a bit tied up and still faces some difficulties, his passed pawns assure ultimate triumph. There are two main lines:
(a) An attempt to exploit the pinned rook is futile: 35.♖d4 ♖fe5 36.♖cc4 (if 36.♖dc4 c5) 36...f5, and soon Black unpins with ...♔c8 and gets his queenside pawns moving.
(b) If 35.♖d7 ♖c5! 36.♖×c5 b×c5 37.♖×f7 ♔b6,



and even though Black's pawns have been broken up and his king looks vulnerable, he can still win. Stockfish rates at -3.00 or worse all but one line for White: 38.♕h3 (if instead 38.♖×h7? c4 etc. (-6.47), or 38.♖f6+ c6 (-4.02)) 38...♕d1+ 39.♔h2 ♕d5



40.♖f6+ (again not 40.♖×h7?? ♖e1 41.♕g2 ♕×g2+ 42.♔×g2 c4 etc. -14.33) 40...c6 41.♕c8 ♖e1:





Now White finally gets some checks in, but Black need not be concerned: 42.♕b8+ ♔a6 43.♕a8+ ♔b5 44.♕b7+ ♔c4



45.f3 (if 45.♖f4+?? ♔c3 46.f3 [or 46.♕g7+ ♔b3 47.♕b7+ ♔a3 and White is finally out of checks and Black mates in fifteen at most] 46...♕a2+ and mate in at most sixteen) 45...a4 46.♕a6+ ♔b3 47.♕b6+ ♔a2



and again White is out of checks, and Black will soon queen his a- or c-pawn (-9.53). One wonders if Freiman ever realized what might have been. Perhaps better for his sanity if he never knew.

***Game 73, Duras-Rubinstein*:** A classic rook ending by Rubinstein. We can offer only one small improvement on a note from early in the game.

In the note at White's 14th move, after 14.c5 ♘c4,



White need not play 15.♕e2? as in the note; much less egregious is 15.♗c1, and if 15...d×c5 then 16.♗×c6 b×c6 and Black's nominal extra pawn, being tripled, is worthless. And if we must have White playing 15.♕e2? ♘×e3 16.♕×e3,





Lasker's continuation 16...♗×a4?! 17.♘×a4 d×c5 nets only the skimpy return of a pawn after 18.♔h1 (-1.42), compared to either 17.♗×c6 ♗b4 and the threat of 18...♗×c5 winning the queen gives White no time to save his bishop (-3.77), or 16...♗×c3 17.♕×c3 ♗×a4 (-3.34), in either case winning a full piece.

***Game 74, Dus-Chotimirsky–Forgács*:** A mostly uneventful draw, sparsely annotated. The one note with a concrete variation can be improved.

In the note at move 16,



Lasker is correct to disparage 16...♘c3?, but his supporting analysis goes wrong at the end. After 17.♗×c3 ♖×c3 18.♘e4 ♖×a3 19.♖×a3 ♗b4 (19...♗×a3 turns out no better) 20.♖c3 f5 21.♘g3 e4, the final move he gives, 22.♗d3-e2,



would allow Black eventually to come out materially even, albeit with his pieces awkwardly placed, *viz.* 22...e×f3 23.♖×d8+ ♕×d8 24.g×f3 ♗h3 25.♖c8 ♕×c8 26.♕×b4 ♕d8:



Rather than 22.♗e2, White can do much better with 22.♗c2!:





and either 22...e×f3 23.♖×d8+ ♕×d8 24.h3 — The key compared to Lasker's line: Black's bishop is trapped, and White's is not *en prise* on e2. — 24...♗×h3 25.g×h3 g6 26.♕a1 ♗×c3 27.♕×c3 and White is up a piece for two pawns (+2.65), or 22...♖×d1 23.♖c8+! ♖d8 24.♖×d8+ ♕×d8 25.♕×b4 e×f3 26.h3 ♗×h3 27.g×h3 g6 28.♕f4, and White will be up a piece for just one pawn (+3.47).

***Game 75, Cohn-Schlechter*:** A game with some fascinating might-have-beens. It must have been quite a tough loss for Cohn, who stood very much better before even a dozen moves had been played, and who maintained a definite advantage until the very late stages. Winning opportunities occurred both in the middle game and the endgame, and Lasker often missed or misjudged them. This was especially true in the endgame, which we found extremely interesting and have examined at length.

At move 12, White began a strong attack with 12.e6, a move Lasker seems to dislike, commenting "but by the opening of the lines for the rooks, Black obtains an attack on the castled king." As will be seen below, Lasker's reservations about 12.e6 were without basis. Nevertheless, White would have had an even better attack with a move Lasker did not consider, 12.♘f3-g5!:



Black is probably already lost. If now 12...h6? 13.♘×f7! ♔×f7 14.♗×g6+ ♔g8 15.f4 and he will be helpless against the coming onslaught. The two least dire alternatives are:

(a) 12...0–0 13.f4 ♗h6 14.♗a3 ♘e7 (if 14...♖e8 15.♘×f7 ♔×f7 16.f5 etc.),



and White can continue the attack strongly with either
(a1) 15.e6 ♗×g5 16.f×g5 f×e6 17.♖×f8+ ♕×f8 18.♕e2 ♗c8 (if 18...♕f7 19.♖f1 ♘f5 20.g4+−) 19.♖f1 ♕e8 20.♖f6 etc. (+2.56), or
(a2) 15.♖f3 ♗c8 16.♕f2 etc. (+1.94).

(b) 12...♕e7 (12...♕d7 enters similar lines) 13.f4 and the black king is best advised to relocate: 13...0–0–0 14.f5 14.g×f5 (if 14...f6 15.♘e6) 15.♗×f5+ ♔b8 16.♗h3 ♖df8 17.♘×h7 ♖fg8 18.♗g5 ♕e8, and now just about any reasonable move, *e.g.* 19.♕d3, 19.♖f2, 19.♖ae1, or 19.♗f6, to name a few, keeps White in command (about +1.65 to +1.85).

The note at move 13 is correct that White wins if Black plays 13...h×g6, but like so many of Lasker's annotations it goes astray at the end.



Lasker gives 13...h×g6 14.♕×g6+ ♔f8 15.♗a3+ ♔g8 16.♕×e6+ ♔h7 17.h4 "and wins." Both Komodo and Stockfish say "Really?" after 17...♕f6!,



which suddenly makes winning highly problematic, *e.g.* 18.♕g4 ♗c8 19.♕h5+ ♗h6 20.♕×d5 ♗g4 (-0.25), or 18.♘g5+ ♔g6 19.♕g4 ♖×h4 20.♕×h4 ♖h8 21.♕g4 ♕×g5 22.♕×g5+ ♔×g5 (-0.50). It may be that in some line White can eventually make his preponderance of pawns tell, but neither engine is optimistic.

In any event, the worth of 17.h4?! is a trivial question, because instead of it White has a clear win with 17.♕f5+!:



Forced then is 17...♔g8 18.♘g5 ♖h6 19.♖fe1,





and there really is nothing Black can do, *viz.* 19...♖f6 20.♕h7#, or 19...♗c8 20.♕f7+ ♔h8 21.♖e8+ etc., or 19...♘a5 20.♕f7+ ♔h8 21.♖e7 ♗f6 22.♖ae1 ♗×e7 23.♖×e7 ♕f8 24.♖e6 ♕×f7 25.♘×f7 ♔h7 26.♘×h6 (+3.15).

At move 14, Lasker gives a strangely half-hearted, vague, equivocal comment that 14...♕g8 15.♖e1 ♗f6 "makes the impression of having been better."



Komodo does not agree; White proceeds with 16.♗h6 ♔c8 (if 16...♖d8? 17.♖×e6! ♕×e6 (17...♔×e6 is much worse) 18.♖e1 ♕g8 19.♕f5+ ♔d6 20.♕×f6+ and mate in at most 12) 17.♕e2 ♘d8 18.♘e5, which Komodo evaluates at +2.37, i.e. about a half-pawn higher than the game continuation.

The reader is advised that from this point on there is a discrepancy between the book's version of the game score, and ChessBase's version. A repetitive set of moves, 17-18, is absent from the ChessBase score. Since this work is designed to be used in conjunction with the book, we adhere to the book's numbering here. Thus, if instead you are playing through the game from ChessBase or another like database, your move numbers will be two less than what is shown here.

Lasker makes no comment on moves 15-24, thus missing another opportunity for White. Cohn played 23.♗g5×h6, not at all bad, but strongest was 23.♘e5+!:



If then **(a)** 23...♔d6 24.♗×h6 ♖×h6 25.♘f7+! ♘×f7 26.♖×e6+ ♖×e6 27.♖×e6+ ♔d7 278.♖×b6+ ♔d8 29.♖×b7 (+2.87), or **(b)** 23...♔c8 24.f4 ♗×g5 25.f×g5 ♖hg8 26.♖f3 ♖e7 27.♖f6 and either the e- or g-pawn falls (+3.11).

At White's 25th move, Lasker is unfairly harsh toward Cohn's 25.♗g4×e6+,





saying “He gives away all his advantage for a trifle.” As will be shown below, this is not the case. The alternative Lasker suggests, 25.h3, is not demonstrably better. Komodo prefers 25.♘f3 ♖h6 (not 25...♖×g4?? 25.♘e5+) 26.♘e5+ ♔c8 27.g3 (about +2.00 though material is still even), but Cohn should not be faulted for taking “a pawn in the hand.”

The vindication of 25.♗×e6+ is seen a move later. After 25...♘×e6, rather than 26.♘×e6?!, White should have played 26.♖×e6:



Black then cannot play 26...♖eh8? 27.♖×g6 ♖×h2 28.♘h3 +−, so after either 26...♖×e6 27.♘×e6, or 26...♖hh8 27.♖×e8 ♖×e8 28.♖×e8 ♔×e8 29.f4, the reduced material improves White’s endgame prospects, which are bright with his 3-to-1 kingside pawn majority.

We now enter the endgame phase. Until Rubinstein came along, Lasker was generally considered the best endgame player of his day, probably of all time to that point (see for example Capablanca’s remarks above). Yet the Cohn-Schlechter endgame has such subtle intricacies that Lasker repeatedly lost his way. We found this part of the game very intriguing, and so we give it extended treatment.

At move 28, where White played 28.♖e1×e3,



Lasker prefers 28.f×e3 and comments “He ought to have preserved this rook, as the a-pawn is weak. But it must be admitted that it is surprising that Black should have been able to make such decisive use of this slight advantage.”

This is a more than minor misjudgement of the position, and one cannot help but think Lasker was again “analyzing by result,” since Schlechter did win in the manner described. In fact, as we will show, White’s kingside majority is more of a threat than Black’s on the queenside, and the exchange of rooks augments and expedites that threat.

At move 31,



Lasker is correct to fault the text move 31.h4, but from there he takes several false steps. He gives 31.♘e5 g5 32.♘f7 g4 33.♘e5 ♗c8 34.♔f2 ♗f5 35.♔g3



and:
(a) 35...♗b1 36.♔×g4 ♗×a2 37.♔g5 ♗b1 38.♘g6 "and the two pawns queen at the same time";
(b) 35...a5 36.♘×g4 ♗b1 37.h4 ♗×a2 38.♘f6 "and now the black a-pawn will queen, but White's two united passed pawns are very strong, *e.g.*" 38...a4 39.h5 ♗b1 40.h6 ♗g6 "(to avoid 41.e4)" 41.♔g4 a3 42.♔g5 a2 43.♔×g6 a1♕ 44.h7 "and Black cannot win, for instance" 44...♕h1 45.g4 ♕h4 46.♔g7 ♕g5+ 47.♔f7 ♕h6 48.g5.

There are several mistakes in this analysis. They start almost immediately, but it seems best to take them in reverse order, starting near the end of variation (b). The statement "Black cannot win" at move 44 is major understatement: Black is busted no matter what he does at that point (+4.98 per Stockfish at 27 ply).

However, at move 42, Black can still draw,



providing he avoids Lasker's 42...a2?? in favor of 42...♗b1, ♗c2, or ♗d3, *e.g.* 42...♗b1 43.e4 (a move Lasker needlessly feared in this case) 43...♗×e4 44.♘×e4 d×e4 45.h7 a2 46.h8♕ a1♕ reaching a drawn queen ending with even material and a passed pawn for each side. 0.00, says Stockfish.

Amazingly, Black can even put his bishop *en prise* with 42...♗h7!? and still draw:



43.♘×h7 a2 44.♘f6 a1♕ 45.h7 ♕a8 46.♔g6 ♕f8 47.g4 (if 45.♘g8 ♕d6+ 46.♔g7 ♕g3+ 47.♔h8?? Stockfish announces mate in 39!) and now 47...♔c4 (or ♔a4/ ♔a5/ ♔a6), 47...♕d8, or 47...c6/c5 are all dead even (0.00 at 36 ply).

Going back to the position at Black's 40th move in variation (b),



Black need not have retreated the bishop to g6 "to avoid 41.e4" as Lasker cautioned. He can proceed directly with 38...a3 39.e4 ♗×e4 40.♘×e4 a2 41.h7 a1♕ 42.h8♕ ♕e1+ 43.♘f2 ♕e3+ 44.♔h2 ♕×f2,



reaching another even queen ending where the checks can go on *ad infinitum*.

The engines find little to quibble over in variation (a); there seems to be no way to avoid another drawn, double-queening situation. The fundamental flaw in Lasker's analysis starts much further back, in the stem line. After 31.♘f7-e5 g6-g5, rather than Lasker's 32.♘f7?, which as we have seen only draws, White can win with 32.g3!:



Stockfish's evaluation immediately jumps up to over +4.00 after this move, and further analysis more than bears this out. Some representative lines:

(a) Of course if 32...g4, hoping to forestall the h-pawn's advance, simply 33.♘×g4+− .

(b) 32...♔a4 33.h4 g×h4 34.g×h4 ♗c8 35.h5 ♗f5 36.h6 ♔a3 37.♘c6 ♔×a2



38.♘e7 (not 38.♘×a7?! ♔b3 39.♘c6 ♗h7 40.♘e7 c6! 41.♘×c6 ♔×c3 and the win is very much in doubt) 38...♗e4 39.♘×d5! and wins (at least +6.14).

(c) 32...♗c8 33.h4 g×h4 34.g×h4 ♗f5 35.h5 ♔a4 (if 35...♗b1?! 36.h6 and Black can't afford 36...♗×a2 37.h7 etc.) 36.♘c6 a5 37.♘e7 ♗e4 86.h6 ♔a3 39.♘×d5



and as in line (b) it's obvious White will win (+10.82).;

(d) 32...c5 33.h4 g×h4 34.g×h4 c×d4 35.c×d4 ♗c8 36.h5 ♗f5 37.h6 a5 38.♔g2 ♔a4 39.♔f3 ♔a3 40.♔f4 ♗h7 41.♔g5 ♔×a2 42.e4! ♗×e4 43.♘g6 b5 44.h7 b4 45.h8♕ b3 46.♕e8



46...b2 (or 46...♔a3 47.♕e7+ ♔a4 48.♕d7+ ♔a3 49.♕d6+ ♔a2 50.♘f4 b2 51.♘×d5 b1♕ [if 51...♗×d5 52.♕×d5+ ♔a1 53.♕b5 etc.] 52.♘c3+ and Black's new queen is stillborn) 47.♕a4+ ♔b1,



and it's clear Black will never be able to queen his pawn and is lost (Stockfish says mate in about 30).

Other 32nd moves are possible for Black, but almost all end up going into the main theme, the advance of White's h-pawn, the inability of the black bishop to stop it, and the inability of the black king to capture the a-pawn and queen one of his own pawns in time.

At move 34,



Lasker disparages Cohn's 34.♔f2 and says 34.g5 "was his last chance." It was not, and as at move 30 above, Lasker's supporting analysis is flawed. In the first of his two variations, 34...♗×a2 35.♘×g6 ♗b1,



White has to play 36.h5 or 36.♘f8, which both should draw. Lasker instead gives 36.♘e5?, continuing 36...a5 37.h5 a4 38.g6 a3 39.h6 ♗×g6 40.♘×g6 a2 41.h7 a1♕+ 42.♔h2,



concluding "White may possibly draw." Stockfish says no: 42...♕×c3 43.h8♕ ♕c2+ 44.♔h3 ♕×g6, and Black has all the winning chances (-5.11).

Lasker's second line, beginning 34...a5 35.h5 g×h5 36.g6,



purports to show how "White would even win," but it also goes quickly awry with 36...♔a4?? (a blunder; correct is 36...♗×g6 75.♘×g6 ♔c4=) 37.g7 ♗h7



38.♘d7?! — Instead White wins with 38.c4! d×c4 39.♘×c4 ♔b4 40.♘e5 b5 41.e4 ♔c3 42.♘d7 ♗g8 43.♘f6 ♗f7 44.d5 ♔d4 45.♘e8 ♔e5 (if 45...♔×e4?? 46.d6!, or 45...♔c5 46.♘×c7) 46.♘×c7 b4 46.♘a6 (+7.79 per Stockfish at 26 ply) — 38...♗g8 39.♘f6 ♗f7 40.g8♕ ♗×g8 41.♘×g8 ♔a3?? — Another blunder; 41...♔b5 draws. Lasker winds up with 42.♘e7 ♔×a2 43.♘×d5 ♔b3 44.♘×c7 ♔c4 45.d5 ♔c5 46.c4 and yes, White does win in this line, but only because of the two major blunders.

So Lasker's 34.g5 is only good for a draw, and therefore is no better than Cohn's 34.♔f2. However, once again such a question is moot. Cohn's real last chance, which he and Lasker both missed, was 34.♘f3!:



The key idea is that if now 34...♗×a2?? 35.♘d2! and the bishop cannot get back to the b1-h7 diagonal to stop the h-pawn. Black has several plausible-looking continuations; we present what we consider the most important here. Other moves, for the most part, are either clearly unsound, or they transpose into one of the following illustrative lines:

(a) 34...♔c6 (to bring the king over to fight the kingside pawns) 35.♘d2 ♗c2 36.♔g2 ♔d6 37.♔f3 ♔e6 38.♔f4 ♔f6 39.e4 d×e4 40.♘×e4+ ♔g7 (40...♗×e4?? 41.♔×e4 is tantamount to resignation) 41.♘g5 ♔f6 42.h5 g×h5 43.g×h5 ♗b1 44.a3 ♗d3 45.h6 c6 46.h7 ♔g7 47.♔e5 ♗b5 48.♔d6 ♔h8



49.c4! and either 49...♗a4 50.d5+− or 49...♗×c4 50.♔×c6+−.

(b) 34...♗c2 35.h5 g×h5 36.g×h5 ♔c4 37.♘g5 ♔×c3 38.♔f2,



and:
(b1) 38...♔b2 39.e4! d×e4 40.♔e3 ♔×a2 41.h6 etc.;
(b2) Similar is 38...♗b1 39.e4 ♔×d4 40.h6 d×e4 41.♘e6+! (most definitely *not* 41.h7?? e3+) and on 41...♔d3 42.h7!, or on any other move 42.♔e3 and 43.h7+−;
(b3) 38...♔d2 37.h6 ♗g6 38.♔f3 ♔c2 39.♔f4 c5 40.♔e5



40...c4 (if 40...c×d4 41.e×d4 a5 and White can win with 42.h7, 42.♔f6, 42.♔×d5 or several other moves) 41.♔f6 ♗d3 42.e4 c3 43.h7 ♔b2 44.h8♕ c2 45.♕h2, and if 45...d×e4 46.♕d2 and the d-pawn will march merrily along, or 45...♔b1 46.♕h1+ c1♕ 47.♕×c1+ ♔×c1 48.e×d5 and again the d-pawn will march merrily along.

(c) 34...♔a4 35.♘d2 ♗c2 36.h5 g×h5 37.g×h5 ♗h7 38.c4!



Much more problematic is 38.♔f2?! a5 (if 38...b5 39.e4! d×e4 40.♔e3) 39.c4 d×c4 40.♘×c4 ♔b4 41.♘d2 ♔c3 42.♘f3 a4 43.♘g5 ♗g8 44.h6 a3 45.♘e4+ ♔c2 46.♘f6 ♗×a2 47.h7 ♗c4 48.h8♕ a2 49.♕h7+ ♔b3 50.♕×c7 a1♕ 51.♕×b6+ ♔c2,





when White has two connected, passed pawns, but winning will be much more complicated since Black has a queen too.

Continuing now after 38.c4! from the previous diagram: 38...d×c4 (if 38...c6? 39.c×d5 c×d5 40.e4 and Black will not be able to cope with two passed pawns +5.41) 39.♘×c4 ♔b4 40.♘d2! ♔c3 (not 40...♔a3? 41.e4 etc.) 41.♘f3 and:



(c1) 41...b5 42.♘g5 ♗g8 (or 42...♗b1 43.e4+−) 43.h6 ♔d3 (if 43...♔b2 44.e4 ♔×a2 45.e5 etc.) 44.♔f2 a5 46.h7 etc.;
(c2) 41...a5 42.♘g5 ♗g8 43.h6 ♔d3 44.♔f2 a4 45.h7 ♗×h7 46.♘×h7 ♔c3 47.♔e2 ♔b2 48.♔d2 ♔×a2 49.♔c3 ♔b1 50.♘f6 a3 51.♘e4 a2 52.♘d2+ ♔c1 53.♘b3+ ♔b1 54.e4 etc.

The position at move 34 is definitely another elephant-drowner, and improvements for one side or the other may be lurking in the depths, but we think this analysis indicates very strongly that White could have won with 34.♘f3.

Returning to the actual game, after 34.♔f2?! ♗×a2 White's advantage was much reduced, perhaps below any objective chance of winning, but contrary to Lasker's assessment, he was far from lost.



The main difference here compared to the position after 34.♘f3 is that White's a-pawn is gone, making it much easier for Black to mount threats on the queenside. Best now for White was not 35.♘×g6 (which he did), but to switch to defense and get his king queenside starting with 35.♔e2. A plausible continuation then is 35...a5 36.♔d2 (not, for example, 36.h5 g×h5 37.g×h5 ♗b1 38.♘d3?? ♔c4−+) 36...♗b1 37.♔c1 ♗e4 38.♔b2 a4 39.♔a1,





and while Stockfish shows some advantage for White (+1.31), it seems unlikely he can win, yet with reasonable care he should not lose.

And even after the game continuation 35.♘×g6 ♗b1 36.♘f4 a5,



Cohn *still* was not lost until he played 37.♔e1??. Instead, he still could have drawn with 37.♘×d5! c6 (if 37...♗e4?! 38,♘×c7+) 38.c4+! ♔×c4 39.♘f6 (or 39.♘×b6+ ♔b5 40.♘d7 probably draws too) 39...a4 40.h5 a3 41.g5 a2 42.g6 a1♕ 41.g7 ♕a2+ 42.♔g3,



and Black has nothing better than 42...♔d3 43.g8♕ ♕×g8 44.♘×g8 ♔×e3 45.♘e7 ♔×d4 (not 45...c5?? 46.d5!+−) 46.♘×c6, and the game is as drawn as a pencil sketch.

We do not want to seem too hard on Lasker in this game. Yes, he was superficial and careless at some points, but in the endgame, starting around move 28, the complexities became so involved that not only Lasker but such endgame virtuosi as Rubinstein, Capablanca, Alekhine, Botvinnik and Benko could well have lost their way. We went on at such length in that phase of the game not to deprecate Lasker, but only in search of objective chess truth.

***Game 76, Bernstein-Speijer*:** Another disappointing result for Speijer, who got a gift pawn at move 15. Both he and Lasker missed subsequent winning opportunities, including one in another very interesting endgame.

Lasker makes no comment on moves 16-27. At White's 25th move,



rather than 25.♖be1, White was better advised to play 25.c4, taking his attacked pawn out of danger. After 25.♖be1, there was no reason why Black should not grab the pawn with 25...♖×c2 26.a3 ♗f5, increasing his advantage even more (-2.86).

At move 27,



Bernstein's 27.f5?!, played apparently with vague hopes of counterplay after 28.♕×h4, was psychologically effective but objectively bad. Better probably 27.♕d3 ♕e7 28.c4 ♗f5 29.♕d4, when Black is still winning but he'll have to work for it. Lasker was quite correct that after the further text moves 27.f5 ♗×f5 28.♕×h4,



Black could have played 28...♖×c2 29.♖e1 ♔g7 with complete impunity; 28...♗×c2 is also fine (both about -3.20). This would have been much stronger than Speijer's 28...♕e7?!, which takes the evaluation down to about -1.10.

Even after Speijer's inferior choice at move 28, he had one last chance to win starting at move 34, but he missed it by playing the natural-looking but ultimately drawish 34...f7-f5. Instead, the only chance to win lay in 34...c6-c5!:



Within a few minutes' computation time, Stockfish rated this move -3.91 at 37 ply, indicating an almost certain win. This writer is not an endgame expert, but it seems the key factors in Black's favor after 34...c5! are (1) that it keeps the white king from getting to d4, and (2) that Black gets the last word in waiting moves, and thus can gain the opposition and force White into *Zugzwang*. Here is one illustrative continuation: 35.♔e2 ♔g7 36.♔e3 ♔f6 37.♔f4 g5+ 38.♔g4 ♔g6 39.h3 f5+ 40.♔f3 ♔f6 41.g3 ♔e5 42.♔e3 c6 43.a3 g4!:



44.h4 — Black surprisingly need not fear giving White a passed h-pawn. If instead 44.h×g4 f×g4 45.a4 a5 46.♔e2 ♔d4 and Stockfish announces mate in twenty. — 44...a6 (one of the aforementioned waiting moves) 45.a4 (if 45.b4?? c4−+) 45...a5 46.♔e2 f4 47.g×f4+ ♔×f4 48.♔f2 g3+ 49.♔g2 ♔g4 50.h5 ♔×h5 51.♔×g3:



The kingside pawns eliminated, Black can now force his way into the queenside and make his majority there tell, despite having a doubled pawn. 51...♔g5 52.♔f3 ♔f5 53.♔e3 (if 53.♔e2 ♔f4 54.♔d2 d4 55.♔e2 ♔g3 56.♔d2 ♔f2 etc.) 53...♔e5 54.♔e2 ♔d4 55.♔d2 c4 56.b×c4 d×c4 57.d×c4 ♔×c4,



with a trivially easy win from here on (mate in 16 at most).

Lasker not only made no comment on moves 29-40, and so missed 34...c5!, but he made a serious mistake (or else there is a serious typo) in his note at move 41:



Lasker's note reads "If 41...♔f7 42.♔e5 ♔e7 43.h5; and if 41...♔e6 42.♔g5 ♔f7 43.h5." One wonders if, in his original manuscript in the old descriptive notation, Lasker's note actually read,

or was intended to read: “If 41...K-B2 42.K-**Kt**5” (rather than 42.K-**K**5), because after 41...♔f7?? 42.♔e5?! only draws, while 42.♔g5! wins,



viz. 42...♔g7 43.h5! g×h5 44.♔×f5 ♔h6 45.♔f6 d4 46.♔f5 ♔7 47.♔g6 etc. Since the note’s second variation wins for White in a similar way, the typo hypothesis seems plausible. On the other hand, this may be yet another example of Lasker’s repeated carelessness and superficiality. He may have thought that after 41...♔f7 42.♔e5 ♔e7 43.h5 g×h5 44.♔×f5 White would win,



but he does not, *viz.* 44...♔d6 45.♔g5 ♔e5 46.♔×h5 ♔d4 47.g4 ♔×d3 48.g5 c4! 49.b×c4 d×c4 50.g6 c3, and both sides will queen and the game is a draw.

***Game 77, Forgács-Cohn*:** A weak effort by Cohn, who may have been dispirited from his loss to Schlechter in the previous round. Our one comment shows that his game was even worse than Lasker thought.

At move 13,



in lieu of Cohn’s 13...♕c7, Lasker recommends 13...♗b4 14.♖fe1 ♘f8 15.♕g4 ♗×c3 16.b×c3 b5 17.♗d3 a5 18.♘d2 f5,



but the resulting position must have seemed better than the game continuation to Lasker only because he then gave the needless 19.♕h5?! (about +0.62). Correct instead is 19.e×f6! ♕×f6 20.♘f3 (also good is 20.♘e4 ♕e7 21.♘c5) 20...♖d8 (if 20...e5 21.♕e4) 21.♘e5 ♗d7 22.♖e3 and, as in the game, White is building up an overwhelming position (+1.72).

***Game 78, Rubinstein–Dus-Chotimirsky*:** A terrible blunder in a won position by Rubinstein. Lasker's suggested alternative is not optimal.

At move 19,



Lasker criticizes Rubinstein's 19.♖fc1 as "overlooking the combination of his opponent." Yet Komodo sees it as almost the best move on the board (+2.36 at 24 ply), behind only 19.e3 (+2.57) and slightly ahead of Lasker's recommended 19.♕c4 (+2.17, fifth-best). Based on his note at move 20, Lasker seems to think that 19.♖fc1 turns a won game into at best a draw, but that is not the case.

At move 20,



Rubinstein did commit an irremediable blunder with 20.♖×b5?? and lost. As his alternative, Lasker gives a long variation beginning with 20.♕a6, concluding that it "might have drawn," though in one sub-variation, 20.♕a6 ♘d4 21.♘×c3 b4 22.e3 b×c3 23.♖×b8 ♕×b8 24.e×d4 ♕b2,



which Lasker considered dangerous for White, Komodo finds that White is just fine after 25.♖f1 c2 26.♕c6, *viz.* 26...♕×d4 27.♕×c2 ♖×f7 28.♖d1 (+2.25), or 26...f5 (not 26...♗a3?? 27.♕×f6#) 27.♗d5 ♗g5 28.f4 ♗e7 29.♗b3 ♕×d4+ 30.♔g2 ♕d2+ 31.♔h3 (+1.84). The opposite-colored

bishops here might still presage a draw, but whatever winning chances there may be all belong to White.

Yet none of that matters, since White had two much better alternatives that win:

(a) 20.♕h4!,



and if **(a1)** 20...f5 21.♕f4 ♕×f4 22.♘×f4 ♘e5 23.♖×c3 (+2.25), or **(a2)** 20...b4 21.♘×e7 ♘×e7 22.♖×b4 (+2.24), or **(a3)** 20...♘d4 21.♘×e7 ♘×e2+ 22.♔f1 ♕×e7 (not 22...♘×c1?? 23.♘g6+) 23.♖c2 (+3.11).

(b) 20.♕g4!,



and: **(b1)** 20...f5 21.♕f4 transposes to (a1) above, or **(b2)** 20...b4 21.♘×e7 ♘×e7 22.♖×b4 as in (a2) above (+2.53), or **(b3)** 20...♘d4 21.e3 c2 22.♖b4 ♘c6 23.♘×e7 ♘×e7 (if 23...♘×b4 24.♕×b4 and the ♘e7 is defended.) 24.♖×c2 (+2.52).

***Game 81, Salwe-Burn*:** For the most part a tedious exercise in wood-shifting, this 99-move draw nevertheless has a few exciting moments. Salwe and Lasker both missed opportunities for White to win.

White did not capitalize fully on Black's 44...c5? (better 44...g5 or 44...♔f7).



Instead of adding one more attacker of the pawn by 45.♗b4?!, he could have pounced immediately with 45.d×c5!, since if 45...♗×c5?? 46.♗b6+−, or 45...♖×c5?? 46.♖×d6+−.

Relatively best for Black then would be 45...♗f8 46.c6 ♖d6 47.♖b6, when White is winning (+2.79 at 26 ply per Komodo).

After move 55 Lasker declared flatly "Now the game is drawn," and he made no comment on the remaining 44 moves. It may well have been a theoretical draw at that point, yet as in the Cohn-Schlechter and Bernstein-Speijer games, mistakes were made in the long, unannotated final stretch that could have changed the outcome.

At move 59,



Black had to play 59...g×f4+ to keep the draw in hand. Instead he played 59...♔e6?, to which White replied with the aimless 60.♔f3?!. White should have played 60.f5+!:



The main lines then are:
(a) 60...♔d6 61.♖b7! ♖a1 62.♖f7 ♖g1+ 63.♔f3 ♖f1+ 64.♔g2 ♖a1 65.♖×f6+ etc. (+52.06(!) at 34 ply per Stockfish);
(b) 60...♔e7 (...♔f7 and ...♔d7 work out similarly) 61.♖b5 ♖d6 (if 61...♔d6 62.♖b7 ♔c6 63.♖e7 ♔b5 64.♖e6 +4.49) 62.♔f3 ♖d7 63.e4 d×e4+ 64.♔×e4 and White finally has a passed pawn and should win (+4.89 Stockfish).

One more opportunity went unnoticed amid the soporific wood-pushing of the final 44 moves. At move 81,



Burn had to play his rook to a1, a2, a3 or a4. Instead he played 81...♖a8??, to which Salwe, his brain by then no doubt benumbed by stultifying fatigue and boredom, replied 82.♖c7+?!. Instead 82.♔d7! wins:



The Nalimov tablebase now announces mate in at most 37, *viz.* 82...♖a5 83.♖c5 ♖a7+ 84.♖c7 ♖a5 85.♔d6+ ♔f6 86.d5 ♖a6+ 87.♖c6 ♖a8 88.♖b6 ♖a7 89.♖b2 ♖a6+ 90.♔c7 ♖a7+ 91.♖b7 ♖a8 92.♔d7 ♖a6 93.d6 ♖a8 94.♖b4 ♖a7+ 95.♔c8 ♖a8+ 96.♖b8 ♖a2 97.d7 ♖c2+ 98.♔d8 ♔f7 99.♖c8 ♖d2 100.♖c3 ♖d4 101.♔c7 ♔f6 102.d8♕+:



and we'll let the reader work out the rest.

***Game 82, Tartakower-Perlis*:** The note at move 15 is puzzling.



Lasker says "With 15.♘×e5 ♗×e5 16.f4 White would have a good game," continuing 16...♗×c3 17.♗×c3 ♕b6 18.♗d4 ♕×b5 19.f5 ♗d7 20.♗×f6 g×f6 21.♕d4,



which is indeed somewhat better for White. However, that is due mainly to the unforced error 17...♕b6?; instead Black is fine after, say, 17...♖c8 or 17...♘e4.

In any event, all that is beside the point, because rather than mess around with 15.♘×e5, White can simply win a pawn with 15.♘×d5!:



If now 15...♘×d5 16.♘×e5 ♗×e5 17.♗×e5, or 15...♗×d5 16.♘×e5 ♗×g2 17.♔×g2, or 15...♘×f3+ 16.♗×f3 ♘×d5 17.♗×d5, in each case White being a clear pawn up.

***Game 83, Znosko-Borovsky–Vidmar*:** Almost a fiasco for Znosko-Borovsky, who had an overwhelming early attack that should have made this game a miniature. Instead he let his advantage slip so far that Vidmar could have drawn or perhaps even won. But Vidmar too failed in the clutch. Lasker's middlegame notes are not too bad, but again the endgame had hidden possibilities he and the players failed to detect.

In the note at move 23, Lasker is correct to fault the text move 23.f5 and recommend 23.e5,



but some of his supporting analysis can be improved. In his second sub-variation, after 24...d×e5, he recommends 25.♘f6+, saying "25.♖f6 ♘d4 would now not be so strong." But it's perfectly fine, winning by force:



26.♖×c7+ ♖×c7 27.♘×b6+ ♔e7 28.♖×e6+ ♔×f7, and both 29.♕d3 ♘×e6 ♕f5+ etc. (+7.87) and 29.♖c6+ ♘×b3 30.♖×c7+ ♔e6 31.a×b3 (+5.70) are crushing.

Further on that same variation reaches this position,



where Lasker gives a continuation starting with 28.♖f6+ and concluding "Black will be most uncomfortable." Yes, he is uncomfortable in that line (about +4.50), but better is 28.♕d3+ ♔×h5 29.♖f5+ ♔g6 (if 29...♕×f5 30.♕×f5+ ♔h4 31.g3#) 30.♖cf1 ♖hf8 31.♖f6+ ♔g7 32.♕g6+ ♔h8 33.♖×f8+ ♖×f8 34.♖×f8+ ♕g8 35.♖×g8#, when Black is checkmated and beyond all discomfort.

At move 25, on which Lasker did not comment, Znosko-Borovsky began throwing away his advantage with both hands,



when he played 25.♕e6+?!, which takes Komodo's evaluation down by about a queen's worth. Instead, he had any number of devastating alternatives, chief of which is 25.♖ce1 ♘d4 26.♖×e4 ♘×b3 27.♘g6 ♖hd8 28.♖fe1 (+14.24).

Lasker's note at move 26, recommending 26.f×e6, is quite correct, but his lack of comment on moves 27-37 leaves the reader perhaps unaware that by move 32, White had squandered all his earlier advantage. So much so that if, instead of 32...♔d7-d6, Vidmar had played 32...d5-d4+,



he should have drawn, and with luck even won. 32...d4+ starts at the right time the counterplay that came too late in the actual game. Komodo and Stockfish both then give best play as 33.♔d2 b5 34.♖g8 c4 35.b×c4 b×c4 36.♖f4 ♘c6 37.♖h4 ♖e7:



The potential in Black's position is seen now if White plays 38.♖×h6?? c3+ 39.♔d1 d3 40.♖h4 c2+ 41.♔d2 ♖e2+ 42.♔×d3 c1♕−+. Better are:
(a) Komodo's recommendation 38.♖gg4 b5, and now White may be best advised to give back the exchange: 39.♖×d4+!? ♘×d4 40.♖×d4+ ♔c6 (-0.56), since if 39.♔d1 Komodo gives 39...d3

40.♖g3 ♔d6 41.♖×h6 ♔c5 42.♖×f6 ♘d4 43.♖f8 ♘e2 44.♖c8+ ♔b4 45.♖×d3 c×d3 46.f6 ♖f7 47.♖c6 ♘d4 (-1.83).
(b) Stockfish's preference 38.♔d1 ♖e5 39.♖g7+ ♔d6 40.♖×b7 ♖×f5 (-0.53 at 31 ply).

However, Vidmar did not play this, and by move 45 Znosko-Borovsky's advantage was up close to +3.00 again. Then, however, Z-B (and Lasker) missed another chance:



Here 46.♖e6! is best, *viz.* 46...♔a5 47.f6 ♔×a4 48.f7 c2+ 49.♔c1 ♘b4



Threatening 50...♘a2+ and forcing 50.♖e1 ♖×f7 51.♖×f7 ♘d3+ 52.♔×c2 ♘×e1+ 53.♔d2 ♘×g2 54.♖×b7,



and now either 54...♘f4 55.♖d7 ♘e6 56.♖d6 ♘c5 57.♖×h6 which is a win for White per Nalimov, or 54...♘h4 55.♔d3 ♘f3 56.♔c4 (threatening mate) 56...♔a5 57.♖b2 ♔a6 58.♖f2 ♘e5+ 59.♔×d4, also a win for White.

However, going back to the position just before White's 46th move,



Znosko-Borovsky did not play 46.♖e6!. Instead there was a double blunder, Z-B giving away his

winning chance with 46.f6??, and Vidmar giving it right back to him with 46...♘e5??. Instead, Vidmar could probably have drawn with 46...c2+!!:



If now 47.♔×c2? ♘e5+ 48.♔d2 ♘×g6 and it's White who would have to fight to draw. Therefore 47.♔c1 ♘b4 48.♖a3 (to prevent 48...♘a2+) 48...d3 49.♖a1 ♘a2+



50.♔d2 (not 50.♖×a2?? d2+ 51.♔×d2 c1♕+) 50...♔a5 51.♔×d3 c1♕ 52.♖×c1 ♘×c1+ 53.♔e3 ♔×a4 54.♖×h6,



and despite White's three passed pawns Stockfish says about +0.17 at 37 ply.

However difficult the draw might be from the above diagram, it was certainly better for Black than after Vidmar played 46...♘e5??:



Yet even so, Znosko-Borovsky did not take full advantage, which he could have by 47.♖×h6! d3! (if 47...♘×f3?? 48.f7+ ♔a7 49.f8♕+−) 48.f7+ ♔a7 49.♖d6 (not 49.f8♕?? c2+ and mate in four) 49...♘×f7 50.♖d×d3 ♘e5 51.♖×c3 ♖d7+ 52.♔e2 ♘×f3 53.♔×f3,



reaching a rook ending one need not be a Rubinstein to win. Still, fortunately for Znosko-Borovsky, his actual move 47.♖g7 was the next-best choice, and he brought in the point without further error.

***Game 84, Speijer-Lasker*:** A case of Lasker the tiger just waiting for the rabbit to jump the wrong way, which of course he did. However, Lasker might have pounced earlier.

At move 26, Lasker played 26...♖e8-e6, but he had a stronger alternative in 26...♗g7-h6!:



The key idea is that Black would like to win the pinned knight with d6-d5, but with White's rook on e3 that doesn't work, *viz.* 26...d5 27.e×d5 and either 27...♖×e3 28.♘f×e3 c×d5 29.♘×d5, or 27...c×d5 28.♖×e8+ ♖×e8 29.♕×d5. Therefore Black attacks the ♖e3. The main continuations then are:
(a) 27.♖h3 ♗f4 28.♕f3 d5 29.♘cd2 ♗c8 and Black wins the exchange (-2.85);
(b) 27.♖ee1 d5



and either:
(b1) 28.e×d5 ♖×e1 29.♖×e1 c×d5 winning the knight (-4.12), or
(b2) The more complicated 28.♕h3!? d×c4 29.♕×h6 (not 29.b×c4? ♕f4−+) 29...c×b3 30.♘d2 b2!



and White has two main but futile tries: 31.c4 ♖d7 32.g3 ♖ed8 33.♘f1 (if 33.♖fd1 ♕b4−+) 34.♗×c4 (-3.31), and 31.♘f3 ♖d7 32.♘g5 f6 and White is forced into 33.♘×h7 ♖×h7 34.♕×g6+ ♖g7 35.♕×f6 ♗c4 (35...♗d3 is less clear) 36.♕×c6 ♖d8 37.♕h6 (if 37.♕×c5 ♗a2−+) 37...♕e5



38.♕h3 (if 38.♖×b2 ♕×e4!) 38...♖b8 with ...♗a2 soon to follow, and though White has a lot of pawns they won't compensate for being down a rook or more (-4.11).

***Game 85, Teichmann-Bernstein*:** We offer only one (quite superfluous) improvement to Teichmann's overwhelming attack. At move 39,



where he played 39.♖g1 (quite strong, about +5.35), best was 39.g×h6+! and mate is soon forced, one example being 39...♔f8 40.♘d5 ♔e8 41.♕h8+ ♔d7 42.♕g8 ♗×d5 43.e×d5 ♖f6 44.♕g4+ ♔e7 45.♖e2+ ♖e6 46.♕×e6+ ♔f8 47.♖b8#.

***Game 87, Perlis–Znosko-Borovsky*:** The note at move eight goes badly awry. After 8.e5 ♘e4,



best for White is 9.♗d2. Lasker's recommended 9.♕d4 is a serious mistake, to which Black replies not as he thought with 9...f5?!, but with 9...♕a5!:



If now 10.♕×e4? ♗×c3+ 11.♔d1 (worse is 11.b×c3 ♕×c3+ 12.♔d1 ♕×a1 −+) 11...♗×e5 and Black is practically winning already (-1.78). Relatively best is 10.♗d2 ♘×d2 11.♔×d2 (if 11.♕×d2? ♕×e5+) 11...d6 12.e×d6 0–0 13.a3 ♗×d6!,



and while material is even, Black is better developed and has good attacking prospects against the uncastled king (-1.44).

***Game 88, Burn-Tartakower*:** This game is without doubt one of the worst debacles in the entire tournament, both for the players' ineptitude, and for Lasker's grossly mistaken annotations. His errors of both omission and commission are major and serious.

Through much of the tournament the Yorkshire-born English player Amos Burn showed all the tactical acumen and energy of a Yorkshire pudding, never more so than in this game. His biographer, IM Richard Forster, speculates that Burn did not enjoy the food and accommodations in Russia, and may even have become ill (*Amos Burn: A Chess Biography*, McFarland & Co. 2004, p. 792). Whatever the reason, at move 26 Burn (and Lasker) missed a powerful shot:



Burn played 26. ♘g3, continuing a slow buildup. Instead, he could have broken things open immediately with 26.♘×d7 ♖×d7 27.d5! e×d5 28.g5 (attacking the ♖d7)



28...♖gd8 (of course if 28...d×e4 29.♖×d7, while if 28...♖dd8?? 29.♗d4 f6 30.g×f6 ♘×f6 31.♘×f6 ♗×f6 32.♗×f6 ♕×f6 33.♕×h6#) 29.♗×a7 (now 29.♗d4 would be thwarted by 29...f6 because an eventual ♕×h6+ would not be mate) 29...h5 (or 29...♔g8 30.g×h6 ♕b2 31.♗b6 +2.78) 30.♗d4 f6 31.g×f6 ♗×f6 32.♘×f6 ♘×f6 33.♖g1



33...c5 (not 33...d×c4?? 34.♗×f6 ♕×f6 35.♖×d7) 34.♗e5 ♔h7 (if 34...d4 35.♖dg3) 35.♕e6 ♖f8 36.♖dg3,



and though for the moment material is even, White is obviously winning (+3.75). There are far more threats than Black can handle, for example 37.f5, 37.c×d5, and (most powerfully) 37.♖×g6 ♕×g6 38.♖×g6 ♔×g6 39.♗×f6 ♖×f6 40.f5+ ♔g5 41.h4+ ♔g4 42.♕×f6+− .

At move 34 Burn's move 34.♗c1-a3 was not at all bad, next-to-best in fact, but his bishop would have been much more effective with 34.♗b2!:



This threatens 35.d5! ♕×b2 36.♘×g6+ ♔g7 (or 36...♔g8 37.d×c6 ♘e5 38.♘×f4 +3.29) 37.♕×h5 ♕×h2+ 38.♕×h2 ♗×h2 39.♘×f8 etc. (+3.23). Black has many defensive tries, all ultimately ineffective. A few illustrative examples:

(a) 34...♗×g5 35.d5! e5 36.♘×g5 ♘×g5 37.♕g2 ♘c5 38.♕×g5 ♘×d3 39.♘×g6+ ♔g8 40.♖×d3 (+3.78);
(b) 34...♘×g5 35.♕g2 ♘×e4 36.♘×g6+



and either 36...♔g8 37.♕×e4 (+3.35), or 36...♕×g6 37.♕×g6 ♘f2+ 38.♔g2 ♖g8 39.♕×g8+ ♖×g8+ 40.♔×f2 (+3.11);
(c) 34...♖f7 35.♕g2 ♗c7 36.d5 e5 37.d×c6 b×c6



38.♘×g6+ (also very good is 38.♘d6 ♗×d6 39.♖×d6 ♘hf8 40.♕×c6 ♔h7 41.♘×g6 ♘×g6 42.♖×d7 +3.10) 38...♕×g6 39.♖×d7 (+2.72);
(d) 34...♗b8 35.♕g2 ♖f4 36.d5 e5 37.d×c6 ♘df8 38.♖d8 ♕e7 39.♖8d7 ♕e6 40.c7 ♘×d7 41.♖d6



and we will let the reader work out the rest (+4.83).

After White's 34th move, Lasker gives what is probably the most bizarre misevaluation of a position we have ever seen from a World Champion (or any high-ranking player, for that matter).



He writes "The knight at e4 is occupied in guarding the g-pawn; the pawn at d4 defends the e5-square, the gate of the center, through which the stream of black pieces would like to flow for the counterattack." In other words, Lasker sees White as being on the defensive! This is something like saying the United States was on the defensive when American bombers were pulverizing Japan in the last months of World War II.

Based on this assessment, Lasker calls Tartakower's 35...c5 "an elegant move, which is, moreover, founded on the logical requirements of the position." Nonsense.





In the first place, Black had better moves, though none satisfactory: 35...♔g8 (+2.06), 35...♗b8 (+2.11), or 35...♗c7 (+2.30). Tartakower's 35...c5? should only have accelerated Black's demise. Secondly, after the natural 36.d×c5 (Burn for once playing the best move) Lasker continues his hallucinatory misjudgement by saying of Tartakower's next move, 36...♖f5,



that it was "finely played." Again, utter balderdash. 36...♖f5?? takes Komodo's assessment of Black's already lamentable position down by more than a full rook's worth, from +2.89 to +8.25.

But again, Burn did not take full advantage. His unimaginative 37.♘×f5 was not bad, probably still good enough to win, but far from best. Lasker's comment was "He need not have taken yet, but he could not improve the position of any piece materially." As we will now show (and as was already pointed out in the aforementioned Forster book), this is ludicrously mistaken. White could have put a dagger into the heart of Black's position with 37.♗a3-b2!!:



There are only three replies that Komodo initially rates lower than +12.00:
(a) 37...♕×b2 38.♘×g6+ and either 38...♔g8 39.♖×d7 (+8.73), or 38...♔g7 39.♘×f4 (+11.10);
(b) 37...e5 38.♘×f5 g×f5 39.♘d6 ♖f8 40.g6 ♘g5 41.♕×h5+ ♔g8 42.♖×g5 ♗×g5,



and take your pick of 43.♕×g5 (+16.52), 43.♘f7 (+15.18), 43.c6 (+11.34) or 43.♖h3 (+10.32), not to mention just about any other move;
(c) 37...♘e5 38.♘d6 ♖ef8 39.♘h×f5 e×f5 40.♖d5 ♘×g5 41.♕h4 ♘e6 42.♖e1 ♔g8 43.♗×e5



and Black will soon be as extinct as the dodo, the wooly mammoth, and the brontosaurus all put together (+9.32).

Furthermore White had many other ways besides 37.♗b2 to win convincingly. At the end of the note at move 37 cited above, Lasker added that, compared to 37.♘×f5, "Perhaps 37.♕g2 would have been a little stronger."



Quite an understatement, *viz.* 37...♖f7 38.♗b2 e5 39.♘d6 ♖ee7 40.♘×f7+ ♕×f7 41.♕×b7 (+5.21).

For those who like things simple, 37.♘d6! serves well:



viz. 37...♗×d6 38.♘×f5 e×f5 39.c×d6 +4.46.

And lastly, let us not omit 37.c6!:



And then:

(a) 37...b×c6 38.♖×d7 ♕×d7 39.♗b2+ ♔g8 (if 39...e5 40.♘×g6+) 40.♘×g6 ♗×g5 41.♘h4 (+5.19), or
(b) 37...♘df8 38.♗×f8 ♖e×f8 39.♖d7



and either 39...♖8f7 40.♖gd1 (+5.53), or 39...♖5f7 40.♕×e6 b×c6 41.♖×f7 ♕×f7 (41...♖×f7 42.♘×g6+ ♔g8 43.♘f6+ ♘×f6 44.g×f6 and mate quickly) 42.♘×g6+ ♔g7 43.♘×f8 ♔×f8 44.♕c8+ ♔g7 45.g6 (+14.82).

In fact, Komodo shows at least ten winning 37th moves for White that it rates +3.33 or better, and the text move 37.♘×f5 doesn't even make the list. Yet it could still have won if Burn had followed up properly.

After 37.♘×f5 e×f5, rather than 38.♘f6?, which threw away almost all White's advantage, Burn had to play 38.♘e4-f2!:



If then 38...♘×g5?? 39.♕h4 ♘e6 40.♖×d7 ♕×d7 41.♖×g6 ♖e7 42.♗b2+ ♘g7 43.♕×f4 (+7.35). Komodo sees best play for both sides as proceeding 38...♘df8 39.♕f3 ♗×g5 40.c6 b×c6 41.♗×f8 ♖×f8 42.♕×c6 ♖f6 43.♕a8+ ♖f8 44.♕g2,



when besides being up the exchange, White has a mobile 3-to-1 queenside pawn majority, and a prime target in the g-pawn, which he already threatens to capture by 45.♘h3 ♗h6 46.♕×g6, and if 44...♗h4 45.♘h3 g5 46.♘f4 ♕f7 47.♕b2+ ♘f6 48.♘g2 and Black's position is falling apart (48...♕b7?? 49.♖d8+−). Komodo rates the diagrammed position +3.01 at 22 ply, Stockfish even higher, +4.04 at 25 ply.

Even with all these failures, Burn may have had one last chance to win, at move 43. Instead of 43.h2-h3, he might have tried 43.♖d3-g3!?:



Forced then is 43...♘g4 44.h3 f4 45.♖d3 ♘e3 (less good is 45...♖e3 46.♖×e3 ♘×e3 47.♕e4 ♕f7 48.b4 h4 [not 48...♘×c4?? 49.♖f1 +4.20] 49.♔h2 +2.69) 46.♕f3,



when there is still a lot of play in the position, and though neither Komodo nor Stockfish see a clear win on the horizon, the chances are all White's (+2.14 at 25 ply). But according to Forster Burn was in severe time pressure and so chose a safe, drawing line.

If Burn's failure here can be excused by illness, the same cannot be said for Lasker. His serious lapses as an annotator here are all the more surprising and blameworthy when one considers what he was later to write in *Lasker's Manual of Chess* (1925):

"In the beginning of the game ignore the search for combinations, abstain from violent moves, aim for small advantages, accumulate them, and only after having attained these ends search for the combination — *and then with all the power of will and intellect*, because then the combination must exist, however deeply hidden." (emphasis added)

The combinations did indeed exist, but Lasker applied very little will or intellect to the search.

***Game 90, Duras-Spielmann*:** Lasker is again asleep at the most crucial moments.

At move 27,



where White played 27.♕a4, Lasker comments "27.♘f1 first was imperative," without saying

why. Both Komodo and Stockfish indicate that 27.♕a4 was in fact best, and that after 27.♘f1 ♖df8 White would be at some disadvantage (about -1.25).

Lasker makes no comment at move 29,



where unaccountably Duras played 29.♕a3?, the beginning of the end for him. Instead, pawn-grabbing starting with 29.♕×a7 should draw: 29...f×e3 30.f×e3 ♖df8 31.♕×b6 ♕g3 32.♕×c6



and now one side or the other is forced to settle for perpetual check, either by **(a)** 32.♕×e3+ 33.♔h2 ♖f3 34.♕×e4 ♖×h3+ 35.g×h3 ♖f2+ 36.♕g2 ♖×g2+ 37.♔×g2 ♕e2+ 38.♔g3 ♕e3+ 39.♔g2 (not 39.♔h4?? g6−+) 39...♕e2+ etc., or **(b)** 32...♖f2 33.♕×e4 ♖8f3 (anything else and Black is lost) 34.♕e8+ ♔h7 35.♕×h5+ ♔g8 36.♕e8+ etc..

At move 32,



no comment is made about Duras' 32.♕c1??, a blunder allowing mate in six. Necessary to avoid immediate disaster was 32.♖g1, when Komodo gives 32...c5 33.♖dd1 ♖8f7 (not 33...♕×e3?! ♕×a7 or 33...♖f2?! 34.♕×a7),



and now White can try:
(a) 34.♕c1, though after 34...♖f2 35.♖d2 ♕×e3 36.♖×d6 ♕×c1 37.♖×c1 ♖f1+ 38.♖×f1 ♖×f1+ 39.♔h2 ♔f7 and Black should win (Stockfish says -2.28 at 26 ply).
(b1) Probably best is 34.♕a6!?,



when the likeliest continuations are **(b1)** 34...♖f2 35.♕c8+ ♔h7 36.♕e8 ♕×e3 37.♖ge1 ♕g3 38.♕×e4+ g6, or **(b2)** 34...♕×e3 35.♕c8+ ♔h7 36.♕e8 ♖f4 37.♔h2 ♕×c3 38.♖×d6, or **(b3)** 34...g6 35.♕c8+ ♔g7 36.♕c6 ♕×e3 37.♖ge1 ♕×c3 38.♕×e4. In each case White stands somewhat worse (about -1.15 to -1.50), but he has avoided mate and can fight on with some hope of a draw.

***Game 91, Dus-Chotimirsky–Freiman*:** A game that began in perfect symmetry (see the position after move 12), and stayed fairly even throughout, until the wildly inconsistent Dus-Chotimirsky (who beat both Lasker and Rubinstein in this event) blundered it away to the usually luckless Freiman. Lasker's notes have more blunders than the game.

The note at White's 22nd move says that 22.e×f4 ♗×f4 23.♗c5 ♕g5 24.♗×f8 ♗×c1 "would be in Black's favor, as White's a-pawn is attacked."



But the situation is much more complicated than Lasker realized. Komodo gives as best a line he probably did not consider, 25.♗×g7+ ♔×g7 26.h4!:



Now either:
(a) 26...♕×h4 27.♖×c1 ♕f4 28.♖c3 ♖d2 29.♕e1 with a materially even but rather unclear position rated at +1.49;

(b) 26...♖×d1+ 27.♕×d1 ♕d2 28.♕g4+ ♔f8 (any other move allows mate quickly) 29.♕g8+ ♔e7 30.♕×h7+ ♔d8 31.♕×b7 (all forced to this point) 31...♕e1+ (better than 31...e3) 32.♔h2 ♗f4+ 33.♔h3 ♕h1+ 34.♔g4 ♕×g2+



35.♔f5 (35.♔×f4 ♕×f2+ is a draw) 35...♕×f2 36.♔e6 ♕d4 (else mate) 37.♕e7+ ♔c8 38.♕f8+ ♕d8 39.♕×f4 e3



40.♗d5 (not 40.♕×e3?? ♕e8+; and if 40.♕f3 e2 41.♕c3+ ♔b8 42.♕e5+ ♔c8 43.♔f5 ♕d3+ 44.♔g4 ♕×b3 45.♕×e2 God knows how things will play out.) 40...♕e8+ 41.♔f6 ♕d8+,



and White can either acquiesce to a draw with 42.♔d6 ♕e8+ etc., or try to win with 42.♔g6 ♕×d5 43.♕×e3, but it will be a bitch. Despite the inconclusiveness of the above analysis, we can at least say with certainty that it is not in Black's favor and the white a-pawn doesn't enter into it.

In the second variation of the note to Black's 22nd move, after 22...f3 23.g3,



Lasker gives 23...♗c8, which as we will demonstrate below is a serious mistake. Relatively best for Black would be either 23...♗c7, 23...♗b8, or 23...♖c8, though the position would still favor White (about +1.65).

After Lasker's 23...♘c8??, White should not continue with his pointless 24.♘c5?!, but with 24.♘b6!:



Black must lose significant material, *viz.* **(a)** 24...♖d7 25.♕g4 ♖e8 (if 25...♘b7 26.♘e6 +4.35) 26.♖×c8 ♖×c8 27.♘e6 ♖b8 28.♘×d7 ♖×b6 29.♘f5 and the e- and f-pawns fall (+2.75); or worse, **(b)** 24...♖de8 25.♖c6 ♕e5 (if 25...♘e5 26.♘c5 ♕b7 27.♘d5 +4.58) 26.♘f7 ♕×h5 27.♘×h5 g6 28.♘×g6! h×g6 29.♖d×d6,



and though for the moment Black is nominally down only a pawn, he faces much worse loss, *e.g.* 29...♘f5 30.g4! and the bishop must stand and die, because if 30...♘×g4 31.♖c7! ♘e6 32.♘d4+ ♔g8 33.♖g7+ ♔h8 34.h4+− .

The note at White's 23rd move can be improved considerably in the line 23.e×f4 ♖f5. Much better then than Lasker's 23.♕h5-g4 is 24.♕h5-h6!:



Black is now lost, *viz.*:
(a) 24...♖×f4?? 25.♘×g7+ ♕×g7 26.♕×f4!+− ;
(b) 24...♘×f4?? 25.♘×g7+ ♕×g7 26.♖×d8+ etc.;
(c) 24...♖ff8 25.♘×g7+ ♕×g7 26.♖×d6 (+2.47):
(d) 24...♘b7 25.g3 e3 26.f×e3 ♖f6





27.♕h3! (most definitely *not* 27.♗×f6?? ♕×e3+ 28.♔f1 ♕f3+ 29.♔e1 ♖e8+ 30.♗e7 g×h6−+) 27...♕e4 28.♗c2 ♕h1+ 29.♔f2 ♕f3+ 30.♔e1 ♗e4 31.♗×e4 ♕×e4 32.♔f2 ♖ff8 33.♗b6,



and Black, already down two pawns, must lose more material (+4.10).;

The note at move 26 is a shambles.



While it is true that the text move 26.e×f4 was not optimal, it by no means gave White a lost position as Lasker claims. The only two alternatives he gives, 26.♗e5 and 26.♖c6, are dreadful, and he says nothing about 26.h3, 26.g3, 26.♖d4, or 26.♕h5, all of which maintain equality.

And the supporting analysis for one of his alternatives is badly flawed. After 26.♖c6,



Lasker's 26...h6? would actually give the advantage back to White: 27.♗×g7+ ♖×g7 28.♖d×d6 ♕×d6 29.♕×g7+ ♔×g7 30.♖×d6 and White is fine (+1.10). Correct instead is 26...f×e3!,



and if **(a)** 27.f×e3 ♕b3! 28.♖b1 (not 28.♖c×d6?? ♕×d1+ 29.♖×d1 ♖×d1#, nor 28.♖d×d6?? ♕d1+ 29.♖×d1 ♖×d1#) 28...♗e5 and White loses at least the bishop, or **(b)** 27.♕×e3 ♗×h2+ 28.♔×h2 ♕×c6 29.♖×d7 ♕×d7 30.♕×e4 and Black is up ♜-for-♗.

It goes unremarked that Black missed a chance at move 27.



Rather than the lukewarm 27...♖df7, Freiman should have played 27...♖e7! 28.♖c2 (else 28...♗×c1 in most cases) 28...e3,



and now:
(a) 29.g3 e×f2+ 30.♖×f2 ♗e3 (-3.24);
(b) 29.♗d4 ♖d8 30.♕c3 ♔g8 31.f×e3 ♗×e3+ 32.♕×e3 ♕×e3+ 33.♗×e3 ♖×d1+ 34.♔f2 (-2.50);
b) Relatively best is 29.♔h1 ♕f7 30.♖e2 ♗d6! 31.♕×d6 (if 31.♖×d6 e×f2 and mate in 11) 31...e×f2 32.♖×f2 ♕×f2 33.♗d4 ♕e2 (-2.44).

Lasker apparently considered the game decided by move 28, and made no comment on the last ten moves. Thus several things escaped his notice, including the moves that actually decided the outcome.

By move 33, Freiman had only the merest residue of an advantage that was never great to begin with,



and that was gone after he played 33...♕h2. About the only move not leading to deadeye equality was 33...♕g6, but it does not yield much after 34.♗d4 ♗h2 35.♕b3 (only about -0.40). However, Dus-Chotimirsky brought Christmas early with the gift of 34.♔e2??, after which White

was irrevocably lost. Instead, he could have drawn with 34.♕e6!:



This surprising move carries no immediate threat, but amazingly, Black can now make no progress. Some sample variations:
(a) 34...♕h1+ 35.♔e2 ♕h2 36.♗d4 ♕g3 37.♗c5 ♖f6 38.♕e4=;
(b) 34...♖c7 35.♕e4 ♖c4 36.♕g6 ♖c7 etc.;
(c) 34...♕g3 35.♖f3 and Black can either accept repetition by 35...♕h2 etc., or keep trying with 35...♕h4 (not 35...♕g5?? 36.♖d5+−) 36.g3 ♕h5 37.♔g2 ♖c7 (if 37...♗e5?! 38.g4 ♖×f3 39.g×h5 ♖f2+ 40.♔h1 ♗×b2 41.♕×a6 +1.10) 38.♖df1 (or 38.g×f4 ♖c2+ 39.♔g3 ♖×b2=) 38...♖e8 39.♕b3 ♗d6=.

Black has other possibilities, but they all get either a 0.00 assessment from both Komodo and Stockfish, or rebound to White's advantage.

***Game 94, Bernstein-Lasker*:** Only one minor correction. In the note variation at move ten, after 10...♘g4 11.♗×e7 ♕×e7 12.f4,



Black should play, say, 12...c5 or 12...♖ae8, and avoid Lasker's recommended 12...f5 13.h3 f×e4,



because instead of 14.♘×e4 as in the note, White can win a pawn with 14.♕c4+ d5 15.♘×c6 and either 15...♗×c6 16.♕×c6 ♘f6 17.♘×d5, or 15...d×c4 16.♘×e7+ ♔f7 17.h×g4 ♔×e7 18.♖ae1 etc.

***Game 96, Freiman-Cohn*:** Another case of analysis by result, Lasker attributing Black's win to a grand strategic design and "splendid tactics," when in fact White simply blundered in an even

position. But at least in examining Lasker's mistakes Komodo uncovered some aesthetically appealing lines.

At move 24, Lasker comments "White is somewhat at a loss how to continue the game."



Granted, Freiman's 24.♖×d4 was not best, but Komodo lists ten moves or more that maintain near-equality, with 24.♖de1, which Lasker seems to dislike, as best at 0.00.

The game was not lost until move 29,



when White played 29.♘f2??. Of possible alternatives, Lasker examines only 29.♗e1, and botches that. Most importantly, however, he completely overlooks a saving resource for White, 29.♗f4!!:



This threatens 30.♗h6 ♖e5 31.♖d2 ♕c6 32.f4+−, and suddenly throws Black on the defensive. It also yields some pretty variations. Black has only three moves that don't give White a major advantage:

(a) 29...g5 30.♗×g5 d5 31.♖d2 (if 31.♗h6? d4) 31...♕c6 (preventing 32.♗h6) 32.♕d4 (0.00);
(b) 29...♗e6 30.♗h6 ♖e7 31.♖d2 ♕c6 32.♖e2 ♕d7 33.♘f4 ♖ae8 34.♗g5





and either **(b1)** 34...♖g7 35.♕e1 ♔f7 (if 35...♗f7 36.♗h6) 36.♕c3 ♔g8 37.♕e1 ♔f7 etc. with a draw by repetition, or **(b2)** 34...♗f7 35.♗×e7 ♖×e7 36.♕f6 ♖×e2 37.♘×e2=;
(c) 29...♖e7 30.♖d2 ♕c6 31.♗g5 ♖d7 32.♘f2 ♖e8 33.♘g4 ♕c3



This is absolutely forced; anything else that doesn't hang a major piece loses quickly to 34.♘f6+ or 34.♘h6+. Of course White cannot play now 34.♕×c3?? ♖e1#, but he does survive. — 34.♘f6+ ♔h8 (not 34...♔f8?? 35.♗h6+ ♔e7 36.♕×c3),



and now moving the rook to d1 or the queen to b1, d1, f1 or g1 keeps White even or perhaps slightly better, *e.g.* 35.♕d1 ♖e5 36.♘e4 and now forced is 36...♖×e4 37.f×e4=. A quite interesting line is 35.♕b1,



and now Black must avoid 35...♖e5? 36.♘×d7 ♖×g5 37.♖c2 ♕g7 (definitely *not* 37...♕a5?? 38.♕a1+ ♔g8 39.b4 ♕b5 40.♘f6+ ♔f8 41.♘×h7+ ♔g8 42.♘×g5 ♕×g5 43.♖×c7 (+8.76)) 38.♖×c7 and Black must accept the loss of a pawn, since if he tries to trap the knight it backfires: 38...♗e8 39.♖b7 ♗×d7?? 40.♖b8+. Therefore Black must play (from diagram) 35...h6 36.♘×e8 h×g5 37.♖c2 ♕a5 38.♖e2 with a draw likely (+0.15).

***Game 97, Spielmann–Dus-Chotimirsky*:** One very interesting tactical nuance eluded both Spielmann and Lasker. At move 33,





Spielmann's 33.♖f4 was not bad, but much more powerful was the "creeping move" 33.♖ff2!:



This quiet-looking but surprisingly effective move has two purposes: unpinning the queen to threaten 34.♕g4+, and to keep the c-pawn defended if queens are exchanged. The deadly threat of 34.♕g4+ forces Black to do the latter. 33...♕×d4 34.♖×d4:



Black is now lost in all variations, for example:
(a) 34...♗b7 35.♗d3 h5 36.♖×b4 (+4.21);
(b) 34...♖a8 35.♖×d6 ♗b7 36.♗d3 ♗d5 37.♖b6 e5 38.♖×b4 (+4.17);
(c) 34...♖b6 35.♖g4+ ♔f8 36.♖g7 d5 37.♖×h7 ♔g8 38.♗d3 (+4.54);
(d) 34...e5 35.♖×d6 ♗g4 36.♖fd2 h5 37.♖d8+ ♖×d8 38.♖×d8+ ♔h7 39.♗×f7 (+6.87);
(e) 34...d5 35.♗d3 h6 36.♖g4+ ♔f8 37.♗h7 ♔e8 38.♖g8+ ♔d7 39.♗g6 (+6.96).

The relative inferiority of the text move 33.♖f4 would have been apparent if, instead of 33...♕×d4+??, Dus-Chotimirsky had played 33...e5,



when after 34.♕×b6 ♖×b6 and either 35.♖e4 h5 (+1.54) or 35.♖h4 ♗f5 (+1.35), White stands better but still has a lot work ahead of him.

***Game 98, Salwe-Duras*:** Oldrich Duras was already famous for his *Sitzfleisch* (see his 168-move loss to Wolf at Carlsbad 1907), but this game is 106 moves of mostly tedious wood-shifting that

he could have shortened by half. Lasker makes some cogent comments, but also some serious errors of omission and commission.

Lasker's move 38 recommendation of 38...♘×f4 is good, probably winning, but shortly thereafter, at move 49, he (and Duras) missed a clearly winning line.



Instead of 49...♘d3?!, which let things drag on, it would have been a wrap after 49...♖a8!, *viz.* 50.h×g6 h×g6 51.♗c1 ♖a2 52.♗b2 (anything else allows mate in at most ten) 52...d3 53.♖h8 ♘a4 54.♖b8+ ♔c4 55.♖c8+ ♔d5 56.♗c1 ♖e2 (+6.09).

At move 64,



Lasker is correct that 64.♔f2, intending 65.♔g3 and an eventual f4-f5, would have drawn. But Salwe stubbornly and needlessly tried to cling to both his pawns throughout the endgame. Lasker probably noticed, but declined to comment, that Salwe had many other opportunities to draw during the seemingly interminable and mostly inconsequential 42 remaining moves. For example, at move 70,



instead of 70.♗g7, 70.f5 g×f5 draws. Salwe's fixation on keeping both pawns ultimately cost him the game, but in fairness we should recognize that in 1909 one could not consult Fine's *Basic Chess Endings*, Averbakh's *Comprehensive Chess Endings*, *Dvoretsky's Endgame Manual*, or the Nalimov tablebases.

At move 87, a further drawing chance arose.



Duras made it all the easier for White to draw by playing 87...♔b3 (better 87...♔d5). However, after 88.♔d3 ♖d1+, Salwe again feared needlessly for his f3-pawn and played 89.♔e2?!, when he should have played 89.♔e4!,



and it's a draw after 89...♖e1+ 90.♔d5 ♖f1 91.♔e6 ♖×f3, and also after 89...♖f1 90.f5! g×f5+ and either 90.♔×f5 or 90.♔f4.

Lasker's note at move 95 is incorrect.



He states "95.f5 would not avail, because of 95...g×f5 96.♔f4 ♖f7 97.♔g5 ♔f2 98.f4 ♔f3 99.♔g6 ♖f8 100.♗d6 ♖d8 etc." While it's true that the final position of Lasker's variation is won for Black, that is only because his line includes a blunder. Instead of 98.f4??, 98.♔f4! still draws:



If 98...♖f8 99.♗g7 ♖f7 100.♗e5 *ad nauseam*, or if, say, 98...♖b7 it's a draw whether White takes the pawn or just shuffles his bishop around.

The note at 102 is mistaken, in the opposite direction.



Lasker is correct to label Salwe's text 102.♗f8 the losing move, but then he goes on to say "By 102.♗a3 the game would have been drawn, for after 102...♖c4+ 103.♔e5 ♔×f3 104.♔f6 ♖c6+ 105.♔g5, White could play the bishop to f6 and win the g-pawn." Again what Lasker says of the final position is true, but he has erred further back. Rather than 102...♖c4+?, Black wins with 102...♖c3!:



Then comes 103.♗d6 ♖e3+ (not 103...♖×f3? 104.♔e5=) 104.♔d4 ♔×f3 and Nalimov says mate in 21.

Yet White *still* could have drawn, not with 102.♗a3, but with 102.♗d6!:



This denies Black the key tempo he gets with the bishop on a3. If now 102...♖c3 simply 103.f5 and it's 0.00 no matter what Black does.

***Game 99, Tartakower-Mieses*:** This must have been a demoralizing loss for Tartakower, who was clearly winning at one point, and an encouraging win for Mieses, who made quite a comeback. As for Lasker, once again he failed to spot the game's crucial junctures, and his notes include several notable errors and one major howler.

Nothing is said at White's 28th move,



where Tartakower's 28.♖×f7 was not best, as we show below. He should have played 27.h3, when he has secured his g-pawn and will still be able to pick up either the c- or f-pawn very shortly (+1.72 at 26 ply).

After 28.♖×f7, the only alternative Lasker considers for Black is 28...♖×g4, missing the best move. Instead, the flaw in 28.♖×f7 becomes apparent after 28...♗d8!:



This should assure Black of equality, and even offer winning chances if White errs. Some sample continuations:
(a) 29.♖×c5+ ♔b8 and now if 30.h3 ♖×h3+ 31.♔g2 ♖h2+ 32.♔×g3 ♖d2 (0.00), showing why h2-h3 should have been played the move before;
(b) 29.♘e7+ ♗×e7 30.♖×e7 b6 31.♖×a7 ♔b8 32.♖f7 (if 32.♖e7 ♖×g4 33.♖×e5 ♖gh4) 32...♖×g4 33.♖f3 ♔b7 (-1.36);
(c) 29.♖f3 ♖×h2+ 30.♖×h2 g×h2 31.♔×h2 ♖×g4 (-0.37). It is strange that Lasker did not mention 28...♗d8, since he correctly recommended it next move, in the note line 28...♔b8 29.♖×c5 ♗d8, which would have transposed to line (a) above.

Lasker's criticism of Tartakower's 31st move is not entirely justified.



While Lasker's recommended 31.♖×c5 was quite strong, probably best (+2.95), the text move 31.♖c1 was also quite good enough to win (+2.32). It failed only because of Tartakower's next move, on which Lasker makes no comment.



Here, instead of 32.♖cf1, White should have played 32.a4 to forestall the counterplay Black soon gets on the a-file. Deprived of that, there is little Black can do as White progressively invades,

e.g. 32...a6 33.♖f5 ♖e6 (if 33...♗d8 34.♖h1 ♖e6 35.g4 and White's passed pawns begin to advance) 34.♖cf1 ♔c8 35.♖f7 ♖eh6 36.♖a7 ♔b8 37.♖ff7 ♗d8 38.♖fb7+ ♔c8



39.♘e7+ ♗×e7 40.♖×e7 ♔b8 41.♖×a6 ♖×h3 42.♖×b6+ etc. (+3.69 at 25 ply).

Lasker makes a strange comment at move 33:



"If 33.♖1f3, the bishop could not have moved." True, but then a rook certainly could: 33...♖a6 34.a4 (if 34.♖f8+ ♖×f8 35.♖×f8+ ♔b7 36.♖f7+ ♔c8 37.♖f8+ ♔d7 etc. (-1.35)) 34...b×a4 35.b×a4 ♖×a4 36.♖7f5 ♖a2+ 37.♔g1 ♖a1+ 38.♖f1 ♖×f1+ 39.♖×f1 ♔b7 with a slight advantage for Black (-0.65 at 23 ply). In view of the fact that Black played the rook to a6 next move, it is odd that Lasker did not consider it here.

The note at move 39 is howlingly wrong in one variation. After 39.h5 c4 40.h6 c3 41.h7 c2 42.♖g8,



Lasker writes "42...♖b1 or 42...♖×h7 and White can draw at best." Yes, 42...♖b1 does draw, but 42...♖×h7?? definitely does not: 43.♖×d8+ ♔b7 44.♖×h7+ ♔a6 45.♖d6+ ♔a5 46.♖×a7#.

No comment is made at move 40, where another major mistake occurred.



Tartakower played 40.h5?, dashing for good any hope of victory. He may still have had a chance to win with 40.♘e7!? ♗×e7 41.♖×e7,



and now:
(a) 41...c3?? 42.g7 ♖c8 43.♖f7 c2 44.♖f8 +5.28;
(b) 41...♖e3? 42.g7 ♖c8 43.h5 d3 44.♖d7 d2 (if 44...♖×e4+ 45.♔f5 ♖f4+ 46.♔g5+−) 45.♖×d2 c3 46.♖g2 ♖×e4+ 47.♔f5 (+4.00);
(c) Black's best try is 41...♖b2, but with careful play it appears White can eke out a win: 42.h5 ♖g2+ 43.♔f5 ♖g8 44.♔e6 d3 (not 44...♖f2?? 45.g7 ♖g2 46.h6+−) 45.♔f7 ♖h8 46.g7,



And now: **(c1)** 46...♖h7? 47.♔g8 ♖h6 48.♖f1 ♖c6 49.h6 ♖c8+ 50.♔f7 c3 51.h7 and mate in 13 at most; **(c2)** 46...♖h6 47.♖×e5 d2 (if 47...a6? 48.g8♕+ ♖×g8 49.♔×g8 c3 50.♖d5 d2 51.♔g7 ♖c6 52.h6 +4.28) 48.♖×b5+ ♔c7 49.♖c5+ ♔b6 50.♖d5 (+2.19).
(d) 41...♖g8 42.h5 ♖b2 just transposes to (c).

The note at move 46 says "If 46.♘b4 then 46...♗f6 after which only Black would have chances of winning."



Quite true, but Lasker fails to mention that 46.♘b4 was also White's last chance of drawing. The line he gives as an example of how Black might win (from diagram), 47.♘×d3 ♗×g7 48.h×g7 ♖×g7+ 49.♔f3 ♖c7 50.♖c1 a5 51.♘e1 b4 52.♖×c2 ♖×c2 53.♘×c2 ♔c7,



does so only because he then gives 54.♔g4??. Instead 54.♔e3 would draw.

It also bears mentioning that further back in Lasker's note variation, after 52.♖×c2, Black could then, instead of exchanging rooks, win with 52...b3!:



For example 53.♖b2 a4 54.♔e3 ♖b7 and either 55.♘c2 b×c2 56.♖×c2 a3 (-8.72 at 35 ply), or 55.♖b1 a3 56.♘d3 a2 57.♖g1 b2 58.♘×b2 ♖b3+ 59.♘d3 ♖b1−+.

Best for White after 46.♘b4 ♗f6 is a move Lasker does not mention, 47.♔f3!:



Stockfish then sees a draw as virtually forced, *viz.* 47...♗×g7 48.h×g7 a5 49.♘×d3 ♖×g7 50.♖a1 b4 51.♖×a5 ♖d7 52.♘c1 ♖d1 53.♖b5+ ♔a7 54.♔e2 ♖×c1 55.♔d2 ♖e1 56.♔×c2 ♖×e4,



and 0.00 per Nalimov.

***Game 100, Znosko-Borovsky–Burn*:** Another sorry effort by the presumably indisposed Burn. Lasker's early comments are mostly cogent and relevant, but his silence after move 17 leaves too much unsaid.

The note at move 12 says “White would have a good game” after 12.d5 ♘×e3 13.f×e3 b4 14.d×c6 ♘c5 15.♘b5 0-0,



and 16.♗d5. Indeed he would then, with his threats of 17.a×b4 and 17.c7, about +1.75 per Komodo. Much better than 15...0–0?, however, is 15...♘×b3 16.c×b3 ♗c5=.

A winning move went undetected by all concerned at White’s 22nd. Instead of the innocuous 22.f3-f4, Znosko-Borovsky could have struck a powerful blow with 22.♘ef5!:



The threat of 23.♕×h6 forces Black to capture the knight, but both ways lose:
(a) 22...g×f5 23.♕×h6 f4 24.♕×f6



24...♕d8 (if 24...f×g3 25.♖d3 ♕d8 26.♕h6 ♕e7 27.f4 etc. +9.24) 25.♘h5 ♕×f6 26.♘×f6+ ♔g7 27.♘×d7 (+4.12);
(b) 22...♗×f5 23.e×f5 ♔h7 24.f×g6+ f×g6 25.h4 ♕d8 26.h5 ♘×h5 (relatively best) 27.♘×h5 ♕h4 28.g4 e4 29.♗×e4 ♖×e4 30.f×e4 ♕×g4+ 31.♕g2 ♕×h5 32.♖×f8 ♕×d1+ 33.♖f1 (+4.08).

What was basically the losing move came at move 23,



when Burn played 23...e×f4?, dislodging the first pebble of the avalanche that overcame him, and then the second with 24.♖×f4 ♖e5?. Much better was 23...♕d8, which after 24.f×e5 ♖×e5 25.♖f4 puts Black an important tempo ahead of the game continuation and allows him to construct a tenable defense by 25...h5 26.♖df1 ♘g4 (or 26...♘h7 or 26...♘g8), with about an even game.

***Game 101, Speijer-Perlis*:** A stupefying game in which White, who was winning before ten moves had been played, pissed away his advantage in protracted, planless, pointless piece-puttering and pawn-pushing, giving his opponent every chance to equalize. Black obligingly refused, finally blundering at move 44, by which time Lasker had long since ceased to comment. Perhaps just as well; his notes before that were none too good.

The note at move 14 is a mess.



While the text move 14.♗a4 is not best (we tell you what is a bit further on), Lasker's recommendation 14.♕d4 is no better, and his supporting analysis is botched at several points. Its main line begins 14.♕d4 ♗f6 15.♕×a7 ♖×b2,



at which point Lasker gives the lukewarm 16.♖ab1 (+0.75); far better is 16.♘d5! (+1.80). The note then continues 16...♗×c3 17.♖×b2 ♗×b2 18.♖b1,



and now Lasker gives the egregious 18...♕f6??, which loses to 19.♕b8+ ♔g7 20.♕×b2 when an exchange of queens is forced and White's passed pawn should decide (+2.24). Far better to remove the king from the back rank with 18...♔g7!, thus forcing 19.♖×b2 ♕f6 20.♖b1 ♕c3 when Black keeps his queen and White will find it much harder to win (only +0.78).

In the note's third variation, where Lasker is showing one of two "desperate attacks [that] would have soon collapsed," he gives (from first diagram) 14.♕d4 ♗f6 15.♕×a7 ♖b6 16.♗a4 ♗d4 17.♘d5,



and apparently he believes Black will now obligingly fall into 17...♖b4?? 18.♕a5+−. This completely overlooks the quite un-desperate 17...♘g4!:



If now 18.♖f1?? ♕h4 19.h3 ♘×f2 and White is busted (-5.40). Likewise after 18.♘×b6 ♗×f2+ 19.♔f1 ♗×b6 20.♕a6, and Black can win with either 20...♕g5 threatening 21...♕f4+ (-4.47), or 20...♕f6+ 21.♔e1 ♕f2+ 22.♔d1 ♘e3+ 23.♖×e3 ♕×e3 etc. (-3.31) Therefore forced is 18.♘e3 ♘×e3 19.f×e3 ♗×b2,



when White's nominal extra pawn is worthless and Komodo rates the position dead even.

In any event, all this is beside the point, because neither Speijer nor Lasker realized the best 14th move for White was 14.♘d5!:



Now of course if 14...♖×b2?? 15.♕d4+−. Relatively best for Black is 14...♗f6, when a plausible

continuation is 15.♖b1 ♔g7 16.b4 ♖f8 17.b5 ♘g8 18.♖b3 ♘e7 19.♘×f6 ♘×c6 (not 19...♔×f6?? 20.♕d4+ ♔e6 21.e5 +6.70) 20.♘d5 ♘e5 21.f4 ♘d7,



with a pawn plus and a much better position for White (+2.61).

***Game 102, Lasker-Vidmar*:** Lasker makes short work of Vidmar's novelty 6...g6, assailing it in a style very much like the Yugoslav Attack in the Sicilian Dragon. Not much to comment on, except that it might have been mentioned that Vidmar played very poorly from move 13 on; in fact his choice at that point,



13...♘c4, should have received a "?" if not two. About the only continuation Komodo sees as very viable is 13...♗×h6 14.♕×h6,



and letting it run a while from there produced this wild variation: 14...c6 (preventing 15.♘d5) 15.g4 b4 16.♘a4⁉ (16.♘b1 may be more prudent, but it's definitely less fun) 16...c5



17.♘f5⁉ (might as well; if 17.♘b3?? ♗×a4−+) 17...g×f5 18.g×f5 ♗×a4 19.♖hg1+ ♘eg4 20.♖×d6



20...♔h8 (if 20...♕×d6?? 21.♖×g4+ ♘×g4 22.♕×d6) 21.♖×g4 ♘×g4 22.f×g4 ♗d7,



and in view of his rook deficit, White will probably have to force a draw, for example by 23.♖×d7 ♕×d7 24.♕f6+ ♔g8 25.♕g5+ etc. We can't say for certain whether 13...♗×h6 would have led to an even game for Black, but it should have been tried.

***Game 103, Schlechter-Bernstein*:** A masterful exploitation by Bernstein of Schlechter's hesitation in a dominant position. We have only one minor comment.

The note at move 18 is correct to recommend 18.♖fe1, but after 18...♔d7 19.♕f3,



rather than Lasker's 19...♔c8, which does indeed give White "an irresistible attack" (+3.33), better is 19...♘d8,



when White's advantage is much less after either **(a)** 20.♘c7 ♕f8 21.♘×a8 ♔c8 22.♘f5 ♗×f5 23.♕×f5+ ♔b8 (+1.08), or **(b)** 20.♘f5 ♕×e6 21.♖×e6 ♘×e6 22.♘×d6 ♔×d6 (+1.37), or **(c)** 20.♘c5+ ♗×c5 21.♖×e7+ ♗×e7 22.♘f5 (+1.59).

***Game 106, Mieses–Znosko-Borovsky*:** A quite interesting game with regrettably scanty notes. The long unannotated segments, moves 15-37 and 43-57, have some hidden gems and noteworthy, instructive possibilities. And as we have often seen before, the decisive mistake completely escapes Lasker's notice.

The game is even up to move 17, when Black starts to go wrong and lets White take the initiative.



Rather than 17...♕e6, as actually played, Black might tried 17...♖hd8 18.f×e5 f×e5 19.b3 c4 20.b×c4 (if 20.d×c4 ♖×d1+ 21.♖×d1 ♖×d1+ 22.♔×d1 ♕×h2=) 20...♕d7 21.♖hf1 ♕a4 with counterplay.

Znosko-Borovsky's 21...♕d6-a6? is a mistake that could have let Mieses wrap up the point much sooner than he did. Better instead was 21...f×e5,



when if **(a)** 22.♕×f7?! c4 23.♔b2 c×d3 24.c3 ♕c6 25.c×d4 ♕c2+ 26.♔a3 b4+ 27.♔×b4 ♖×d4+ 28.♔a3 ♕c5+ 29.♔b2 ♕c2+ etc., draw. Therefore **(b)** 22.♕f6 ♖d7 23.♕×d6 ♖4×d6 24.♖f5 f6 25.♖df1 c4 (not 25...♖f7? 26.♖×e5) 26.d×c4 b×c4 27.♖×f6 ♖d4, when though White has some advantage (about+0.88), it is much less than he could have had after 21...♕a6?.

However, after 21...♕a6?, Mieses threw away his advantage with 22.♕×f6?!. Much better, probably even winning, was 22.♕f5+!:



Now more or less forced is 22...♔b7 23.♔b2 c4 24.♕×f6 ♕×f6 25.e×f6 c×d3 26.♖f4!





26...♔c6 (if 26...d×c2 27.♖×d4 ♖×d4 28.♖h4 +2.02) 27.♖h4 h6 28.♖×d3 ♖×d3 29.c×d3 ♖×d3 30.♔c2 ♖d4 31.♔c3 ♖d1 32.♖×h6,



a position clearly won for White (+2.20 per Stockfish at 25 ply).

It was Black's turn to miss a probably winning chance at move 36. Znosko-Borovsky's 36...♖d7-g7 was not bad, but much more dynamic was 36...c7-c5!.



White now has several plausible replies, but they tend to channel into two main lines:

(a) 37.♖f5 c4! 38.d×c4 (if 38.h5 ♖g7 39.h6 ♖g8 40.♔d2 c×b3 41.c×b3 a2 42.♖f1 ♖×g5 -5.57) 38...b×c4 39.♖×e5 c3! 40.♔e3 ♔a6



and if 41.♖f5 ♖d2 (-4.13), or 41.♖e6+ ♔b5 42.♖e5+ ♔b6 43.♖e6+ ♔c7 44.♖a6 ♖d2 (-4.21);

(b) 37.♖f1 c4 38.♖g1 ♔c6 39.♔d2 ♔c5 40.h5 ♖a7





and now:
(b1) 41.♔c1 c×d3 42.c×d3 ♔d4 43.♔d2 ♖f7,



and White has a only choice of a quick death by 44.♔e2 ♔c3 etc. (-13.78), or slow by 44.♔c2 ♖c7+ 45.♔b1 ♔×d3 etc. (-4.76).
(b2) 41.g6 a2



Forcing White to take his rook out of action. 42.♖a1 c×b3 43.c×b3 h×g6 44.h×g6 ♔d4 45.♔c2 ♖a6 46.g7 ♖g6 47.♖×a2 ♖g2+ 48.♔b1 ♖×g7 49.♖a5 (if 49.♖d2 ♖c7 etc.) 49...♖b7 50.♔c2 ♔e3



White is in *Zugzwang*, unable to move without fatal material loss, *e.g.* 51.♔d1 ♔×d3, or 51.♖a6 ♖c7+ 52.♔d1 ♔×d3 etc. (both about -15.00). The dynamic potential of a c7-c5-c4 advance did not occur to Znosko-Borovsky until it was too late.

At Black's 39th move,



Lasker's note reads "Here 39...h6 was indicated. If 40.g×h6 ♖g2+ 41.♔c1 ♖h2 drawing at least." Could Lasker have meant 41.♔e3, which does draw? Because if White does actually play 41.♔c1??,



the punishment is swift and terrible: 41...♖g1+ 42.♔d2 a2−+. This was another case where we checked the old Dover edition, and it definitely does say "K–Bsq" which does not look much like "K–K3".

In any event, Black's best choice at move 39 was not 39...h6 but 39...c6!?:



The next several moves are pretty much forced: 40.♔c1 h6 41.♖f5 (not 41.g×h6?? ♖g1+ 42.♔d2 a2−+) 41...♔d4 42.♔b1 h×g5



And now:

(a) 43.h×g5? ♖g6 44.♔a2 c5 45.♔a1 c4



46.♔b1 (if 46.d×c4 b×c4 47.b×c4 ♔×e4; 46.b×c4 b×c4 47.♔a2 c×d3 48.c×d3 ♔c3 and mate in twelve) 46...c3 47.♔a1 ♔e3



48.♔b1 (if 48.♖×e5 ♔d2 49.♔b1 a2+ 50.♔a1 ♔×c2 and mate in seven) 48...♖g7 49.♖×e5 ♔d2 50.♖f5 a2+ 51.♔×a2 ♔×c2 52.♖f2+ ♔×d3 53.♖g2



53...♖a7+ 54.♔b1 ♖a3−+.

(b) Therefore White must play 43.♖×g5!,



his only chance. Best play now continues 43...♖h7 44.h5 c5 45.♔a2 c4 46.b×c4 b×c4 47.d×c4 ♔×e4,



and while both Komodo and Stockfish say the position favors Black, neither could find a win, and in fact their evaluations tended to go down the deeper they went, Stockfish for example saying only -0.59 at 31 ply. Even so, these lines clearly indicate that if Black wanted to win, he needed to try the tricky 39...c6!? which keeps the pressure on and gives White many ways to go wrong, rather than Lasker's 39...h6, against which White can easily draw.

At move 41,



Black finally got around to playing c7-c5, but it was too late for it to have any of the effect seen in the above lines; it takes the engines' evaluations down to 0.00 immediately. The only move they see with any winning chances is 41...♖c6.

Still, Black was in no danger of losing until move 48.



There he sealed his doom with 48...♔×e4??, yet another decisive blunder on which Lasker failed to comment. He still could have maintained equality with 48...♖g6, *e.g.* 49.♖h6 ♖g8 50.♖h7 ♔×e4 51.♔a2 ♔f5 52.♖f7+ ♔g6 53.♖f6+ ♔h5=.

***Game 107, Duras-Tartakower*:** Very little to comment on here; Lasker's notes are adequate. We add only one small observation.

At move 32,



though there was nothing wrong with Black's text move 32...♖g8, he could have safely captured another pawn with 32...♗×a2!, since the attempt to trap the bishop fails: 33.b3 a5 34.♔g3 a4 35.b×a4 ♖a8 36.♖h1 ♖×a4 37.♖a1 b5 etc. Had White not blundered next move with 33.♖h6?? and instead played 33.b3 or 33.a3 (both about -1.20), the additional pawn would have come in handy.

***Game 108, Dus-Chotimirsky–Salwe*:** Yet again, Lasker fails to point out the decisive mistake.

At move 39,



White became anxious for the health of his g-pawn, playing 39.h3??, a blunder that made the game irrevocably lost. Instead he should have blithely given it up and drawn, for example by 39.g5! ♖g4+ (40.h×g5 is no better) 40.♔f2 ♖×g5 41.b7



41...♖b5 (if 41...♘d7 42.♖c8+ ♔f7 43.♖d8 ♖b5 44.♖×d7+ with equality) 42.♖c7 and Black cannot win this endgame,



e.g. 42...g5 43.h4 g×h4 (if 43...g4 44.h5) 44.♔g2 ♖b6 45.♔h3=. White can also draw with 39.b7 ♖b4 40.♖c7, or 39.♖c7 ♖×g4+ 40.♔f2 ♖b4 41.b7, both of which just channel into lines similar to 39.g5. The key factor that enables these three moves to draw is that White gets his b-pawn to the seventh rank. The loss of time with 39.h3?? allowed Black to play 39...♖b4, preventing it.

***Game 111, Schlechter-Forgács*:** Subtly skillful play by Schlechter to win a pawn, but it might not have been enough to win had Forgács not blundered (about which Lasker says nothing). The one note where Lasker does say much of anything, he is wrong.

At move 24, where Black played 24...♖a8-a7, Lasker is badly mistaken in recommending 24...f5.





After 25.e×f5 g×f5 his note says “the continuation might be 26.♘h5 ♗h8 27.g4 ♘e7 ... White could not play 26.♘h4, as 26...e4 would follow, the white bishop being still *en prise*.” But this ignores the much stronger 26.♖×a2 ♖×a2 27.♕b3!:



The power of this line is perhaps not immediately apparent. There are two key ideas: (1) after the rook retreats (which it must, since if 27...♕a8 simply 28.♘×f5), the ♗c2 is no longer *en prise* and if White makes room on the third rank the queen can then instigate threats not only from d3 but also from e3, f3 or g3 depending on circumstances; and (2) White can gang up on the pinned f-pawn with the bishop and his knights. Black’s pieces are poorly positioned for defense. After 27...♖a8 (the most logical retreat), White actually has two ways to exploit the plight of the f-pawn:

(A) The simplest and most direct is 28.♕d3:



The natural response would seem to be 28...e4, but it fails spectacularly: 29.♘×e4! and if 29...f×e4 30.♕×e4+ and Black has only a choice of poisons: 29...♔h8 30.♕h7#, or 29.♗f5 31.♕×f5+ etc., or most artistically, 29...♕f5 30.♘h4! ♕×e4 31.♗×e4+ ♔h8 32.♘g6+ ♔h7 33.♘e5+ ♔h8 34.♘f7#.

With 28...e4 out of the question, Black can try 28...♘e7, but then White just piles up on the f-pawn with 29.♘h4, and nothing can stop 30.♘×f5 next move. Komodo rates the resulting positions at about +2.15 or better.

(B) Equally or more effective, though complicated, is 28.♘h4:



If now:
(B1) 28...♘e7 29.♘h×f5! ♘×f5 30.♕d3 etc. (+2.00);
(B2) 28...e4 29.♗d2! (to make way for the queen on the third rank) and:



(B2a) 29...♘e7 30.♘×e4 f×e4 31.♕e3 ♘f5 32.♕×e4 ♔g8 33.♘×f5 (+3.62);
(B2b) 29...♖e8 30.♘×e4 f×e4 31.♖×e4 ♗f5 32.♖×e8 ♕×e8 33.♘×f5 (+8.89).
(B2c) 29...♗d4 (to prevent 30.♕e3) 30.♘×e4 f×e4 (or 30...♖e8 31.♕f3 ♘d8 32.♘g3 ♖×e1+ 33.♗×e1 ♘e7 34.♗×f5+ ♗×f5 35.♘h×f5 ♘×f5 36.♘×f5 +5.04) 31.♗×e4+ ♔g7 32.♕g3+ ♔f6 33.♗c3 ♗×c3 34.♕×c3+ ♔e7 (if 34...♔f7 35.♗g6#) 35.♘g6+ (+17.64);

Of course Black can decline to recapture on e4 in any of these lines, but then he will simply lose both his e- and f-pawn with his king still terribly vulnerable. White should win easily.

Black's blunder at move 55 goes unremarked.



White is only a pawn up, but Black erred with 55...♘e7?? 56.♕e7 and the game was over. Instead he could have played 55...♕c2+ 56.♔h3 ♕c8+:



White now has three options:
(a) Accept perpetual check with 57.♔g2 ♕c7+ etc.;
(b) Exchange queens with 57.♕e6 ♕×e6+ 58.♘×e6+ ♔f7 59.♘d4 when, unlike the position Lasker commented on at move 52, Black can get his knight into play well before the white king comes out, giving Black reasonable drawing chances (+1.06);
(c) 57.g4 h×g4+ 58.♔g3 ♕b7 (not 58...g×f3?? 59.♕e7+ ♘f7 60.♘e6+ ♔g8 61.♕×f6+−) 59.♘d5 (if 59.f×g4 ♘f7=) 59...♘g8 60.♔×g4 ♕b1,



with a problematic position very difficult for White to win (only +0.60 per Komodo, +0.81 per Stockfish).

***Game 113, Rubinstein-Schlechter*:** A game skillfully conducted by Rubinstein. Lasker seems to have taken more interest in and care with Rubinstein's games than others', but even so his notes are uneven.

The note at move 11 can be improved at several points. After 11...♘×c3 12.b×c3 b5 13.♗d3 a6 14.c4,



best is 14...♗b7, not Lasker's 14...c5?!. Further on, after 14...c5 15.c×b5 a×b5 16.♗×b5 c×d4,



Lasker's 17.♖c7? is incomprehensible; White gets nothing after 17...♕d8 18.♕c1 ♖×a2. Correct is 17.♕×d4! ♖×a2 18.♖c7 ♖a5 19.♗×d7 ♖d5 20.♗×e6 ♕×e6 21.♕f4 (+1.15). Continuing with the note line, after 17.♖c7?! ♕d6?! Lasker gives another incomprehensible move 18.♖c6?!,



when 18.♖c2, defending the a-pawn, is correct. Finally, in response to 18.♖c6?! Black should play not 18...♕b4? but 18...♕b8,



when material will be even after either 19.♘×d4 ♖×a2 or 19.a4 d×e3 f×e3.

No comment is made at move 20,



where Schlechter's 20...♘c8? considerably worsened his position (Komodo's evaluation goes from +0.98 to +2.18). He was better off not worrying about his a-pawn. Several moves were preferable, including 20...♔h8, 20...♗h5, 20...♖cd7, 20...h6, and 20...♗f7.

In the note variation at Black's 21st move, he need not have suffered quite so dreadful a loss as Lasker thought. After 21...b6 22.♕c3,



rather than 21...e×d5, there is 22...♘d6 23.e5 ♘b5 24.♕e3 c×d5 25.a4 g4 26.♘d2 ♖×c1 27.♖×c1 f×e5 28.a×b5 ♕g7,



which at +1.59 is far less egregious than the +4.47 of Lasker's line.

White's play at move 22 can be improved.



Rubinstein's 22.♘ed4 results in winning the exchange, but at the cost of a pawn. Better is 22.♘g3!:



If Black now tries to continue as in the game with 22...c×d5 23.e×d5 ♖×d5,



the result is catastrophic because White's rook is not blocked by a knight on d4, thus 24.♗×d5 and either 24...♖×d5 25.♖×d5 e×d5 26.♖×c8 (+8.51), or 24...e×d5 25.♘f5 (+6.01). Relatively best for Black is (from previous diagram) 22...c×d5 23.e×d5 e×d5 24.♗a4 b6 25.♕c3,



and now 25...♘d6 is necessary to prevent 26.♘f5. Thus after 26.♗×d7 ♗×d7 27.♖×d5 White has won the exchange cleanly, without giving up a pawn for it (+3.25).

***Game 115, Salwe-Cohn*:** A mind-numbingly tedious game, 134 moves and fifteen hours long (not counting time spent in adjournment analysis), with a groaningly drawn-out ♖+♗+3♙ -vs-♛ ending in which both players were obviously out of their depth. Salwe finally managed to win more by accident than skill. Lasker seems to have put little effort into the notes, effectively leaving the last 97 moves unannotated, and thus many opportunities to decide matters sooner

were not pointed out. We will highlight a few of them; to do them all would severely tax the reader's (and this writer's!) patience.

The start of Black's long, slow march to defeat is not pointed out in Lasker's notes. It can pretty much be pinpointed at move 41,



where Cohn played 41...♖c5?!. Instead 41...♘f6 would have kept the game about even.

Salwe might have exploited 41...♖c5?! more effectively than he did, with 42.b4!:



forcing 42...♖b5, and then after 43.♖×e4 ♖×d5 44.♕×g4+ ♗×g4 45.♖×e7



we have an ending where White, after taking the h-pawn, would have a 3-to-1 kingside majority and should win fairly easily.

At Black's 42nd move,



he played 42...♕c7? which led to an unusual ♖+♗+♘ -vs-♛ material imbalance (+2.73). Instead he could have cut his losses considerably with 42...♘×e3! 43.f×e3 ♗×e4 (only +0.75).

At move 52,



Black played 52...♔g7?!, beginning a series of moves that ultimately resulted in the loss of his f-pawn. Better was 52...b4!?, *e.g.* 53.♗e4 ♕c1 54.♔e2 a3 55.b×a3 b×a3 and Black's a-pawn counter-balances much of White's nominal material advantage (only +0.78 at 26 ply).

At move 63,



White played 63.♘c3?, throwing away much of his advantage (down to below +1.00). Correct was 63.♘f2, and if 63...♕c4+ 64.♘d3, with a still winning edge.

After 70.a4,



Lasker makes his last comment (other than to say "adjourned" at moves 72 and 92): "Of course, White must win in the end with his superior force." The engines do not agree; at that point, Komodo's assessment is +0.14, Stockfish's +0.08.

From that point on, the game becomes a long sequence of checks by Black (often not properly evaded by White), and too many inconsequential moves by White when he's not in check. There were multiple opportunities for White to win or for Black to draw, some of which (but by no means all, since we do not especially enjoy repetitive tedium) we will now demonstrate.

At move 84,



instead of 84.♖f5?!, White should have remembered the old adage “Rooks belong behind passed pawns!” He could have started making real progress with 84.♖a4!:



A sample continuation then is 84...♕h4+ 85.♔g2 ♕e1 86.♗f3



86...♕d2+ (if 86...♕×e3?? 87.a7 +−) 87.♔g3 ♕e1+ 88.♔f4 ♕c3 89.g5 (not 89.a7?? ♕e5#!) 89...♕b3 90.♗d1!



90...♕f7+ (if 90...♕×d1?? 91.♖d4+) 91.♔g3 ♕a7 92.♔f2 ♔e5 93.♗c2 ♕c7 94.♗d3 ♕f7+ 95.♔e2 ♕a7 96.g6 ♕d7 97.♖d4 ♕g7 98.♖g4 ♔f6 99.a7 ♕×a7



100.g7 and wins.

Another opportunity came three moves later.



Black played 86...♕a5? (better 86...♕a1), to which White replied ineptly with 87.♖f3?!. Instead he had the quickly decisive 87.♖f6+!:



and now forced is 87...♔e7 (if 87...♔e5 88.♖f5+, or 87...♔c7 88.a7!+−) 88.♖h6 ♕d5+ 89.♔g3 ♕g5 90.a7 ♕×e3+ 91.♗f3



and either 91...♕×h6 92.a8♕+−, or 91...♕g1+ 92.♔h3 ♕f1+ 93.♗g2 ♕d3+ 94.♔h4 and Black's checking account is empty.

Playing over the next 30-odd moves is like watching two blind men trying to sort M&Ms by color, so we will cut to the final exchange of errors. At move 123,



Stockfish, analyzing as far as 35 ply, says that White can (a) force mate in 36 moves starting with 123.♔c3, or (b) have an advantage of +57.95 with either 123.♗c2 or 123.♔a1, or (c) have a still winning advantage of +7.00 with 123.♔b1. Salwe, however, played 123.♔b3?. Cohn then could have forced a draw with 123...♕d2!:



Though this lets White queen with 124.a8♕, that would allow perpetual check by 124...♕×d3+ etc. As does any other continuation except 124.♖f6+ ♔e7:



But then we have either:
(a) 125.a8♕ ♕×d3+ 126.♔b4 ♕d2+ 127.♔c4 ♕c2+ 128.♔d4 ♕d1+ 129.♔e4 ♔×f6,



or
(b) 125.♖e6+ ♔×e6 126.♗c4+ ♔f6 127.a8♕ ♕×e3+ 128.♔a4 ♔×g6,



and Nalimov says both are draws, despite White having the advantage of a bishop in the latter, and two pawns in the former. Fortunately for Salwe, Cohn played 123...♕h1??, proving yet again Tartakower's adage that the winner of a chess game is he who makes the next-to-last mistake.

***Game 117, Znosko-Borovsky–Duras*:** A short game for which we offer only one correction, but it's a doozy.

At move 22,



White blundered with 22.♗c3?? and resigned after 22...♖e2, which forces mate quickly. Lasker says “The right move was 22.♖f2.” Um, no. Lasker is again asleep at the wheel, and this is yet another of his howlers. 22.♖f2?? is almost as bad as the text move, being refuted by 22...♖×e1+ 23.♗×e1 ♗d4!:



If now:
(a) 24.♖e2 ♕f1#;
(b) 24.♖g2 ♖e8 25.♗d2 (or 25.♗f2 ♗×f2 26.♖×f2 ♖e1+) 25...♖e2 and mate in four at most;
(c) 24.♖f3 ♕h5 25.♔g2 (or 25.♖f4 ♕e2 26.♗c3 ♗f2 -18.46) 25...♖e8 26.♗f2 ♗×f2 27.♖×f2 ♕d5+



28.♔h3 (if 28.♔f1 ♕h1#, or 28.♔g1 ♖e1+ etc.) 28...♖e6 etc. (-7.35).;
(d) 24.♖f4 g5 25.♖f3 ♕e6 26.♗f2 ♕d5 27.♔g2 g4 (-17.31);
(e) Relatively best is 24.♔g1, but then 24...♕e6



and either **(e1)** 25.♗c3 ♗×f2+ 26.♔×f2 ♖e8 etc. (-7.68), or **(e2)** 25.♔f1 ♕d5 26.♕e7 (if 26.♔g1 ♖e8 -7.85) 26...♕h1+ 27.♔e2 ♗×f2 28.♗×f2 ♕c1 etc. (-4.81), and White is toast.

The actual “right move” was 22.♕c5!?,



when after 22...♗×b2 and either **(a)** 23.♔g1 ♕d7, or **(b)** 23.♕b6 ♖e2 24.♖f2 ♖×e1+ 25.♗×e1 ♕e6 26.♕×b7 ♖e8 (if 26...♕×e1+?! 27.♔g2 ♕e8 28.♕×b2=) 27.♕×b2 ♕d5+ 28.♔g1 ♖×e1+ 29.♖f1 ♖×f1+ 30.♔×f1 ♕h1+ 31.♔e2 ♕×h2+ 32.♔f3. White stands worse (about -1.10 in either line) but he is far from lost.

***Game 121, Forgács-Bernstein*:** A mostly well-played and well-annotated game. Only one minor improvement.

At White’s 19th move,



Lasker says of Forgács’ 19.♘e5 “This move shows up the weakness of Black’s strategy.” While that is true in a general sense, it could have been shown all the more clearly and specifically by 19.d5!,



when after either **(a)** 19...c×d5 20.♗×f6 g×f6 21.♘d4 d×c4 22.♘×e6 f×e6 23.♗×c4 ♖×d1 24.♗×e6+ ♔g7 25.♕×d1 (+2.16), or **(b)** 19...♗×b2 20.d×e6 ♖×d1 21.♖×d1 ♗f6 22.♖d7 ♕c8 23.♕d2 f×e6 24.♕d6 ♘g6 25.♕×e6+ ♔h8 26.♕f7 b6 27.♗d3 ♕e8 28.♕×e8+ ♖×e8 29.♗×f5 (+2.15), White has a major advantage.

***Game 122, Burn-Vidmar*:** Our ailing Englishman finally wins one! Though he might have been much more efficient.

Lasker makes no comment on moves 27 to 72. Thus at move 42,



the reader is not apprised that Burn's 42.♕b6?! gave away most of his advantage. Instead he could have decided the game quickly with 42.♕e6!:



This threatens 43.♖d8 ♔g7 44.♘g6 ♘×g6 45.f×g6 and Black is crushed. Komodo evaluates only two replies as under +4.60 initially:
(a) 42...♘c6 43.♘g6+ ♗×g6 44.♖d7 ♕c8 45.f×g6 ♖g7 (if 45...♖×g6?? 46.♖×h7+ ♔×h7 47.♕×c8) 46.♖d6 ♕×e6 47.♖×e6,



and White wins one knight or the other (+4.64);
(b) 42...♕c7 43.♗b6 ♕b7 44.♖d8 ♕c6 (not 44...♘f8?? 45.♕×f6+) 45.♖d6 ♕b7 46.♗e3 ♘c8 47.♘g6+ ♖×g6 (if 47...♗×g6 48.♖d7) 48.f×g6 ♘×d6 49.g×h7 ♔×h7 50.♕×d6,



and White is up a bishop (+3.90).

***Game 123, Mieses-Lasker*:** Mieses never managed to beat Lasker in 13 tries over 20 years, scoring +0 -8 =5. This happened to be their last serious game together. Mieses holds his own for a while, but ultimately cracks. Komodo found two significant improvements at the game's crucial juncture.

Lasker calls his move 41...d6-d5 “decisive,”



and so it turned out to be, but its decisive effect was greatly increased by Mieses’ reply 42.e×d5??. Much better instead was 42.♕c2:



If Black then tries to continue his plan of transferring his king to the queenside he gets in trouble: 42...♔e7? 43.e×d5 ♖×e1+ 44.♖×e1+ ♔d8 45.♖×e8+ ♔×e8 46.d×c6 (+2.11). Therefore 42...d×e4 43.♖d7+



43...♔g8 (if 43...♖8e7?! 44.♖×e7+ ♔×e7 45.♖×e4 ♖×e4 46.f×e4 and Black’s advantage is minimal, -0.43) 44.♔h2!:



If now 44...e×f3?! 45.♕g6! and the threat of mate forces Black to liquidate into an even position with 45...♕f4+ 46.♔h3 ♕h6+ 47.♕×h6 g×h6 48.♖×e6 ♖×e6 49.♔g3=. (This shows the point of 45.♔h2, so that 45...♖×e1 would not be check.) Therefore Black would go with something like 44...♘c5 45.♖d4 ♕a2 46.f×e4,





when though Black still has a positional advantage, material is even and White is able to fight on for quite a while.

Also reasonable, or at least not immediately fatal, is 42.♕d3,



when after 42...♕×d3 43.♖×d3 d×e4 44.♖d7+ ♖6e7 45.♖×e7+ ♖×e7 46.f×e4 ♘d2 White will lose a pawn but may yet survive.

After 41...d5 the game continued 42.e×d5?? ♖×e1+ 43.♗×e1:



Lasker now played 43...♕e2, which while good enough to win was only second-best. Much the strongest was 43...♖e3!,



which gives White only a choice of catastrophes, for example: 44.♕f5 ♕e2 (-4.11), or 44.♕c2 ♘d4 (-4.30), or 44.♗f2 ♖×f3 (-6.60), or 44.♔g2 ♕e2+ (-24.43).

***Game 124, Duras-Speijer*:** One would never guess from Lasker's notes that Oldrich Duras, at the time one of the top ten players in the world, even in the top five according to some, could have ben held to a draw, or even beaten, by the relative nobody Abraham Speijer, who finished 17th in this event.

Speijer's best opportunity came at move 26. If, instead of 26...♔g8-h7, he had played 26...b5-b4!, the game might have turned out differently.



If then 27.♘e2? ♗g5 28.f4 e×f4 29.♗×f4 ♗×f4 30.♘×f4 ♕a7 31.♗c4 ♘d3 32.♘×d3 ♕×e3+, and Black is winning (-3.31). Better is 27.♘d1 ♖d8 28.♖e1 ♖d2 29.♘e3 ♘×e4,



but Black is a clear pawn ahead with perhaps other advantages as well (-1.16).

At move 31, Speijer had at least ten moves that would have kept the game very close to even,



including 31...♖d2, 31...h5, 31...♗f6, 31...♗d7, 31...♕f8, and 31...♕d6. Lasker comments only on one of them, 31...b4, giving then 32.♘b1 ♘×e4(?) (completely unnecessary; better 32...♗f6 -0.45) 33.♖×e4 ♖×e4 34.♗×g6+.

Speijer unfortunately chose 31...♘e6??:



This should have immediately lost the game to 32.♗×g6+!, when if 32...♔×g6?? ♕f5#, so Black must accept 32...♔h8 (or 33...♔g8) 33.♗f5 ♘g5 34.♕e3 (+2.67). But somehow Duras

overlooked this, playing instead 32.♗×e6?! allowing Black back to equality. Lasker's failure to point this out is hard to understand, since he had mentioned the possibility of ♗×g6+ in his note about 31...b4.

***Game 125, Dus-Chotimirsky–Znosko-Borovsky*:** This Battle of the Hyphens has a howler of commission, and several of omission.

At move 40, instead of 40...♘f6-d7 as actually played, Lasker recommends 40...♘f6-g4+,



giving it one of the few "!" marks he bestows in the book. Apparently he believed it would win for Black, but that is not the case. One line he gives, 41.♔g1 ♘e3 42.♕×c5 ♖g7?? (better 42...♕×c5 43.♖×c5 ♖g7 44.♖h2=)



goes down in flames to 43.♖h8+ ♔×h8 44.♕×f8+ ♖g8 45.♕×g8+ ♔×g8 46.♖×c6 b×c6 47.b7 etc. (+15.67). The other, 41.f×g4 f3,



is only good for a draw after 42.♖h5 f×e2+ (not f×g2+?? 43.♖f5 ♖×f5+ 44.g×f5 +3.25) 43.♔g3 ♕f6 44.♖e1! ♕f2+ 45.♔h2 ♕×e1 46.♕g6+ ♖g7 47.♕e6+ ♖ff7 48.♕e8+ ♖f8 49.♕e6+ etc.

Lasker does not comment on the final moves, 41-57, thus the reader might not realize the comedy of errors therein. Starting with this position, before Black's 45th move, we will give the rest of the game, with text moves in boldface and our comments in regular type.





45...♖g6? Raises White's advantage to +2.52; better 45...♘f6 +0.64. **46.♖h8+ ♖g8 47.♖×g8+ ♔×g8 48.♘e4 ♕g6**



49.♖d1 About fifth-best. Better 49.♕d5! and after either 49...♘f8 50.♖h5 ♕e6 51.♕×c5 (+2.50), or 49...♘f6 50.♕d8+ ♖f8 51.♖h8+ ♔×h8 52.♕×f8+ ♘g8 53.♕×c5 (+3.12), White will soon be picking off pawns. **49...♔g7 50.♖d6?!** 50.♕d5! (+2.41)



50...♕h5? Apparently the only point of this is to get in a useless spite check. Instead Black could have fought on with 50...♘f6 51.♘×f6 ♖×f6 52.♖d8 ♖f7 53.♕×c5 ♕e6 (+0.85). **51.♕d5 ♕h4+??** 51...♘f8 was better, but by now that's like saying drowning is better than hanging. **52.♔e2 ♘f6??** Better 52...♘f8 again. **53.♕×e5** Strongest was 53.♘×f6 ♖×f6 54.♕×e5. **53...♕h1 54.♕g5+ ♔f8 55.♖×f6 ♕c1 56.♕×c5+ ♕×c5 57.♖×f7+ 1–0**

***Game 126, Cohn-Tartakower*:** Not much to say here; we just note that White could have begun his decisive breakthrough one move sooner than he did.

At move 30, rather than 30.♗e2-h5, White had the much stronger 30.♖a1-g1!:



Black is helpless now, *viz.*:
(a) 30...♕f7 31.♗h5 ♕f8 32.♗g6+ ♔h8 33.♗f7 and mate soon;
(b) 30...♕f8 31.♗h5 etc. as in (a);
(c) 30...♕d8 31.♕h5 ♕f6 32.♗×a6 ♖×a6 33.♕e8 etc. (+14.74);

(d) 30...♕e6 31.♕g3 ♕f7 (if 31...♖g8 32.♕×g8+ ♕×g8 33.♖×g8 ♔×g8 34.♗×a6) 32.♗h5 ♕f6 33.♗g6+ ♔h8 34.♕h3 ♕f8 35.♗f7 ♗e2 36.♖g6 ♕×f7 37.♖×h6+ ♔g7 38.♖h7+ ♔f6 39.♖×f7+ ♔×f7 40.♕×f5+ (+9.76).

This became academic when Black replied 30...♕f8??. Instead he could have forced White to work a bit harder with 30...♕d8,



though White still ultimately wins, *e.g.* 31.♕g3 ♕f6 32.♖g1 ♔h8 33.♕e1! (intending 34.♖g6) ♖g8 34.♖×g8+ ♔×g8 35.a4 ♗d3 36.♕b4 ♕d8 37.♕b7 etc. (+7.37).

***Game 130, Bernstein-Perlis*:** The main struggle and decisive phase of this game comes in the long queen ending that starts at move 36 and goes on for another 43 moves. Such endgames are notoriously difficult to analyze, and Lasker seems to have made almost no effort to do so. While we will not attempt a full analysis, we will remark on some important points.

At the start of the endgame, after 36.♕×d5+,



Lasker recommended 36...♔f8 over Cohn's 36...♔h8, but Stockfish sees no difference between either move nor 36...♔h7, rating them all 0.00.

The evaluation stays at or very near 0.00 until Black's 54th move,



where Stockfish says Black can maintain equality with 54...h5, 54...♔c8, or moving the queen to any of d2, d3, d5, c5, c7, b6 or e6. Cohn, unfortunately, played 58...♕d1+?!, which bumps the evaluation up to +1.21, and after 59.♔a5 compounded his error with 59...♕d2+??, which suddenly jacks it up to +5.91, i.e. *Nigrum mortuus est*. 59...♕d6 would have limited the damage.

But Cohn caught a small break when Bernstein played 60.♔a6. Instead, 60.♔b6! would have hastened the end.



An illustrative line: 60...♕f2+ 61.♔b7 ♕f3+ 62.♔b8 ♕f4+ 63.♔a7 ♕a4+ 64.♔b6 ♕f4 (with no more checks Black must defend his h-pawn) 65.♕g8+ ♔e7 (if 65...♔d7?? 66.♕g4+) 66.♕c8 ♕h4 67.♕c5+ ♔d7 68.♔b7,



and the writing is on the wall (+12.19).

But Cohn again erred in turn, at move 61.



With 61...♕e6+ he might still have had an outside chance (+3.03), but he played 61...♕f2+?. The game continued 62.♔b7 ♕f3+ 63.♔b8 ♕f4+ 64.♔a7 ♕a4+ 65.♔b6 ♕f4,



reaching a position identical to that after 64...♕f4 in our analysis variation above. After this Bernstein never really lost his way and wrapped things up in fourteen more moves.

***Game 132, Spielmann-Schlechter*:** A well-played game by Spielmann, with two surprisingly elementary analytical lapses by Lasker.

Lasker must not have been paying close attention when he wrote the note at move eight. Of this position,



he wrote "Is there anything better here? After 8...♗e6 9.d×e5 ♘a5 10.♘d4 and if 10...c5? *[better to avoid all this by 10...♘×b3 or 10...b4 – TK]* 11.♘×e6 f×e6, White can obtain an advantage only by 12.a×b5, for after 12.♕g4 ♕d7, Black would reply to both 13.f3 and 13.a×b5 with 13...c4 and the issue appears very doubtful."

Actually the main thing this note makes appear doubtful is Lasker's competence. Firstly, after 12.a×b5,



the advantage White obtains is considerable, *viz.* 12...a×b5 13.c4 ♘×b3 14.♖×a8 ♕×a8 15.♕×b3 b×c4 16.♕h3 ♕c8 17.f3 and the knight is lost (+2.00).

Secondly, in the event of 12.♕g4, the last thing Black wants to do is 12...♕d7?,



since it leaves the ♘a5 either *en prise* or pinned and leads to other problems, *viz.* **(a)** 13.a×b5 c4 14.♖×a5 c×b3 15.♘d2 ♘×d2 16.♗×d2 b×c2 17.b×a6 (+2.92), or **(b)** 13...a×b5 14.c4 h5 15.♕h3 ♗e7 16.c×d5 0–0 (relatively best; if 16...e×d5 17.♕×d7+ ♔×d7 18.♗×d5 +5.24) 17.♖×a5 ♖×a5 18.d6 c4 (not 18...♗d8?? 19.♗×e6+) 19.d×e7 ♕×e7 20.♗c2 (+4.09).

If White does play 12.♕g4,



Black is best advised not to defend the e-pawn, but to play 12...c4 13.♕×e6+ ♗e7 14.♗a2, with much less disadvantage (+0.73).

Another inattentive note is at move 27,



where Lasker writes “Not 27.g3 ♕×h3 28.c×d4 on account of 28...♘h4.”



But in that case White simply combines defense with digestion by 29.♕×c6, and he’s fine (+1.37, about the same as after the text move 27.♖f3).

***Game 134, Znosko-Borovsky–Cohn*:** Only two quick comments on this short game.

At move 19,



nothing is said about the text move 19.♗f7+? being a serious mistake. Though White had already lost a pawn, 19.♖e1 would have kept the game more or less even.

Then it might also have been added that after the further moves 19...♗×f7 20.♖×f7 ♕e3+ 21.♕×e3 d×e3 22.♖×b7 a5,



it was incumbent upon White to play ♖b7-b1 either immediately or next move to prevent the a-pawn from queening. Instead after 23.c3 a4 24.♘e4?? it was too late.

***Game 135, Speijer–Dus-Chotimirsky*:** A rough-and-tumble game between two players who, though they were also-rans in this event, showed a lot of fighting spirit. Some interesting possibilities went unmentioned in Lasker's notes.

There was more to Speijer's knight sac 14.♘d4×b5 than he or Lasker realized.



After 14...♕c8 Lasker examined various replies, correctly assessing 15.♗e3 and 15.b4, but too curtly dismissing 15.♗f4!?, seeming to think 15...♘fd7 took care of it, ending his comment at that point. But a lot can happen after 16.♕h5!?:



This creates numerous complications. The main variations:
(a) 16...0–0 17.♗×e5 g6 18.♕g5 f6 19.♗×f6 ♖×f6 20.e5 ♖×f2 21.♖×f2 ♗×f2+ (if 21...a×b5? 22.♖af1 +0.89) 22.♔×f2 ♕c5+ 23.♔e2 ♖f8 24.♖f1 ♖×f1 25.♔×f1 a×b5 26.♗b3,



with a still very unresolved position;

(b) 16...a×b5 17.♗×e5 ♘×e5 18.♕×e5 0–0 19.♘×b5



and White is up two pawns for the moment, but a lot can happen (+0.61);
(c) 16...g6 17.♕h6 ♖f8 (if 17...a×b5? 18.♗×e5 ♘×e5 19.♕g7) 18.b4 a×b5 19.b×c5 ♕×c5 20.♗d2,



and though material is even, Komodo thinks Black's uncastled king gives the edge to White (+0.88).

After move 15, Lasker made no further comment on the game, so all the following are Komodo's additions.

At White's 18th move,



Komodo dislikes Speijer's 18.♕×b7 (-1.58), preferring to exchange queens with 18.♕×c5 ♘×c5 19.f3, rating White's deficit then at only -0.33, apparently thinking the two passed pawns and bishop pair offer a lot of compensation for Black's extra knight.

At Black's 20th move,



rather than Dus-Chotimirsky's 20...♕c8 (-0.68), Komodo prefers 20...e5! 21.♗e3 (if 21.♗c1 ♘×e4) 21...♕×b2, winning an important pawn (-2.00). And rather than Speijer's reply 21.♕a4, it again prefers 21.♕×c8+ ♖×c8 22.f3 when the passed pawns, supported by the bishop, may offer counterplay (-0.65; computers are nothing if not consistent).

By the time we get to move 30 White was quite lost and further comment is superfluous,



but we will mention (just for fun) that 30.f3?? made a bad situation very much worse; relatively best was 30.♖cc1 (-2.86). And after the further moves 30...♕b6+ 31.♔f1,



Black could have maximized his return not with 31...♕×c7 32.f×e4 ♕×h2 (which was still plenty good enough to win), but with 31...♖e2 32.♕×e2 ♖×e2 33.♔×e2 ♕×c7, and Black is up queen and knight for a rook and two pawns (+7.66).

***Game 136, Lasker-Duras*:** The Czech master (and future GM) Duras played Lasker very tough in this game, and could have drawn but for one tactical error. Lasker annotated the game unusually well, and we offer just a few improvements.

At move 34,



Lasker had to choose between immediately taking the a-pawn, or nabbing the d-pawn after 34.♖×d5 e×d5 35.♘×d5+ ♔d7 36.♘×c7 ♔×c7:





He decided against this latter course because “Black’s King would then have a very favorable position in the center, both for attack on the Queen’s side and defense of the King’s side.” However, Komodo believes that assessment could be changed if (from first diagram) White first interpolates 34.g4! driving the black knight away:



Now after either **(a)** 34...♘h4 35.♖×d5 e×d5 36.♘×d5+ ♔d7 37.♘×c7 ♔×c7 38.f4 (+2.49),



or **(b)** 34...♘d6 35.♖×d5 e×d5 36.♘×d5+ ♔d7 37.♘×c7 ♔×c7 (+1.96),



it is White who has the better king position and the option of moving to either wing.

Lasker’s note at move 40 recommending 40.♘×d5 is quite correct; it was by far the best move and would have clinched the win. But the note can be improved in one line: after 40.♘×d5 e×d5 41.♘e6+ ♔c4 42.♘×g7 d4,



rather than 43.♘f5?!, White should play 43.♘e6! d3 44.♘f4 and the d-pawn must fall (+3.94).

After missing the chance at move 40, Lasker's play is uncharacteristically weak for several moves. At move 42,



42.♖c2+?! further diminished his advantage. Komodo suggests 42.♘c2 ♖b1 43.♘cd4:



This threatens 44.♘×b5 ♔×b5 45.♘c3+, therefore 43...♗c4 44.b3,



and Black is in trouble no matter how he replies, *viz.* **(a)** 44...♗×b3 45.♘c3 ♖e1 46.♘e4+ ♔c4 47.♘×e6 (+1.90), or **(b)** 44...♗×e2 45.♘×e6+ ♔b6 46.♖×e2 ♖×b3 47.♘d4 ♖d3 48.♖×e7 ♖×d4 49.♖×g7 (+2.78), or **(c)** 44...e5 45.b×c4 e×d4 46.c×b5 ♖×b5 47.♘×d4 (+1.86).

***Game 137, Vidmar-Mieses*:** A very well-played game by Mieses, who won mainly by careful positional play rather than his preferred mode of sacrificial attack. We have only one minor comment.

At move 31,



Vidmar's 31.♖f4? was a tactical mistake that allowed Mieses a decisive combination. Better was 31.♖d3, accepting gracefully the loss of the d-pawn with the hope of resisting strongly in the endgame.

***Game 139, Rubinstein-Bernstein*:** A difficult game between the Russian Empire's two best players at that time. Lasker's annotations, mostly neither very good nor bad, are marred by a howler.

At Black's 31st move,



Lasker is very hard on Bernstein's 31...♖g6, saying "Black ... is tired out and judges the situation wrongly ... He ought to play 31...♔g6." Yet this judges the situation far more wrongly, as 31...♔g6?? loses to 32.♖f8:



To counter the threat of 33.♕e8+ ♔h7 34.♖h8#, Black must give up major material, *viz.* 33...♖f5 33.♕e8+ ♔g5 34.♕e7+,



and 34...♔f4 35.♕e5+ ♔×f3 36.♖×f5+ etc., or 34...♔g6 35.♕×h4 ♖×f8 36.♕g4+ (+9.48), or 34...♖f6 35.♕×g7+ and mate in 16 at most.

Going back to move 31, Komodo says best is 31...♕h3, rated about -0.60 after either 32.♕e2 or 32.♕e7+ ♔g6. Black was by no means in a *Zugzwang* situation as Lasker seemed to think.

***Game 140, Mieses-Perlis*:** The future GM from Leipzig is given quite a drubbing by the lawyer from Bialystok. Lasker's notes can be improved at a few points.

The crucial point was move 31.



Lasker makes no comment on Mieses' 31.♕d4??, which was the losing move. Instead with 31.♘×d7 ♕×d7 32.a4 or 32.h3, the game would have been perfectly even, per both Komodo and Stockfish.

After 31.♕d4??, Perlis did not capitalize as quickly as he could have, playing 31...f3, which Lasker praised unduly as "the first shock." Instead, much more shocking and decisive was 31...♕g6!:



This threatens 32...♕×b1+! 33.♖×b1 ♖e1+ and mate next. If 32.♖f1 ♗h3 33.g3 f×g3 34.h×g3 and then simply 34...♗×f1 or any of several moves rated -3.00 or better. Or if 32.g3 f×g3 33.h×g3 ♗g4 34.♘d3 ♖e4 35.♘f4 ♕f5 36.♕d2 ♗f3 37.♖e1 g5 38.♖×e4 ♖×e4,



and White is crushed whether the knight moves or not: 39.♘d3 ♕h3 and mate next, or 39.♕d3 ♖×f4 40.♕×f5 ♖×f5 (-5.30).

After Perlis' 31...f3 White could have put up somewhat stiffer resistance than he did, for example by 32.♖d1,





but after, say, 33...♗f5 34.♕f4 (else 34...♗e4 cuts the queen off) 34...♕h5 35.♕h4 ♕×f4 36.g×h4 ♖e2 (-1.81) it's clear Black will eventually win.

***Game 141, Duras-Vidmar*:** Until Black blundered at move 19, this was a more complex and murky game than Lasker's notes indicate.

Vidmar's 12...0–0 may not be quite the "gross blunder" Lasker thought it was. After 13.a×b5 a×b5 14.♕×b5,



Komodo indicates that instead of 14...♗×f3?, Black could have gotten decent counterplay with14...c5!?, *e.g.* 15.♘bd2 c×d4 16.c×d4 ♕c7 17.♗b1 ♖fb8 18.♕d3 with compensation for the pawn (only +0.35).

Further on, Lasker makes no comment at move 18,



where Komodo thinks White erred with 18.♕b5?!. Better to avoid doubled pawns by 18.♗×g5 h×g5 19.f3 when Black has no compensation for his pawn minus (+1.00). After 18.♕b5?! ♗×e3 19.f×e3,



had Black played 19...♘f6, 19...♗g6, or 19...♕e7, and not the text move blunder 19...♕g5?? nor Lasker's questionable recommendation 19...f6?! (+1.10), both Komodo and Stockfish rate the position almost completely even.

***Game 142, Dus-Chotimirsky–Lasker*:** Soviet GM and historian Alexander Kotov described Russian master Fedor Ivanovich Dus-Chotimirsky (1879-1965) as "a chess fantasist, capable of losing to a beginner, but tomorrow crushing a world champion." That wild inconsistency certainly applied to Dus-Chotimirsky's form at this event, as he beat both co-winners, Lasker and Rubinstein, but scored only +3 -7 =6 against the rest of the field. Reportedly he infuriated Lasker during this game by pretending to be absorbed in a Japanese translation of the German philosopher Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Whatever the reason, Lasker played more like a beginner and Dus-Chotimirsky like a champion here. Lasker's notes, though as usual too sparse, were objectively self-critical. We offer only two improvements.

Lasker might not have lost had he had noticed at opportunity at move 17, where instead of 17...♘d5-f6, he should have played 17...♘d5-b4!:



If now 18.c×b4? ♕×d4+ 19.♔h1 ♕×a1+ (-1.90). Therefore White would have to play 18.♕e2 ♘×d3 19.♕×d3, giving Black the bishop pair, an advantage that proved so important in this game.

At move 35,



White played 35.g3, which while good enough win was only about the sixth-best move. By far the strongest was 35.♗g3!, attacking the pinned knight.



Then 35...♗×h4 as in the game is easily crushed: 36.♕×f4 ♗×g3+ 37.♕×g3 (+6.16). The only alternative is to defend the knight by 35...g5, but then comes 36.♗c2 (threatening mate) 36...f5 37.e×f6 ♖×f6 38.♕h7+ ♔f8 39.♕h8+ ♔f7 (if 39...♔e7 40.d6+ ♔d7 41.♗a4+ and mate shortly) 40.♕×d8 g×h4 41.♕c7+ ♔g8 42.♗×f4



and either 42...♕×f4+ 43.♕×f4 ♖×f4 44.d6 (+7.66), or 42...♖×f4 43.♕h7+ ♔f8 44.d6 and mate in about a dozen.

***Game 143, Cohn-Speijer*:** A game generally annotated well by Lasker, but we must point out a few exceptions.

The note at move 18 is rather a mess, frankly rife with howlers. After 18.f5,



Lasker gives 18...♘e5 (better is 18...♕f6) 19.♕g3 ♕×c4,



after which the note splits into two sub-variations, **(a)** 20.♖×e5 and **(b)** 20.♗h6.

(a) 20.♖×e5 d×e5 21.♗h6



Black should now protect the e-pawn by 21...♕c5+! 22.♔h1, and then stop the mate threat with 22...g6, and after 23.♗×f8 ♖×f8 he has a tangible advantage (-0.91). Instead, Lasker gives 21...g6?!, which gives up the pawn for nothing: 22.♗×f8 ♖×f8 23.♕×e5 (-0.01).

(b) 20.♗h6



Lasker continues 20...♘g6?! (better 20...g6=), when White should play 21.♖b4 ♕×a2 22.f×g6 f×g6 23.♗f4, when he has a bishop for three pawns and Komodo rates the position at +0.30. But Lasker does not consider 21.♖b4, instead leaving the rook hanging and giving two other variations, 21.♗×g7 (which probably loses, and certainly does in the continuation Lasker gives) and 21.f×g6 (which definitely loses, unless Black blunders by playing Lasker's recommendation).

(b1) 21.♗×g7



Best now is 21...♕×b5, which forces the continuation 22.♗f6 (not 22.♗×f8? ♖×f8 23.f×g6 f×g6 24.♖e1 ♕c4 (-2.30), nor certainly 22.f×g6?? ♔×g7 23.g×f7+/g×h7+ ♔h8, -5.10 or more) 22...♕c5+ 23.♗d4 ♕c4 24.♕e3 f6 25.f×g6 h×g6 26.♕h6 ♕f7 27.♖×f6 (if 27.♗×f6? ♕h7 -1.60) 27...♕×f6 28.♗×f6 ♖×f6,



when Black has two easily coordinated rooks for the queen, and much the better pawn structure, with two islands to White's four. His winning prospects are good (-0.86).

Lasker, however, gives the dreadful 21...♔×g7??,



which rather than repulsing White's attack augments it lethally: 22.f6+! ♔h8 23.♖h5 ♖g8



24.♖×h7+!! ♔×h7 25.♕h3+ ♘h4 26.♕×h4+ ♔g6 27.♕g4+ ♔h6 28.♕h3+ ♔g6 29.♖f5



29...♕e2 (The attempt to deflect and defuse the attack by 29...♕c5+ 30.♖×c5 b×c5 fails to 31.♕f5+ ♔h6 32.h4! ♖g6 33.g4 etc.) 30.♕g3+ ♔h6 31.♕h4+ ♔g6 32.♖g5+ ♔×f6 33.♖×g8+ ♔e6 34.♖×a8,



and White is up a rook (+4.19).

(b2) The errors really pile up in the other variation Lasker gives in the 20.♗h6 ♘g6 line, that being 21.f×g6??:



This is simply a blunder which loses to 21...f×g6! (threatening mate at f1) 22.♖×f8+ ♖×f8





Again threatening mate, and forcing White into either 23.♖b1 ♕×a2 24.♖e1 g×h6 (-3.33), or 23.♖f5 g×h6 24.♖×f8+ ♔×f8 (-2.78).

But Lasker doesn't have Black playing 21...f×g6!; instead he gives 21...g×h6??,



which loses ingloriously to 22.g×f7+ ♔h8 23.♖bf5 ♕×e4 24.♕f2 (+4.91).

The note at move 20 can be improved. It is correct to recommend 20...f5!, but after 21.♕h3 h6 22.♗d2,



while Lasker's 22...f×e4 is, as he says, "without danger," much better is 22...♕×c4 23.♖×f5 ♖×f5 24.♕×f5 ♕×a2,



when Black is not only not in danger, but a pawn up as well (-1.48).

It goes unmentioned that at move 24,





White could have forced a draw with 24.♖×h7 ♔×h7 25.♕h5+ ♔g8 (not 25...♔g7?? 26.♗h6+) 26.♕g6+ etc.

At move 29,



one wonders why Black did not play 29...♘×d4 30.c×d4 ♕×a2 safely winning a pawn (-1.33), and why Lasker did not mention it.

***Game 145, Schlechter-Salwe*:** This game won the first brilliancy prize, but (alas!) had Salwe played correctly, Schlechter's brilliancy would have arrived stillborn.

Of Schlechter's 22.d×e5,



Lasker says "An elegant sacrifice, which is advantageous for White whether accepted or refused." Not so if the sacrifice is accepted in the correct way, which neither the players nor Lasker considered: 22...♘×e4!. This makes the whole combination stumble right out of the gate.



Giving up the knight this way, rather than by Salwe's 22...♖×a6? 23.e×f6 g×f6, avoids the ruination of Black's kingside pawn structure, which later made Schlechter's attack so effective. White is now busted whatever he tries:
(a) 23.♗×e4 ♖×a6 24.e×d6 ♖×d6 and Black is simply up the exchange (-1.98);
(b) 23.♖×a8 ♘×d2 24.♖×f8+ ♔×f8 25.♘×d2 (not 25.e×d6?? ♘×f3+) 25...d×e5 and Black is up queen and pawn for rook and bishop (-2.96);

(c) 23.e×d6?? ♘×d2 24.d×c7 ♘×f3+ 25.g×f3 ♖×a6 and Black is up a rook (-5.64);
(d) 23.♕d3 ♖×a6 24.♕×e4 ♘g6 25.e×d6 ♕×d6 26.♘h4 ♕f4 and White's attack is stopped,



viz. 27.♘×g6 f×g6 28.♕×f4 (not 28.♕×g6?? ♕×f2+ and mate quickly) 28...♖×f4 29.♗×g6 ♖a2 (-1.74). In this line also good is 26...♗c8, adding the rook to the defense of the ♘g6 (-1.71).

***Game 146, Forgács-Spielmann*:** While we are not really concerned with opening theory in this work, an early remark by Lasker cries out for comment.

At Black's eighth move,



Lasker dislikes Spielmann's choice 8...g×h4 (though it was standard theory at the time), saying "It would be simpler to play the pressing. 8...♖×g7 first. If then 9.♕h5 Black develops by 9...♘c6."



Looking through our collection of opening encyclopedias (which go back to 1843) we found no mention of this continuation. A search for this position through ChessBase 14's nearly seven million games found no matches. And just as well, as Lasker's recommendation of 9...♘c6?? would be disastrous for Black: 10.♕h8+ ♗f8 11.h5 ♗d7 12.h6 ♖g6 13.♗d3 f5 14.♕h7 ♕f6 15.♕×g6+ ♕×g6 16.h7



and now either 16...0–0–0 17.h8♕ (+1.68), or 16...♗g7 17.h8♕+ ♗×h8 18.♖×h8+ ♔e7 19.♖×a8 (+1.65). One wonders if Lasker was salting his analysis in hopes of catching a MacCutcheon-playing rabbit some day.

***Game 148, Bernstein-Burn*:** The hitherto uninspired Burn is on fire in this game, though he makes more mistakes, and gets more help from his opponent's errors, than Lasker realized. As usual, Lasker is superficial, seemingly even oblivious when analyzing tactical complications, and so he misses all the following possibilities.

At move 17, where the no longer lethargic Burn essayed the ambitious 17...♘g4+,



Bernstein would have been better off not accepting the sacrifice. Komodo finds no advantage for Black after 18.♔g1.

In turn, after the sacrifice was accepted by 18.h×g4?,



Burn should have not played the immediate 18...♕h4+. Better was 18...f×g4 19.♗e4,



and only then 19...♕h4+ 20.♔g1 ♘g3, when Black is rolling (-1.36). The reason this move order matters is seen at White's move 20 in the game,





where instead of 20.♗e4? White could and should have played the *Zwischenzug* 20.♘g2!?, gaining a tempo by the attack on the queen.



If now 20...♕g3?! 21.♗e4 ♗d6 22.♘e2 ♕h3 23.♘gf4 ♕h4 and Black is in retreat (+0.71). Best is 20...♕h3 21.♘f4 ♘×f4 22.♗×f4 g×f3 23.♕×f3 ♕×f3 24.♖×f3, and though White is down a pawn he can still make a fight of it (-0.62), which is not the case after 20.♗e4? (-1.69).

Burn nearly blew it at move 23, by playing 23...♕h1-h5?!. Instead he could have stayed on the winning track with 23...♕h3!.



The threat then is 24...g3+. If now:
(a) 24.♘f4 g3+ 25.♔e1 g2 26.♕×g2 ♕×g2 27.♘×g2 ♗f5 28.♗f4 ♖ee8, and Black will win the ♗e4 and be up rook and pawn for knight (-2.90);
(b) 24.♗f4 ♖×e4! 25.♘×e4 ♕f3+ 26.♔g1 ♕×e4 (-1.63);
(c) 24.♕d3 ♗f5 25.♕×h3 g×h3 26.♗f3 (or 26.♘f4 ♗×e4 -3.74) 26...h×g2 (-2.36).

The flaw in 23...♕h5?! would have been apparent had White played not 24.♘f4? but 24.♗f4!:



If then 24...♗d7 25.♗×e5 ♕×e5 26.♕d3 (+0.49), or 24...♖e7 25.♕h1 ♕h3 (not 25...♕f7?? 26.♕×h7#, or 25...♕e8?? 26.♗×h7+ and mate shortly) 26.♖e1 (also +0.49). In either case White is out of danger, with prospects of making his active minor pieces count before Black's extra pawns do. And it's certainly better than what he got out of 24.♘f4? (-1.84).

***Game 149, Spielmann-Rubinstein*:** Lasker handles some considerable tactical complications in parts of this game much better than in other games, and we offer only some minor improvements.

The note at move 34 is correct to recommend 34.♗×f7+!,



and its analysis of lines where the bishop is captured is accurate. However, it bears mentioning that Black's best course is not to take the bishop: 34...♔h8 35.♗×g6 h×g6 36.♖g2 ♖b×b2 37.♕×d6 c×d6 38.♖cg5,



reaching a double-rook endgame where White's advantage is not great (+0.66 per Komodo, +0.73 per Stockfish).

The note at move 52 can be improved. After 52.♖e3,



better than Lasker's 52...♖b7 is 52...♖×e3!, *viz.* 53.f×e3 (if 53.♔×e3 ♔b3) 53...f5 54.♔c2 g6! (a nice waiting move),



and either 55.a4 ♔b4−+, or 55.♔d2 ♔b3−+, or 55.♔b2 g4−+.

***Game 150, Salwe-Forgács*:** Another case of analytical failures by Lasker with tactical complications.

At move 21, rather than 21.♗c2×e4 as in the game, White might have tried 21.♗c2-b3+,



and after the forced continuation 21...♔h8 22.f3 ♗b7 23.♕×e7 ♗×e7 24.♗×g7+ ♔×g7 25.♖d7 ♖fe8 26.♖×b7 he is up a pawn (+1.39), though the bishops of opposite color might make a win problematic.

At move 26,



Salwe's 26.♖e6? does not deserve the lavish praise Lasker gives it ("an elegant move, which decides the game at once"). Correct instead was 26.♖c8! h6 27.g3 ♔h7 28.♖×e8 ♕×e8 29.♖e1 and White wins the e-pawn (+1.46).

The inelegance and ineffectiveness of 26.♖e6? would have been apparent if, instead of 26...♕×h2+??, Black had simply played 26...♖×e6! 27.♕×e6 h6!,



and after either 28.♕×e5 ♗×e5, or 28.♕c8+ ♔h7 29.g3 ♗a7 30.♗×a7 ♖×a7, White's advantage is negligible (+0.23). And of course not 28.♖d8+ ♔h7 29.♕×f7?? ♕a1+ and mate next. It is hard to understand how Lasker missed this simple answer to Black's problems.

***Game 151, Tartakower-Schlechter*:** More of the tactical oversights we have come to expect.

It should have been mentioned that 12...c7-c5? was a noteworthy mistake that effectively decided the game. Instead Black should have played 12...♗c8-e6,



and after 13.♘×d6 ♕×d6 14.♘e5 ♘bd7 15.♗f4 ♕b6 he stands somewhat worse (+0.60) but not nearly so bad as in the game.

In the note at move 13, Lasker is correct that Black could not play 13...♗e6,



but his supporting analysis is wrong. After 14.♘×d6 ♕×d6, Lasker gives 15.♗×h6?!,



on the grounds that it "would have broken up [Black's] king's wing." But then comes 15...c×d4 16.♗f4 ♕b6 17.c4 ♘c6 and White has nothing (+0.10)

Far stronger than 15.♗×h6?! is 15.♖×f6!,



forcing 15...g×f6 16.♕h5,





when we have various possibilities, all winning for White:
(a) 16...f×e5?? 17.♗×h6 ♕e7 18.♗g5 (+7.61);
(b) 16...c×d4 17.♘g4 ♔f8 18.♘×f6 ♔e7 19.♘e4 ♕b6 20.♕h4+ ♔d7 21.♘f6+ ♔c8 22.♘×e8 (+3.68)
(c) 16...♔f8 17.♗c4,



and:
(c1) 17...♗×c4 18.♗×h6+ ♔e7 19.♘×c4 ♕e6 20.♕×c5+ ♔d8 21.d5 ♕e7 22.♘d6 ♘a6 23.♕a3 (+4.49);
(c2) 17...♔e7 18.♘×f7 ♗×f7 19.♗×f7



19...♘c6 (if 19...♖h8 20.♗×h6 c×d4 21.♖e1+ ♔d7 22.♖e6 +8.65) 20.♗×e8 ♖×e8 21.d×c5 ♕e5 22.♕×e5+ ♘×e5 23.♗×h6,



and White is obviously winning (+2.66).

***Game 154, Vidmar–Dus-Chotimirsky*:** Only a few comments on the note at Black's 23rd move.

Lasker believes that rather than 23...♘d7-f6, Black should have played 23...♕e7-f6:



Komodo sees no particular virtue in that move, and thinks White should defend his f-pawn with 24.♗e3 or the trappy 24.♖f1. The note continues 24.♕g4 ♕h6,



and now, presumably for illustrative purposes, Lasker deliberately gives a move he knows is bad, 25.♕h4?, which he duly punishes by 25...♕×h4 26.♗×h4 ♘×e5 27.♗×d8 ♘×c4 "and wins."

Yet 24...♕h6?! is itself bad, and can be punished by 25.♘×d7! ♖×d7 and now White can play the long-desired 26.d5!,



since if 26...e×d5?? 27.♕×d7+−, or 26...♗×f2+ 27.♔×f2 ♗×d5 28.♗×d5 ♖×c1 29.♖×c1 ♖×d5?? 30.♖c8+ and mate next. Relatively best is 26...♗×f2+ 27.♔×f2 ♖cd8 28.d×e6 ♖×d1 29.♖×d1 ♖×d1 30.e×f7+ ♔f8 31.♕×d1 ♕×f4+ 32.♔g1, with advantage for White (+0.93).

Going back to the position after 23...♕f6,



Komodo found a rather interesting line in a variation Lasker did not discuss, 24.♖f1!?. If now 24...♕×f4,



we have an intriguing forced continuation: 25.♗e3 ♕×e3+ (not 25...♕h4?? 26.♖f4 ♕g5 27.♘×f7 +3.29) 26.♕×e3 ♘×e5 27.♖f4 (if 27.♕×e5?? ♗×d4+) 27...♘×c4 28.b×c4,



and though White is up ♕-vs-♗+♗+♟, Komodo rates the position as virtually even, +0.28.

***Game 155, Perlis-Duras*:** A game that, despite its length, never really gets up any steam. Lasker's notes are generally good, especially in the strategic sense, though we do question one of them.

At move 39, Lasker says Black "could accomplish the draw by 39...♔d6."



But that is quite uncertain, perhaps even dubious, if White then plays 40.♗e2:



If now 40...♖g8? 41.♘×e4+ f×e4 42.♗×h5 and Black has simply lost an important pawn (+1.58), and if 40...♗f7?? 41.♘×f5+ is devastating. Therefore Black must let his most powerful piece be tied down to guard duty while White is free to make progress, *e.g.* 40...♖h8 41.a4 ♖h7 42.b4 ♗d7 43.b5 ♗e6 44.♘×e4+ f×e4 45.♖c6+ ♔e7 46.f5 ♗f7 47.♖c8 ♗d6 48.♖a8 etc. (+1.78).

***Game 156, Burn-Mieses*:** For the second game in a row, Burn shows some initiative and ambition, only to lose on a terrible miscalculation.

The situation at move 15 is quite complicated, but despite this (or perhaps because of it?) Lasker makes no comment. Komodo finds that White went wrong with 15.♘c3-e4? and instead should have played 15.♗e4:



Black then has three playable replies that maintain equality:
(a) 15...♘c4 16.♗×b7 ♗×c3 17.♗c6+ ♔f8 18.♗×a8 ♕×a8 19.♘e5 ♗×a1 20.♖×a1=;
(b) 15...♗×c3 16.♗×b7 ♘c4 17.a4 ♗×a1 18.♖×a1 ♖b8 19.♗×a6 0–0 20.a×b5 ♕d5=;
(c) 15...♗×e4 16.♘×e4 ♘c4 17.♘e5 ♗e7 18.♗×f6 ♗×f6 19.♘×c4 b×c4 20.♕×c4 0–0,



and now not **(c1)** 20...♗×d4?? 21.♖ad1 e5 22.♘d6+ ♕×d6 23.♖×d4 ♕b6 24.♖×e5+ (+6.43); nor **(c2)** 20...♕×d4?? 21.♘×f6+ ♕×f6 22.♕c6+ ♔e7 23.♕b7+ ♔f8 (if 23...♔d6 24.♖ad1+ ♔c5 25.♖e4 a5 26.♕c7+ ♔b5 27.a4+ ♔a6 28.♖d6#) 24.♕×a8+ etc.; but simply **(c3)** 21.♖ed1=.

Mieses could have retained the advantage 15.♘e4? allowed him if, after 15...♗×e1 16.♖×e1, he had played not 16...♘b2-c4 but 16...♖c8!:



Komodo then sees best play for both sides proceeding with 17.♘e5 ♗×e4 (not so good is 17...♖×c2?! 18.♕×c2 ♗×e4 19.♖×e4, or 17...♗d5 18.♕f3 ♗×e4 19.♗×e4 0–0) 18.♗×e4 ♕×d4 19.♗c6+ ♔e7 20.♗b7 ♖c7 21.♘c6+ ♖×c6 22.♗×c6 ♘d3 23.♖d1 ♖d8



24.♗f3 (not 24.♗e4?? ♘f4! −+) 24...h6 25.♗e3 ♕c4, and Black will soon advance e6-e5-e4, defending and eventually unpinning the ♘d3, after which he should win with his two extra pawns.

In the note at move 20, Lasker is quite correct that White had to play 20.♕h5+ instead of the losing 20.♕×e6+??. In one of the note's three variations, 20.♕h5+ ♔g8 21.♗h6,



he said "White's position would be good enough to play to win." At first Komodo was dubious, saying that 21...♕e7 would hold the draw, but after a while it came up with 22.♗d1!?,



which threatens 23.♕h3 ♔f7 24.♗h5+ and wins. More or less forced therefore is 23...f5 23.♕×f5! e×f5 24.♖×e7 ♖c6



25.♖e8+ (not 25.♖g7+? ♔f8 26.♖×b7+ ♖×h6) 25...♔f7 26.♗h5+ ♔f6 27.♖×h8 ♖c7,



and with an extra pawn, plus the bishop pair in an open position with pawns on both flanks, White has a definite advantage (+1.59). So in this case Lasker is vindicated!

***Game 157, Freiman-Bernstein*:** As before, Lasker leaves long stretches of this game unannotated, and again important things are overlooked.

No comment is made on moves 42 to 101. Yet at several early points in that long expanse of silence, there was something worth shouting about. At move 44,



Black played 44...♗c6?!, a wasted move in an opposite-color bishop ending where a tempo or two can be critical. Yet Black could have won, with 44...♔f5!:



It did not take long for both Komodo's and Stockfish's evaluations to start skyrocketing. Some illustrative variations:
(a) 45.♗×e7 ♔g4 46.♗b4 ♔×h4 47.e6 ♔×g5 48.♔e5 f3 (-14.58 per Stockfish). The white e-pawn is no threat because Black can place his bishop on the a4-e8 diagonal, while White cannot stop the black pawns;
(b) 45.e6 (hoping to delay the black king's advance to the kingside pawns) 45...♔×e6 46.♔d3 ♔f5 47.♗×e7 ♔g4 48.♔e2 ♔×h4 49.♗f6 ♔g3 50.♗e5 ♔g4 51.♗f6 ♔h5 52.♗e7 h6 53.g×h6 ♔×h6−+;
(c) 45.♔d3 e6 46.♗d6 ♔g4 47.♔e2 ♔×h4 48.♔f2 ♔×g5−+;
(d) 45.♗e1 (to prevent an eventual ...♔×h4) 45...e6 46.♗f2 ♔g4 47.♔d3 ♔f3 48.♗e1 ♔g2 49.♔e2 ♗a6+ 50.♔d2



50...♔f1 *Zugzwang*! (not 50...f3? 51.♔e3 ♗e2 52.♗f2=) 51.h5 g×h5 and mate in about 24 per Stockfish.

A position very similar to that after move 45 of variation (a) actually occurred in the game, after move 46. It is interesting to compare them. First, from variation (a) after Black's 45th move:



Then, from the actual game after Black's 46th move:



The only differences are the positions of the white king and the black bishop, due to the tempo Black wasted with 44...♗c6?!. Given the game's result, one might think that was enough to change a black win to a draw. But was it?

In fact, even after the wasted move, Bernstein still could have won! From the above diagram, Freiman continued 47.♔e2 (as good as any other move), and Bernstein replied 47...♔g3?!, another wasted move. It is hard to understand why he did not play the natural 47...♔×h4!:



after which the main line runs 48.♔f2 ♔h5 49.♗d8 h6 50.g×h6 ♔×h6 51.e6 g5 52.e7 g4,



and Stockfish says Black mates in no more than 26 moves.

In fact, Black could have won by playing ...♔×h4 not only at move 47, but also at moves 48 and 49! It was only after then, when Bernstein had played 49...f3?,



that the game was irrevocably drawn. By the time he finally got around to capturing the h-pawn, at move 50, White was able to reply 51.♗c5-e3!,



and the tactic of ♔h4-h5 and h7-h6 was no longer available to Black.

***Game 158, Duras-Burn*:** Burn goes down in flames quickly. Only two small improvements need be noted.

The note at move 16, discussing the variation 16...♖a5 17.♘d5 ♗×b2,



then gives 18.♗×h7+, when "the Rook would remain in a miserable plight." Yes, it would, but why be satisfied with such a small advantage (+1.49)? Far better is 18.♖b1!,



and:
(a) 18...♖×a2 19.♗b3 (+3.60);
(b) 18...♗f6 19.♕h5 h6 20.♘×f6+ ♕×f6 21.♕×a5 (+5.56);
(c) 18...♗e5 19.f4 ♗f6 20.♕h5 ♔f8 21.♕×h7 ♘d4 22.♗g6 ♗e6 23.♕h8+ ♗g8 24.♖fe1 ♘c6 25.♗h7 ♔f7 26.♖×b7 ♗×h7 27.♕×h7 ♖c8 28.♗b6 ♖×d5 29.c×d5 ♘e7 30.♗a5 (+5.13).

At move 24, White played 24.♕e7, which was quite good enough to win (+2.83). Best though was 24.♕e8! (threatening 25.♘e7+),



and 24...♗f6 25.f5 g5 26.♖be1 c6 27.♖e7 (+7.08).

***Game 159, Dus-Chotimirsky–Perlis*:** A very complicated game in which both players repeatedly lost their way. So too, unsurprisingly, did the annotator, so our critique must needs be rather lengthy.

In the note at move 19, after 19...f5 20.♕d5+ ♗e6 21.♕×b7 e4,



Lasker gives 22.♘e5, apparently unaware that this allows Black to force a draw by 22...♖ab8 23.♕c6 ♖fc8 24.♕a6 ♖a8 25.♕b7 ♖ab8 etc. Correct instead is 22.♗e5!,



which wins in all variations, for example:
(a) 22...♗d8?? 23.♕×a8;
(b) 22...♗d6 23.♕×e7 ♗×e7 24.♘d4 ♗d5 25.♖fd1 (+4.33);
(c) 22...♖c8 23.♘d4 (+4.71);
(d) 22...e×f3 23.♕×c7 ♕g5 (if 23...♕×c7 24.♗×c7 and the passed pawns will soon roll +4.28) 24.g3 ♖ac8 25.♕d6 (+3.32).

Black's downward slide began unnoticed at move 20,





where he played 20...♖d8?, which quickly took the evaluation into losing territory (about +2.25) Better was either 20...♕f7 or 20...♖e8, both about +0.65.

The flaw in 20...♖d8 would have been revealed if, instead of 21.♖fd1, White had played 21.b6!:



It is surprising how strong this move is. After the forced 23...♗b8 and 22.♖fd1,



Black has only unpleasant choices:
(a) 22...♖×d1+ 23.♖×d1 (threatening 24.c6) 23...♗e6 24.♘h4 ♔h8 (if 24...g6 25.♘×g6 h×g6 26.♕×g6+ ♔f8 27.♗a3 +15.51) 25.♘f5



25...♗×f5 (or 25...♕f7 26.♖d8+) 26.♕×b7! (+9.17);
(b) 22...g6 23.♗a3 ♖×d1+ 24.♖×d1 ♕e8 25.♕d5+ ♔g7 26.c6



26...b×c6 (if 26...♕×c6?? 27.♕d8 with the deadly threat of 28.♕f8#) 27.b7 ♗×b7 28.♕d7+ ♕×d7 29.♖×d7+ ♔g8 30.♖×b7 (+3.77);
(c) 22...♖e8 23.c6 b×c6 24.♕×c6 ♗b7 25.♕c4+ and:



(c1) 25...♕e6 26.♖d7! ♕×c4 27.♖×c4 ♗a6 (if 27...♗c8 28.♖×c8 ♖×c8 29.b7) 28.♖c1 ♖e6 29.b7 ♗×b7 30.♖×b7 and White is up a piece (+2.62);
(c2) 25...♔h8 26.♘h4 g6 27.♗a3! ♕×a3 28.♖d7 ♗e4 29.♖f1,



removing the rook from attack by the black queen, and Black is helpless against the dual threats of 30.♕f7 and 30.♕×e4 (+4.18);
(d) 22...♔h8 23.c6 ♗d6 (if 23...b×c6?? 24.♖×d8+ ♕×d8 25.♕×c6 and the rook is lost +6.56) 24.c7 ♖e8 25.♘d2 intending 26.♘c4,



and Black is just being crushed positionally (+2.64).

Lasker's note at move 24 is correct that White could have won with 24.♘×e5!, but after 24...f×e5,



while Lasker's natural 25.♕×e5 is not at all bad (+1.96 after 25...♗g4), best is 25.h3!,



when ♗c8-g4 is prevented and the threat of 26.♕d5+ ♗e6 27.♕×e5 forces either 25...♗×h3 26.g×h3 (+4.03), or 25...♗×b6 26.c×b6 (+3.71).

The note at move 25 contains what seems to be a howler. After 25.♘×e5 f×e5 26.♕×e5 ♗b3



Lasker's 27.♖×d8+?? loses horribly to 27...♖×d8 and the threat of back-rank mate forces White to lose his queen, 28.h3 ♕×e5−+ . Perhaps Lasker gave this bad move intentionally for instructive purposes, but it bears mentioning that 25.♘×e5 was not all that bad, as long as White avoids 27.♖×d8+?? in favor of 27.♖d3!?:



A sampling of possibilities:
(a) 27...♕×e5 28.♗×e5 ♖c8 29.♖×b3 ♖×c5 30.f4=;
(b) 27...♖c8 28.♕×e7 ♗×e7 29.♖×b3 ♖×c5 30.♔f1 (+0.66);
(c) 27...♗×a4?! 28.♕c3 ♖c8 29.h4 ♕f7 (else 30.♕c4+, and *not* 29...♕×h4?? 30.♕×g7#) 30.♖g3 ♗f6 31.♕×f6 ♕×f6 32.♗×f6 g6 33.♖a3 ♗b5 34.♖×a5 ♖×c5 +0.90;
(d) 27...♗c2 28.♕d5+ ♔h8 29.♖e3 ♕f8 30.♗e5!? ♗g5 (if 30...♖c8?? 31.♕×b7) 31.♗×b8 ♗×e3 32.f×e3 ♕×b8 33.c6 b×c6 34.♕×c6 ♗f5 35.b7 h6,



and despite Black's extra bishop Komodo rates this at +0.89 at 23 ply.

However, all this is pretty much academic, because the best 25th move for White went unmentioned by Lasker, to wit, 25.♘d4!:



Forced now is 25...♗f7 26.♘f5 ♕f8,



when White has a definite positional advantage (about +1.30) but no material edge as yet.

It appears that at move 27, White had a stronger move than 27.♘d4-f5 that went unnoticed, 27.♘d4-b3!:



This seems less aggressive than the text but is actually more effective. The threat is 28.♕d3, winning a bishop and more. Also the knight attacks the a-pawn. The main illustrative variations:
(a) 27...♕×b3? 28.♖×d7 ♕×b2?? 29.♕d5+ and mate quickly;
(b) 27...♗e8 28.♘×a5 ♗e7 29.♘×b7! ♗×d6 30.♘×d6 ♕b3 31.♗×e5 f×e5 32.a5



and the pawns are on the march (+3.65);

(c) 27...♗c6 28.♖×c6! and:



(c1) 28...b×c6 29.♘×a5 ♗×b6 (relatively best) 30.♘×c6 ♖b7 31.c×b6 ♖×b6 32.♗a3 (+2.43);
(c2) 28...♕×b3 29.♗×e5! f×e5 30.♕×e5 ♕d1+ 31.♔h2 ♕d7 32.♖d6 ♗c7 33.♕d5+ ♔h8 34.b×c7 ♕×c7 35.f4 (+2.25).

It was a tragedy for Dus-Chotimirsky that he missed the above opportunities, but his biggest missed chance was at move 29.



Lasker is correct to fault his 29.♕d3?!, which, though it did not lose, greatly reduced his advantage. Lasker's recommendation 29.♖d7 was quite good, but even stronger (and more dramatic) was 29.♗×e5!:



And now:
(a) 29...f×e5?? 30.♕×e5 ♕f7 31.♖e6 h6 and White has the happy choice between **(a1)** 32.♖e8+ ♔h7 33.♕e4+ ♕g6 34.♖h8+ etc. (+8.93), or **(a2)** 32.♕×b8 ♕×e6 33.♕×d8+ ♔h7 34.♕c7 ♕e4 35.c6 (+21.03);
(b) 29...g6 30.♖×d8+ ♖×d8 31.♕×f6 ♖d7 32.♕h8+ ♔f7 33.c6 b×c6 34.♕×h7+ ♔e6 (if 34...♔e8 35.♕×g6+ ♕f7 36.♕×c6 +9.54) 35.♕g8+ ♖f7 36.♗c7 (+7.11);
(c) 29...♗e7 (probably the least of evils) 30.♖d7 ♖e8 31.♗g3 (+6.99).

Lasker seems to think the game was decided when White played 40.♗d2?, and so stopped annotating. While that move was a mistake, it was not properly capitalized on, and so, as we have seen so often, the outcome of the game was actually determined later, among the moves he ignored. In particular, a series of mistakes occurred in moves 40-43, where Dus-Chotimirsky and

Perlis did the chess equivalent of an Alphonse and Gaston routine. “After you, Fedor Ivanovich.” “No, you first, my dear Julius!”

After 40.♗c3-d2?, Black should have immediately played not 40...g7-g5 (as he did) but 40...♖a8-d8!,



threatening not only to take the bishop but also 41...♖d4+ if permitted, and perhaps more importantly, creating a *cordon sanitaire* across which the white king cannot pass. There are then three main variations:

(a) The black a-pawn is unimportant: 41.♗×a5 ♖d4+ 42.♔b3 f4 43.♔a3 ♖d1 44.♖b4 ♗d4 45.♖c4 ♔d5 46.♖c2 ♗×c5+ etc. (-3.46);
(b) 41.♗c3 ♗×c3 42.♔×c3 f4 43.♖b1 ♖d3+ 44.♔c4 (if 44.♔b2 ♖d2+) 44...♖a3,



and White will not be able to cope with pawn advances on both wings;
(c) 41.♗e3 g5 42.g3 h6 43.♔b3 ♗e5 44.♔c2 f4 45.g×f4 g×f4 46.♗d2 f3!



and:
(c1) 47.♗×h6?? ♗d4 48.♗e3 ♗×e3 49.f×e3 ♖d3 50.♖b1 ♖×e3 (-11.51);
(c2) 47.♗e3 ♗d4 48.♖b3 ♗×e3 49.♖×e3 ♖d4 50.♖a3 ♔×c5 etc. (-5.45).

After 40...g5?!,





White should have capitalized on the mercy thus granted him by playing 41.♖×a5, 41.♖b1, or 41.♗c3, any of which would have kept his drawing chances alive. Instead he played 41.g3?, on which Black again could have pounced with 41...♖d8!:



and:
(a) 42.♗c1 ♖d3 43.♗b2 (not 43.♖b3?? ♖d4+ 44.♔c3 ♖×a4+ 45.♔c2 ♖a2+ 46.♔d1 ♖×f2 -7.10) 43...♗×b2 ♖×b2 44.♖a3 etc. as in line (a) above;
(b) 42.♗c3 ♗×c3 43.♔×c3 f4 44.g×f4 g×f4



45.♖b1 (if 45.♖b3 ♖d3+ 46.♔c2 ♖×b3 47.♔×b3 e3 48.f×e3 f3−+) 45...♖d3+ 46.♔c4 ♖a3 etc.;
(c) 42.♗e3 h6 43.♖×a5 ♗e5 44.♖a7 f4 45.g×f4 g×f4 46.♗c1 ♖d4+ 47.♔b3 ♖d3+



48.♔b4 (or 48.♔c2 ♖f3 49.♔d1 ♖×f2 etc. -3.47) 48...♖d1 49.♗a3 e3−+.

But Dus-Chotimirsky got let off the hook again, by 41...h6?!,



to which he could have replied 42.♗c3 ♗×c3 43.♔×c3 ♖d8 44.♖×a5 and Black's advantage is negligible. (-0.59). But instead he put himself right back on the hook with 42.♗e3?, yet the thrice-merciful Perlis, instead of winning with (you guessed it!) 42...♖d8! again, let him off once more with 42...♗e5?!:



This would have allowed White again to draw the game with 43.♗d4! ♗×d4 44.♔×d4 ♖d8+ 45.♔e3 ♖d3+ 46.♔e2 f4 47.g×f4 g×f4 48.h4 and Black won't get anywhere (-0.30). But Dus-Chotimirsky, not even noticing this gift horse at all, let alone looking in its mouth, played 43.g4?,



and this time Perlis did not show mercy but played 43...f4!, giving himself a winning advantage (-3.55). Seldom, if ever, have we seen such a series of consecutive mistakes by both players in high-level tournament play.

Yet that *still* did not decide the outcome. Perlis maintained his advantage and was moving toward victory when at move 53 he faced an important decision.



Black has four ways to get out of check, but one is better than the other three: 53...♔×b6!, when a likely continuation is 54.♖e6+ ♔c5 55.♖×h6 ♖a3+ 56.♔c2 a4 57.h4 g×h4 58.g5 ♖g3 59.g6 b5 and wins (-23.81 per Stockfish at 27 ply).

The move actually played, 53...♔d6, was not as strong but might still be good enough to win if Black is careful. This of course he was not. After 54.♖f5,



54...♔c6 was necessary to keep a winning edge, but Perlis played 54...♔e6?!. He then proceeded to fritter away what advantage he had, until after move 61 it no longer existed.



Here White has several moves that keep the draw in hand, the best being 62.♔d3 or 62.♖h1 (both -0.08 per Stockfish at 41 ply). Also 62.♖h2 (-0.68) or 62.♔e4 (-1.37) might have served. But Dus-Chotimirsky played 62.♖h5??, and this time the goddess Caïssa decided the quality of mercy had been strained enough. Perhaps Perlis might yet again have found a way not to win, but after 62...♔b6 Dus-Chotimirsky greatly compounded his error with 63.g5?? (-13.23), and the comedy of errors was soon over (0-1, 69). What can we say, chess is a hard game.

One wonders if Rubinstein played over this game, and if so what he thought. His great endgame skill became known to the wider world in this event, and his best endings usually featured rooks and/or bishops, as here. Had he played either side, the issue would probably have been decided much sooner.

***Game 161, Teichmann-Speijer*:** A game needlessly drawn out due to a poor strategic decision by the phlegmatic Teichmann, finally won on a late blunder by Speijer. The notes contain many more blunders by Lasker, some of his worst.

The note at move 26 is a monstrosity. Just as Game 159 saw a series of consecutive errors by both players, so Lasker here makes error after error, including three howlers, in the space of a five-move comment. We will take them one by one. After 26.g6 f×g6 27.h×g6,



Black need not play 27...h6?!; best is 27...♗×f5 28.♘×f5 h×g6 29.♘g3 ♗f6 30.♗e3 and Black is fine (-0.35).

Then after 27...h6,



Lasker's 28.♗×h6?! is not really effective, and White is better off with 28.♕h2.

But in the event of 28.♗×h6,



Black must not play Lasker's 28...e×d4??; necessary instead is 28...♗×h4!,



with then two variations:
(a) 29.♘×h4 g×h6 30.f4 d×e4 31.d×e5 and White has compensation for the sacrificed piece (+0.35);
(b) 29.♘×g7!? ♔×g7 (forced, for if 29...♖e7 30.♘h5 +4.14) 30.♗×g7 ♔×g7,



when we have an unusual material imbalance of ♕+♙+♙-vs-♗+♞+♞, and a rather unclear position (+0.31).

The problem with 28...e×d4?? appears if White avoids the knee-jerk recapture 29.c×d4?!, and plays 29.♘×g7!:



Forced then is 29...♗×h4 30.♘×e8 ♖×e8 31.e5:



Now if 31...♕×e5?? 32.g7 ♘fd7 33.♗h7+! ♔f7 (or 33...♔×h7 34.♕g6+ ♔g8 35.♕×e8+ etc.) 34.♖ae1 ♕f6 35.g8♕+ (+13.73). So the best Black can do is 31...♘fd7 32.c×d4 ♘c4 33.♕h2,



when if 33...♗e7?? 34.g7! etc. as in the previous variation. So Black might as well resign, since the best Komodo says he can do is 33...♘c×e5 (+6.54).

Returning to the note line, if White is so unobservant as to play 29.c×d4?!,



then as at move 28 Black must reply 29...♗×h4, and after 30.♘×h4 d×e4 31.♗×e4 ♕d8 32.♗g5 ♕×d4 he is not all that bad off (+0.31).

However, if Black does play the note move 29...d×e4??,





he is soon very bad off, *viz.* 30.♗×g7! ♗×h4 31.♗e5



and now forced is 31...♕×e5 (if 31...♕d8?? 32.♘h6#) 32.d×e5 ♗×f5 33.♗×e4 (+4.40).

But Lasker, in his inattentive mercy, has White playing 30.♗×e4?!,



which again lets Black off the hook by (you guessed it!) 30...♗×h4.

But Lasker then caps off this cavalcade of miscalculation by having Black play 30...♗d5??,



and commenting "though White would have gained a pawn his position would be insecure and his attack would have been beaten off."

Has a World Champion ever made a more mistaken misevaluation of a position? Far from White being insecure and beaten off, after 31.♗×d5+ ♘×d5 32.♗×g7 ♗×h4 33.♗e5 ♖×e5 34.g7 ♖×f5 35.g×f8♕+ ♔×f8 36.♕g8+ ♔e7 37.♖ae1+,



it is Black who has been beaten like a rug, an egg, a drum, a rented mule, or whatever simile you prefer (+12.47). Throughout this note Lasker just seems to have made pawn captures and recaptures automatically, reflexively, never considering that they were not at all forced and better moves existed.

The note at move 30 is probably correct to fault Teichmann's settling for the mere win of the exchange, but Lasker's alternative line can be improved. After 30.b3,



relatively best is 30...♘c8, not the note's 30...♘bd7?. And 30...♘bd7 is best exploited not by 31.♗d2 but 31.♗a3!:



This threatens to win the queen by 32.♘d4, and so forces Black into something like 31...c5 32.♖ad1 ♖ed8 33.♖×d5, and White is winning (+3.25).

And in any event, stronger than 30.b3 is 30.g6!,



when comes 30...f×g6 31.h6 g×h6 32.♘×h6+ ♔g7 33.♗e3 ♘c4 (not 33...♔×h6?? 34.f5+) 34.♗d4,



threatening 35.f5 and thus forcing 34...♗×e5 35.♘f5+ ♔h8 36.f×e5 (+3.41).

The note at move 54 is mistaken.



Lasker says of Black's last move, 54...♘b8, "He parries therewith the menace 55.b4 c×b4 56.c5, whereupon the pawns of Black would fall. If White now undertakes this maneuver, the knight shall go via a6 to c5."

No, in the event of 55.b4 Black must *immediately* play 55...♘a6 forcing 56.b5 ♘b8, when the position stays blocked. If instead 55...c×b4?? 56.♗×b4 ♗×b4 (if 56...♖d7 57.♗×e7 ♖×e7 58.♔×d4 +3.71) 57.♖×b4 ♘a6 58.♖b5,



and the knight cannot get to c5 without allowing decisive material loss. White is winning (+5.12).

***Game 163, Forgács-Tartakower*:** A well-played attack by the Hungarian master Forgács. We offer only a few minor comments on side variations.

The "merely hypothetical line of play" Lasker offers in support of 8.♘f3 needs improvement at White's 18th move. White has any number of reasonable moves at that point, but Lasker's 18.♖f1-f3? is not among them.



Rather than Lasker's 18...♖c7?!, Black has 18...♗×b5! winning a pawn, since if 19.♗×b5? ♕×d4+ etc. The same applies after Lasker's next move 19.g4?. Finally after the note's further moves 19...♖fc8 20.♕d2 the danger is removed.

In the note at Black's 18th move, after 18...f4 19.♕×f4,



much better than Lasker's 19...♗e6? is 19...♘d8, when if 20.♘g5 ♘e6 21.♘×e6 f×e6 and Black is OK (-0.53).

***Game 164, Rubinstein-Salwe*:**

The note at move 23 goes badly wrong at the end. After 23...♘f4 24.♖c4 ♕d3 25.♕×b4,



Black should play 25...♖b8! or 25...a5! immediately, winning either queen for rook or rook for pawn. If Lasker's recommended 25...♘e2+?! 26.♔h1 is played first,



then both 26...a5 or 26...♖b8 can be met by 27.♖g4+, and White escapes unharmed.

The note at move 32 makes a strange comment,



that Black's losing mistake of 32...♖×c6?? "certainly cannot be explained by time pressure, as the critical moment of the thirtieth move was past." Yet in the Program of the Tournament, item nine

clearly states “There is a time limit of two and one-half hours for ***thirty-seven*** moves,” not thirty, so time control had not been reached. However, it does appear that Salwe was not in *Zeitnot*, because the game score shows him using, for the entire game, only 2 hours 11 minutes of his allotted 2½ hours.

As for the chess content of the note, Komodo is more optimistic about White’s chances after 32...♘e7 than Lasker was.



Lasker wrote “After 32...♘e7, it was doubtful whether White could win; at all events winning would have been a very difficult matter.” But Komodo sees play as continuing 33.♘×e7 ♕×e7 34.♖h4,



and now either:
(a) 34...♖g8 35.♕e4 ♖g6 36.♕×b4 (+2.50);
(b) 34...♕d8 35.♖d2! ♕×d2 36.♕×f6+ ♔g8 37.♖g4+ ♔f8 38.♕h8+ ♔e7 39.♕×e5+ ♔f8 40.♕g7+ ♔e7 41.♖e4+ ♔d6 42.♖d4+ ♕×d4 43.♕×d4+ (+3.69);
(c) 34...♕d6 35.♕f5 ♔g8 36.♕×h7+ ♔f8 37.♕e4 ♔e7 38.♕×b4 ♕×b4 39.♖×b4 ♖×c6 40.♖×c6 ♖×c6 (+2.52).
It seems more than likely that a master of Rubinstein’s endgame ability would win from these advantageous positions.

***Game 165, Freiman-Spielmann*:**

The note at move ten needs several corrections. After 10...♘g5?,



the best way to exploit the situation is not with Lasker’s 11.♘c3, but with 11.c4!:



If now
(a) 11...♘e6 12.c5 a6 13.♗×c6 b×c6 14.♕c4 ♗a7



and White is effectively up a piece, as the bishop will never get out alive;
(b) 12...a6 12.♗×g5 ♕×g5 13.e6 ♕×d5 14.c×d5 ♗c8 15.♗a4 ♗a7 16.♘c3 ♔e7 17.d×c6 b5 18.♗×b5 a×b5 19.e×f7 ♗e6 (if 19...b4? 20.♘d5+) 20.♘×b5,



and White is two pawns up (+2.44).

Continuing with the note line, after 11.♘c3 ♘e6



12.♔h1?! (better 12.♖d1) Black should not play Lasker's 12...0–0 13.f4 ♗e8 (+1.80), but 12...♕h4 13.f4 0–0–0, and he's not nearly so bad off (+0.77).

In any event, 10...♘g5? is not Black's only alternative to 10...♘×f2. Best is 10...♕h4!:



The threat against the f-pawn forces either 11.g3 ♕g4 12.♗d3 ♗f5 (-0.63), or 11.♗e3 0–0–0 12.♗d3 ♘g5 (-0.40), both slightly in Black's favor, per Komodo.

Moves 11-20 are unannotated, thus some winning chances for White go unremarked. At move 19, stronger than Freiman's 19.♗f1-b5 was 19.♘c3-b5!:



More or less forced then is 19...♖d7 20.♘×a7+ ♘×a7 (not 20...♔b8? 21.♘×c6+ ♕×c6 22.♘d4 ♕f6 23.♘×f5 winning the bishop, since if 23...♕×f5?? 24.♗×c7+) 21.♕×a7 ♕b6+ 22.♕×b6 c×b6 23.♗e3,



a position where White's bishops should rule the board (+2.99).

At move 20,



rather than 20.♖e1, White would have done better with 20.♘×d4:





If then:
(a) 20...♕×d4 21.♗e3 ♕f6 22.♗×a7



and:
(a1) 22...b6?? 23.♗a6+ ♔d7 24.♘d5 ♕e5 25.♖d1 and all hell will break loose over the black monarch (+7.22);
(a2) 22...♗g6 23.♕g3 ♕d6 24.♕g4+ f5 25.♕a4 (+3.66);

(b) 20...♖×d4 21.♗g5



(b1) 21...♕×g5 22.♕×d4 (+2.91);
(b2) 21...♕e5? 22.♖e1 ♖e4 23.♘×e4 ♗×e4 24.♕×a7 ♕×b5 25.♖×e4 (+5.32).

Another good unnoticed chance for White came at move 22, where instead of 22.♗b5-c4 he should have tried 22.♗f4-e5:



Komodo then gives 22...♕g6 23.♕c5 ♕b6 24.♕×b6 c×b6 25.♘a4!



25...♖d2 (if 25...a×b5?? 26.♘×b6#) 26.♘×b6+ ♔d8 27.♘c4 ♖×c2 28.♖d1+ ♔e7 29.♘e3 ♗g4 30.♖e1 f6 31.♘×c2 a×b5 32.♗c3+,



and with careful play White should be able to win (+2.76).

Finally, at move 23,



Komodo sees White as still having good winning chances if, instead of the text 23.♗×e6+, he had played 23.♗d3 (+2.60 at 23 ply).

***Game 166, Bernstein-Mieses*:** A tragic loss for Mieses, who held his own staunchly in a long, difficult opposite-color bishop ending, only to blunder at move 61. At least he blundered only once; Lasker does so several times.

The note at move nine is an embarrassment. After 9.♕×b7,



Black can draw as Lasker describes by 9...♘b4 10.a3 ♖b8 11.♕a7 ♖a8 etc., but most players would probably prefer 9...♘a5 winning the queen.

The note at move 27 is rather a mess, in both variations. After 27.♕c6 ♘e7,





Lasker's 28.♕c5 is OK, but strongest (and most dramatic) is 28.♖d2!:



Now after 28...♕b8 (not 28...♕×d2?? 29.♕e8+) 29.♕c5 ♖c7 30.♕f2 ♖f8 31.♗a3 ♕b7 32.♖de2 ♖e8 33.♗d6 ♖d7 34.♕c5,



the pinned knight finally dies (+5.45, compared to +1.82 for Lasker's 28.♕c5 ♖c7 29.♕e3).

In the note's other variation, 27...♖fd7, better moves than Lasker's for both White and Black can be found.



First off, rather than 28.♗×d5?!, better is 28.a4 ♘b4 29.♕c5 ♘d3 30.♗×d3 ♗×d3,



when we again have the OCBs but White's a-pawn is protected (+0.90).

If White does play 28.♗×d5,



then correct is not the automatic recapture 28...♖×d5?, but 28...♖d6! 29.♕c5 ♖a5 30.♕e3 ♖a×d5



and White's edge is minimal (+0.21).

Finally, if Black is so foolish as to play the rest of the note line, 28...♖×d5? 29.♖×f6 ♖×a2??,



one would hope that White would not play Lasker's 30.♖×g6, but put the poor man quickly out of his misery with 30.♖e8+ and mate very soon.

The note at move 28 can be improved considerably. After 28.a3 ♖a5 29.♕c6 ♖d6



White should play not Lasker's 30.♕b7, but 30.♗×d5 ♖×c6 31.♗×c6 ♕b6 32.b4 ♖f5 33.♗f3:





While White is at some disadvantage here (-0.67), his disadvantage is all the greater if, after 30.♕b7, Black plays not 30...♖d7?! but 30...♖b6!,



forcing 31.♗×d5 ♖×b7 32.♗×b7 ♖b5 33.♗f3 ♖×b3,



and Black has won an important extra pawn compared to the previous diagram (-1.46).

***Game 167, Salwe-Freiman*:**

For no apparent reason the first 24 moves are unannotated, which leaves buried in obscurity a very interesting unplayed variation. By move 19,



White had built up a considerable positional superiority, but he played the meek 19.♗f2?! and thus failed to seize the chance offered by 19.c5!:



If now 19...d×c5? 20.♗×c5 ♖e8 21.e5 and some blood must be shed. Relatively best is 19...♘e8 20.♘d5 ♖e6 21.♖f1 (intending 22.f5),



and now no matter what Black tries White strikes some heavy blows. A few examples:
(a) 21...a6 22.♘b×c7 ♘×c7 23.♘b6 ♕e8 24.c×d6 ♘b5 25.♘×a8 ♕×a8 26.e5 (+2.48);
(b) 21...♘e7 22.♘b×c7 ♘×c7 23.♘×e7 ♖×e7 24.c×d6 ♖e8 25.♖c1 ♗c6



26.♖×c6! b×c6 27.d7 (+2.85);
(c) 21...♕d8 22.c×d6 c×d6 23.f5 ♖e5 24.f×g6+ f×g6 25.♖f7 ♖h5 26.♗d4 ♘e5 27.♗×e5 ♖×e5 28.♘×d6 ♘×d6 29.♘f6+



29...♕×f6 (if 29...♔h8 30.♕×h6+ ♗×h6 31.♖h7#) 30.♖×f6 (+6.25).

In the note at Black's 28th move, Lasker yet again seems to think that pawn captures are obligatory. After 29...♖d8 30.♘e4,



Black need not, nor should he, play 30...d×e5?. Much better is 30...♖de8 (+0.89) when if 31.f5? ♖×e5.

No comment is made on White's error at move 35.



Rather than 35.♖d6?!, a wasted move he had to retract after 36...♘g5 threatened mate, the natural and strong move was 35.♖c2!:



This both prepares to advance the c-pawn, and eliminates the mate threat arising from 35...♘g5. A likely continuation is 35...♖c8 36.♖d6 ♘g5 37.c5 b×c5 38.b×c5 ♖c7 39.♖×a6 and White is winning (+1.93).

At move 39, Lasker recommends 39...♔f8,



saying "then the king would stop the c-pawn, and Black would have won the c-pawn for the f3-pawn." But that is simply not true: 40.c5 b×c5 41.b×c5 ♔e7 42.♖fd2



and the king does *not* stop the c-pawn (+3.01).

No mention is made of the fact that at move 46,



Freiman's 46...f5?? was a serious blunder. With 46...♔f8 he still had some hope of holding out (+1.45).

***Game 168, Tartakower-Rubinstein*:** An interesting and instructive game with some subtle tactical resources that escaped both the players and the annotator.

Lasker is critical of Tartakower's 32.♖b8-a8, calling it White's only error of the game, but Komodo considers it actually the best move at that point (why will be explained below). The problems with Lasker's recommended alternative 32.♖b8-c8 don't show until several moves into the two variations he gives.

(a) After 32.♖c8 ♔e7 33.♗d2,



Black is by no means obliged to play the note's 33...♘b7?? 34.♗c6+−. Instead 33...♖c7 34.♖×c7+ ♗×c7 keeps him alive and if not well, at least certainly not yet lost (+0.95).

(b) Black does better in the note's second variation. 32...♗×f4 33.♘×f4 ♖c7 34.♖a8 ♘c4 35.♘d5 ♖d7 36.♔g3 reaches this position:



Lasker, thinking that now "Black would have no moves left," gives 36...♘e5?!, but this overlooks a neat combinational finesse: 36...♖×d5! 37.♗×d5 ♘b6 38.♖d8 ♔e7,



and White must give back his momentary material gain by 39.♖×e8+ ♔×e8 40.♗b3 (+0.36) or 39.♖a8 and Black has the choice of 39...♘×a8 or 39...♘×d5 (both 0.00).

And the same resource is available a few moves later in the note line! After (from previous diagram) 36...♘e5 37.♗e4 ♘c4 38.♔f4,



not Lasker's 38...♘d2?!, but 38...♖×d5! 39.♗×d5 ♘b6 40.♖d8 ♔e7



with the same position as before, except that the white king is on f4 instead of g3. After 41.♖×e8+ ♔×e8 42.♗b3 White's advantage is negligible (+0.43).

The superiority of the text move 32.♖c8 is not apparent until three moves later. After 32...♘c4 33.♗×d6 ♘c×d6 34.♘d4 ♖c7 the game reached this position:



Tartakower played 35.♘c6?!, which made a draw pretty much inevitable. Instead he should have played his other minor piece to that square, with 35.♗c6!:



This reduces Black almost to *Zugzwang*. The a-pawn cannot move except to die, 35...♖c8 36.♖×a7 loses the pawn too, the ♘e8 is pinned and the ♘d6 must stay put to guard it. The king can go to e7 but no further, and the white jailers cannot be driven away. Thus all Black has are meaningless waiting moves like ♔f8-e7-f8 or ♖c7-e7-c7 etc. Meanwhile White *can* make meaningful progress, advancing his a-pawn and king.

A plausible continuation is 35...♔e7 36.a3 (a purposeful waiting move)



If now:
(a) 36...♘c8 37.♗×e8 ♔×e8 38.♘b5 ♖c5 39.♘×a7



and Black has only a choice of evils:
(a1) 39...♔d7 40.♘×c8 ♖×c8 41.♖×c8 ♔×c8 42.♔f3 and wins;
(a2) 39...♖×g5+ 40.♔f1 ♖h5 (the knight cannot be saved) 41.♖×c8+ ♔d7 42.♖c3 (+3.15).

(b) 36...♔f8 37.h4 (another purposeful waiting move):



(b1) 37...♖e7 38.♘b5 ♘×b5 39.♗×b5 (virtual *Zugzwang*) 39...♖e5 40.♗c6 f6 41.♔f3 f×g5 42.h×g5 ♔f7 43.♗×e8+ ♖×e8 44.♖×e8 ♔×e8 45.♔e4



and no matter what Black may do, White has king position and the opposition, and will create a passed pawn on one wing or the other, *viz.* 45...♔d7 46.♔d5, or 45...♔e7 46.♔e5, or 45...♔f7 46.♔d5;
(b2) 37...♔e7 38.♔f3 ♔f8 39.a4 ♔e7 40.a5 ♔f8



The time for White to strike has come: 41.♗×e8 ♘×e8 42.♘b5 ♖d7 (or 42...♖c5 43.♘d6) and either 43.♖×a7 or 43.♘×a7 win.

***Game 170, Speijer-Schlechter*:**

The note at move 23 is another instance of Lasker mishandling relatively simple tactics. It is true that 23.♘d5 would fail,



but not by the note continuation. After Lasker's 23...♗×d5 24.c×d5 ♕×a4 White plays not 25.♗×c5?, but 25.♕c2! :



when follows 25...♖eb8 26.♘d2 ♖3b4 27.♕c1 ♖4b7 28.♗×c5 ♕b5 29.♗e3 ♕×d3 30.♕a3 ♕×a3 31.♖×a3, and the black a-pawn soon falls leaving the game even.

The correct refutation of 23.♘d5? is 23...♘×d5!:





And now 24.c×d5 (24.e×d5 is no better) 24...♗×g4! 25.h×g4 (or 25.♘h2 ♗×h3) 25...♕×g4+ 26.♔h2 ♕×f3,



and White might as well resign.

***Game 171, Lasker-Teichmann*:** Our only observation here is historical rather than analytical.

Lasker's comment after 6.♕e2,



that "this move does not seem to have been played yet at this juncture," shows what a different world it was then, and perhaps what little interest Lasker had in the chess literature of his day. Nowadays one can quickly check a database to know that in fact the move had been played at least 13 times before, first in the match Bird-Wisker, London 1873. Other instances involving high-ranking players included Blackburne-Van Vliet, London 1893; five times by Wolf over 1904-05, including once against Lasker's opponent here (and translator of the book!) Teichmann, at Ostend 1905; Réti-Spielmann and Alapin-Réti, Vienna 1908; and Speijer-Loman, Leiden 1909. Surely some of these games saw publication, but Lasker did not know of them.

***Game 172, Perlis-Cohn*:** The drawn outcome here might be considered a fair result, as both players missed chances to win. Lasker missed a lot too, including some very interesting tactics and endgame technique.

The note at White's ninth move goes wrong after 9.♗d2 ♖e8 10.0–0–0 ♗×e5 11.f×e5 ♗g4 12.♕e3 ♖×e5 13.♕g3:



Black now should not play Lasker's 13...♕e7?!, but 13...♖×e4!:



And now:
(a) 14.♘×e4? ♘c×e4 15.♕e3 ♗×d1 16.♗d3 (if 16.♔×d1?? ♘g4) 16...♗×c2 17.♗×c2 ♕×d2+ 18.♕×d2 ♘×d2 19.♔×d2 and the smoke clears with Black two pawns up (-2.17);
(b) 14.♖e1 ♖×e1+ 15.♗×e1 ♕d7 and Black is a clear pawn up (-1.08);

The note at Black's ninth move is correct that 9...♘f×e4! was best, probably winning, but the note can be improved in the third of its variations. After 10.♘×e4 ♖e8 11.♗e3,



stronger than 11...♘×e4 is 11...♖×e4!, when continuing along the note's lines we have 12.0–0–0 ♕e8 13.♘e5 ♗×e5 14.f×e5 ♖×e5 15.♗×c5 ♖×e2 16.♗×e2



16...♗f5 (not 16...♕×e2?? 17.♖d8+) 17.♖d2 (-2.50).

A bit further into the note line, after 11.♗e3 ♘×e4 12.0–0–0,



better than 12...♕f6 is 12...♘c3! — bringing the note's climactic apocalypse two moves sooner — 13.b×c3 ♖×e3



14.♖×d6 (if 14.♕×e3?? ♗a3+ 15.♔b1 ♕×d1+ 16.♕c1 ♕×c1#) 14...♕e8 15.♕f2 c×d6 (-1.81).

At move 22,



there was nothing wrong with Perlis' 22.b4, and it did not deserve the censure Lasker gave it. Nor was his recommendation 22.♗c1 any better. Komodo's preference is 22.♖d2,



which allows a double capture on e4 without leaving the b-pawn undefended. Black can really do nothing about this, since moving the bishop is disastrous: **(a)** 22...♗d5?? 23.♖e8+ ♔g7 24.b4 ♕c4 25.♘×f5+ ♔f6 26.♘e3 (+13.91); **(b)** 22...♗c6?? 23.♖e5 ♕f8 24.♘×c6 b×c6 25.♖de2 ♔g7 26.b4 (+6.08); **(c)** 22...♗×f3 23.♖e8+ ♔g7 24.g×f3 (+4.08). And if **(d)** 22...♕d5 23.g4! (+5.75). Therefore Black has nothing better than, say, **(e)** 22...a5 23.♗×e4 f×e4 24.♖×e4 (+3.21).

At move 26, Lasker's recommendation of 26.♖e8+ is indeed best, but there is a terrible, inexplicable error in the supporting analysis. After 26.♖e8+ ♔g7 27.♗e5+ f6 28.♘f5+ ♔f7 the note reaches this position,



where Lasker unaccountably gives 29.♘h6+??, which obviously loses to 29...♔×e8 (-5.75). Correct is 29.♖e7+ ♔g6 30.♖g7+ ♔×f5 31.g4+ ♔e6 32.♗×c7+ ♕e5 33.♖×e5+ f×e5 34.♗×b6 and White is winning by a landslide (+20.94).

It goes unremarked that White lost much of his advantage at move 27.



Here, much stronger than the text move 27.♘f5 was 27.♖e8+ ♔h7 28.♗e5 (threatening 29.♖h8+) 28...f6 29.♗f4 ♔g6 30.♖2e7,



and to avoid mate starting with 31.♘f5 Black must play 30...♖×b4 31.c×b4 ♕×d4+ 32.♗e3 ♕c4 33.♖h8 ♕×g4 34.♖g8+ (mate in 15 anyway, says Stockfish).

At move 29,



Lasker is correct to fault Perlis' 29.♖×f7+, which further lessened White's advantage. His recommendation of 29.♗×c7 is indeed better and should win. Best, according to Komodo, is 29.♖2e4,



when a likely continuation is 29...♕a2+ (if 29...♕×c3?? 30.♖×f7+ ♔g6 31.♖×c7) 30.♔g3 ♖g6 31.♗e5 h5 32.♖e8 ♖g8 33.♖×g8 ♔×g8 34.♗f6 ♔h7 35.♖e8 ♔g6 36.♗d4 (+8.23).

At move 36, Lasker faults the text move 36.♘f5-h4,



saying Perlis had missed his last chance and should have played 36.♘d4 ♖×a5 37.h4. However, Stockfish very much likes 36.♘h4, and finds that the last chance came next move, when after 36...♖×a5 Perlis needed to play not 37.♘g2?! but 37.g6+!:



Stockfish indicates that, despite all White's previous mistakes, this wins in all variations. We present just a few representative samples, which rather than draw them out to great length, we leave at points where the computer evaluation becomes overwhelmingly clear:
(a) 37...♔g8 38.♔f3 c5 39.♘f5 b5 40.♗h6 ♖a7 41.♗e3 ♖c7 42.♔f4 (+18.27);
(b) 37...♔h8 38.♗f4 c6 39.♔f3 ♔g8 40.♔e4 ♖a4+ 41.♔f5 ♖a1 42.♔f6 ♖f1 43.♔g5 (+13.94);
(c) 37...♔g7 38.♗f4



and:
(c1) 38...♖c5 39.♗e3 ♖d5 40.♗d4+ ♔g8 41.♔f3 (+6.51);
(c2) 38...c6 39.♗c7 ♖a8 (if 39...♖c5 40.♗b6 ♖×c3?? 41.♗d4+) 40.♗b6 ♔f6 41.♔f3 ♔g5 42.♔g3 (+7.66).

***Game 173, Burn–Dus-Chotimirsky*:**

The note at move 24 is correct that 24...♕b7 was better than the text 24...♕b5, but then it missed the most convincing demonstration of this fact. After 24...♕b7 25.b3 a4 Lasker gives 26.c3,



which deserves a "??", but then follows it with the meek 26...♖b6?!. Instead 26...♖×b3! is crushing,



viz. 27.a×b3 ♕×b3 and mate next, or 27.♗a3 ♖×a3 28.♖d2 ♖×a2+ 29.♖×a2 ♗×a2 (-13.65).

The note at move 33 asks "Why not 33.♖×e5?".



It's not clear what Lasker meant by this. That it wins for White? Or ensures a draw? It does neither. Komodo gives the continuation 33...♗×e5 34.♖×e5 ♗f7 35.♗a3 ♖b7 36.♖c5 (not 36.b×a4?? ♖×c2−+) 36...♖e8 37.♔b2 (if 37.b×a4?? ♖e1+) 37...a×b3 38.c×b3 ♖e2 39.♖c2 ♖×f2,



reaching a position deemed slightly favorable to Black (-1.01).

In the long unannotated stretch of moves 34 to 63, White may have had one last winning chance. Instead of 38.♖e2×e5, Komodo proposes 38.♔b1-c2!? protecting the d-pawn.



It then gives best play as proceeding 38...♖c8+ 39.♗c3 ♖d4 40.♖×e5 ♖×d3 41.♘c4 ♖f3+ 42.♖×f5 ♖×f5 43.♖×e7 ♖×f2+ 44.♔d3 ♖×g2 45.♘e3,



when the game may still be drawn, but most of the winning chances are White's (+2.47).

***Game 174, Mieses-Duras*:** Another inattentive job of annotation by Lasker, who makes too much of one mistake and misses the one that really decided the game.

The note at move 16 goes badly wrong at the end. After 16.♘e2 ♗×e3 17.♕×e3 ♘c6 18.c4 ♖e8 19.♕f3,



Lasker gives 19...d4; better is 19...♕e7 20.c×d5 ♕×e2 21.♕×e2 ♖×e2 22.d×c6 b×c6 23.a4, when though Black's position is the worse, material is even. 19...d4? simply loses the pawn to 20.♘×d4!,



since if 20...♘×d4 21.♕g4 and the pinned knight falls next move.

Mieses might have wriggled out of the worst consequences of his mistake at move 16 if at move 18, instead of 18.♕d2-c1, he had played 18.♗g5!?:



Komodo then gives these variations, in all of which White, unlike after 18.♕c1, avoids losing a pawn:
(a) 18...♘×d2 19.♗×d8 ♖f×d8 20.b×a5 ♘e4 (-0.33;
(b) 18...f6 19.♕c3 f×g5 20.♘e6 d4 21.♖×d4 ♕f6 22.♖×c4 ♕×c3 23.♖×c3 ♖×c3 24.♘×f8 ♗×b4 25.♘e6 (-0.40);
(c) 18...♕d7 19.♕c3 ♗b6 20.♗e7 ♖fe8 21.♗c5 ♗×c5 22.b×c5 ♖×c5 23.♖×e8+ ♕×e8 24.♖e1 ♕d8 25.♘f5 f6 26.♕d4 ♖c7 27.♕×a7 (0.00).

After move 16, Lasker makes no further comment on the game. Thus the reader is left uninformed that after winning the b-pawn at move 18, Duras played a string of less-than-best moves capped by 24...♘a5?!. Much better, and possibly his last chance to retain a winning edge, was 24...♕f6:



If now 25.♖×b7?? ♘a5, or 25.♕×b7? ♘d6 26.♕×a7 ♖×c3 27.♘d4 ♘c8 28.♕a5 ♖c4 29.♕×d5 ♖×d4 30.♖×d4 ♘×e7 (-2.26). Best for White is 25.♖e2, when Black has some edge, but no more than half a pawn's worth.

By move 27, Mieses had fought back to equality.



He might even have gained a slight edge by avoiding 27.♖×a7 in favor of 27.♘×d5 (+0.25).

The decisive mistake came next move,





when Mieses played 28.♕d6??. Komodo indicates he still could have drawn by playing the queen to b2, a4 or e7. One sample line with two sub-variations: 28.♕b2 and
(a) 28...♖c5 29.♘×d5 ♕e6 30.♖e7 ♘c4 31.♕b1 ♕c8 32.♕e4 (not 32.♘×b6? ♕c6+),



and White is fine (+0.50);
(b) 28...♖×e3 29.f×e3 ♘c4 (or 29...♕g4 30.♕c2 ♘c4 31.♖e1=) 30.♕d4,



when Black does have an extra pawn and a well-posted knight, but White is up the exchange (+0.22).

***Game 175, Spielmann-Bernstein*:**

White's advance 12.e5, though premature, would not have been as bad as Lasker thought had Spielmann followed up properly. After 12...d×e5,



rather than 13.♘c5?, he should have played 13.f×e5 ♘d7 (not 13...♘×e5?? 14.♗×b7) 14.e6!



and either:
(a) 14...f×e6 and the extra pawn is very weak, in fact so weak that White can easily win it back with 15.♗g4;
(b) 14...♘f6? 15.♘c5 ♕c8 16.♘d5



16...♖b8 (if 16...♘×d5?? 17.e×f7+ ♔h8 18.♕×d5 and Black will lose a piece) 17.♘×f6+ ♗×f6 18.e×f7+ ♖×f7 19.♗d5,



and Black will lose the exchange.

At move 17,



nothing is said about 17.a4?, which did much more than 12.e5 to lose the game. White could still have had a fighting chance with 17.♖ad1, 17.♔h1, 17.♗e3, or 17.♕f2.

Afterword

So, our critique of *St. Petersburg 1909* is done, and has turned out to be about 50% longer than the original book. We hope that the reader has found this work interesting and instructive. No claim is made that all our analysis here is accurate. Corrections, improvements, suggestions and other comments are welcome, and may be sent to info@russell-enterprises.com.