

Analytical Notes, Corrections, and Enhancements

by Taylor Kingston

A chess game is usually a fairy tale of 1001 mistakes. — Tartakower


Errare humanum est, or as Tartakower noted in reference to a gaffe by Lasker, sometimes even *errare supra-humanum est*. Inevitably a chess book written without computer assistance, unavailable in Tartakower's day, will have some analytical mistakes. These games were examined with the very strong program Rybka 3 UCI in "infinite analysis" mode, supplemented by the Nalimov tablebase in cases of 6-man endgames. Rather than change Tartakower's notes or interrupt in mid-text, we have compiled here the significant corrections thus found. By "significant" we mean not minor half-pawn differences, nor later revisions of opening theory, nor instances where mate might have been done in six moves instead of eight or two pieces won instead of a rook, etc. Rather, we looked for crucial points where a verdict was overturned (e.g., a combination deemed sound proved not, or a move considered bad proved good, or vice versa), or where a move that could have made the difference between a win and a loss or draw was overlooked, or where a seemingly difficult win could be gained far more simply.

Rybka's evaluations, where given, are expressed numerically, e.g., +1.00 means White is ahead by a pawn (or equivalent compensation), -5.00 means Black is (or by force soon will be) up a rook or its equivalent, =0.00 is a book draw or deadeye equality, etc. These were reached on the editor's hardware, and should be considered approximations which may vary slightly on other machines, though the basic verdicts should stand.


These corrections are offered not in any spirit of petty fault-finding, and certainly not to belittle Tartakower or aggrandize ourselves, but only in pursuit of objective chess truth, which, we believe, Tartakower would endorse. For his own interesting discussion of errors, see his essay "What Is A Mistake?" at the end of this appendix. Also, following that is our own attempt to explain Tartakower's analytical errors in terms of his personal circumstances.

The editor is deeply grateful to Dr. Steven B. Dowd, endgame expert and internationally published study and problem composer, for his help on many of the endings, a part of the game where computer analysis is sometimes misleading.

Game 1, Tartakower-Schenken:




Here Black played 20...♖e7? and was lost (+1.98). Not mentioned is that 20...♘ce7! would have held indefinitely (-0.09). Further on, Tartakower avoided 26.e6,




calling it "useless" based on the continuation 26...♗c6 27.♗f7 ♖e8 28.e7+, which does indeed allow Black equality. But White can improve with 28.♘c3!, viz., 28...♘xc3 29.♖b1! ♖c7 (if 29...♖b8 30.♘d6) 30.e7+ ♖xe7 31.♘xe7+ ♗xe7 32.♗xd5+ ♗d7 33.♗xd7+ ♖xd7 34.♖xb7+ ♖c6 35.♖xa7+- (+3.71). In fact 26.e6 was

White's strongest continuation, since after 26.♘c3 as actually played,




Black need not have transposed to the above with 26...♘xc3, but could have played 26...♖c6! 27.♗g5+ ♖c8 28.♘b5 ♘xa1 29.♘xa7+ ♖b8 30.♘xc6+ ♗xc6 31.♗xf5 ♘d4 with far less disadvantage (+0.79).

Finally, here,



instead of 29...♗f7?, Black had the unnoticed 29...♗d8! when White's attack stalls, e.g., 30.♖g6 ♖c7 31.♘d6+ ♖b6 (-0.36), or 30.♘d6 ♗c6+ 31.♖g2 ♗e4 (=0.00).


Game 4, Tartakower-P. Johner: The note to Black's 25th move says "After 25...♖e7 ... not yet 26.♗e5, because of 26...♗e4." In fact White need not avoid this, since Black would be crushed after 27.♗d6! (+9.84),



when if, for example, 27...♗xe2 28.♗d8+ ♖h7 29.♖xh6+ forces mate, or if 27...♖e8 28.♗c7+-.


Next move, 26.♗xe6, the note says "Less forceful is 26.♖xe6 [allowing] 26...♗xh2 27.♖e8+ ♖f8 28.♗d4 ♗xg1+ 29.♘xg1 ♖axe8 30.♘f3 ♖d8 and Black

can put up obstinate resistance.” But 26.♖×e6 is no less forceful, since after 27...♙f8,




instead of 28.♖d4?, White has 28.♖e7! which wins quickly (+7.40).

Game 5, Tartakower-P. Johner: At Black’s 13th, in the variation 13...♙b2 14.♖fb1 ♖a3 15.♖b7 ♙a6 16.♖ab1 ♖b6




the note is correct that Black wins the exchange, but Rybka finds an amazing long yet forced line by which White either regains it and comes out ahead materially, or gains other ample compensation: 17.♖c7 ♖bd5 18.♖d5 ♖d5 19.♖cb7 ♖b6 20.♖e7+ ♖e7 21.♖e5 f6 (if 21...♖ac8?? 22.♖f3 f6 23.♖b4+ ♖d8 24.♖f7+) 22.♖g3 ♖f8 23.♖xc6 ♖e8 (if 23...♖c8 24.♖a3+ ♖f7 25.♖e7+ ♖g8 – not 25...♖g6?? 26.♖e5+! fxe5 27.♖b3! and mate shortly – 26.♖xa7 ♖d7 27.♖xd7 ♖xd7 28.♖b7 with two passed pawns and active pieces for the exchange (+1.93)) 24.♖c7 ♖xa2 25.♖b4+ ♖g8 26.♖e7+ ♖e7 27.♖d8+ ♖f7 28.♖e7+ ♖g6 29.♖c1 h6 (not 29...♖c8?? 30.♖c3! ♖h6 31.♖g3 g6 32.♖g4+ –) 30.♖xe6




and White’s passed pawns should win (+2.43). Tartakower is hardly to be faulted for missing such a line, and the main point of his note, that 13...♙b2 should be avoided, is quite correct.

Game 6, Tartakower-Vidmar: Black’s alternatives to 16...e5 are better than indicated. In note (I), after 16...♙b4+ 17.♖d1 ♙b2 18.♖c1 ♖c8 19.♖a7,




rather than 19...♖a8, stronger is 19...♖d6!, with the likely continuation 20.♖h6 (♖e3 and ♖d2, with or without 20.♖h8+ first, work out much the same) 20...♖a8 and either 21.♖g7 ♖a3 22.♖g5 ♖a7 23.♖h8+ ♖f8 24.♖f4 ♖xc1+ 25.♖xc1 ♖xc1 26.♖xc1 ♖xa2 (-0.90), or 21.♖b5 ♖g6 22.♖e3 ♖e7 23.♖xd6 cxd6 24.♖b3 ♖xa2 (-0.64), with White’s attack spent and Black a pawn up either way. This indicates White should perhaps have chosen 16.g3, or 16.0–0–0 as mentioned in the note to White’s 16th, instead of 16.♖b5.

The concluding assessment of note (II) is incorrect; after 16...♖c8 17.♖h8 ♙b4+ 18.♖d1 ♙b2 19.♖c1 a6 20.♖xc7+ ♖e7 21.♖h3,




it is not White who has “fresh threats” but Black, most notably 21...♙b6! (-1.61) winning the knight (if 22.♖c3 ♖d8 etc.). In this line White should avoid 17.♖h8? in favor of 17.0–0–0.

Game 7, Martinovich-Tartakower: The note after Black’s 23rd move




gives the impression White will be equally lost after either 24.♖xc8+ (as played) or 24.♖xh2, when it is claimed 24...♖c3+ makes “new ravages in White’s camp.” However, Rybka indicates that in the latter case, after 25.♖b2,




any ravages will actually be by White in Black’s camp, viz.:

(A) 25...♖xd3 26.dxe6 fxe6 27.♖d1 ♖xe3 28.♖g6+ ♖e7 29.♖f5+! exf5 30.♖d6+ ♖f7 31.♖xd7+ ♖e7 (if 31...♖g6 32.♖xc8 ♖xf4 33.♖d8 ♖b4 34.♖xa6+ etc.) 32.♖xf5+ ♖f6 33.exf6 ♖c1+ 34.♖xc1 ♖xc1+ 35.♖a2 ♖c8 (35...gxf6?? 36.♖c2+ –) 36.fxg7+ ♖xg7




and White stands much better (+2.22);


(B) 25...♖a3 26.♖e2 ♖xb2+ 27.♖a2 (not 27.♖xb2? ♖xd3 –) 27...b4 (if 27...exd5? 28.♖d1 and the ♖b2 is lost) 28.♖d1 ♖a3 29.dxe6 and:



(B1) 29...♙e6 30.♞d2 ♖c7 31.♜xe6 fxe6 32.♙g6+ ♜f8 33.♙xa6 ♞h6 (33...♙c6?? 34.♙xc6 ♙xc6 35.♞d8+) 34.f5 winning (+9.11):




(B2) 29...fxe6 30.♙g6+ ♜f8 31.f5 exf5 32.e6 ♙e8 33.e7+ ♜g8 (33...♜xe7?? 34.♙g5+ and mate quickly) 34.♙xf5 ♞h5 – Forced; if, say, 34...♞c7 35.♙e6+ ♜h7 36.♙g5 (threatening 37.♙e4+-) 36...♙g6 37.♙f5 (+3.79) – 35.♙xc8 ♙a5 36.♙c4+ ♙xc4 37.bxc4 ♙c1+ 38.♜b1 ♙xe3 39.♞f1 again winning (+2.83):



Any other try after 24.♞xh2 ♖c3+ 25.♞b2 loses quickly, e.g., 25...exd5 26.e6! fxe6 27.♙g6+ ♜d8 28.♜xe6+ ♙xe6 (or 28...♜e7 29.♙d2 ♙xe6 30.♞e1 ♖f6 31.f5+-) 29.♙xe6 etc. This indicates that 23...♜xa2 was actually unsound, and Black needed to vary with 23...♜xd5, or even earlier with 21...♞xc1+ 22.♞xc1 ♜c3+ 23.♜a1 ♜xd5.


Game 10, Tartakower-Spielmann: The notes are too pessimistic about 16.♜d1, saying “Black can then adequately defend himself with 16...♞f8.”



Actually that loses summarily to either 17.♙g5 ♙f6 18.♙h6 (+5.29), or 17.♞g1 ♙e5 18.♞g8 etc. (+6.71). Relatively


best after 16.♜d1 is 16...d5, but that too loses quickly, to 17.♞g1 ♞g6 18.♞xg6 hxg6 19.♙xg6 (+3.43). In fact 16.♜d1 is as good or better than the text move 16.♜f1, and both win.

Two moves later, it goes unnoticed that White seriously endangered his win here,




where 18.♞e1! was played, when after 18...♙g4 19.♞xe7 ♙xh5 20.♞e1, had Black found 20...♞f8! (instead of 20...♙f3?), White’s advantage would have been minimal (about +0.50). Much stronger than 18.♞e1 was 18.♞g1! and, for example, 18...♞xg1+ 19.♜xg1 ♖e5 20.♙g5+ ♙xg5+ 21.♙xg5+ ♜d7 22.♞e1 (+5.25) or 18...♙e5 19.♞e1 ♖f8 20.♙g5+ ♜d7 21.f4 (+5.95), or 18...♖e5 19.♞g5 ♞xg5 20.♙xg5+ ♙xg5 21.♙xg5+ ♜d7 22.♞e1 (+5.15).

Game 11, Swiderski-Tartakower: At White’s 16th move, the note says “If 16.♞xc3 ♙d5.”



However, this simply drops a pawn without compensation: 17.♙xd5 ♖xd5 18.♙xg4 (+1.22).


Position II, Lee-Tartakower: At the end of the note to White’s 38th move,



Black may eventually win after 42...e3 as stated, but if so, the process is long and complex. Clearly simpler and best is


instead 42...f3!, viz., 43.♙c4 ♙xf2+! 44.♙xf2 e3 45.♞f1 ♞b2 46.♜d1 e2+, or 43.♙b7 ♙xf2+ 44.♙xf2 g3 45.♞f1 ♞e2+ 46.♜d1 g2 47.♞g1 f2 etc.

Game 14, Tartakower-Chigorin: The note to Black’s 17th gives 18.♙xc5 g5 19.♞ab1 ♞c8 20.♙b4 ♞c7 as giving “Black something approaching equality.” However, if instead of 20.♙b4 White plays 20.♙a7!



the b-pawn is lost and White has a significant edge. After 18.♙xc5, probably 18...♜g8 is objectively best, but even then after 19.♞ab1 ♞b8 20.♞b6 ♜c6 21.♞b1 ♜h7 22.♞xb7 the pawn goes and White stands much better.


Game 15, Tartakower-Marshall: The note to Black’s 29th, in the variation 29...♜g7,



recommends 30.♜f5+ ♞xf5 31.♙xf5 “and Black is faced by insoluble problems.” In fact most of Black’s problems are then solved; White’s attack is gone and the game is virtually equal after any of four moves: 31...♜a7 (+0.01), 31...♞g8 (+0.11), 31...♜b6 (+0.18), or 31...♞h8 (+0.29). Instead, White wins with 30.g3! and a lethal opening of either the g- or f-file, e.g., 30...♞f6 31.gxf4 ♜f8 32.♞g1 ♖e6 33.♞g8+ ♙xg8 34.♜xg8 ♞e1+ 35.♜g2 ♜xg8 36.♙h7+ ♜f8 37.♙xc7 (+3.15), or 30...f3 31.♜f5+ (Now it works!) 31...♞xf5 32.♙xf5 and a timely ♞xf3 when required wins (+5.12).


Game 16, Tartakower-Schlechter: Among the notes to Black’s 10th, in line 1b, after 10...♜d7 11.♜bd2 ♜xd2 12.♙xd2 ♜f6 13.♙g5 h6 14.♙xf6 ♙xf6

15.♖e5 ♖h4 16.g3 ♖h3 17.♗f3 ♖e6




18.♗xb7? is a mistake, allowing Black to equalize with 18...♖ab8! – not, as given, 18...♖xe5? 19.dxe5 ♖ab8 20.♗xa7 and the white queen covers f2 – 19.♗e4 (if now 19.♗xa7?? ♖xb2 20.♖f2 ♖xf2 21.♗xf2 – the crucial difference! – 21...♗xh2+ and wins.) 19...♖xe5 20.dxe5 ♖xb2= (-0.23). Instead White has 18.♖xf7! ♗g4 19.♗xg4 ♖xg4 20.♖xd6 cxd6 (+1.51).

In line 1c, after 12...h6 13.♖b3 c5,




rather than the half-measure 14.♖c4, instantly decisive is 14.♖g5! (+5.97).

The note to Black's 13th indicates that 14.cxd4 ♖xe5 15.dxe5 ♖g4 leads to a won game for Black,



but instead of 16.♗f3 as given, much better is 16.♖d6!, leading to dynamic equality and complex play.


The note to Black's 20th says after 21.cxd4 ♖e6 Black has “consolidated,”



but after 22.♖e5! intending 23.♖d3, he's busted (+5.36).


Position III, Freyman-Tartakower:

Even in the line 37...♗b1 38.♗f7, which Tartakower thought might give White counterplay, Black has nothing to fear:




38...♖xf2+! 39.♖xf2 (or 39.♗xf2 ♖c2+ and mate shortly) 39...♗e4+ 40.♗g3 (if 40.♖f3 ♗g4+ 41.♖g3 ♖c2+ etc.) 40...♗xe3+ 41.♖f3 ♗g1+ 42.♗h3 ♖c2 43.♗xf8+ ♗h7 and White must give up his queen to forestall mate.

Game 18, Tartakower-Fahrni: In the notes to Black's 25th, the assessment of 26.♖xd4 ♗h1+ 27.♗e2 ♖f4+ 28.♗d2 ♗xe1+ 29.♗xe1 ♖xh5 30.♖xa7 ♖f4 31.♗f1 b6, as better for Black, is incorrect.




After 32.♖a4! c5 33.♖b3, followed by a2-a4-a5, White frees his bishop and is a clear pawn up (+1.56). Instead of 31...b6?, Black should try 31...♖e5, which wins back a pawn after 33.g3 ♖xh3. Even then, White is somewhat better (+0.84).

Game 20, Tartakower-Spielmann: All the moves thought bad in the note to White's 21st are actually good, especially 21.gxf6, when after 21...♖e6




White has, for example, 22.♖h4 ♖d7 – or 22...♖g8 23.♖a3 ♖f7 24.♗h5 ♖b8 25.♖a5 ♖dd7 26.♖xc6+ bxc6 27.♗f5 ♖f8 28.e5 with an overwhelming position (+6.58) – 23.♖f5 ♖b8 24.♖e7 when Black is virtually forced to give up the exchange with 24...♖xe7 25.fxe7 ♗xe7 26.♗h5 (+3.30), since if, say, 24...♖h8 25.♖a3 h5 (to prevent 26.♗h5) 26.e5 again with a huge advantage (+5.28).

Game 21, Tartakower-Jaffe: Variation (c) in the note to White's 32nd is problematic. After 32...a5




rather than the difficult 33.♗e2! , better 33.b4! which wins quickly and clearly, e.g., 33...axb4 34.a5! ♖f5 35.♖xe6 ♗e7 36.♗xe7 ♖xe7 37.a6 c5 38.♗f3! (preventing 38...♖e4) 38...cxd4 39.a7 ♖xe6 40.a8♖+, or 33...♖a2 34.b5 cxb5 (34...♖xc4?? 35.b6+–) 35.axb5 a4 36.♖xe6! etc.

Game 25, Tartakower-Perlis: The note to White's 18th is incorrect to say that in this position




19.♖e8+ wins for White. After 19...♗xe8 20.♖xe8+ ♖xe8 White would be lost, with just his queen against two rooks and a bishop (-1.75). Then at Black's 20th, in the variation 20...♗g7,




not 21.♖e4! h5 22.g4? as given (-0.78 after 22...♖h6!), but the decisive 21.♖g4! and either 21...♗f7/♗f8 22.♖xf6+ (+5.08), or mate soon after 22...♗h6 23.♖e5 etc.

Game 28, Tartakower-Nyholm: In the note to Black's 12th, the final assessment is incorrect. Rather than White having "a fine attack,"




Black defends with 18...♗d5! and wins after either 18...♗d5 19.♖xd5 ♖xd5 20.♖e1 ♖c7! (not 20...0-0-0? 21.♖xf7) 21.♖g6+ ♖d7 22.♖xh8 ♖xh8 (-2.15), or 19.♖d1 ♖xe5 20.♖e1 ♖e4 21.f3 ♖b6+ 22.♗f1 ♖d8 23.♖e2 (or 23.♖c2 ♖d7 24.♖xe4 ♖xh2) 23...♖d7 24.fxe4 ♖f4+ 25.♖f3 ♖xf3+ 26.gxf3 (-4.22).

Game 30, Tartakower-Mieses: The note to Black's 12th understates matters when it says that here



the pawn on e5 is "incurably weak." In fact White immediately wins the pawn plus the exchange: 13.♖xe5! ♖d8 (if 13...♖xe5?? 14.♖f8+ ♖d8 15.♖g4+ mates) 14.♖f7 etc.


Game 31, Schlechter-Tartakower: The note to White's 42nd says after 42.a4



Black should play 42...♖a5 "attacking a fresh weakness," i.e. the a-pawn, but that's small beer compared to attacking


the h-pawn: 42...g4!, viz., 43.♖h2 g3 44.♖e2 ♖xh3+! 45.♖xh3 ♖xh3+ 46.♖g2 ♖h2+ 47.♖f3 ♖xe2 48.♖xe2 ♖g1 etc. (-11.66), or 43.♖dd3 b5 44.axb5 axb5 45.♖dc3 bxc4 46.♖a3 (46.♖xc4? ♖xh3+) 46...♖xa3! 47.♖xa3 ♖xh3+ 48.♖xh3 ♖xh3+ (-11.56).

More importantly, at Black's 49th,




49...♖e5 does not deserve a "!", since after 50.bxa6 ♖h2+ 51.♖d3 ♖xc2 52.♖xc2 ♖xe4 53.♖e6 ♖e3 54.♖d1 ♖f2 the game is drawn, not won for Black. Instead 49...axb5 retains winning chances.

Game 32, Tartakower-Réti: The note at Black's 25th overlooks the best move, 25...♖c3!,



which indirectly defends the a-pawn (26.♖xa7?? ♖xf3+) and maintains equality.

Game 33, Maróczy-Tartakower: Several notes are flawed. At White's 17th,




a) 17.c4 is not forced; after 17.♖d1! c6, better than 18.♖d4 is 18.♖xa5! and either 18...♖xa5 19.♖xa5 ♖c5+ 20.♖h2=, or 18...♖c5+ 19.♖xc5 ♖xd1+ 20.♖h2 ♖e2 21.♖d2, when White has two pawns for the exchange. Also

18.♖xd6 is much better than thought if 18...♖e1+ is met not with the egregious 19.♖f2?? (refuted far more by 29...♖h4+ than 18...♖xd1), but by 19.♖xe1 ♖xd6 20.♖e3, or 19.♖h2 ♖xd1 20.♖xc6 ♖d6, with a fighting chance either way.


b) The variation 17.♖f3 ♖e1+ 18.♖h2 was deemed "insufficiently convincing" for Black, but works fine if instead of 18...♖xf4+? he first plays 18...♖xc1! (-3.58).

At White's 19th, in the variation 19.♖d4 ♖b6, no mention is made of 20.♖e3!,




which is White's only playable move (-0.79), far better than 20.♖b3?? (-4.62) or 20.♖xd6?? (-4.03).

After White's 23rd,



unnoticed is that Black should have played 23...♖g1+ immediately (forcing mate in 9). White in turn missed that 23...♖c6? then allowed 24.♖e3!! ♖xa1 24.♖xc5 ♖xb2 25.♖xa4 with two pawns for the exchange and a fighting chance (-0.63).


Game 35: Tartakower-Réti: The note to Black's 16th says after 16...♖e7 the line 17.♖f3 ♖ae8 18.♖d3 "achieves little."




It actually loses: 18...♖xe1+! and either

19.♖xe1 ♖a5 20.♖d1 ♖xa3++, or
19.♖xe1 ♖xd3 20.♖xe8+ ♖xe8 and if
21.cxd3?? ♖e1#.

In note (3) to Black's 19th, in this
position




White is said to be “dominating the
board,” but actually Black has
consecutive mate threats: 21...♖c6!
22.g3 ♖h3! forcing 23.f3 ♖xf3,
regaining a pawn and equality. In the
same note, the line 19...♖g6 20.♖h6+
gxh6 21.♖h8+ ♖f7 22.♖e1,



said to be drawn, is not if instead of
22...♖d7 Black plays 22...♖f8! (-1.58).

In the second note to Black's 24th, after
22...♖d7 23.♖d1 ♖d6 24.♖xd6 ♖xd6
25.♖e2 cxb3?? (better 25...♖c6),




not 26.cxb3 as given, but 26.♖c4+!
winning.

Game 36, Spielmann-Tartakower:


Removed from the notes to White's 8th
was a line which after 8.♖d3 h6 9.♖h4
dxc4! 10.♖xc4 ♖b6 11.♖e2 cxd4

12.♖d1 ♖fd5 13.♖xd4




recommended 13...♖g5. This would
land Black in serious trouble, viz.,
14.♖xg5 hxg5 15.h4! g4 16.♖g5 f5
17.♖xg4 etc. This line was not in the
German edition; how it came to be in the
1953 English edition is not clear.

After White's 9th, the note about the
“violent unpinning” 13...g5 14.♖g3 ♖e4



being is refuted by 15.♖xc4 is mistaken;
Black would then win with either
15...♖xe5 or ♖xc3 (-1.95). The actual
refutation is 15.♖xc4! dxc4 16.♖xe4
♖e8 17.♖xc4 (+2.88). Unlike the
previous note, this one is in the German
edition.


Game 37: Tartakower-Sämisch: As the
note to Black's 24th says, 24...♖f8 is the
best defense, but it must be followed up
properly if White plays the double sac
25.♖xg6 fxg6 26.♖xg6+ ♖xg6
27.♖xg6+:



Now not 27...♖g7 as given, due to


28.♖e3! ♖f7 (else 29.♖f3 forces mate by
♖h7# quickly) 29.♖h7+ ♖f8 30.♖f3
winning the queen. Instead Black must
play 27...♖h8 28.♖xe6 (if 28.♖f6+ ♖g7
29.♖xe6 ♖d8) 28...♖d8, with good
chances to hold and eventually win with
his extra rook.

Game 38, Tartakower-Spielmann: The
note to Black's 17th correctly says
18.♖e2? is bad, but gives a wrong
refutation.




Not 18...♖xg5? 19.♖xd4 ♖c5, when
after 20.♖he1+! ♖ge4 (or 20...♖f8
21.♖e5) 21.f3 Black does not win a
piece, but first 18...g6! 19.♖d3 and only
then 19...♖xg5 ++.

Game 40, Euwe-Tartakower: In the note
variation at White's 9th, 9.♖e5 ♖xd4?,




the given move 10.♖xg6+ would, after
10...hxg6 11.♖xg6 ♖d6 12.♖h8 ♖g4
13.♖f4 ♖c5 14.♖h1 ♖xh8 lead to
advantage for Black. White should
instead play 10.♖xg6! cleanly winning a
pawn, since if 10...hxg6? 11.♖xg6+ and
12.♖xd4.

The note at White's 11th is badly
mistaken. 11.♖e2 ♖e4? 12.♖xe4 dxe4
13.♖e5?! ♖xc2??




does not give “assured advantage to Black”; rather it loses to 14.♖c4+ ♖h8 15.♖x8+ ♜x8 16.♜xc2. Even worse is the further continuation 14.♖x8+? ♜x8?? due to 15.♖c4+ ♖g7 16.♖h6+ ♖h8 17.♜f7+ etc. Black should avoid 11...♜e4? in favor of, say, 11...♜f5.

Game 41, Tartakower-Rubinstein: The note to White’s 15th concludes with “Black controls the board.”




But 18.♜g3! puts White in control, winning two pieces for a rook, viz., 18...♖g4 19.h3 ♖a5 20.♖e1! ♜e2+ 21.♜xe2 ♖xe1 22.♜xg4 ♜xg4 23.hxg4 (+1.81).

The note at Black’s 24th says “a mistake would be 24...♜xd3,” and it is,




though not because of 25.♖xc8 as given, but 25.♜g4! and, for example, 25...♜c5 26.♜c3 ♜e4 27.♜h6+ ♖f8 28.♜h8+ ♖e7 29.♖a7+ ♖d7 30.♜d4 etc. (+6.45).

At the end of the note to White’s 47th,




not 54.♜d2, which allows Black to continue checking with 54...♖a3+, but 54.♖c4!, and if 54...♖a4+ 55.♖c5 ♖a3 56.♖b4 ♖a6 57.♜c5+-.

In the note to Black’s 50th, after 50...♖h1




not 51.♜d3+?! as given, but 51.♜e6+ and 52.♖xc6+ winning the rook or mating. Similarly, in the note’s other variation 50...♖a3+ 51.♖c4 ♖xh3,




not 52.♖xc6?!, but 52.♜e6+! ♖g4 (if 52...♖f3 53.♜g5+, or 52...♖e4 53.♖xc6#) 53.♖d1+ ♖f3 54.♜g5 (54.♖xf3+? ♖xf3 only draws!) 54...♖xg5 55.♖xf3+-.

Game 43, Maróczy-Tartakower: The note at White’s 21st gives 21.♜c3 ♜h5 22.♖g2 ♜h4+ 23.♖g1 ♜g3 24.♖h2 ♜g5 25.♖f2 ♜f5




“with winning and decisive threats,” but Rybka cannot find any, especially after 26.♜xe4! dxe4 27.d5! (+0.50). Better winning chances lie probably in 21...♜h4+ 22.♖g1 g3.

Contrary to the note at Black’s 28th, 28...e5! is far from inconclusive: after 29.♖d2 exd4 (also good is 29...♜g5! 30.♖e2 ♖g4+-) 30.♖f2 (or 30.exd4) 30...♜f3!,




White, rather than “getting rid of a dangerous enemy piece,” is crushed by it (-6.87), since if 31.♖xf3 exf3 32.♜xf3 ♜h2#.

The endgame envisaged by the note at White’s 31st,



after 31.♖d2 exd4 32.exd4 ♖f3 33.♖xg3 ♜xg3 34.♜h2 ♜xh2+ 35.♖xh2 ♜e2+ 36.♖f2 ♜xd4 turns out, after 37.cxd5 cxd5 38.♜c3 ♜xb3 39.♜xd5, to be a likely draw despite Black’s three extra pawns. Instead, after 31.♖d2 Black should keep his queen by 31...♜f3! 32.♖xg3 ♜xg3 33.♜h2 ♜g5! 34.♖f2 (if 34.dxe5 ♜f5+ 35.♖g2 ♖xg2 36.♜xg2 ♜xg2+ 37.♖xg2 dxc4 38.bxc4 ♜xe3+ with a definitely won ending) 34...♜f5 (-4.29).


Game 44, Tarrasch-Tartakower: In the note to White’s 19th, after 19.♖xc8 ♜xc3+



White need not play 20.♖d2??. Better 20.♜d2 ♜xd2+ 21.♖xd2 ♜c4+ 22.♖c3 ♖axc8, though then Black is still much better.


Game 45, Rubinstein-Tartakower: At White’s 5th, in the variation 5.♖g5 exd5 6.cxd5 h6 7.♖xf6 ♜xf6 8.♜c3 b4 9.♜b5

♖b6




White is not forced to lose a piece as claimed, viz. 10.♖c2! (instead of 10.♖a4) 10...♖xb5 (or 10...d6 11.♗bd4) 11.♖e4+ ♔e7 (11...♖d8?? 12.♗e5+-) 12.d6 ♗c6 13.dxe7=.

The note at White's 20th is seriously mistaken; after 20.♗cd5 g5??




Black does not win a knight, but loses the game: 21.♗xh7+! and 21...♖xh7 22.♖e4+ ♖g8 23.♗e7+ ♖f8 24.♗fg6+ ♖xg6 25.♗xg6+ ♖f7 26.♖xb7+-, or 21...♖f8 22.♗g6+ ♖xg6 23.♖e7#, or 21...♖h8 22.♗g6 ♖d7 23.♗xe8+- . Instead 20...♗xd5 21.♗xd5 axb5 gives Black with some advantage.

At Black's 24th, it's not clear what "manifold complications" were envisioned after 24...♗xb2 25.♗e5;




Black is winning after any of several moves, the strongest being 25...♗d5! and, say, 26.♗f3 ♗xa1 27.♗xa1 ♗f6! intending 28...♗e8 (-4.22).

At White's 31st the extensive analysis of the line 31.♗d4 ♖xe3 32.fxe3 ♖xe3+ 33.♖f1 is interesting but superfluous.



Rather than tackling a Gordian knot by 33...♖xd4, Black cuts to the quick with 33...♗d2! forcing mate or winning the queen, e.g., 34.♗f3 ♗e3+ 35.♖xe3 ♖xe3 etc.


Game 46, Bogolyubov-Tartakower: In the note to White's 17th, the line 17.♗h5 gxf4 18.♖xf4 ♗g5 is not nearly as good for Black as thought,



since instead of 19.♗xg5? White has 19.♖e5! ♗f6 20.♗xf6+ ♗xf6 21.♖xc5 netting three pawns for the piece. Rather than take the bishop immediately, Black should first play 17...♗g4! forcing 18.♗g3, and only then 18...gxf4.


Position V, Spielmann-Tartakower:

Time pressure affected this game, and seemingly even the later analysis, though in mitigation it must be said that some remarkable resources were far from obvious.




Here, 28...♖e3?! endangered Black's win; much stronger was the unmentioned 28...♖xg2! (-2.74).

The note at Black's 29th claims "an easy ending" after 29.♖h3 ♖e2,




but in fact that lets White equalize with the surprising 30.♖f4+! ♖h5 (if 30...♖xf4?? 31.♖c7+ ♖g4 32.♖g3+ ♖h5 33.♖g5#) 31.♖xf5+ ♖h6 32.♖xe2 ♖xe2 33.♖a5=.

The note to White's 30th transposes two crucial moves; after 31.♖f4+ ♖h5 32.♖xf5+ gxf5



White must play 33.♖f7+! ♖h6 34.♖xf5 (+1.21), since if 33.♖xf5+ ♖h6 34.♖f7 as given, Black wins with 34...♖g1+ 35.♖f1 ♖d1+ 36.♖xd1 ♖xd1+ 37.♖b2 ♖d2+ 38.♖b3 ♖xg2 (-3.58).


At Black's 31st, in the variation 31...♖h5,



not, as given, 32.♖f7? ♖h6 33.h5?, which loses to 33...♖e3 (-2.89). Instead White equalizes with another surprising rook sac: 32.♖xe4! fxe4 33.♖xe4, viz., 33...♖g1 34.♖f3+ with perpetual check, or 33...♖g4 34.♗d5+ ♖h6 35.♗d2+ again with perpetual check (or 35.♖xa8 if White wants to try for a win), or 33...♖f2 34.♖xf2 (also interesting is 34.♗d5+ ♖xh4?! 35.♖h1+ ♖g4 36.♖g1+ ♖f4 37.♖f7+ ♖e4 38.♖g4+ ♖e5 39.♖e7+ ♖e6 40.♖e4+ ♖xe4 41.♖xe6+ ♖f4 42.♖f7+ ♖g3 3.♖xh7∞)


35.♖xf2 ♜xf2 36.♜xa8 with an incalculable queen ending.

After White's 32nd,




the “deadly threat” is not 33.♜e5, which only draws after 33...♜b8 or ♞e8, but 33.♞e4! fxe4, and only then 34.♜e5+ ♞g4 35.♜xe4+ ♜h5 36.♜xg2+-.

Finally, in the last note,




while 34...♜e2 is certainly good enough to win (-7.40), preferable is the quick mate 34...♜xa2+ 35.♜c1 ♜c2#.

Game 48, Tartakower-Chajes: In the note to Black's 12th, after 12...♜xf4 13.♞f1 ♜e3+ 14.♜xe3 ♞xe3 15.♞xf7,



Black must play 15...d6 or 15...♞f6, since 15...d5? as given allows – instead of 16.♞xd5?! – 16.♞f8+! ♜d7 17.♞xd5, winning at least a piece.


At Black's 33rd, one wonders if the note disapproving 34.♞e7+ ♜d7 for White is a misprint (though the German edition has it too),



since after 35.♞d1+ ♞d6 36.♞xd6 cxd6 37.f6! g6 (37...gxf6 38.♞f5) 38.♜d3 White would be in fine shape (+2.97), whereas after 34...♜b7! White's edge is minimal.


Game 49, Tartakower-Thomas:

Unmentioned is that here,



27...♜e6? was probably the losing move, whereas after 27...gxf6!, Black would have had dynamic equality, for example 28.exf6+ ♜d7 29.♞e7+ ♜c6 30.♞c4 ♞g8+ (30...b6 31.b4) 31.♞f1 ♞d6 32.♞e4 ♞d5 ∞/≈ (-0.24).

At White's 41st, 41.♞f3 is playable but not of “utmost importance.” Contrary to the note, White could have proceeded 41.♞d8! ♞e8,




and then not 42.♞d6+?! as given, but now 42.♞f3! and, for example, 42...c4 43.♜e3 b5 44.♞d6+ ♜xe7 45.♞xe8 ♜xd6 46.♞d4+-, or 42...a5 43.♞xe8 ♜xe8 44.♜e4 a4 45.♜e5 ♜d7 (45...a3?? 46.♜e6 a2 47.♞d6*) 46.♞f6 a3 47.♞f7 ♜xc8 48.e8♜+ etc. It should also be noted that even with 42.♞d6+?!, the final position in Tartakower's note is won, the Nalimov tablebase saying that White mates in 21 moves at most.

Position VI, Tartakower-Em. Lasker:


This long, complex analysis has some errors, but none major, and the final verdicts on the major variations are correct. One irony is worth noting, though. Rybka supports Tartakower's conclusion that the best defense,

21...♜d8 (var. F), should draw. However, after 29...♞g8, near the end of F's main line,




White need not draw with 30.♜f6+. Instead he wins with 30.♞f6+! ♜g7 31.♞h5+ and either (a) 31...♞f8 32.♜f6 and to stop 33.♜xd6# Black must give up major material by, say, 33...♞d8 (if 33...♜c5 34.b4) 34.♜xd8 ♜h6+-, or (b) 31...♜h6 32.♜f6+ ♞g6 33.♜h8+ ♜g5 34.h4+ ♜xh4 35.♞f4+ ♜g5 36.♞h3+ ♜xh3+ 37.gxh3+-.

However, Black can improve earlier in that line, avoiding 28...♜e3 in favor of 28...♜d4!,




when it appears he can hold the draw, e.g., 29.♞e2 ♜xb2 30.♞f4 ♜e5 and White can make no further progress.

Game 54, Norman-Tartakower: Since in the variation given at White's 24th, 24.♜xf6 ♞e5 25.♜e6+ ♜xe6, Black wins only a pawn against the best defense 26.♞xe6 ♞xc4+ (-1.36), far better for Black is the decisive 24...♜a4!,




viz., 25.♜b1 ♞f8 26.♜g5 ♞xf2, or 25.♞d2 ♞f4 26.♞hd1 ♞xd2+ 27.♞xd2 ♜xc4+, or 25.♞de1 ♞a3+ 26.♞d2 ♜b4+ etc.

At White's 25th, in the variation 25.♖c2 ♜f4+ 26.♖d2,




not 26...♖xc4? as given, since Black must give up the rook after 27.g3 ♜e4 28.f3 ♖xc2+ etc. Instead, 26...♖e2! 27.♖hd1 ♜xf2-+.

At Black's 25th, the strongest move goes unnoticed. Instead of 25...♖e8, 25...b5! wins:




The pawn is immune (26.cxb5? ♖b4, or 26.♜xb5? ♜c3+ 27.♜b1 ♖xc4+-). Relatively best is 26.♜b1 ♖xc4 27.♖he1 ♜f5+ 28.♖d3 ♜xf2, but Black is winning (-1.73). This is important, because next move, 26.f4! is better than indicated.



The refutation given, 26...♜a1+, does not refute the unmentioned 27.♜c2! (instead of 27.♜d2?? as given) and after 27...♖e2+ 28.♜d3 ♜xa2 29.♜xa2 ♖xa2 30.c5 ♖e7 31.♖a1 ♖xa1 32.♖xa1 the game is virtually even (-0.16) due to White's knight outpost. Black can instead try 26...♖xf4 27.♖xf4 ♜xf4+ 28.♜b1 ♖e2 with compensation for the exchange (-0.81), but this is nowhere near so favorable as what 25...b5! provides.


Game 55, Tartakower-Znosko-Borovsky: In the note to Black's 18th, after 18...♖d7?,



rather than net just one pawn with 19.♖xd7 ♖xd7 20.♜xb7, White can gain considerably more by 19.♖xc8! ♖xc8 (if 19...♖fxc8?? 20.♜xf7+) 20.♖xd7 ♖fd8 21.♖e5 ♖f6 (to prevent 22.♜xf7+) 22.♜xb7 ♖xe5 (if 22...♖c7 23.♖c6! forces the exchange of queens) 23.♖xe5 ♜b6 (else 24.♖xe6!) 24.♜xb6 axb6 with a clearly won game.

Game 56, Opocensky-Tartakower:


Contrary to the note at Black's 26th,



26...♜xf3+ is actually just as good as 26...♖xf3, since after 27.♖g2 ♜f5!, when if 28.♖xa8?? ♜f1 #.

Position VIII, Tartakower-Réti:

Contrary to the note at White's 44th, 44.fxe4+ is actually the most exact continuation.




If 44...fxe4 45.a6! intending 46.b6 wins, and if 44...♜xe4 White need not allow

Black to promote; instead 45.♜d2! prevents that but still lets White easily promote a queenside pawn. Of course Tartakower's line is also quite good enough to win.


Position IX, Michell- Tartakower:

Michell may have been at his wit's end at move 53, but in fact he did have a useful move, 53.♖a1! (instead of 53.♜d2?), which should hold the draw:



If 53...♖e8+ 54.♜f1=, or 53...♖a8 54.♖h1=, or if, as in the game (and most importantly) 53...♖h2 54.♖xh2! g×h2 55.♖a7+! (the point of 53.♖a1) 55...♜g8 56.♖h7! ♖e5 57.♜f2=. It is interesting that both Tartakower and Nimzovitch missed this.


In the note to White's 54th, if 54.♖f2,



not 54...♖xf3?!, which only creates a difficult opposite-color bishop situation after 55.♖xf3 ♖g2+ 56.♜e1, but the decisive 54...♖g5+! and either 55.♜e2 ♖e3 56.♖f1 ♖xg2+-, or 55.♖xg5 gxf2-+.


Game 60, Tartakower-Przepiorka:

22...♖c6! is underestimated. After 23.h3 White may be "consolidating his position," but Black is winning, viz.,




23...h6! 24.♖e3 (if 24.♙d2 g5, while 24.♙xh6? is unsound) 24...♙a2! (threatening 25...♙xf2 26.♖xf2 h×g5) 25.♙xa2 ♖xa2 26.♖d2 (if 26.♙xc6 ♙xc6 27.♖e8+ ♖h7 28.♖xc6 [or 28.f×g7 ♖xg7 29.♖xc6 h×g5 -+] 28...h×g5 -+) 26...♖d5 27.♙e3 (if 27.♙f4 ♖d4+ 28.♖h2 ♖xf6 -+, or 27.♙h4 ♖d4+ 28.♖f2 ♖xd3 29.f×g7 ♖xg7 -+) 27...f4! 28.♙xf4 ♖d4+ and 29...♖xf6, when White's attack is over and Black's extra pawns should win.

In the note to White's 25th, 25.♙b2+ ♖g8 26.♖f6 ♖f8 is actually fine,




as long as White plays 27.♙e2! (+10.10) rather than 27.♙c2 (+1.58).

Game 62, Tartakower-Spielmann: In the variation 22.♙e6,




the "intermediate resource" Black should employ is not, as given, 22...♙e4? 23.f3 ♙c6? when 24.e4 wins (+7.02), but 22...♙c4!, and whether play continues 23.e4 ♙xe6 24.e×f5 ♙d5, or 23.♙xg7+ ♙xg7 24.♙xg7 ♙g8, or 23.♙f4 ♙b8, Black has good chances to draw with opposite-color bishops (about +1.25 in all three lines).

Game 63, Tartakower-Verlinsky: In the variation 17...♙e6, there is no need to defend the d-pawn with 17.♙d1;




rather attack first with 18.♙xh7+! ♖f8 (worse is 18...♖xh7 19.♖h4+ ♖g8 20.♖xe7) 19.♙d1 (+1.53).

Game 66, Grünfeld-Tartakower: In the variation 28.b3,




not 28...c×b3 29.♖×b3 a5 as given, but 28...♖b1+ 29.♖h2 ♖×b3 and wins. More importantly, overlooked at White's 29th was 29.♖d4!,



when if 29...♖xd4? 30.e×d4 White gains a passed pawn and a winning endgame. Therefore Black is forced to cede his central queen position (by, say, 29...♖c2+ or 29...♖e7), when the game is even and a draw likely.


Game 68, Tartakower-Pannekoek: Either there is an error in the game score, or the note at Black's 23rd is badly mistaken. After 23.♙f3 e×f3 24.e6+ ♖e7! White has no "rapid and easy win," nor any win at all.



Instead he must take perpetual check by 25.♙g7+ ♖e8 26.♙g8+ etc. Anything else loses quickly, e.g., 25.♖xf3 ♙g8 26.♙g7 (if 26.♙xg8 ♙xg8+ 27.♖f1


d×c4! 28.♖×b7 ♖f4+ and mate soon) 26...♙xh2+ 27.♖f1 (or 27.♙xh2 ♙xg7+ 28.♖h1 ♖e4 -+) 27...♖f4 etc., or 25.♙f2 d4 26.♖d3 ♙e4 27.♖d2 ♙g8+ 28.♖f1 ♖h3+ etc. Also 24...♖e8 works just as well; only if 24...♖f8?? 25.e7+ does White win. Furthermore, after the game continuation 23...♖h5 24.♙f1, Black could still have played 24...e×f3 with the same results. Only after 24...♙c8? was he losing.

Game 70, Tartakower-Tackels: The disapproval given 21.e×d5 in the note at White's 21st is undeserved. It's perhaps the strongest move, and after 21...♙e3? as given (better 21...c×d5 or 21...♙g7) White has several crushing lines,



chief of which is 22.♙dh2!, viz., 22...♙g7 23.♖h3 ♖f8 24.♙h8+ ♙xh8 25.♖xh8+ ♖e7 26.♖f6+ ♖d7 27.d×c6+ b×c6 (if 27...♖c8 28.c×b7+ ♖×b7 29.♙a6+-) 28.♖xf7+ ♖d8 29.♖f6+ ♖e7 30.♖xc6 and ruin by either 31.♖xa8+ or 31.♙d2+.


Likewise, in the note to Black's 27th, the "?" given 28.♖xf5 is undeserved.



Then 28...♙g7, said to be good for Black, fails to 29.♙d7!, e.g., 29...♖×b2+ 30.♖d1 ♖b1+ 31.♙c1 ♙f8 32.♙h4 and mate soon. Relatively best is 28...♙e7, but White still wins with 29.g6 ♙h6+ 30.♙d2 f6 31.♙h4 etc. much as in the actual game.


Game 71, Tartakower-Romih: Perhaps because of its complexity, this game has an unusual number of errors, though

even so some seem inexplicable. One such is the note at Black's 20th,




which says Black is threatened with 21.♖f7 ♜e6 22.♙f5, and that the text move 20...♜g8 is the only way to prevent it. In fact any of at least ten moves are playable for Black, and even if it were White's move, in reply to 21.♖f7 Black could simply play 21...♜g5. This note is especially odd given that Tartakower mentions the ♜e7-g5 escape route in the next note.

At Black's 29th, in the note variation 29...♜e6 30.♜g3+ ♜h8 31.♖f6 ♜c8



not 32.e6? as given (32...♙xex6!= instead of 32...♜e8?+-), but 32.♖gf3! ♜g8 and only then 33.e6.


Overlooked at move 31 is probably the crux of the game, where Black could have refuted White's sacrifices and won with 31...♜d6!!:



Posing various threats on the g-file and b8-h2 diagonal, plus ♖a8-e8-xe6 repulsing White's attack – this move turns the tables. The critical line is 32.♖f7 (if 32.♖1f2 ♖e8 etc.) 32...♜g3! 33.♖1f2 (33.♖xg7+ ♜xg7 34.♜h5 ♖f8+) 33...♜g6 34.♜xg6 ♖xg6 35.♖xb7 ♖xe6 36.♖ff7 ♙f8 37.♖g7+ ♜h8 38.♖ge7 (if 38.♜f2 ♖ae8 39.♖g3


♙d2 40.♖b3 c5 41.♙xc5 ♙d7 (-5.97)) 38...♙d8 39.♖xe6 (39.♖f7 ♙xh4) 39...♙xe6 40.h5 ♙g5 intending 41...♙e4 (-4.08).

38...♖g5 does not deserve the “?” given it. It was almost certainly the best move at that point. The real error was a move later, 39.♜e8 ♖g5?; only then was Black truly lost. Instead, he could have held with 39...♖g7!:




when White cannot avoid a draw by repetition – e.g., 40.♖f2 ♜e1+ 41.♖f1 ♜xe3+ 42.♖f2 ♜e1+ etc. – except by something suicidal such as 40.h6 ♜e1+ 41.♖f1 ♜xe3+ 42.♜h1?? ♜xh6+ 43.♜g1 ♜e3+ 44.♜h1 ♖h7+ and mate next.

In the note at Black's 38th, both variations stemming from 38...♜e1+ are flawed. After 39.♜h2 ♜h4+ 40.♖h3?, 40...♜e7 as given is playable, but best by far is 40...♜f2!,




forcing 41.♖g3 ♜xg3+ 42.♜xg3 ♖xg3 43.♜xg3 ♙xe6 and Black wins easily.

But White need not play into this nor allow perpetual check after 38...♜e1+. He can retain winning chances with 39.♖f1! ♜xe3+ 40.♜h2 ♖xg2+ (forced) 41.♜xg2



and either (a) 41...♜e2+ 42.♖f2 ♜g4+ 43.♜g3 ♜xg3+ 44.♜xg3 ♙xe6, or (b) 41...♜g5+ (not 41...♜xe6?? 42.♜xf8+) 42.♜g3 ♙xe6 43.♜xg5+ ♙xg5 44.♖b1 ♜h7 (if 44...b5 45.♖c1 ♜f7 46.♖xc6, or 44...♙e6 45.♖xb7 ♙xd4 46.♜g3 a5) 45.♖xb7+ ♜h6 46.♜g3 ♜xh5 47.♜f4 ♜g6 48.♖b6, in all cases reaching an endgame winning for White.

It is especially puzzling that the possibility of 39.♖f1 is not mentioned at move 38, while it is given a “!” in the note to the next move, where it is not quite as effective. That note gives “39...♜e1+ 40.♖f1! ♜xe3+ 41.♜h1 ♖xh5+ 42.♜xh5 ♜xe6, and [Black] can still put up a fight.”




True, but after the virtually forced continuation 43.♜g5+ ♙g6 44.♖f6 ♜e1+ 45.♜h2 ♜h4+ 46.♜xh4 ♙xh4 47.♜g3 ♜g7 48.♖f1 ♙g6 49.♖b1, we reach an ending similar to line (b) above, which while perhaps not as favorable to White, should still be won for him.

Perhaps this flawed but fascinating game of Tartakower's is best looked at like one by the young Tal, where he was playing the man as much as the board, sacrificing pieces more for psychological effect than objective soundness, and above all for the sheer joy of the fight.

Game 71, Tartakower- Crépeaux:


Several notes seem to be written quite hastily here. At White's 5th, in the sub-variation 5.♙f3 ♙c6 6.0-0 cxd4 7.♙b5 ♙c5?,



the refutation given, 8.♙f4, does not work unless preceded by 8.exd5! exd5, and only then 9.♙f4 ♜f8±. If first 8.♙f4


then not 8...♖b6? as given but 8...♗f6!, and if 9.♗c7+ ♕f8 10.exd5 (10.♗xa8 dxe4) 10...♗xd5 11.♗xd5 (11.♗xa8? ♗xf4) 11...exd5 and Black is not so bad off.

The note at White's 9th says after 8...cxd4 9.cxd4 ♗a5 10.c4 ♗xc4 11.♖a4+ White wins a piece, but this overlooks 11...b5,




both stopping check and protecting the knight.

The note at White's 23rd implies that 23.cxd5 is markedly inferior to the text move 23.♖xa6, but this is not true. After 23.cxd5,



Black is lost even in the supposed refutation 23...♗e2 24.♖e1 (far stronger is 24.c6! ♗d8 25.♖xg7 ♖f8 26.♗a3 forcing Black to give up his queen.) 24...♖b5, when White can win several ways, for example 25.♗xg7 ♖g8 26.♖xa7! ♗d8 (26...♖xa7 27.♖b8+) 27.d6 etc.


Game 73, Tartakower-Colle: The note at Black's 16th is badly mistaken. After 16...♖e2 White may "avoid simplification" by 17.♖b3,



but he loses the game to 17...♖d1+! and


either 18.♖f1 ♖xd4+ 19.♗h1 ♖xa1, or 18.♗f2 ♖e1+ 19.♗f3 ♖e2+ 20.♗g3 ♖e3+.

The note at Black's 30th is correct to fault 30...h6 and recommend 30...♗e7, but in that case after 31.♖g2 g6 32.♖e2 Black need not play 32...♗f7? allowing 33.a5+- . Instead 32...♗a5! holds,




viz., 33.♗d2+ ♗f7 with approximate equality.

Game 74, Réti-Tartakower: In the note at White's 18th, after 18.♗xb5 ♗xb3 19.axb3 ♖g6,



there is no compelling need to play 20.e4, nor, after 20.e4 ♗xe4, the egregious 21.f3? ; White may safely play g2-g3 at either move.


Likewise in the note to White's 24th, after 24.♖fe1 ♖c2 25.♖b1 (25.♖d2!?) 25...a3 26.bxa3 ♖8c3 27.♖a7 ♖c5



White is not obliged to play 28.f3? as given; the surprising 28.♗h1!? allows continued resistance, for example 28...♖xf2 29.♖g1 (threatening both 30.♖xa6 and 30.axb4) 29...♖f6 30.axb4 ♖c7 31.♖b8+ ♖c8 (31...♗h7? 32.b5+-) 32.♖a7 ♖8c7 33.♖b8+ etc. If Black wants to continue to play for a win he must try a tricky, risky line such as


28...♖c7 29.♖b8+ ♗h7 (if 29...♖c8 30.♖a7 bxa3 31.f3=) 30.♗b3 ♖b7!? (if 30...♖c8 31.♖a7 repeating) 31.♖xb7 ♗xb7 32.♗xc2 ♖xf2 33.♖ec1 f5 34.axb4 f4∞.

Game 75, Teller-Tartakower: The note at White's 9th contains multiple errors. To begin with, its first move, 9.♗c2,




is not good. Then to take subsequent moves in order: 9...♗c5? – Loses a pawn; better 9...d4 10.♗xb4 ♗xb4±, or 9...♗xc3+ 10.bxc3 ♖a5± – 10.♗a4? – Simply 10.cxd5± – 10...0-0?! – Better 10...♖a5+ 11.♗c3 d4 12.a3 dxc3 13.b4 ♖c7 14.bxc5 and White's queenside is in ruins, a considerably greater advantage than Black gets from the given continuation 11.♗xc5 ♖a5+ 12.♗d2 ♖xc5.


Game 76, Tartakower-Kleczynski: At White's 18th, unmentioned is the strongest continuation, 18.♗g5! (threatening 19.♗xe5+-),



viz., 18...♗d6 19.f4 h6 20.♗e6! fxe6 (20...♗xe6 21.fxe5 ♗g4 22.exf6+-) 21.fxe5 ♗xe5 22.♗xe5 ♖f7+- . This is important, because if to the text move 18.f4 Black replies 18...exf4 (actually relatively best), the given line 19.d6 ♗xd6 20.♗xf6 does not win:




after 20...♙e7! 21.♖c3 ♘xf6 22.♗xf6+
gxf6 23.♖xf6 f×g3 White has nothing
better than perpetual check by 24.♜g5+
♜f8 25.♖h6+ etc. Instead, after
19...e×f4,




White should proceed 19.♗xf6+ ♘xf6
20.♖xe8+ ♖xe8 21.♗xf6 g×f6 22.d6
♜d8 23.g×f4, with some advantage
(about +1.04), but no immediate win.

At White's 22rd,



while the text 22.♖ff1 is OK, it yields no
quick win against the best defense,
22...♖e1. Instead, White had the
resignation-inducing 22.♖f7+! ♜xf7 (or
22...♜f7 23.♜g6+ ♜f8 24.♖f1+ and
mate shortly) 23.♖f1 ♜xf1+ 24.♜xf1+
♜e7 25.♗xg7 (+4.58).


Game 77, Tartakower-Kohn: The
lengthy note to Black's 13th, in its
discussion of the Tarrasch-Rubinstein
game, reaches this position,



giving the continuation 21.♗e7+ ♜g8
22.♗h6+ ♜h8 23.♜g8+ ♖xg8 24.♗hf7+
♜f7 25.♗f7#. However, Black need
not allow mate; after 21...♖f7 22.♗f7+
♜g8 23.♖xe8+ ♖xe8 he is only down a


pawn, with drawing chances.

The note to White's 16th, in the sub-
variation 16...b5 17.♗b3 b4




recommends 18.♖a4, but better simply
18.♗b4 taking the loose pawn with
impunity.

A note at Black's 23rd gives the variation
23...♗c2 24.♖e6 ♗a3 25.♗b6 f×e6
26.♗c8 ♖c8 27.b×a3 "and White has
gained a pawn." However, after
23...♗c2,




White can do far better, with 24.♜xf8+!
♜xf8 25.♖e6 f×e6 26.♖c2, gaining a
whole piece, and soon at least another
pawn.

The note at Black's 35th says 35...f4
would have "evinced more composure."




However, it accomplishes nothing else,
losing to 36.♖c3 much as in the actual
game.

In the note to Black's 36th, the variation
36...♜d6+,



not 37.♜g3?! as given, but 37.g3!, when
Black cannot defend both g7 and f5, and
is soon mated (e.g. 37...♜e5 38.♖xg7+
♜xg7 39.♜xf5+ etc.).


White could have started his crushing
attack one move sooner, at move 38,
where instead of 38.♜c5, there was
38.♖f7!,



when if 38...♖1d3 39.♜c8! and either
39...♖g3 40.♖xg7+ etc. as in the game,
or 39...♜g3+ 40.f×g3 f×g3+ 41.♜g1
♖d1+ 42.♖f1+- . 38.♖f7 also prevents
38...f3, which was Black's best try in the
game.


Position XIII, Rubinstein-Tartakower:

The note at Black's 30th is incorrect.
After 30...♖b1+ 31.♜f2 ♖b2+ 32.♜e1
White does not win. Black simply
continues checking, though not always
with the rook:




32...♖b1+ 33.♜d2 c3+ 34.♜c2 (if
34.♜d3 ♗a6+ 35.♜e4?? ♖e1+ 36.♜e3
♖e3+ 37.♜f4 ♖f3+ 38.♜e4 ♗d3#)
34...♖b2+ etc., drawing.

At White's 34th, 34.♜e2?? is fatal rather
than useless; after 34...♗a6+ 35.♜f2




not 35...♖b2+ as given, but 35...♖f1+! 36.♔g2 ♖xf6 and wins.

Game 80, Tartakower-Kmoch: It bears mentioning that 30...g5??, on which no comment was made, was a serious blunder. Best was 30...♖b8-c8,




after which White still has some advantage (about +0.71), but no immediate win.

Game 81, Winter-Tartakower: The note to White's 18th says that after 19.♖h1 ♖f8+ 20.♔e2 ♖g3 21.♖xh6 ♖f2+ 22.♔d3 g×h6 "losses in material for White are inevitable."




However, after 23.♔e2! (instead of 23.♖d4 as given), no such loss is forthcoming (23...♖xg2?? 24.♔g1).

While the note at Black's 19th is correct that 19...♖h5 is inferior to the text move, it by no means allows mate. After 20.♖f4




Black can immediately exchange queens, 20...♖xf4 21.e×f4, with no pressing danger. We suspect the note was mainly intended to illustrate a pretty (if unforced) combination.

At move 24, Black would have done better to take the other rook.




Rather than 24...♖xh2+, best was 24...♖xg1! 25.♖h1 (much worse is 25.♖g2? ♖c1 26.♔d1 ♖d8 27.♔f2 ♖xb2+ etc., or 25.♖g2? ♖h1 26.♖f3 ♖f8 27.♖g3 ♖f1+ and mate shortly) 25...♖xg4+ 26.♔d2 ♖xc4, going up two pawns and winning easily (-3.00).

At Black's 27th, the note variation 27...♖e5 28.♔a4 ♖f8 29.c5, rather than "holding the position" for White,




allows a quick crush: 29...♔e4 30.♖h3 ♔f3+ 31.♖xf3 (if 31.♔d2 ♔d8+, or 31.♔e1 ♖xe3+) 31...♖h2+ 32.♔d3 ♖xf3 (-11.29). White should reply to 27...♖e5 with 28.♖c1, though then he is still losing (-2.40).

In the note to Black's 35th, after 35...♖d8+,




36.♖d7 does not merit the "!" given it. Black still wins by 36...♖xd7+ 37.♔xd7 h3 38.♔xe5 ♖xe5 39.♖xg4 h2 40.♖c8+ ♔h7 41.♖h3+ ♔g6 42.♖g2+ ♔f7 etc. Relatively best is 36.♔c3, but it loses too.

Game 82, Tartakower-Bogolyubov: At White's 33rd, in the variation 33.♔h5 ♖xd5,




the note's main point, that 34.♔xe8 loses, is quite correct. But it bears mentioning that White can force a draw with 34.♔f3 ♖f7 (other moves are worse, e.g., 34...♖e6 35.♖b5 c6 36.♔xc6!) 35.♔xb7+ ♖xb7 (35...♖b8?? 36.♖b5+-) 36.♖b5+ ♔a8 37.♖c6+ ♔b8 38.♖b5+ etc. Of course, in the actual game, neither player was aiming for a draw.

At White's 35th, the note variation 35.♔xd5 ♖xd5 36.♔g1? (better 36.♖e1 or ♖d1) 36...g3 37.♖f4 is indeed "feeble" for White,




but not if Black plays 37...♖e4? as given, as that allows 38.♖h6! (threatening 39.♖f8+ ♖d8 [or 39...♔d7 40.♖d1] 40.♖xf5+ etc.) and White gets wild counterplay, e.g., 38...b6 39.♖d1 ♖b5 40.♖f8+ ♖e8 41.a4∞ etc. Correct instead is 37...h3! 38.♖xg3 (anything else allows forced mate) 38...♖xe3! 39.♖g7 ♖e8 and Black is winning.

Game 83, Tartakower-Réti: At White's 25th, while the retreat 25.♔f3, as actually played, was not bad, White could have used his "shock troop" immediately:




25. ♖xg6+! h×g6 26. ♙xg6, after which best play runs along the lines of 25... ♙h6 27. ♗h5 ♖g7 28. c5 b×c5 29. d×c5 ♖c8 (or 29... ♖e4 30. c6 f5 31. c×b7 ♗b7 32. ♙b2+ ♖f6 33. ♗xg6+-) 30. c6 ♙a6 31. ♗xg6! ♗xg6 32. ♙f5 ♗e7 33. ♗g6+ ♖h8 34. ♗xh6+ ♖g8 35. ♗g6+ ♖h8 (35... ♗g7 36. ♙e6+ ♖h8 37. ♗h6+ ♗h7 38. ♗xh8+) 36. ♙xg6+- (+3.39).

Position XIV, Sergeant-Tartakower: At White's 57th,




no clear loss looms if White avoids the suicidal 57. ♖c4+?!, and instead continues 57. ♖f1+ ♖x d4 58. ♖h2 ♖e5 59. ♖xg4+ ♖x e6, when a draw looks likely.

Game 86, Euwe-Tartakower: The note at White's 21st, after 21. ♗f5, considers the best defense to be 21... ♗ae8 22. ♗af1 ♗e7.




However, that leaves Black in virtual *Zugzwang* and very much lost. White can calmly improve his position a while, or proceed directly with 23. ♗c6 threatening 24. ♗x f7 ♗x f7 (24... ♗f x f7?? 25. ♗a8+ ♗f8 26. ♗x f8#) 25. ♗x f7 ♗x f7 26. ♗e8+. Black has nothing better than 23... ♖xg5 24. ♗x f8+ ♖h7 25. h×g5 ♗xg5, losing a whole rook.

In contrast, the disparaged 21...c6 is not nearly so bad,




viz. 22. ♗e6 ♗x e6 23. ♖x e6 ♗f c8 (23... ♗f e8? 24. ♖c7) 24. ♗af1 ♖e5 25. ♗xh5 and Black is somewhat worse (+0.68) but not hopelessly lost.

Game 87, Tarrasch-Tartakower: It bears mentioning that White's losing move came here,




when he played 21. f3?. Instead a draw could have been forced by 21. ♗h3, viz., 21... ♙x e4 (21... h5?? 22. ♙b7+-; if 21... ♗x e4 22. ♗x h7+ ♖f8 23. ♗f3 ♗d7 24. ♗h8+ ♖e7 25. ♗f6+ ♖e8 26. ♗h8+ etc. =) 22. ♗x h7+ ♖f8 23. ♗h8+ ♖e7 24. ♗f6+ ♖d7 25. ♗d1+ ♙d5 (25... ♖c7?? 26. ♗e7+ ♖c6 27. ♗x d8+-) 26. ♗x d5+ e×d5 (26... ♗x d5 27. ♗d3 ♖e8 28. ♗x d5 ♗x d5 29. h3 ♗ad8 30. ♗h8+ ♖d7 31. ♗g7 ♖e8=) 27. ♗c3 ♗x c3 28. e6+ f×e6 29. ♗x c3=.

Game 89, Lazard-Tartakower: This is, alas, perhaps the worst-annotated game in the book, starting at White's 8th, in the note variation 8. ♖x e5 ♖x e5 9. f×e5 ♖d4 10. ♗e2:




Now not 10... ♙g4?! as given (11. ♗e3! ♗f e8 12. ♗x d4 ♙x d4 13. ♙f4=), but 10... ♗e8! 11. ♙e3 ♗x e5 12. ♙x c5 ♗x c5 13. ♖e4 ♖x e4 14. d×e4 ♙f5 15. 0-0-0 ♙x e4 16. c3 ♙g6+-.


The note at White's 9th, in the variation 9. ♖x e5, has a series of errors. For clarity, we present the book's moves in black, and our suggested improvements in red:



9... ♗e8?! (better 9... ♗d4 10. ♗f3 ♗x e5+) 10. ♙f4 ♖g4 11. ♗e2?! (better 11. ♗d2 ♖x e5 12. 0-0-0 =) 11... ♖x e5? (11... ♗d4! 12. g3 ♖x e5 13. 0-0-0 ♙g4 14. ♗e4 ♙f3 15. ♗x d4 ♙x d4 16. ♙h3 ♙x h1 17. ♗x h1 with the exchange for a pawn) 12. ♙x e5 ♙d4?? (not the "!" given it; better 12... ♙f5)




13. 0-0-0?? (13. ♙x d4!! ♗x e2+ 14. ♖x e2 and White, with rook, knight, bishop and pawn for the queen, is winning) 13... ♗x e5 14. ♗f3?? (relatively best is 14. ♖e4) 14... ♙x c3 15. b×c3




15... ♗a5? (missing 15... ♗g5+! 16. ♖b1 ♙g4 17. ♗g3 ♙x d1 18. ♗xg5 ♗xg5 and Black is up a rook). The rest of the note, 16. d4 ♗f5 17. ♗e4 ♙e6 "and Black has regained his piece with advantage," is correct, but it is hardly the advantage either side might have had at various points.

At White's 10th, the illustrious problemist Fred Lazard did not avoid a catastrophic variation. His best chance was note line (a), when after 10. ♖x e4 ♖x e4?! (not "!!" as given; see below) 11. ♙x d8 ♖c3 12. ♖x e5 ♗x e5+ as given,




instead of 13.♔d2? he could have avoided the worst with 13.♙e2! ♖xe2+ 14.♗xe2 ♜xe2 15.♔e2 ♙g4+ 16.♔d2 ♖xd8, reaching an ending where, with R+R+6P vs. R+B+B+5P, he has drawing chances.

Returning to the note line, after 13.♔d2? ♜xd1 14.♖xd1 ♙g4 15.♙c7,



it does become catastrophic if, instead of 15...♖e7?! as given, Black plays 15...♙e3+! 16.♔e1 (16.♔c3?? ♖c5+ 17.♖b4 ♙xd1 -+) 16...♖e6 and White has only the ugly choice of 17.♖b1 ♙b6+ 18.♔d2 ♙xc7, or 17.♙g3 ♙g5+ 18.♙e2 (18.♔f2 ♖f6+ 19.♔g1 ♙e3+ 20.♙f2 ♙xf2#) 18...♖xe2+ etc.


In any event, given the relative salvation White finds in the with 13.♙e2! variation above, it behooves White to vary from the note line earlier, with 10...♜eg4! (instead of 10...♜xe4 “!!”):




Best play then continues something like 11.♙e2 ♙f5 12.0-0-0 (if 12.♜fd2 ♙xe4 13.♜xe4 ♜f2 14.♙xf6 gxf6 15.♙f3 [15.♖g1? ♜xe4 16.dxe4 ♙xg1] 15...♖xe4+ 16.dxe4 ♜xh1 -+) 12...♜f2 13.♙xf6 gxf6 etc., Black ending up a

piece or the exchange ahead (about -2.00 or better).

In the note to Black’s 11th, one of the two disparaged variations is actually as good or better than the text move. After 11...♙d5 12.♙xf6 ♙xf3 13.d4 ♙xh1 14.♙e5




And while the second variation, 11...♜e4, may be a “will-o’-the-wisp,” the way to prove it is not 12.dxe4 ♙xg5 13.♙d5 as given,




as this allows the crushing 13...♙e3! (-6.11). Instead White should vary earlier with 12.fxe4 ♙xg5 13.h4, though he may still be lost.

That the text move 10.♜e2 was in fact catastrophic is shown at move 13, where instead of 13...♙xf3,




Black had 13...♙e3+! inducing quick resignation, viz. 14.♙xe3 ♖xe3 15.♙e1 ♙xf3 16.♙g3 ♖xd3+ 17.♔e1 (if 17.♔c2 ♖d2+ 18.♔xd2 ♜e4+, or 17.♔c1 ♙e4 18.♙g1 ♙f5 19.♙f2 ♖f3 -+) 17...♙d5 18.♙g2 ♙b5 19.♙f4 ♙g4 -+ (-6.65).

After 13...♙e3+ was missed, play continued 13...♙xf3 14...♜g3,




and now Black *did* play 14...♙e3+, but he should not have! Instead after 14...♙f2+! 15.♙e2 ♙g4 White has no good defense against the threat of 16...♙e3+ 17.♙xe3 ♙xe3+ 18.♔c2 ♙xe2, and can honorably resign. It was this error that allowed the game to go on as long as it did.

The note at move 14 says 14...♙g4 would be “unpropitious,” and indeed it is, but not for the reason given.




White should simply play 15.♙xf3 ♙xf3 16.♙xf6 ♙xh1 17.♜xh1 gxf6, when he’s down the exchange but not without chances. But the move given, 15.♙e2??,




is met by 15...♖xe2! 16.♙xe2 ♙d5!, and major material loss is inevitable.

The note at White’s 20th discusses “the promising maneuver 20...♜d5.”




This should met not by 21.♖g5 as given, but rather by 21.♜f2! ♜d8 22.a3, with a nearly even game. After 21.♖g5, the note is correct that White need not fear 21...♜e3+, but he most definitely must fear 21...a3!,



viz., 22.♜c1 ♜f5 23.♜e4 a×b2+ 24.♜×b2 ♜c7 25.c4 ♜f4 26.♜f1 (26.♜h1?? ♜×d3+) 26...♜h3! 27.♜d2 ♜×f1 28.♜f1 ♜×e4 29.d×e4 ♜d8+ etc. (-5.91), or 22.b×a3 ♜×c3! 23.♜×e6 (23.♜×c3 ♜ac8; 23.♜×c3 ♜ac8+ 24.♜c6 ♜×c6#) 23...f×e6++, or 22.♜ab1 ♜b4+ 23.c×b4 (23.♜d1 ♜×a2; 23.♜c1 ♜×a2+ 24.♜d1 ♜b3+) 23...♜ac8+ 24.♜d1 ♜×a2 25.b×a3 (25.♜a1 ♜b3+) 25...♜×b1++.


Finally, in the note to White's 21st, the variation 26.♜g1,



it is unclear what advantage Tartakower thought Black would have with 26...♜e3 27.♜e1 f4; after either 28.c4, or 28.♜×e3 f×e3 (28...♜×e3?? 29.♜×e3 f×e3+-) 29.♜g3 ♜×a2 30.♜b8+ ♜f7 31.♜f4+ ♜f6 32.♜×e3, the game is virtually even. Instead Black should simply play 26...♜×g1 27.♜×g1 ♜×a7, with the better endgame.


It is ironic that this mistake-filled game won a brilliancy prize, while other far more deserving games by Tartakower (e.g. vs. Schlechter, St. Petersburg 1909, or vs. Maróczy, Teplitz-Schönau 1922) did not.

Game 91, Tartakower-Bogolyubov: In the note to White's 7th, after 7.♜×b5 c×b5 8.♜f3,




the given continuation 8...♜a5+ 9.♜d1 ♜a4+ 10.♜c1 c3 yields Black relatively little. Instead, he can simply keep the unsoundly sacrificed piece with 8...♜c7! intending 9...♜b7 or 9...♜c6, since if 9.♜×a1?? ♜b4+ 10.♜d1 ♜b7 11.♜×a7 ♜c6 White's queen is trapped.

At Black's 32nd, while 32...♜×f4+ would probably not have saved Black, it was nonetheless the best move. After 33.♜f3,




Black should play not 33...♜c1+ as given, but 33...♜e5. This puts him at a disadvantage of only about +0.65, compared to +3.55 after 33...♜c1+? 34.♜g2 ♜b2+ 35.♜f2 ♜a3?? (better 35...♜e5 still) 36.♜×f5, or the +2.63 evaluation after the text move 32...♜f2?, which was the crucial mistake of the game.

To raise a minor technicality, at White's 42nd the threat of Black promoting his b-pawn is still real, but not fatal as claimed. 42.d6? is certainly a poor move, throwing away an easy win, but after 42...b1♜




instead of 43.♜×b1?? (which would be fatal), White has 43.♜×b1 ♜×b1 44.d7 and 44...♜d2 45.♜×b1 ♜×d7, or 44...♜h1+ 45.♜f2 ♜h×e1 (45...♜d1 46.♜×h1 ♜×d7) 46.d8♜+, with approximate equality either way.

Game 93, Tartakower-Monticelli: In the note to White's 16th, after 16...♜b6,




the suggested line 16...♜×d1 17.♜×d1 ♜×b6 18.♜×e5 ♜g4 19.♜d2 ♜ad8 20.♜×d8 ♜×d8 21.h3 ♜e6 22.♜×e6 f×e6 23.♜×e6+ ♜h8, rather than offering hope of resistance, leaves Black completely lost (+5.37). Relatively best is 16...♜c5, viz., 17.♜×f7+ (if 17.♜×a8 ♜×c4=, or 17.♜×c8 ♜×c8 18.♜b3±) 17...♜×f7 18.♜d8+ ♜f8 19.♜×f8+ ♜×f8 20.♜×a8 ♜d7,




and either 21.♜c7 21...♜d6 22.♜×a6 (22.♜e8 ♜e7) 22...b×a6, or 21.♜d1 ♜×f2+ 22.♜h1 ♜h7 23.♜c7 ♜f4, with some drawing chances either way.

The note to White's 20th is correct that 20.♜×e5 is bad, but the reply 20...♜×f2+ is wrongly disparaged; it is actually strongest by far:




After 21.♖h1 ♜xg4 White has simply dropped a piece. And of course if 21.♖xf2?? ♜c1+ forces mate, or if 21.♖xf2?? ♜xe5.

At White's 21st, after 21.♖g3??



the black king would not “slip away” by 21...♖h8; rather he would gleefully conquer by 21...♙f2+!! and either 22.♖xf2 ♜xf2+ 23.♖xf2 ♖d1+ and mate next, or 22.♖h1 ♙xg3 23.♖g1 ♖d1 etc.


Game 94, Capablanca-Tartakower: The note at Black's 19th correctly calls 19...♖d3 “precipitate,” but botches the refutation. After 20.f3 exf3? (better 20...♖ad8=) 21.♖xd3 fxg2 22.♖g1 ♖f1+,



23.♖d1? ♖af8 24.♖c2 as given loses, viz. 24...♖8f3! 25.♖d2 (if 25.♖g5?? ♖3f2+ 26.♖d3 ♖xd1+ 27.♖xd1 ♖f1 --, or 25.♖d3? ♖xh3 26.♖xg2 ♖c1+ 27.♖xc1 ♖xd3 28.♖g4 ♖xb3 losing two pawns) 25...♖xh3 26.♖xg2 and Black is up a sound pawn. Instead White must play 23.♖c2! ♖xg1 24.♖xg1 ±, with a knight for two pawns.


Game 96, Tartakower-Colle:

The note variation at Black's 18th would not provide the hoped-for moment's respite; after 19.♖e3 ♖hg8? (much better 19...e6) 20.♖c3 ♖d7,




White has 21.d6! exd6 22.♖d5! (threatening both 23.♖xc7# and the family fork 23.♖e7+) 22...♖g7 23.♖e7+ ♖b8 24.♖xg8 winning the exchange.

In the note at Black's 31st, after 31...♖c8,




White should not play 32.♖a7 “preparing the regrouping ♖b6-a5, followed by ♖a8#,” since instead of 32...♖f6+ as given, Black has 32...♖xf4! when White's advantage is minimal and the intended maneuver is thwarted, since if 33.♖a5 ♖e5+ forcing exchange of queens. Rather, White should play the decisive 32.♖d8!,




forcing 32...♖f6+ 33.♖a3 and either 33...♖e6 34.f5+- or 33...♖e8 34.♖d7+-.

Game 97, Tartakower-Maróczy: In the note at Black's 20th, after 20...♖b7 21.♖xf5,



it has been overlooked that the ♖h6 is *en prise*. Rather than 21...♖g6?? as given, 21...♖xh6 22.♖b5+ ♖c6 holds.


At Black's 21st, the note variation 22...♖xe6 actually appears to have been the best defense.



Then not 22.♖f4? as given, as then 22...♖xb2! 23.♖fe1 ♖b7! 24.♖xe6 (24.♖g3? ♖g6+-) 24...♖xf3 25.♖xe7+ ♖xe7 26.gxf3 ♖g8+ 27.♖f1 ♖gg2 28.♖e1+ ♖d7 29.♖e2 (if 29.♖xf5+? soon ...♖xa2.) 29...♖g8 and Black, with a material edge of rook and three pawns for the two bishops, is winning.


Instead, White is better advised to try 22.♖g7 ♖g8 23.♖ae1 ♖xg7 24.♖xe6 fxex6 25.♖f2, or perhaps 22.♖g3 ♖b6 (22...♖xb2?! 23.♖c1 ♖b6 24.♖xf5 ∞) 23.♖c1.

It went unnoticed, but Black blundered at move 23.




After 23...♖xf5?? (better 23...♖e8=), instead of the text move 24.♖xf5, White could have won with 24.♖d5+! ♖d6 (relatively best; worse is 24...♖d7 25.♖xe7! ♖c6 [if 25...♖xe7?? 26.♖xf7+ ♖e8 27.♖xd7#] 26.♖xd7+ ♖xd7 27.♖e5 and one of the black rooks is lost) 25.♖xf5 ♖xd5 26.♖xd5+ ♖c7 (26...♖e8 27.♖g5) 27.♖xe7+ and White is a piece up.

In the note to Black's 27th, 27...♖d7 is indeed a “melancholy alternative,”



but not because of 28.♖xf7+ ♜xf7 ♜xd7+ as given. Far better is 28.♖e1+ ♜f6/♜f8 29.♜xd7, winning the queen for nothing.


Finally, it appears the rook ending is actually not as good for White as Tartakower believed. Black could have drawn with a4-a3 probably at move 32, and certainly at move 33. For example,



after 33...a3 34.bxa3 (forced) 34...♖g6 35.♖xd4 (else 35...♖d6+-) 35...♖c6, we reach the position mentioned in the note to White's 35th move, which Tartakower acknowledged as a draw.


Position XIX, Znosko-Borovsky–

Tartakower: While Znosko-Borovsky might have been quite content to draw, had there actually occurred the variation in the note to Black's 34th, 4...♖c8 35.♜e4 ♜d5 36.♜xd5 ♖xd5 37.♖e4 ♖c5?? (better 37...♖h5, though Black is still worse),




he would most likely have been happy to win with 38.♖g5!, instead of drawing with 38.h5 as given.

And in that same note, in the line 34...♖b8 35.♜f3 c5+?? (almost anything is better),




while the given 36.♖e4 may perhaps “sway the balance in White's favor” and make his unpinned bishop “the decisive factor,” far more swaying and decisive is 36.♖b7! ♖f8+ (if 36...♖xb7 37.♖e4 and mate shortly) 37.♜g3 ♜g8+ 38.♖g7 ♜xh7 39.♖xh7 and wins.

Finally, it appears White's sacrifice at move 35 was unsound and unnecessary.




Instead of 35.♖b7?, there appears to be no way for Black to win after the unmentioned 35...♜f3 or 35...♜f1, with equality.

Game 98, Tartakower-Halberstadt: The note at Black's 23rd, examining acceptance of the knight sacrifice, has several errors. The sacrifice is indeed correct, and White wins, but not in the ways given. In variation (b), after 24...♖h6 25.0–0–0 ♜c8+ 26.♖c3 ♜h8




best is simply 27.gxh6+-, since if, as given, 27.♖xh6+? ♖xh6 28.♖h1




rather than 28...♖f7?, Black has 28...♜f5! with advantage. And even after 28...♖f7, the given continuation 29.♖xh6+? allows 29...♜g7!= (rather

than 29...♖h7?? 30.g6+-). White should reply to 28...♖f7 with 29.g6+-.

In variation (c), after 24...♜g6 25.♜d3+ ♜f7




White should not play 26.♜f5+ as given, but 26.0–0+! ♜e8 27.♜g6+ ♜d7 28.♖xf8 ♖xf8 (if 28...♜xf8? 29.♖f1 ♜e7?? 30.♖f7+-) 29.♜xg8, regaining his piece with advantage. After the given 26.♜f5+ ♜e7 27.♜e4+,




Black can hold with 27...♜d7! 28.♜xb7+ (28.♖c1 ♖b8=) 28...♜c7+, when he is still up a piece for two pawns and White's attack is petering out.

Game 99, Tartakower-Romih: We suggest one improvement to the note at Black's 20th: after 20...gxh4 21.♖g4 ♖g6 22.♖e5 ♖g7 23.♜e4 d6 24.♖xf4 ♖xf4



rather than 25.♖xf4 as given, better 25.♜a8+ and mate next.


The note at Black's 21st is incorrect. If 21...♜c5 22.fxg5 does not win a pawn;




after 22...Rxf2 23.Rxf2 Qxc4 White cannot recapture on c4, pawns are even and Black stands slightly better.

21...Qc5 is best answered by 22.Qg4.

At White's 23rd, the capture 23.dxe6 is indeed not best, but not because Black can reply 23...dxe6.




In that case, White continues 24.Qd7+! Rf7 25.Qd4+ and either 25...e5 26.dxe5+-, or Black moves the king and loses the exchange, e.g. 26...Qf8 27.Qh6 or 26...Qg6 27.Qe5+. Relatively best after 23.dxe6 is 23...Qd6,




though after 24.Qxd6 cxd6 25.exd7 Rf8 26.Rxf4 Rxf4 27.Rxf4 Rxd7 White still stands clearly better if not winning.

Position XXI, Tartakower-Treybal: The note at Black's 45th is correct to advise against 46.Qxa5?, but gives the wrong follow-up.




Not, as given, 46...Ra8? – Correct is 46...Qxa4! 47.Qxa4 Ra8 48.Qb3 Ra5 with good drawing chances. – 47.Qc4? – Still winning would be 47.Rxb6! Qxb6 48.Qc4+ Qc7 49.Qxc5, and the two passed pawns are ample compensation for the exchange. The rest of the note is correct. – 49...Qxa4 48.Qxa4 Ra4.

Game 100, Tartakower-Weenink: The note at Black's 8th, in the variation 8...Qd5 9.0-0 Qxe3 10.Qxe3 Qa6? 11.Qxa6 Qxa6,




says incorrectly that 12.Qe5 now wins. That move is met adequately by 12...f6, since if 13.Qxc6? Qd5 and the knight has no escape square. What does win is 12.Qg5! and Black cannot defend f7, since now if 12...f6?? 13.Qxe6+ etc.

At White's 15th, it is unclear why Tartakower considered 15.Qf4+ the less “exact” bishop check, since after the given continuation 15.Qf4+ Qe5 16.dxe5 Qd4+




White is clearly winning, viz., 17.Qh1 and 17...Qxe5 18.Rae1+-, or 17...Rhe8 18.exf6+-, or 17...Qe4 18.Qg4+ Qe7 19.Qxg7+ Qe6 20.Qe3 Qxe5 21.Qg4+ Qd6 22.Qxd4 etc. Also good is 17.Rf2.

The note at White's 20th is mistaken that after 20.Qf3 “a defense by 20...Qf6 is possible.”




After 21.exf6 Black is totally lost, viz., 21...gxf6 22.Rad1 Qxc4 23.Qxf6 and mate in 5, or 21...Qe5 22.Rae1+-, or 21...Qd6 22.fxg7 Qxg7 23.Qf7+ Qxf7 24.Rxf7 followed by 25.Re1+ and mate shortly, or 21...Qxc4 22.fxg7 Rg8 23.Qf8+ Rxf8 24.gxf8Q+ Qd7 25.Rad1+ etc.

The note at White's 22nd unfairly condemns 22.Qb3; it is perhaps the strongest move. Even if Black replies with 22...Rf8 as given (no worse than other moves),




after 23.Rad1! Black has nothing better than giving up his queen by 23...Qxe5 24.Rfe1 etc., since if 23...Qc5 24.Qf7+! (anyway!) 24...Rxf7 25.Rxf4 and Black's rook (not to mention his king) is toast, because if 25...Rxf4 26.Qe6+ Qf8 27.Qh6#.

Game 101, Marshall-Tartakower: In the note line at White's 16th, after 16.Rxh7 Rxh7 17.gxh7 0-0-0 18.Qf4,



the recommended 18...Qh5 is ineffective compared to 18...d4! 19.c4 (forced; if 19.cxd4 Rxd4 20.Qc2 [20.Qc1?? Qxe2#] 20...Rxf4) 19...d3, and Black wins a piece while staying on the attack.


At White's 22nd, if 22.♖d1,



far stronger than the recommended 22...♗xb2 is 22...♞xd4+! 23.♙xd4 ♗xd4+ 24.♖e1 ♗xb2 and the white rook is lost, since if 25.♞d1 ♙c3+.

Position XXIII, Przepiórka-


Tartakower: It's unclear why the text move 28...♙c5 is considered "much more convincing" than 28...♗xa1, which is actually strongest. After the given continuation 28...♗xa1 29.♙b2 ♗xa2 30.♖c1 ♙c5 31.♙c2,




Black is winning easily, viz., 31...d4, and if 32.♙xd4 ♙xb3+ 33.♖d1 (33.♙xb3?? ♗xg2) 33...♙xd4+, or 32.g4 ♙xb3+ 33.♙xb3 ♗xb3 34.g5 (34.♗f2 ♞h1+) 34...♗e3+ 35.♖b1 ♗xf4 etc., or 32.♗g1 d3 33.♗xc5 dxc2 34.♗xc2 ♞h1+ 35.♖d2 ♞h2+ and wins.

Game 102, Tartakower-Sultan Khan:

The note at Black's 20th goes astray near the end.




After 20...b6 21.♞bc1 c5 22.dxc5 bxc5 23.♞xd5 (better perhaps simply 23.♙xe4 dxe4 24.♙xc5 winning a pawn cleanly) 23...♙df6 24.♞dxc5 ♙xc5,




White must not continue 25.♙xa8 ♙b3 26.♞c3 ♙d2+ 27.♖e1 as given, since this allows 27...♞xa8 28.♖xd2 ♙e4+ 29.♖d3 ♙xc3, and White has insufficient compensation for the exchange. Better instead is 27.♞xc5, when after, say, 27...♞ab8 28.♞xg5 White has still lost the exchange but has three pawns and active pieces for it.

Game 105, Molina-Tartakower: The note at Black's 19th says "less clear [than the text move 19...♞d2] are the consequences of 19...♞d3."



But actually the consequences are quite clear if instead of the given move 20.♞ac1? White plays 20.♙ed5!, and after either 20...♞xf3 21.♙xc7 ♞xc3 22.♙xc3 ♞c8 23.♙xe5 ♙xe4 24.♞fe1, or 20...♗c4 21.♙xe7+ ♖g7 22.♙f5+ gxf5 23.♗xf5, White has gone from nearly lost to an even game.

In the note at White's 22nd, in the variation 22.♙c1 ♞d2 23.♞e1,




the given continuation 23...♞ad8 allows White counterplay by 24.♙g5, when Black is forced to retreat somewhat, viz. 24...♗c6 25.♙c3 ♖g7 26.♙xf6+ ♗xf6 27.♗xf6+ ♙xf6 28.♙d5. Instead, Black

can keep advancing and win another pawn with 23...♙xe4!.

Game 106, Tartakower-Zimmerman:


The note at Black's 29th gives the impression that the text move 29...♞b2 was no worse than other alternatives, but in fact it was a serious mistake which, more than any other move, lost the game, by giving White the tempo needed to make ♙e4-f6+ a genuine threat. Black's best chance lay probably in the unmentioned 29...f5!?,



preventing 30.♙f6+, and when if, for example, 30.♗b3 ♗a4 31.♗xa4 ♞xa4 32.♙g5 h6 33.♙e6 ♞e8 34.♞d7 ♞a6 35.♞g7+ ♖h8 36.♞xg6 ♞axe6 37.♞xe6 ♞xe6 38.♞xc4, we reach a theoretically drawn ending. Or if 30.♞xc4 fxe4 31.♞c2 (31.♞xe4 ♞xf2=) 31...♞a3, with near equality. Or 30.♙g5 ♙d2 31.♗d3 (31.♗b6 ♙f3+ 32.♙xf3 ♗xf3≈) 31...♞d8 32.♗e3 ♞a7 33.♞c2 h6 34.♞cd2 (34.♙h3?? ♙f3+-) 34...♞xd2 35.♗xd2 hxc5 36.♗xc5 and Black still has a lot of fight left.

Game 107, Tartakower-Yates:


The note at White's 38th implies that White had to protect his a-pawn before advancing his b-pawn.



While there was nothing wrong in doing so, 38.b5! was in fact immediately possible and strong, since if 38...♙xa5?? 39.♖b4 traps and wins the knight.


Game 109, Colle-Tartakower:

The note at White's 21st is correct that White threatens to win a piece,




but it is done far more economically by 22.♖c1 ♖b4 23.♜xc5, than by the given line 22.e5 ♜h5 23.♜h7+ ♖h8 24.♖xc3 ♜xf4+ 25.♖f3 ♜xe2 26.♖xe2 ♖xh7 27.♖xc5, which also drops an important pawn in the process.

At White's 32nd, an important defensive resource goes unnoticed.




Instead of the text move 32.♖e4, better 32.♖xb7!. Besides capturing a pawn, this effectively thwarts Black's hopes of attack on the h-file, viz. 32...♖g7 33.♖f1 ♖h8 and now White can safely play 34.♖g2!, since if 34...♜xg2? 35.♖xf7+ ♖h6 36.♖xe6+ etc. If instead 34...♖h7 35.♜d4 (threatening 36.♜xe6+) 35...♖h6 36.♖gg1, or 35...♖h6 36.♜e2! and if 36...♖g6? 37.♜xf4 gxf4 38.♖xg6+ ♖xg6 39.♖e4+- . Best for Black after 32.♖xb7 appears to be 32...♖g7 33.♖f1 ♜b6,




but then after 34.♖f3 ♖h8 35.♖g2 White can hold indefinitely.

In the note to Black's 41st, it's not at all clear what danger Tartakower thought Black might be in after 41...♜xe5 42.♖e4 ♖g5 43.♖e2:




After 43...♜f4 Black is winning comfortably (-3.57), about the same evaluation as the text move 41...♜c5 (-3.39).


Game 111, Tartakower-Colle: White may have missed a very strong continuation at move 19.



Instead of the text move 19.♜d5, better was 19.♜xd3 ♖xd3 20.♜b5!,




when Black cannot defend the a-pawn (20...♖b8? 21.♜f4+ ♖a8?? 22.♜c7+). Best therefore is 20...a6, when Rybka indicates best play runs along the lines of 21.♜xb6 axb5 22.cxb5+ ♖b8 23.g3 ♖d2 24.♖c4 ♖e4 (if 24...♜d6? 25.♖d4 ♖xd4 26.♜xd4; and not 24...♜f8?? 25.♜c7+ ♖c8 26.♜f4+) 25.♖xe4 fxe4 26.a4 ♖d6 (if 26...♖b2?! 27.♖g2 ♖xb3? 28.♖d1 ♖d3 29.♖xd3 exd3 30.♖f3 and White wins.) 27.♜e3 ♖d3 28.♖e2 ♖xb3 29.♖c1,




intending 30.♖c4, retaining the a-pawn while winning the e-pawn and eventually the game.

Game 112, Bogoljubow-Tartakower: No comment is made on White's 41st move, a serious omission, since it was as crucial a turning point as move 19.




White here stood somewhat worse, but was not definitely lost until he played 41.♜g3?, allowing 41...♜g5! when the threats of ...♜f3+ and ...♖d3 were unstoppable. Instead, White had 41.♖h8!, when if, for example, 41...♜g5 42.♜f4+ (both covering d3 and defending the h-pawn) 42...♖f5 43.♖c8+ ♖f6 44.♖f1 ≈, or if 41...♖d3 42.h4! preventing 42...♜g5, or 41...♖f8 42.♜f4+ ♖f5 43.♖h7+ ♖e5 44.♜xe6 fxe6 45.♖c7+ etc. =, or 41...♖d5 42.♖g8+ ♖f6 43.♖h7=.

Therefore to preserve his advantage, on the move before,




Black needed to play 40...f6 or 40...♖f6, preventing 41.♖h8.

Game 114, Tartakower-Koltanowski: The note at Black's 15th, which after 15...b4




recommends 16.♖a2 followed by a long continuation at the end of which White is merely “a good pawn up,” is far too modest in its goal. Instead, White has 16.hxg6+ fxg6 17.axb4 ♖xb4 18.f5! with a winning attack,




viz., 18...gxh6 (18...c5? 19.♗xh6! ♖xh6 20.♖g4+-) 19.exf5 ♗xf5 20.g4 ♗g6 21.♖f3 ♖d7 22.♖h4 ♗f7 23.♗d3+ ♖h8 24.♖f5 ♗xc4 25.♗xh6 ♖xf5 26.♗g5+-.

In the note to Black's 17th, after 17...hxg5 18.hxg6+ ♖xg6 19.f5+ ♗xf5,




far better than the given 20.♗h5+ is 20.exf5+ ♖f6 (if 20...♖xf5 21.d5 forces mate shortly) 21.♖df1 and a quick mate (threatened by both 21.♗xg5 and 21.♖e4) can be prevented only at horrendous material cost.


Position XXVI, Tartakower-Flohr: It appears Black could have drawn this ending at a couple of points. The note at Black's 32nd says that if 32...♖f7 33.♖b8 a5 34.♖a6 wins material, but after 34...c5!




this is not the case, whether White captures *en passant* or not. Further on, instead of 37...♖e7, Black had 37...d5!,



when either 38.♖d4 dxc4 39.♖xc4 ♖e7 40.♖d5 ♖f7 or 38.cxd5 ♖e7 39.♖c4 ♖d6 draws. And even after missing this, next move Black could have put up much more resistance,




with (instead of 38...♖f7?) 38...axb4+! 39.♖xb4 d5! 40.c5 (if 40.cxd5 ♖d6 41.♖c4 ♖e7 42.♖b5 ♖d6 43.♖c4 etc. => 40...d4! 41.cxb6 cxb6




and now the only winning try for White is to enter a difficult queen ending by 42.♖b5!? d3 43.♖xb6 d2 44.c7 d1♖ 45.c8♖ ♖b3+ 46.♖a5, when he faces a far harder task than in the actual game.

Game 115, Baratz-Tartakower:

Unmentioned mistakes at moves 24 and 25 could have changed the outcome of this game. At Black's 24th, far better than the text move 24...♗b6 was 24...♖g6! winning quickly,




e.g., 25.♖xd4 ♗xg2 26.♖f3 ♗xf3+ 27.♖h2 ♖g2+ 28.♖xg2 ♖xg2+ 29.♖h1 ♖f6, heading toward a lethal windmill that forces mate in about a dozen moves or less. This is important, as after 24...♗b6 White could have made things difficult with 25.♖c3!:



This forces Black to negotiate many complications. About the only move yielding a winning advantage is 25...♖f3, after which best play continues along the lines of 26.♖e4 ♖g6 27.♖c1 ♖xh3 28.♖c3 ♖g3 29.♖c4+ ♖h8 30.♖xg3 fxg3 31.♖xf3 ♖xf3 32.gxf3 gxf2+ 33.♖f1 ♖g1+ 34.♖e2 fxex1♖+ 35.♖xe1 ♖g2+ 36.♖d1 ♖xb2, with a probably winning but still difficult queen-and-bishop ending.


Game 116: Alekhine/ Gosselin-

Tartakower/ Villeneuve: In the note to White's 14th, after 14.♖f3 ♗xe3 15.fxe3 ♖e8 16.♖d2?




not 16...♖e7 as given, but 16...♖a5!, and Black will win either the exchange or two pawns.

Game 117, Alekhine-Tartakower: In the note to White's 18th, after 18.♖xg6 fxg6 19.♖xg6+ ♖g7 20.♖xh6 ♖e4, White is under no compulsion to play the given 21.f3?, losing his queen. Instead 21.♗e5! is strong,




the mate threat compelling 21...♖f7 (worse is 21...♗f6 22.f3 ♗xe5 23.dxe5) and only then 22.f3 ♗g5 23.♖g6, when Black cannot play 23...♖f6, but must accept 23...♗xc3 24.bxc3, when as compensation for the sacrificed piece White has three connected passed pawns and good kingside attacking chances.

In the note to Black's 23rd, the sub-variation 23...♗xc4 24.f3 ♗xe5 ♗xc3,




not 25.♖f2 as given, but 25.♗exg6! ♗e4 (25...fxg6?? 26.♖xe8) 26.♗xf8 ♗xf4 27.fxex4 ♖xf8 28.♖f2 ♗c7 29.e5, and White is up the exchange for a pawn with attacking chances as well.

The note at White's 35th is correct that after 35.bxc4 ♗e3 36.♖c1 ♖f7 37.♖f2 ♗g4+ 38.♖e2 ♖e6 39.♖cd1,




Black can "obtain the upper hand," but not by the given 39...♗f6. This is because of 40.♗c2!, when if 40...♖c6? 41.c5! ♖xc5 42.♗b3+! (the point of 40.♗c2) 42...♗d7 43.♖xb4 and it is White who gains the upper hand. Instead, Black must play 39...♖c6 first, forcing 40.d7, and only then 40...♗f6, when the d-pawn is doomed.

The long analysis at White's 56th has two oversights. First, in the variation 56.♖e5 ♗g8 57.♖f5, the disparaged 57...♖c3 is actually quite good,




if, after 58.♖f7+ ♖e6 59.♖f8 ♗h6 60.♖h8,




Black plays not 60...♖f7? but 60...♗g4+!, viz. 61.♖e2 ♗f6 62.♖f8 ♖g3, or 61.♖g2 ♗f6 62.♖f8 ♖c5 63.♖xf6+ ♖xf6 64.g8♖ ♖g5+.

Further on, in the continuation 56.♖e5 ♗g8 57.♖f5 ♖b2+ 58.♖f3 ♖b1! 59.♖f8 ♗e7 60.♖f7,



while the given move 60...♖g1 is good enough to win, much more expedient is 60...♖f1+ and 61...♖xf7.


Game 119, Tartakower-Van den Heuvel: It goes unmentioned that Black might have turned the tables at move 15.



Rather than 15...♗e8?!, best was 15...♗h5!, both defending against the


mate threat and starting a counter-attack, viz., 16.♖g2 (if 16.♖g4 ♗xc4 17.♗xc4 cxd4 18.exd4 [18.♖xh5 dxc3] 18...♖xd4 19.♗e5 b6! 20.♖g2 ♗a6±) 16...♗xc4 17.♗xc4 cxd4 18.♖d1 (18.exd4 ♖xd4±) 18...♖c7 19.♖xd4 ♗f6 20.♗e5 ♗xe5 21.fxex5 b6 22.♖d6 ♗b7 23.e4 ♖c5, and Black is clearly better.

In the note to Black's 16th, after 16...♗f6 17.dxc5 ♗d7 18.♗xd7?! (better 18.♖d1, 18.e4 or 18.♗xd7 ♗xd7 19.e4±) 18...♗xd7 19.♖d1,




rather than 19...♗xc3?? as given, Black has 19...♗xb5! 20.♖xd8 ♗c6+ and either 21.♖g1 ♖xd8, or 21.♖d5 ♗xc3 22.bxc3 ♗xd5+ 23.♖g1 ♖f6, with plenty of compensation for the queen and a more or less even game.

Game 121, Tartakower-Lilienthal: In the note to Black's 6th, it bears mentioning that in the cited game Tartakower-Cukierman, Black committed suicide at move 12.




Rather than walking into mate with 12...♖g6?!, he could have survived with either 12...♗xg5 13.hxg5+ ♖g8 14.♖h5 ♖f8 or 12...♖g8 13.♖h5 ♗xg5 14.hxg5 ♖f8, arriving at the same position,




one which, while not without its difficulties, is tenable and is evaluated by Rybka as virtually even.

The note at Black's 20th overlooks two important moves. After 20...b4,




White should play not 21.♙xc6?! as given, but 21.♙b5!, a likely continuation then being 21...♖e7 22.♙d4 ♘c7 23.♙xc6 ♙xc6 24.♖xc6 ♖d8 25.♗xb4! +-.

This is important, because in the given line 21.♙xc6 ♙xc6 22.♖xc6,




rather than 22...♙b8?, Black has 22...bxc3! 23.♖xa6 cxb2+ 24.♗b1, when his chances are significantly greater than after 21.♙b5.

Game 122, Lilienthal-Tartakower: In the note to Black's 26th, two of the three variations given deserve the disapproval given them, but not 26...♖c7!.




It is in fact the best move on the board, since unlike the text move 26...♖xe8 it does not lose the f-pawn. The note implies that White is better after 27.♖fe1, but this is simply not true; Black has a dozen or more replies that retain a winning edge, the best of them being probably 27...♖xe8 28.♖xe8+ ♗h7 (-3.66).


Game 123, Tartakower-Frentz: The note examining the variation 17...♙d8 has three errors in succession. First, 18.♙c4



is not objectively inferior to 18.♙c5. Second, it should be met not with 18...b6? but 18...c5!




forcing the ♙b4 to retreat, since if 19.♙xc5? ♖c8 20.♙xd4 ♖xc4+ with a virtually even game. Third, if Black does play 18...b6,




then by far the best way to exploit it is not 19.♙xf7 but 19.♖e7!, and if 19...c5 20.♖xf7 ♙e5 f4 etc., winning handily (+2.51).

Game 124, Znosko-Borovsky-Tartakower: In the note variation at White's 19th, after 19.♙xe4, Black must not play the recommended 19...♙xe4,




as this allows the forced line 20.♙d7+! ♖xd7 21.♖xd7 ♙xh4 22.♗c7 ♗xc7 (22...♙xf2+? 23.♗f1 is worse) 23.♖xc7 ♖c8 24.g3 ♖xc7 25.♖xc7,




and Black must lose one bishop or the other, winding up down the exchange. Correct would be 19...♙xe4.

The note at White's 23rd is wrong to recommend 23.♙c5. After 23...♙xc5 24.bxc5 ♗a5! (a move too casually dismissed in the note),




Black can capitalize on the combination of the weak pawn and White's vulnerable back rank; for example 25.♗d3 ♖d8 26.♗b3 (if 26.♗f1 ♙c6 followed by ...♗xa3) 26...♗d2 27.♗c2 (if 27.♖f1 ♙d5 28.♗b4 ♙c4) 27...♖d5 28.♗xd2 ♖xd2 29.f3 (not 29.c6? ♙xc6) 29...♗d7,




when the c-pawn must eventually fall, leaving Black with a won ending.

Contrary to the note at White's 47th, Black is not lost after 47.g4 ♗xb4.




While as the note states 47...e5 is definitely better, after 48.f4 ♖c5! (not 48...gxf4?? g5+-) 49.fxg5 ♘d6 (entering the square of the pawn) 50.♖c2 ♖e7 51.♖b3 ♖f7 52.♖b4 ♖g6 53.♖xb5 ♖xg5 54.♖c4 ♖xg4 55.♖d3 ♖f5 56.♖e3 ♖e5,



Black has the opposition and an elementary win. The same applies to the similar line in the note at move 44, the only difference (an immaterial one) being that there White's king starts at e2 instead of d1.

Position XXVII, Tartakower-Gromer:


Though this analysis was titled *Unequal Weapons*, the weapons in question – White's knight vs. Black's bishop – were, objectively speaking, not unequal enough for White to win against best play. After 42.♘h3,



rather than start retreating with 42...♖b6!?, Black could have played 42...♙a2!, and White could have forced no breakthrough while the bishop simply shuttled back and forth. Or if 43.♘f4+ ♙xf4 44.♖xf4 ♖g6=.


Further on, at what was probably the

decisive point, after 48.♘f3,




rather than 48...♙f6?, Black had 48...♙e5!, preventing 49.♖f4 and maintaining equality, since 49.♘xe5 dxe5 creates a dead-drawn position.

Game 125, Tartakower-Prokofiev: The note at Black's 13th misses a critical resource. In the variation 13...♙a5+ 14.♘c3, not 14...♖d4?? as given, but 14...fxe5!:



Now after 15.♖h5+ ♖f8, unlike in the actual game, White has no decisive continuation, viz. 16.0-0 ♖e7! 17.♘d5 ♙g4 18.♖xe5 ♖xe5 19.♙xe5≈, or 16.♖xe5 ♖d6! (playable since the long diagonal is blocked and g7 therefore not vulnerable) 17.♖g5 ♘f7 18.♖e3 ♘e5 19.♙b3 ♘bd7 20.h3 (or 20.0-0 ♘g4 21.♖h3 ♘df6) 20...♖c5, and Black is putting up a very pesky defense with good chances to come out ahead.


Other replies to 13...♙a5+ are no better,



viz. 14.♘d2 fxe5 15.♖h5+ ♖f8 16.♖xe5?? ♖xd2+ 17.♖f1 ♖e1#, or 14.♖f1 fxe5 15.♖h5+ ♖f8 16.♖xe5?? ♖d1#. White must either go for

perpetual check by ♖h5+ and ♖f3+, or accept a messy near-equality as seen above.


Contrary to the note Black's 20th, the only way in which an immediate 20...♙d8 might have been preferable is as a way to shorten Black's agony,




as after 21.♖d6+ ♖e8 22.♘d5 Black has only a few spite checks to delay mate by ♖e7# or ♘c7#.

Game 126, Tartakower-Domenech:

Contrary to the note at White's 26th,




26.♙xf7+ is not at all “a snare and a delusion,” but the best move on the board if followed up correctly. After 26...♖h8 27.♙xd8+ ♖xd8 not 28.♖d2? as given, but 28.♖g4!,




preventing 28...♖d1# and threatening ♙h6-g5-f6#. Best play then runs something like 28...♙e5 29.♙g5 ♖f8 (or 29...h5 30.♖e2 ♖d6 31.♙b3 ♖d3 [else 32.♖xe4] 32.♖xd3 exd3 33.♙d2+-) 30.♖d7 ♙g7 31.♖xb7, and White is clearly winning.

Game 127, Tartakower-Cunilera: At Black's 11th, in the note variation 11...f5 12.dg3 e4 13.fef1 Black actually can win a piece,




by 13...g8 (instead of 13...e7??), but after 14.dxe4 fxe4 15.fxe4 White has considerable compensation and the uncastled black king is none too safe.

The assessment at the end of the note to White's 12th, that after 12.fef1 e7 13.dg3 dc5 14.a3 dd6?! (better 14...e6) 15.fad1 0-0 16.ab1 d3? (again, better 16...e6) 17.b4 da6 "White's pressure has disappeared," is quite incorrect.




White applies considerable new pressure by 18.c5!, viz., 18...cc7 (or 18...cd8 19.xd3 [or simply 19.cxd3 winning a pawn] 19...cc7 20.fde3 af6 21.dh5 etc.) 19.cxd3 g6 20.e3 af6 (if 20...dxh4 21.cxh6+-) 21.dh5! dg7 22.dg7 cg7 23.fdd6 etc. with a winning attack.

Game 128, Tartakower-Rey Ardid: The note at Black's 24th has several errors. After 24...dxa4 25.dxa4 fxa4 26.fcc7 aa6,




far better than the given 27.fcf1 is 27.fbf1! fb8 (not 27...fa2?? 28.xg7+ cf8 29.fxb6 fa1+ 30.fh2 ac4 31.fbf6+ ce8 32.fef7#) 28.xg7+ fh8 29.fg6 h5 30.fgb6+-.

Further on in the given continuation, after 27.fcf1 fa5? (relatively best is 27...fb8),




far better than 28.g4 is 28.de7+ and 29.dxc6, forking the rooks and winning the exchange.

A decisive shot was missed, both in the notes and the actual game, at move 33. In the note to Black's 32nd, after 32...fa1-a6?? (erroneously described as the "more tenacious" defense), rather than the recommended 33.fbb8?!, White has the immediately decisive 33.dg6!,




threatening mate and forcing one of two replies: 33...fb6 34.fh8+ cg8 35.dxd7+ cf7 36.dxb6, or 33...fd8 34.fxd8 fb6 35.fh8+ cg8 36.d7+ etc., White winning a whole rook either way. In the actual game,



the most tenacious reply was really 32...aa6. Instead, the same opportunity


presented itself when Black played 32...fb1?!, but again 33.dg6 was missed. Ironically, Tartakower played it one move later when it no longer had the same effect.

In the note to White's 34th, after 34.fee8 g6 35.fh8+ cg7 36.fcg8+ cf6,




37.fxg6+ deserves none of the scorn heaped on it. After 37...ce7 White need only avoid the egregious follow-up given, 38.f4?!, in favor of 38.g4, 38.fgxh6, 38.fhxh6, or several other moves, to have an easily won game.

One more winning shot was missed. At move 37, Black had to play 37...fe6 to have any objective chance. Instead he played 37...fd6?,




which White could have refuted with 38.de5+! cf6 39.fcc7 (threatening mate starting with 40.f7+) 39...h5 40.f7+ cg5 41.fxg7+ cf5 42.g4+ hxg4 43.dxg4 fb5 44.f4 (threatening 45.fg5#) 44...exf3 45.gxf3,




and mate can be forestalled only at huge material cost.

Game 129, Kraus-Tartakower: Two moves are disparaged undeservedly. At Black's 16th, there is nothing wrong with the "weak" 16...♖h1.




Rybka in fact ranks it strongest, and contrary to the note, after 17.♗f4+ ♖h6 Black is winning easily (-12.24) and is in no danger, any discovered check being met by e4-e3 or g7-g5.

Similarly, the "very bad" 17...♗g5, while less good than 17...♗h6, is still quite good enough to win.




After the supposedly dangerous 18.h4+ Black simply plays 18...♗h6 or 18...♗f6 and wins (about -5.02).

Game 131, Tartakower-Friedmann: Contrary to the note at move 15, Black is not obliged to lose two pawns after 15...♗h8 16.♗d7.




Instead of 16...♗d7? as given, 16...b4! 17.♗xf6 ♖xf6 18.♗a4 ♗xg2! 19.♗xg2 ♗d5+ 20.e4 ♗xd7 21.♗c5 ♗xc5 22.♖xc5




leaves Black only one pawn down with reasonable drawing chances.

At move 16,



it goes unmentioned that 16...♗f8? was probably the losing move. Better were either 16...♗b6 17.♗xf7+ ♗xf7, or 16...b4, when after, say, 17.♗xf7+ ♗xf7 18.♗c4+ ♗f8 19.♗e2 ♗d5, Black can still resist.


In the note at Black's 18th, after 18...b4 19.♗xf6 ♗xf6,



the given move, 20.♗d5, leads to little advantage after 20...♗xd5 21.♖xd5 ♗xa2. Far stronger is 20.♗c4+! ♗e8 21.♗d5 ♖c8 (if 21...♗xd5 22.♖xd5 ♗b6 23.♗b3) 22.♗xf6+ gxf6 23.♗d4 with a substantial edge for White (+1.59).


Game 132, Tartakower-Najdorf:

Contrary to the note at White's 17th, the "adventure" 17.♗g5 is not really premature. After 17...h6 18.♗xe6 fxe6 19.♗xe6+ ♖f7,




not 20.♗g6 as given, but 20.♗h7+! ♗xh7 (if 20...♗f8 21.♗c3 intending 22.♗b4+) 21.♗xf7 ♗g5 22.d5 ♗f6 23.f4 ♗g6 (23...♗xf4? 24.♖e7+-) 24.♗xg6+

♗xg6 25.♖e7 (threatening 26.f5+ ♗xf5 27.♖xg7) 25...♖g8 26.♖ce1




and White, in return for two minor pieces, has a rook, two pawns, control of the e-file and the seventh rank, and a winning initiative (+2.16).

The notes at move 18 overestimate White's attack and underestimate Black's defensive resources. 18.d5 does not deserve the "!" given it; relatively best at that point




is 18.♗xd7 ♗xd7 19.♗h3 g6 20.d5 ♗d6 21.♗h6 e5 22.f4, with a strong attack.


In contrast, 18.d5 is at best good for a draw. Against the best defense, 18...exd5, 19.♗f5 does not win as claimed;



Instead of 19...♗c6? as given, Black can play 19...♗xe5 20.♗xc8 ♗axc4 21.♗g3 ♗xc8 22.♗xe5 f6≈, or he can improve on the variation 19...♗xc4 20.♖xc4?! (better 20.♗h3) and now not 20...♖xc4 as given,




but 20...dxe5! 21.Rxc8 Bxc8 22.Bxh7+ Qxh7 23.Bxe5 Bf5,




with at least a draw, perhaps even winning chances.

Other replies to 18...dxe5 are only marginally (if any) better.




If 19.Bh3 Bf8 defends adequately, while if 19.Bxh7+ Qxh7 20.Bh3+ Qg8 21.Bxd7 Bxe1+ 22.Bxe1 Bxc4!,



and to avoid disadvantage White has to take a draw by 23.Bxg7 Qxg7 24.Qg4+ Qh6 25.Qh3+ Qg6 26.Qd3+ Qg7 27.Qg3+ etc.


Game 133, Tartakower-L. Steiner: Contrary to the note at Black's 14th, the "impatient" 14...c5 was probably best,

and certainly preferable to the recommended 14...dxe4??,




which loses immediately to 15.Qxf7+ Qh8 16.Qxe7+- . One of the most mistaken notes in the book; one wonders if Tartakower still thought the rook was on f8 when he wrote it.

The game being objectively lost either way, it's rather a moot point, but the note is mistaken to prefer 16...Bfxd5 to 16...Bcxd5. With the former,




after 17.Bf4! Black has no good defense to the threat of 18.Bxf7 Qxf7 19.Bxc7 Qxc7 20.Bxd5 etc., and is in worse shape (+2.90) than after the text continuation 16...Bcxd5 17.Bg5 Bb8 18.Bxf6 Bxf6 19.Bxf7 (+2.04).

Game 134, Tartakower-Grau: In the note variation 18...Bd7,




the recommended reply 19.Qe7 is rebuffed by 19...Bc6! 20.Qe4 (not 20.dxc6?? Bxc6+ 21.Bd6 Bxg2+-) 20...Bac8 etc. with equality. Correct is 19.Qxa6! Bxa6 (19...bxa6 20.Be7 is even worse) 20.Be7 Bf8 21.Bac1 Bb8 22.a3




and Black is virtually in Zugzwang and will soon lose material (+3.20).

Game 135, Tartakower-Keres: The note variation at White's 56th need not lead to a draw.




After 52.Qb6 Bxa4 53.Bxa4 Qd5 54.Be8 Qe4,




White should play not to draw with 55.Bxg6? as given, but to win with 55.Qc7! (also good are 55.Qc6 and 55.Qc5), viz., 55...Qf3 56.Qd6 Qxg3 57.Qe5 Qxh4 58.Bxg6 Qg4 59.Bxh5+ Qxh5 60.Qxf5 and wins.

Game 136, Tartakower-Frydman: 8.Bxc4 does not in fact threaten to win a pawn.




Even were it then White's move, after 9.♙xb8 ♖xb8 10.♕e5 Black has 10...♜e8, defending both f7 and c6.

Game 137, Mikenas-Tartakower: A minor correction to the note at White's 26th: in the line 26.♜xe4 ♖e8 27.♜c2 ♖e2+, Black regains far more than just his pawn.




After 28.♜g1 (worse is 28.♖f2 ♖xf2+ 29.♜xf2 ♖xf3+ 30.♜g1 ♖f1+ 31.♜g2 ♜f2+ 32.♜h3 ♖h1 etc.) 28...♖xf3 29.♜d1 ♖xf1+ 30.♜xf1 ♖xd2 Black is up a whole piece. To limit the damage to a pawn, White must play 27.♜b1,



when if 27...♖e2+ 28.♖f2 ♖xf2+ 29.♜xf2 ♖xf3+ 30.♜g1 at least avoids immediate disaster.


White's best defense at a critical point, move 27, is not mentioned.



The counter-sac 27.♖xe5! is best. If then 27...♖xe5! 28.♕f4! and White either wins back the exchange after 28...♖ee8 29.♕xd6, or has serious counterplay after 28...♖f5 29.♕xd6 ♖c8 30.♖e1 etc. Better is 27...dxe5, but with 28.♜e2 (or 28.♜e4) 28...b5 29.b3 bxc4 30.bxc4,


White can resist much more strongly than in the actual game.

The note at White's 33rd may also have missed White's best defense. After 33.cxb5 ♜f7 34.♜c4 ♜d7,




White should not bother defending the b-pawn with the time-wasting 35.a4 as given in the note. Instead he can defuse Black's f-file threats with 35.♕e3!, e.g., (a) 35...♜xb5 36.♖xf8+ ♜xf8 37.♜xb5 ♕xb5=, or (b) 35...♕xb5 36.♖xf8+ ♜xf8 37.b4 cxb4 38.♜xb4=, or (c) 35...♖xf1 36.♜xf1 ♜g4 (if 36...♜xb5?? 37.♕xd4 ♜xf1+ 38.♜xf1 cxd4+; or 36...♕xb5 37.♜d3=) 37.♜f4=.


Another of this note's moves thus called into question is 34...♜d7, which as the above shows lets the win slip. Instead, Black can still win by 34...♜g6!,



with the lethal threat of 35...♜e4+ and no matter where the white king goes the queen is lost: 36.♜g1 ♕e2+, or 36.♜f2 ♜f3+ 37.♜g1 (if 37.♜e1 ♖e8+ and mate shortly) 37...♕e2+ forcing 38.♜xe2, or 36.♜h3 ♖f5 forcing 37.♜xd4. The only plausible defensive tries then are 35.b3 (proactively defending the queen) or 35.♜g1 (removing the king from the potential check), but they end up in the same position after 35.b3 ♜e4+ 36.♜g1 or 35.♜g1 ♜e4 36.b3:




Now Black has a forced win with 36...g5! 37.♕xd6 ♖f3!,




when because of the threat 38...♕e2+ 39.♜g2 ♖xg3+ White must move his h-pawn, losing in either case: 38.h4 ♖c3!! and after a few nuisance checks (39.♖f8+ ♜h7 etc.) Black wins the queen, or 38.h3 h5! 39.h4 (else 39...h4--+) 39...gxh4 40.♜h2 (40.gxh4 ♜g4+) 40...♖xb3 and Black lands a knockout punch just before White can, e.g., 41.♖f8+ ♜h7 42.♖f7+ ♜g6 43.♜f1 ♖b2+ 44.♖f2 (or 44.♜g1 ♕e2+ 45.♜h2 ♕xg3+) 44...♕f3+ 45.♜g2 ♕d2+ etc.

Game 138, Tartakower-L. Steiner: The note at Black's 31st gives the impression that 32.♖f1 loses. Not true; in fact it's the strongest move at that point.




After 32...♖d2+ 33.♜h3 ♖xc2, rather than 34.♖xa5?? as given, White has 34.♜d7!,



threatening a mate that can be stopped only with major material loss, viz., 34...♖f7 35.♜e8+ ♖f8 36.♕xf6+, or 34...♖xh2+ 35.♜xh2 ♜e2+ 36.♜g1 ♜xh5 37.♜xe6+ ♜h8 38.♖xa5 etc.

Game 139, Tartakower-Winter: While White definitely has some advantage in


the note line 25...♖d2 26.♞eb5 b6
27.♜f3 (about +1.12),




the note is wrong to claim that White is winning, as Black can defend with either 27...♜f4 (so that if 28.♜a8+ ♜b8) or 27...♞f7 (allowing 28.♜a8+ ♜d7). More forceful than 27.♜f3 is 27.c5.

Game 140, Michell-Tartakower:

Contrary to the note at White's 21st, 21.h4 should not be met with 21...g5,




as then White can safely play 22.♠f5!. Black then dare not reply 22...♞f5 as in the game, since then 23.♠xg4 both covers a potential ♠f6-g4 and threatens 24.♠xc8. Black would have to reply 22...♜e6,




and after either 23.♜b3 ♞c7 24.hxg5 ♠g4 25.♜c2, or 23.hxg5 ♠g4 24.♞xc5 (or perhaps 24.♠h6+!? ♜g7 25.♠xg4 ♜xg4 26.f3 ♜g3 27.♞xc5) 24...♞xf5 25.♠xf5 ♜xf5 26.♞xc8+ ♠xc8 27.f3 ♠e5, White is in reasonably good shape. Black actually has no immediately forcing reply to 21.h4, and it was one of the better moves at White's disposal.

Game 141, Becker-Tartakower: The note at move 7 is on thin ice to claim that

White is winning after 7...♠xe2 8.♜xe2 ♠xd4 9.♜e4.




Rybka gives best play then as 9...♠b4 10.c3 ♜d5 11.♜xd4 (if 11.♜xd5 ♠e2+ 12.♜h1 ♠xd5) 11...♜xd4 12.cxd4 ♠c2 13.♠a3 ♠xa1 14.♠e3 f6 15.♠ec4 e6 16.♞xa1 (16.♠b5 c6 17.♠c7+ ♜d7 18.♠xa8 ♠c2=) 16...♠xa3 17.♠xa3,




reaching a simplified position where White's bishop and knight are unlikely to show any superiority to Black's rook.


The note at White's 30th overlooks an important move in the line 30.♜e2 d3 31.♜f3 e2.




Instead of 32.♞de1?? which loses quickly, White has 32.♞xd3! forcing Black into 32...e1♜ 33.♞xe1 ♞xe1 34.♞d8+,



leading to surprising positions in which, despite his extra rook, Black cannot win, viz., (a) 34...♞e8 35.♞xe8+ ♠xe8 36.♜xb7 ♠d6 (or 36...a5 37.♜e7 ♜f8 38.♜e6+ ♜h8 39.c5 etc.) 37.♜xa7=:




Or (b) 34...♠e8 35.♜d5+ ♜xd5+ (35...♜h8 36.♜d7 ♜xd7 37.♞xd7 a5 38.♞xb7 does no better, and the exchange sac 37...♞xg5 38.hxg5, though it leaves Black up a knight, avails nothing because White has too many queenside pawns and Black's are too easily picked off) 36.cxd5 ♜f8 37.d6 ♞h8 38.♞d7,




and, amazingly, the position is drawn.

Black nearly threw away his winning chances at move 32.




The text move 32...♠g4+ deserved a "?" instead of the "!" given to it. Correct was 32...♠xe3 and, for example, 33.♜g2 ♠g4+ 34.♜h3 ♠f2+ 35.♜h2 ♠xd1 36.♞xd1 ♜xc4+ (-1.29), though even then Black's advantage may not be enough to win.

After the game continued 33.♜h3 ♜f7




we have a classic case of wrong rook syndrome when White played 34.♖g1+??. Instead he could have wriggled out of trouble with 34.♖df1+! ♕f6 35.g4! when we see the crucial difference:



The g-pawn is defended, preventing 35...♖g4+ and allowing the king to avoid mate: 35...♖h8+ 36.♔g3 ♖g4+ 37.♔f2 and Black can get nothing better than perpetual check.


Game 143, Tartakower-Prins: The note at White's 12th is wrong to fault 12.♖bd2. It is about as good as the text move 12.♖c3, and if Black replies as 12...♖h4 as given,




White plays 13.♖e4! when if (a) 13...♖xe4 14.♖g5, or (b) 13...♖xe4 14.♖xe4+ ♖xe4 15.♖c8 ♖c6 16.♖xb7+-, or (c) 13...♖h3 14.♖d6+ cxd6 (14...♖xd6 15.♖e4+ ♖d7 16.♖e5+ ♖c8 17.♖g4+) 15.♖xg6+ and either 15...♖d7 16.♖g4+, or 15...♖f8 16.♖f5+, or 15...♖d8 16.♖g5, or 15...♖f7 16.♖xf7+ ♖xf7 17.♖g5+.

The long note at Black's 14th goes astray about midway. After 14...♖xf3 15.♖e6+


♖f7 16.♖g5 ♖e8 17.h5 ♖f8 18.♖h7! ♖f1+ 19.♖d2 ♖f4+,



not 20.♖d3 as given, but 20.♖xf4! ♖xf4 21.h6! g×h6 22.♖xh6+ ♖e7,




and White has the happy choice of continuing his attack with 23.♖g1 (+6.04), or first simplifying somewhat and then continuing his attack by 23.♖xf4 ♖xe6 24.♖g1 ♖c6 25.♖e4+ ♖f6 26.♖h7 (+6.23). This is important, because after 20.♖d3,



instead of 20...♖b5+?? as given, Black has 20...♖xe6!? 21.♖xf1 ♖e3+, muddying the waters. White can still win in this line, but there are many ways to go wrong, which is not the case after 20...♖b5+.


Game 144, Tartakower-Winter:

Contrary to the note at White's 11th, after 11.♖f3 ♖e4 12.♖a3 ♖e6 the initiative does not pass into Black's hands.




Instead White forces simplification to a won game with 13.♖g5! ♖xb3 14.♖xe4 ♖xc2+ 15.♖xc2 ♖xc2 16.♖xd6+ cxd6 17.♖xf4+-.

It is hard to imagine what Tartakower was thinking with his note at Black's 11th. Obviously 11...♖f5??



is not a "useful intermezzo" but an elementary blunder putting the bishop *en prise* to 12.gxf5+- . One wonders if this is a typo and 11...♖xg4 was actually intended.


Black is not obliged to play as given in the note at move 28. After 28...♖e8 29.♖c2,




Not 29...♖3e7?!, but 29...h6!, when Black still stands worse (about +1.15) but is by no means immediately lost.

Game 145, Tartakower-Rossolimo:

White missed a quick win at move 22. While the text move 22.♖he1 was not bad, far stronger was 22.♖e2!,




forking both the ♖c4 and the ♖e7, and virtually forcing 22...♖xd4 23.♖xd4.




Now having already thereby lost the exchange, Black cannot avoid further loss, for example (a) 23...♖b6 24.♗e7 ♗×d4 25.♕h5 ♖f7 (25...f×g5 26.f6) 26.♗d8+ ♖f8 27.♗×d7, or (b) 23...♗d8 24.♕e6 ♗a8 (24...♕×e6 25.♗×e6+ ♗h8 26.♖e1) 25.♕×f8! ♗×h1+ 26.♖d1 ♗c6 27.♗×e7, or (c) 23...♕d8 24.♗c4+ ♗h8 25.h5! and the threat of 26.♕g6+ is lethal.

This is significant, because White's later sacrifice should not have succeeded against best defense. At move 23,



best objectively was 23.♗d3, which wins in all variations, e.g., 23...♖c5 24.g×f6 ♕×f6 25.♕b3+-, or 23...♖c8 24.♗b3+ ♗h8 25.♗f7 ♗d8 26.♕fe6+-, or 23...♗c5 24.♕de6 ♕×e6 25.♕×e6 ♗c6 26.♕c7! ♗×c7 (26...♖c8 27.♖×e7 ♖×c7 28.g×f6) 27.♗d5+ ♗h8 28.♗f7+-.


Instead White played 23.♖×e7 (deserving a “?!” or even “?” rather than the “!” given it), which after 23...♖×e7 24.g×f6 could have been thwarted by 24...♖f7!.



Now White simply cannot force an attack through, as these sample lines illustrate:


- (a) 25.♗g2 b3 26.a×b3 ♖×d4 27.♖×d4 ♗e1+ 28.♗a2 ♗a5+ 29.♗b1 ♗e1+ etc., draw;
- (b) 25.♗d3 ♖c8 26.♗b3 ♕a4 27.♗d5 ♗c5 28.♗g2 ♖×f6=;
- (c) 25.f×g7 ♕×f5 26.♕fe6 ♕×e6 27.♕×e6 ♗e5 +; 25.♖g1 ♗e5 26.♕fe6 ♗×f6 27.♗g2 ♖c8+;
- (d) 25.♗e2 ♖c8 26.♕fe6 ♖×f6 27.♕×g7 ♗e5 28.♗g2 ♗h8=;
- (e) 25.♕h5 ♖×d4 26.♗×d4 ♗×f5 27.♕g3 (27.♕×g7 ♗×f6 28.♗×f6 ♖×f6 29.♕h5 ♖f2=) 27...♗×f6 28.♗×b4 d5, with at best a slight advantage for White.

The note at White's 25th errs at the end. After 25.♗g2+ ♖g7 26.♗a8+




not 26...♗f7?, when Black is still losing (viz. 27.♕fe6 ♖g8 28.♗b7 etc.), but 26...♖c8!, when if anything Black has a slight advantage (-0.45).

The note at Black's 25th is overly cautious to fear 25...♗f7 26.♗g2 ♖e1+ 27.♖×e1 b3. White simply plays 28.♗e4!,




threatening 29.♗e7+ ♗g8 30.♖g1+ and mate next. This trumps Black's illusory threats and forces 28...♗e5 (without or without preliminary spite checks such as 28...b×a2+ 29.♗a1) 29.♗d5+ ♗×d5 30.♕×d5 and White wins easily with his extra material.


Game 146, Keres-Tartakower: The note at Black's 15th has several errors. The note is correct that 15...♗×a2? is bad, but after 16.♖a1 ♗b3,




the best way to capitalize is not 17.♕c7?! but 17.♕cb4! (threatening 18.♖a3) 17...♕×d5 18.♕×d5 b5 19.c×b5 (not now 19.♖a3? ♗×c4) 19...♖b8 20.♖a3 ♗×b5 21.♗×b5 ♖×b5 22.♕c7 ♖eb8 23.♕×b5 ♖×b5 24.♖×a7, and White has won the exchange. Further on in the given continuation, after 17.♕c7 ♖e7 18.♕b5,



not 18...♕b6?, but 18...♖c8! 19.♕×d6 ♖c6 20.♖fb1 ♖a6 21.♖×a6 b×a6, and Black gets off relatively light. Finally, if Black does play 18...♕b6? 19.♕×b6 a×b6,




then not 20.♖fb1?!, as that again allows Black to get off easy with 20...d5! 21.c×d5 ♖ed7!, and 22.♖a3 is no longer possible (22...♕×a3). Instead, White should immediately play 20.♖a3, and if 20...♗×b2 21.♖aa1,




when finally 22.♖f1 or worse is inescapable.

Returning to the actual game, the double threat posed by 27...♗b4 was not as potent as either player supposed.




Instead of the text move 28.♗e4, better was 28.♗b1!, and if then 28...♗a2 White plays 29.♖c2 ♗b4 30.♖b2,




when the threat of 31.♗b6 ♖d7 32.♗a5 forces Black either to give back the pawn with 30...b6 31.♗xb6, or go in for speculative complications with 30...b5 31.♗b6 ♖b7 32.♗a5, and either 32...♗d3 or 32...bxc4, sacrificing a piece or eventually the exchange for unclear compensation.

Game 148, Tartakower-E. Steiner: Unmentioned is Black's best defense at a critical point. After 17...♗xg6 18.fxg6 ♗d5!,




White's attack would have been blunted. Black is still down a pawn, but the presence of opposite-colored bishops offers some hope of drawing. This is in any event far better than anything actually played or mentioned in the book.

Game 150, Lowcki-Tartakower: It bears mentioning that White's 29th move was the critical mistake.




Instead of the losing 29.♗xd6?, White could have maintained equality with 29.h3 or 29.♗c3.

Game 151, Tartakower-Fine: The sacrificial variation at move 22 needs some fine-tuning.




If 23.♗xg6 hxg6 24.♗xd6 as given, Black can limit his loss to a pawn with 24...♗f7! or 24...♗f7!, instead of 24...cxd6. Therefore White's first two moves should be transposed: first 23.♗xd6! cxd6 and only then 24.♗xg6, when White is clearly winning (at least +2.96) whether Black recaptures on g6 or not. Further on, after 24...hxg6 25.♗xg6+ ♗f8,




far better than 26.♗xf6+ is 26.♗h5!, with effect as lethal as in the actual game, viz., 26...♗f7 27.♗h6+ ♗e7 28.♗g7 ♗d7 29.♗xe8 and either 29...♗xe8 30.g5+- or 29...♗xe8 30.♗xf6+-.


Game 152, Tartakower-Böök: The note at Black's 25 is correct to advise against 26.♖e2, but gives the wrong reason.



The given line 26...♗c5 27.♗d5 ♗xe4 does win back a pawn, but after 28.♗xe6 fxex6,




it is an almost worthless isolated, doubled pawn on an open file. Instead, Black can do much better with 26...♖b8! 27.♗d5 ♗d4!,




winning the trapped knight.

It goes unnoticed that Black missed an important chance to equalize at move 28.




Here 28...♖b6? allowed White to keep his extra pawn. Instead, 28...♙d4+! 29.♙f2 ♙xa7 30.♙xa7 ♖a8 31.♙f2 ♖a5




creates a position where Black can pick up one or the other of the loose white pawns and equalize, e.g., 32.♖d1 ♖ca4 33.♖d3 e4 34.fxe4 fxe4 35.♖d4 ♖xd4 36.♙xd4 ♖xd5=.

Game 154, Tartakower-Schmidt: In the variation 17...b4, the note is wrong to condemn 18.♙xf5. It is probably the best move at that point, as long as after 19...bxa3



White avoids the given move 19.♙e7+? in favor of 19.♙xg7! axb2 20.♖b1 ♖xg7 21.♖xb2=.


The note at move 23 implies that 23...a4 24.♖c2 is good for White,



but in fact it leads to considerable advantage for Black after 24...♖xc2 25.♖xc2 b3 26.axb3 axb3 27.♖cc1 ♖a2! (not 27...♙xb2?! 28.♖b1 ♖a2 29.♙c1 ♙xc1 30.♙xc1) 28.♖b1 ♖fa8 29.♙c1 ♖8a5 and 30...♖xc5.


Game 155, Appel-Tartakower: The notes fail to mention that White had a

playable alternative to 29.♖g1?. After 29.h4



White stands worse (-0.49) but is in no immediate danger of losing.


In the variation 33...♖ag8 34.♙e5, the note is wrong to give 34...♖xg2 a “?”. It is actually quite strong, and after 35.♙f7+ ♖g7 36.♖xg2 ♖xf7+



Black is winning handily, viz., 36.♖xg2 ♖xf7+ 37.♖h1 ♙f2+ 38.♖h2 ♙xf4#, or 37.♖h3 ♙f2+ 38.♖xf2 ♙xf2, or 37.♖f3 ♙xc1 38.♖xc1 ♖g3#, or 37.♖h2 ♙xf4+ 38.♖h1 ♙g3+ 39.♖g2 ♙xc1 and if 40.♖xc1 ♙xe2+.


Position XXXI (a), Tartakower-Winter:

In the note variation 32...♙e6 33.h3 h5 34.hxg4 hxg4, White need not bother with the trifling advantage conferred by 35.♖h2; instead he can win immediately with 35.♙xg4!,



viz. 35...♖f1+ (anything else allows mate in at most 6) 36.♖h2 ♖e2+ (again, anything else allows a forced mate) 37.♙f2+ ♙g4 (same story) 38.♖xg4+ ♖xg4 39.♙xg4+-.

At move 33, instead of 33...♖g6?? (+6.71) Black could have improved with 33...h6.




He may still lose (about +0.89), but much more resistance is possible.

Game 156, Tartakower-Enevoldsen:

Tartakower is too hard on himself in giving 22.♖1h7 a “?”; Rybka actually rates it higher than the missed “massacre variation” 22.♖xg8+ ♖xg8+ 23.♖h8+ (+5.40 to +4.52).


On the other hand, in the note at White’s 24th, he is wrong to call the position after 24.♙d6 ♖xh8 25.♙h6+ ♖g8 26.♖g7+ mate:



Black is totally busted, but he does have one legal move, 26...♖f8.


Game 157, Tartakower-Trompowsky:

As the note at move 14 states, 14...♙g4 is a “useless escape,”




but this is emphasized far more by 15.♙xh7+ ♖h8 16.♙e4 than the given line 15.♙f1 ♖h4 16.f3.


The note at White’s 20th is correct to call 20.♖g4 “feeble,” but after the given continuation 20...♙xd3 21.♖xd3? (better 21.♖xd3),



the feebleness is highlighted best not by 21...f5, but by 21...♖e5 winning the exchange. Similarly, in that note's other variation, after 20.h4?




not 20...c5 as given, but 20...♖d3 21.♖xd3 (if 21.♖xd3 ♖xe4) 21...♖c5! 22.♖c4 (22.♖c2?? ♖xe4; 22.♖e2 ♖xe4) 22...♖a6 23.♖a2 ♖xe4,




and Black is probably winning.


Game 158, Tartakower-Orbach: The note at White's 21st is wrong about the 21.c4 line. Black must not play 21...♖f7?,



as that loses to 22.cxd5 ♖xd5 23.e6 ♖g7 (if 23...♖xe6? 24.♖xe4, or 23...♖f6 24.♖c1 ♖h8 25.♖c7 h5 26.♖e2+-) 24.♖c1!,




when the threat of 25.♖xf5 ♖xf5 26.♖xf5 gxf5 27.♖c8# forces Black to move and lose his QN, e.g., 27...♖c6 25.bxc6 and wins. After 21.c4, the only playable move is 21...♖d7!,




when if, say, 22.cxd5 ♖xd5 23.♖xf5 ♖xf5 24.♖xf5 ♖h4+ 25.♖f1 ♖dc5 and Black has considerable counterplay.


Contrary to the note at White's 25th, the rook sac 25.♖dxc6+, far from being premature, is the strongest move.




After 25...hxc6 26.♖xc6+ ♖f7 27.♖h5 ♖xa3 better than the given 28.e6+ is 28.♖c6+! and mate shortly,



viz., 28...♖e7 29.♖g5+ ♖e8 (if 29...♖f6 30.exf6+ etc., or 29...♖f7 30.e6+ etc.) 30.♖e6+ ♖f7 31.♖g6#. Even 28.e6+ wins if followed up properly, viz.,




28...♖e8 29.♖g7+ ♖d8 and now not 30.e7+ as given, but 30.♖f2!, defending the bishop, when about the best Black then has is 30...♖f6 31.♖xf5 ♖d6,




and White can either simplify to a won ending with 32.e7+ ♖xe7 33.♖xe7 ♖xe7 34.♖c5+, or play the quietly deadly 32.♖e2! (preventing a potential ...♖d2+ after the bishop moves) and Black is helpless against the threats of 33.♖c5 and 33.♖b6+, to name only two of many (+9.21).

Game 160, Tartakower – Ekström:

Contrary to the note at move 12, whatever “increased dangers” Black might face in the variation 12...♖b6,




13.e5 and 14.♖xc6 are not among them. After 13.e5 dxe5 14.♖xc6,




Black continues nonchalantly with 14...♖xc6! 15.♖xc6 (or 15.♖xa7 ♖a6 16.fxe5 ♖e8 17.♖f3 ♖d5 18.♖f2 ♖xa7=) 15...♖xc6+ 16.♖f3 (else 16...♖xd1 and 17...♖xb5) 16...♖xf3+ 17.♖xf3 e4 with a substantial advantage.

Game 161, H. Steiner-Tartakower:

Black missed an earlier chance to blow things open, with 18...♖xa2!,




viz., 19.♖xa2 ♖c2+ 20.♗b1 ♗a3!
21.♗xc2 ♗a2+ 22.♗c1 (if 22.♗c3 ♖c8+
23.♗b4 ♖d7 24.any a5#) 22...♖c8+




23.♗c3 ♖c3+ 24.♖xc3 ♗a3+ 25.♗d2
♗b2+ 26.♗e3 ♗xc3+ 27.♗xe4 ♖xb3
28.♖d3 (28.♖b1 ♖c2+; 28.♖d3 ♖c2)
28...♖xd1 29.♖xd1 ♗c6+ 30.♗e3
♗xg2-+.

Amusingly, the notation mistake
21...♗b4 is actually as good or better
than the text 21...♗g5.




Contrary to the note, after 22.♖d1 e3
23.a3, White has decidedly *not*
succeeded in “blunting the head of
White’s attack”; rather it then comes
down on him full force with 23...♖c2+!!,




followed by, for example, 24.♗xc2
♗xa3 25.♖c1 ♖c8+ 26.♖c4 ♖xc4+
27.bxc4 ♖a4+ 28.♗b1 ♖c3#.

Game 162, Thomas-Tartakower: The
note at move 28 underestimates the
danger of letting White take the h-pawn.
After 28...♖d7 29.♖xh7 g6, White wins
not only the pawn but the game.




Now not 30.h4 as in the note, but
30.b4+! axb4 31.cxb4+ ♗xb4 (if
31...♗d5 32.♗f4 ♖e8 33.h4 f6 [to
prevent 34.h5] 34.g5!+-) 32.h4 ♗c4
(32...♗c3 33.h5 gxh5 34.gxh5 b4
35.h6+-) 33.♖g8 ♖e6




34.h5 gxh5 35.gxh5 b4 36.h6 b3
37.♗d2 ♖f5 38.♖xf7+ ♗b4
39.♖xb3!+-.

Game 163, Tartakower-Christoffel: Far
from being a mistake, 43.g4! is a
winning continuation if followed up
properly. After 43.g4 ♖xf4,




not 44.gxf5+? as given, but 44.♖xg7!
winning, viz., 44...fxg4 45.♖xg4+ ♗e7
46.♖xh6+-, or 44...h5 45.♖h6 ♖g2
46.gxh5 ♖xh4 47.♗c5



47...♗e5 (or 47...♗d7 48.♗b6 ♗c8
49.♖g5 ♖g2 50.h6 ♖g8 51.♖f3 ♖e1
52.♖h5 ♖h7 53.♖f7+-) 48.♖g5 ♖g2
49.h6 ♖g6 50.♖h5 ♖h7 51.♗b6 f4
52.♗xb7 ♗f5 53.♖e7 ♗e4 54.♗xa6 f3
55.♖xf3+!+-.


The note at White’s 45th is correct to
give a “?” to 45.♖xg7?,




but rather than settle for the drawing line
45...fxg4, Black can win with 45...♖e6+!
and, for example 46.♗b6 ♖xg7 47.♗xb7
(47.gxf5 ♗c8+-) 47...f4 48.♗xa6
♗c7-+. It’s odd that Tartakower
overlooked the knight fork here, since he
had already pointed it out at move 43.

Position XXXIV, Vidmar-Tartakower:

It’s not at all clear what Tartakower
considered unsatisfactory about the two
alternatives in the note to move 44.
Black’s position is so strong that he has
at least ten winning moves at that point,
those two among them. After 44...gx f3
45.♗d4+ ♗g7




the wished-for 46.♗xd6 fails to
46...♗g2#. And after 44...♗xf3+
45.♗xf3 gx f3 46.b3,



Black has at least a dozen winning
continuations, the best of which is
probably 46...♖f4 47.♖a2 (47.♖dd1 d2


48.♖d3 cxd3; 47.♞b2 ♞a1) 47...♞xa2
48.♖xa2 cxb3 49.♖xb4 d2 50.♖d3 ♞c8
51.♖xf4 ♞c1 –+.

Game 169, Aitken-Tartakower: The note at White's 27th is correct that 27.♞e4 ♞xe4 28.♞xe4 g5 leads to the better game for Black, but it is much more better if instead of 28...g5, Black plays 28...♞c6!,




winning the exchange, viz., 29.♞xf4 ♞f8
30.♞xf8+ ♞xf8 31.♖d4 ♞xg2 32.♞xg2
♞d8 33.♖xe6 ♞xd3 –+.


The note after White's 31st is incorrect about 31...♞xf3, or that "White seems to dispose of more threats." The threats are all Black's:



31...♞xf3! is decisive (and far superior to the text move 31...♞h8), viz. 32.♞xf3 ♞h4+! (stronger than the note's 32...♞xd4) 33.♞f1 ♞xd4 34.♞xg7+ ♞h8,




and after most moves 35...♞d1+ will settle matters (-7.61). Even in the note's line 32...♞xd4, 33.♞xg7+ is merely a spite check; Black simply plays 33...♞h8,




and the various lethal threats – 34...♞h4+, 33...♞xh2+, 34...♞d2+ – cannot all be stopped (-6.03).

Position XXXVI, Yanofsky-Tartakower: The variation given at White's 61st move does not save the game for Black. After 61.♞d1 (as good or better is 61.♞b2 or ♞b1) ♖b3 62.♞h2 ♞d4,




instead of 63.♞c2?, White has 63.c6! winning, viz., 63.c6 ♞c4 64.b5 ♞f5 65.♞h6 ♖d4 66.♞h4 ♞e5 67.c7 ♞d6 (if 67...♞xc7 68.♞f4+) 68.♞xd4+ etc.

Position XXXVII, Tartakower-Alexander: Contrary to the note at Black's 26th, 26...♖d6 is not Black's best move.




In that case, White wins by force with 27.♖a6+ (also good is 27.c4) 27...♞d7 28.♖c5+ ♞c7 29.♞a5+ ♞b8 30.♖d7+ ♞c8 31.♖b6+ ♞c7 (worse is 31...♞b8 32.♞a8+ or 31...♞d8 32.♖xd5+ ♞e8 33.♞a8+) 32.♖xd5+ ♞b8 33.♞c7+ ♞a7 34.♖e7 ♞d3 35.♖xc6+ ♞a8 36.♞a5+ ♞a6 37.♞xa6+ etc.


Black's best chance to hold the game was actually 26...♖d2!?,




presenting White with difficult choices. He can sacrifice the exchange for several pawns with 27.♖a6+ ♞d6 28.♞xb7 ♖xf1 29.♞c7+ ♞e6 30.♞xc6+ ♞e5




and either 31.♞xg6 h×g6 32.♞xf1 ♞xh2:




or 31.♞c7+ ♞f6 32.♞d6+ ♞g5 33.♞f4+ ♞h5 34.♞xf1:




Problematic as both these may be, they probably offer more winning chances than moving the rook. After 27.♞d1 (or ♞c1 or ♞a1),




Black has 27...♖f3+ 28.♞h1 ♖h4 (threatening mate) 29.♞g1 ♖f5!,



when the threat of 30...♖g3+ 31.h×g3 ♜h5# forces White into either 30.♖a6+ ♜d6 31.g4 (31.♜b7?? ♖g3+) 31...b×a6 32.g×f5 ♜f5=:




or 30.h3 ♖g3+ 31.♜h2 ♖e4 32.♞f1 (threatening 32...♜g3+ 33.♜h1 ♖f2#) 32...♜d6+ 33.♜g1 ♜e7,



when White's advantage is small, and winning (if possible) will be difficult.


Game 170, Boutteville-Tartakower: In the note variation 19.♖f3, Black can do far better than just 19...♜f4 "quenching the enemy attack."



Rather, he can be the attacker with 19...♜×c3+! 20.♜f1 (20.b×c3? ♜×c3+


21.♖d2 ♜×a1) 20...♜×b2 21.♖×g5+ ♜e7 22.♜×b2 ♜×b2-+.

Game 172, Van Steenis-Tartakower: The note at White's 9th does not make clear that 9.♖×d4 was far and away his best move at that point. After 9...c5 10.a3!




the worst that can befall him is 10...c×d4 11.a×b4 ♜×b4+ 12.♜f2, when White stands worse but not clearly lost as he was after the text move 9.♜d2?.

Contrary to the note at Black's 18th, 18...♖e5 is the best move on the board, and after 19.♖g3 White does not "hold his own"; instead any of at least ten moves can force his resignation,



most prominently 19...♖c4 (-13.92).


Game 173, Tartakower-Strehle: A puzzling game, both in terms of actual moves and annotations. It goes unmentioned that Black missed several chances to break through on the queenside, notably at move 23,




where 23...a4! would have started breaking down the walls, e.g., 24.♜×a6

♜×a6 25.b4 ♜b6 26.e5 ♜f8 etc., with a probably winning attack.

The note at move 30 is badly mistaken. White *should* have played 30.♜×d4, winning a pawn cleanly,




since after 30...♜×c4?? 31.b×c4 ♜×c4,




the supposedly unanswerable double threats of 32...♜b2+ and 32...♜×c2+ are handled by 32.♜ab1!, and after 32...♜×d4 33.♜×d4 all Black has done is lose the exchange and the game.

Finally, after White's 35th move,




there is no compelling reason for Black to have resigned. After 35...♜b8! (threatening 36...♜×b3+) 36.c×d4 ♜×d4 the game is virtually even. Perhaps he lost on time?

Game 175, Palavan-Tartakower: The note at White's 19th misses the strongest preventive; after 19.e4 ♜ac8 20.♜b1, rather than winning a mere pawn with 20...♜×c1, Black wins that plus a piece or the exchange with 20...♜×e4!,




and if 21...Bxc8 Bxb1, or 21...Bxe4 Bxc1+ 22...Qxc1 Qxe4, or 21...Bb2 Bxc1+ 22...Qxc1 Bxf3 23...Bf4 Qe5 24...Bxf3 Qxe2.

The note at White's 33rd is wrong about 33...Bg7; it's as good as either 33...Bg7 or 33...Bh8. After 34...Qxg6+ Bh8 35...Qxf5,




Black squelches the threat of 36...Qf8+ by 35...Bxf7 and wins.


Game 176, Tartakower-Pachman: The note at Black's 21st, intended to show a line winning for White, overlooks a move with the opposite effect. After 21...Bg8 22...Bg1 Bh4 23...Bg3? (better 23...Baf1 or 23...Qe3),




not 23...Qf6 as given, but 23...e3! forcing 24...Qxe3 (24...Qxe3?? Qe5+-) 24...Bce8 25...Qf2 Bxe2 26...Qxe2 Qxf4



and either 27...Bf1 Qxg3+ 28...Qxg3 Qe5+ 29...Qf2 Bg2+ 30...Qe1 Bxe2+ 31...Qe2 Qa6+ 32...Qf2 Qxf1:




or 27...Qe3 Qxe3 28...Bxe3 Qf8 (threatening 29...Bg2+ 30...Qh1 Bxe2+ etc.) 29...Bg1 Qd6+ 30...Beg3 Bxg3 31...Bxg3 Qxg3+:




in either case with an easy win.

Game 177, Tartakower-Füster: Move 12's caveat against 12...Qc5 13...Qxa8 Qc6 is needless:




after 14...Qxf8+ and 15...Qxc3 White has two rooks and a minor piece for the queen, more than ample compensation (+4.43).

Game 178, Tartakower-Pirc: The note at move 29 over-estimates Black's drawing chances. After 29...gxf5+ Qxf5 30...Qc2 Qg4 31...Qxe4 Qxe4 32...Qxe4 f6 33...Qd4 Qf3 34...Qd3 h5, rather than having "at least a draw," Black is lost after 35.f5!,




viz., 35...h4 36.e4 Qg2 37.e5+-, or 35...Qg4 36.e4 Qg5 (if 36...Qf4 37.h4 Qg4 38.Qe3 Qxh4 39.e5+-, or 36...h4 37.Qd4 h3 38.Qe3 Qg5 39.Qf3 Qh4 40.e5+-) 37.h4+ Qxh4 38.e5 etc.


Though the note at White's 40th makes much of the 34...Qd4-c3 tempo, this finesse was not strictly necessary. The note, for the sake of argument, puts White's king at d4 rather than c3 with White to move at move 40:



and looks only at 40...Qc3 Qf7 41...Qd4 Qf6 etc., draw. This would be true if e5 were the only way into Black's position, but it is not. Black can do nothing but shuffle his king and bishop around on the back ranks, but White, meanwhile, can cheerfully march over to the kingside and win, viz., 40...Qc3 Qf7 41...Qc2 Qc8 42...Qd2 Qd7 43...Qe2 Qe6 44...Qf1 Qc8 45...Qg2 Qe6 46...Qg3




46...Qd7 (or 46...Qf6 47...Qh4 Qf7 [if 47...Qd7 48...Qg8+-] 48...Qxf5+-) 47...Qh4 Qf6




48...Qg8 Qg6 49.h7 and wins.

Game 179, Rossolimo-Tartakower:

Contrary to the note at Black's 13th, after 13...♖e7 14.g4 ♗g6 15.h4,




rather than an attack, White has a lost game, viz. 15...♗xh4 16.c×d3 ♖b4!,




and White has only a choice between immediately giving up the exchange with 17.♖xb4 ♗xb4, or eventually two pawns by 17.♖f2 ♖xd3 18.♖d2 ♖xb2 19.♖xb2 h5 20.♖g2 ♗c5 21.♖f2 d4 22.♖f3 (22.exd4?? ♗xd4+) 22...dxe3 23.♖c3 ♗d4 24.♖c1 0-0-0 25.♖e2 ♗xe5 26.♖xe3 h×g4 27.♖×g4 etc.

Position XIX, Tartakower-Enevoldsen:

Once again Tartakower overrates his opponent's chances in the note to White's 32nd. It's not clear what sort of a fight he thought Black could still put up after 32.♗e4+ ♖c4! 33.♖g3 ♖c7,




but White can take all the fight out with 34.♗d3+ ♖d5 35.♗×g6 ♗b6 (else 36.♖f5+ winning the bishop) 36.♗f7+,




and to avoid 36...♖e4 37.♖e3♯ Black must play 37...♖×f7 37.♖×f7, when White wins easily.

Game 180, Raizman-Tartakower:

Contrary to the note at White's 30th, the variation 30...♗×d5 achieves a great deal for Black. After the forced reply 31.♖×d5,




Black can immediately improve on the note continuation 31...♖bc6 with 31...♖×d6 32.♖×d6 ♖c7 winning the loose rook at d6. And even in the note line, after 31...♖bc6 32.♖h2? (not quite so bad is 32.♖a4) 32...♖b6 33.♖a3,




Black picks up the other loose rook with 33...♖g1+ 34.♖a2 ♖×h2-+.

Game 181, Bergsma-Tartakower: The note at move 25 ends on a sour note; after 25...♗e6 26.♖d5 ♗×d5 27.exd5 ♖f8 28.♗e4?,




Black wins with 28...♖×e4 29.♖×e4 ♖d3!. Better to overprotect f2 with 28.♖f1, though then Black still has a considerable edge.

In the note variation at White's 32nd, after 32.♖h1,




far better than the given 32...b×a4 33.♗×a4 ♖d6 is 32...♖h5!, with results much as in the actual game.

Position XLIII, Tartakower-Wade: At move 65's note, after 65...f1♖,




the note actually read "67. Q-B2 ch," i.e. 67.♖c2+. While that is a legal move it is not check, and it would allow Black to mate quickly (67...♖b5+ etc.). Therefore we took the liberty of changing it to what we believe was intended.

Game 182, Tartakower-Wood: Quite a few analytical errors here, starting as early as move 7. In the note variation 7...♖b6 8.a3 ♖×b2?,




there is no reason to bother with 9.♗b5+ ♗d7 10.♖a2 when White can win the queen more quickly and economically with 9.♖a4.

The note at White's 20th is correct that after 20.g4 ♖h4 21.♖f3 ♖g3 White's f-pawn will fall, but fails to observe that 22.f5!,




threatening 23...Bg1 winning the queen, forces Black to give up a piece by 22...d4 23.♖g5 ♜xg5 24.f6+ ♜xf6 25.♗xg5 ♗xg5 26.♜xg5+-.

The note at Black's 20th claims that it would be too risky to open the h-file by 20...♖xh4, but the continuation 21.♜hg4 ♗e7 22.♖h3 h5 23.♜d3, was not the way to show it.




After 23...♖f7! (simultaneously defending g6 and attacking f4) 24.g3 c5 (ending altogether the brief threat to g6) 25.♜e2 ♜b7 Black is fine,




with good prospects to post his knight strongly by ♜g8-e7-f5 and to open lines on the queenside with b4-b3, especially if White castles on that wing; meanwhile White's kingside attack is stymied.

At White's 29th move,




the text move 29.♜d4 does not deserve the praise heaped on it (see why below). Correct, and practically winning, was 29.hxg6 hxg6 30.♖h2! (threatening to win the queen by 31.♜d2 or ♜d4) 30...♜eg8 (relatively best, to give the king a hiding place; if 30...♜xg4?? 31.♜h7+ ♖f8 32.♜xh8+ 31.♜d4 ♜xg4 32.♜xg4 ♜xh2 33.♜gxe6+ ♜xe6 34.♜xe6+ ♖f7 35.♜c5,




and Black can only choose between 35...♜a8 36.♜xa6 or 35...♜c8 36.♜xd5, ending up a pawn down with the inferior position either way (+2.11 or more).

After the text continuation 29.♜d4 ♗c1+ 30.♜d1 ♗xb2 31.♖h4, the note at Black's 31st mentions 31...♜ef8, giving then 32.♜xe6+ ♜xe6 33.♖e7+ ♜f7 34.♖xe6,




commenting merely "etc." as if White's winning continuation was obvious. However, Black can actually force a draw: 34...♜c8! 35.♖xd5 ♗c3+ 36.♖f1 ♜xg4 37.♜h4 ♜xf3 38.♜xf3 ♜d8!!




39.♖xd8 ♖xf3+ 40.♖e1 ♖e3+ 41.♖d1 ♖g1+ 42.♖e2 ♖g2+ 43.♖e1 ♖g3+ etc. (here obviously meaning perpetual check).

To win against 31...♜ef8,




White must try 32.♜xh7 ♜xh7 33.hxg6 ♖xg6 34.♖g5+ ♖f7 35.♜xh6 ♜xh6 36.♖xh6 ♖e8 37.f5!,




with complications yet to handle but an almost certainly winning advantage.


Position XLIV, Tartakower-Hugot: Contrary to the note at move 46, while 46.g4 is best, it is by no means the only winning move.



Also good are 46.♖f4, ♖g5, ♖g6, ♖e4, and even 46.a4. The one variation given, 46.♖g5 ♖xb2 47.♖xh5 ♖xa3,




still wins, if instead of 48.g4? as given, White plays 48.♖g6 (or ♖g5 or ♖g4) 48...a4 49.h5 ♖b3 50.h6 a3 51.h7 a2 52.h8♖,




and Black's promotion square is covered.

Game 184, Tartakower-Schmid: The note at move 26 overlooks an important move. After 26...dxe4 27.fxe4 Qc6, then 28.d5 Qxd5 29.exd5 Qxd5+ 30.Qf2,




rather than 30...Qg2?, Black can still force a draw by 30...Qh1!, and White cannot escape perpetual check.

In the variation at Black's 29th, after 29...Qxd4??




White can do a lot better than "gain control of greater space" by 30.Qxg5 Qg7 31.Qb4; instead he should pin and win the knight by 30.Qc3 or Qb2+.

Position XLV, Tartakower-Rhodes: It bears mentioning that where Black lost was not with 36...Qd6; both that and 37...Qc6 were fine. However, he missed his last chance to draw at move 38,




where 38...h5 was indeed necessary. Then White cannot gain the necessary tempo, and on either 39.h4 Qd6 or 39.h3 (or 39.b3 or Qa4) 39...h4 Black holds.

Game 185, Tartakower-Trifunovic: The note at move 45 seems to say that in variation (b), 45...Qf8 46.Qe8+,



White wins, but that would be only if Black blunders by 46...Qxe8?? 47.g7. Instead, 46...Qg7 holds the draw.


Black likewise could have held the draw by avoiding ...fxg6. For example, here



46...Qc1! (instead of 46...fxg7??) holds, a fact not mentioned in the notes.


Certainly Tartakower's 45.g6! was the best practical and psychological try, but it was not the objective winner he thought it was.

Game 189, Tartakower-Pilnik: It's odd that the note at White's 23rd cautions against 23.Qa6 while the note at Black's 23rd recommends it (in reply to 23...Qe6). In both cases the move is strong and the supposed defense, 23...Qd8, is refuted in the same way:




24.Qxa7+ Qd7 25.Qxb6 Qxd5 26.Qb7+ etc.

Game 191, Pirc-Tartakower: A number of major errors here, both in the notes and the actual game. The first, in the note at move 20, may be a typo. Here,




White is said to be threatening "22. P x P" i.e. 22.exf5, a move that would lose to 22...Qxe3+. One suspects that "22. B x P" (i.e. 22.Qxh6!) was intended.

The fishing expedition with the knight (14...Qb4, 16...Qxa2, and finally 29...Qb4) involved more danger than Tartakower suspected, and he should probably have extricated the wayward equine earlier with 19...Qb4.




This threatens 20...Qxd5, and White cannot defend by 20.Qc1?? Qd4+ 21.Qh1 Qxd3+, or 20.Qf2 Qb5 (20...fxe4 21.dxe4 Qxg5 is also playable) 21.Qg3 Qd4+ 22.Qh1 Qxd3 23.Qxf5 Qxe4+/-+. Therefore 20.Qc1 Qac8 (20...Qa6! will leave the knight out of play indefinitely, while 20...Qxd5! is unclear, difficult, and sharply double-edged, viz., 21.Qd2 Qd4+ 22.Qh1 fxe4 23.dxe4 Qe3 24.Qxe3 Qxe3 25.Qxc7 Qc6 26.Qxd6 Qxg5) 21.Rc4




and now 21...dxd5? 22. Qd4 or 21...Wxb2?! 22. Qd4, but 21...We7, consolidating with reasonable chances to use the pawn plus eventually.

In the actual game, Tartakower's sense of danger failed him and he erred badly with 24...Qd7-f5,




which deserved a “?” (perhaps even two) rather than the “!” given it. Better instead was 24...Bf7, and then only if 25. Qxe4 Qf5. As it was, after 25.dxe4 Bf7, rather than a “thrilling moment,” Tartakower would have experienced a chilling moment if Pirc, instead of 26. We2, had played 26. We1!,




when Black is lost in all variations, viz.:

(a) 26...Qd7 27. Wxa5 winning the knight (the key difference between We1 and We2);


(b) 26...Qxe4 27. Qf4! Wd4+ 28. Bf2 Bxf6 (28...Qxg2?? 29. We8+) 29. Wxe4 Wxe4 30. Qxe4 Qg8 31. Qg5 Bxf2 32. Qxf2 Qb4 33. Qd8 c6 (33...Qa6 34. Qd3) 34. Qxa5 cxd5 35. Qxb4 dxe4 36. Qxd6 reaching a won ending:



(c) 26...Qb4 27. exf5 Qc2 28. fxg6! Qxe1 29. gxh7 Wxe3+ 30. Qh1 Wh6 31. Bxe1 Wxf6 32. Bf1 Wxf1+ 33. Qxf1, again with a won ending:




(d) 26...Qg8 27. Wxa5! h6 28. Bf4 (28. Wxa2?! Qxe4 leads to less advantage) 28...Qc8 29. Wxa2,




and White is up a whole bishop.

The note at White's 30th has a terrible gaffe; after 30. Bxa1 b6 31. Wxb4 as given,




Black merely plays 31...axb4 --. One can only presume Tartakower thought White had a back-rank mate with 32. Ba8+, but 32...Qc8 stops this.

Returning to the actual game, 32.h5? was a serious mistake. Had White given up dreams of attack and instead played 32. Wg5!,




forcing 32...Wxg5 33. hxg5, he would have been able to resist indefinitely in the endgame. Rybka rates the position almost even, -0.45.

Move 35 is frankly a mess, both on the board and in the notes. Instead of 35...Wh5, Black could have ended matters quickly with 35...Wxe4!,




viz., 36. Qf2 36. Qxf6 37. Bxf6 Wb1+ 38. Qh2 Bxf6 --, or 36. Qc3 Qxc3 37. bxc3 Qc6 --.

The note variation at Black's 35th goes astray repeatedly. After 35...cxd4? 36. Bh3! Bxf6 37. exd5 (deserving “?” rather than the “!” given it) would




would lose to 37...Bf1+! 38. Qh2 Wf4+ 39. Wxf4 Bxf4, when Black wins with his extra pawns. Correct instead is 37. Wh8+,




followed by 37...Qf7 38. Bh7+ Qe6 39. Qc8+ Qe5 40. Wxg4 etc.

Returning to the note variation, after 35...cxd4? 36. Bh3! Bxf6 37. exd5?? Qf7?,




White had best take perpetual check by 38.♖h7+ ♕e8 39.♖h4 ♖f5 40.♖e4+ ♕f8 41.♖h8+ etc., since the given move 38.♖h8??




again allows Black to win by 38...♖f1+ 39.♖h2 ♖f4+ 40.♖g3 ♖e1! (-4.50).

Finally, after the further moves 38...♕e7? 39.♖h4 ♖d1+ 40.♖h2 the note reaches this position:




Here Black can force a draw with 40...♖f5!, the threat of 41...♖h5 compelling White to take perpetual check with 41.♖e4+ or 41.♖h7+ etc. Instead, the note gives 40...♖d3?, after which 41.♖c8 does indeed leave White winning.


Game 192, Tartakower-Ravn: Two improvements are possible in the note at move 16. After 16...♖b7 17.♖f3 d4 18.♖e4 d×e3 19.♖h3,



rather than 19...♖×f4, Black can try 19...♖×h3!? 20.g×h3 e×d2 21.♖×d2 ♖ad8 (threatening 22...♖e5!-+),




when a rook, bishop and pawn for the queen, Black has other dangerous compensation. And further on in the given continuation, after 19...♖×f4 20.♖×c5,




rather than losing with 20...♖×c5, Black can force a draw with 20...♖×g2+! 21.♖×g2 ♖g4+ 22.♖g3 ♖f2+ 23.♖g1 ♖h4 24.♖×h7+ ♖h8 25.♖g2 ♖×g2+ 26.♖×g2 ♖g4+ 27.♖h1 ♖f3+ etc.

Contrary to the note at move 20, 20.♖×h7+ is at least as good as the text move 20.♖e2, as long as after 20.♖×h7+ ♖h8,




White avoids 21.♖×h6? in favor of 21.♖d3! ♖f6 22.♖g6+ ♖g8 23.♖f2+-.

In the note variation 21.♖×e3 ♖×e3 22.♖×e3 Black must play 22...♖×f4 rather than the given move 22...d4,




as that allows 23.♖e4!, when if 23...d×c3?? 24.♖×h7+ ♖f7 25.♖h5+ etc. wins.

Game 194, Teschner-Tartakower: In the note at move 11, after 11.♖e2 e5,




White is not obliged to play the given moves 12.♖f2? ♖d4 13.♖e3??. Far better, say, 12.♖d2 intending 13.0-0-0.

In the note variation at move 14, after 14.♖e2?, rather than 14...♖d7,




Black can simply proceed with 14...♖×b2, since if 15.♖b1?? ♖c3+.

Game 198, Benkner-Tartakower: In the note variation at move 15, 15...e5 16.♖×e5 ♖×g2 17.♖×d7, rather than 17...♖f3, Black can avoid giving up a pawn by 17...♖e4!.




when the threat of a quick mate by 18...♖h3 etc. forces 18.♖×f6 ♖×f6 and then White must either give back the pawn disadvantageously by, for example, 19.♖e1 ♖h1 20.f3 ♖×f3, or allow a draw by 19.f4 ♖×e3+ 20.♖×g2 ♖e2+ 21.♖g1 ♖e3+ etc.

It's not at all clear why Tartakower bothered with a note for the variation 18.c5,



or why he then preferred 18...f3b1?!, since Black can simply win a pawn by 18...exd4 19.exd4 dxc5 20.dxc5 dxc5.


The note at White's 46th move is fine up through 46.g3 c2 b4 47.axb4 dxb4+ 48.g3b1 d3 49.d1 dxb2! 50.dxb2 a3 51.d2,



but there, while the given move 51...axb2 will eventually win, Black has the immediately decisive 51...f3b2+!, and White must either let the pawn queen by 52.g3c1 a2 etc., or be mated quickly after 52.g3a1 f3c2+ 53.g3b1 f3e2 etc.


Game 199, Tartakower-Halberstadt:

Several chances for Black, both in the note variations and the actual game, go unnoticed here. At move 13, rather than enter the complications of 13...h4, Black had a more straightforward way to advantage in 13...g5+!,




forcing 14.f4 (14.d3?? e3 15.f3 dxa2+ 16.g3b1 f5+ 17.d3 dxd3+-) 14...dxa2+ 15.g3b1 d3+ 16.dxc3 f3c5, and Black is up a sound pawn with the better position.

In the note at White's 14th, after 14.g3? f3h6+ 15.f3e3,




rather than just gain a small advantage by 15...f3e3, Black can win by 15...f3e6!, again targeting the a2 weakness.

The text move 13...h4 did not deserve its question mark and certainly not the epithet "fatal."




At worst it should have led to an even game after 14.dxb4 f3b4. However, after the actual continuation 14.f3b3?, Black could have won with 14...a5!,




supporting the knight and threatening 15...d6. After 15.dxf8 f3xh8 the main variations then are:

- (a) 16.f4 f3a6! 17.g3 (if 17.d2 f3e1+ 18.d1 f3c6+ 19.d3 dxa2+ etc.) 17...f3c6+ 18.d3 f3e7 19.d4 f3e3+ 20.g3b1 f3f5+ 21.g3a1 f3xc4 22.f3xc4
- (b) d3c2+ 23.g3b1 d3a3+ 24.g3a1 d3xc4+-




(b) 16.g3 f3e4 17.d3f4 f3f5 18.d3 f3c6+ 19.g3b1 d3xd3 20.d3xd3 f3d8 21.f3he1 f3f3



and the d3 is lost, since if 22.f3e3 f3xf2.


(c) 16.a3 f3f5! and:

- (c1) 17.f4 f3a6! etc. as in line (a);
- (c2) 17.axb4? f3h6+ 18.f4 f3xf4+ 19.d3xf4 f3xf4+ 20.d3d2 axb4 21.d3d3 f3a1+ 22.g3c2 f3xh1 23.d3xf5 f3xf5+ 24.d3d3 f3xd3+ 25.f3xd3 f3xh2




with an easily won ending;

- (c3) 17.d3d2 f3xf2 18.g3d1 f3h6 19.axb4 f3xd2 20.g3g3 (20.g3xd2?? f3d8+ etc.) 20...f3e3 21.f3xf2 f3xf2 22.d3g3 (22.bxa5?? f3d8+ 23.g3c1 f3e3#) 22...f3xg3 23.hxg3 axb4



again with an easily won ending.


Black was not actually lost until his 18th move, when he played 18...c6??. Instead he had 18...♖e5!,



and if 19.♙xb4 ♜xb5=, or 19.♙xb4 ♜g5!=, when White cannot save both his bishops.


Game 201, Matanovic-Tartakower:

30...♙xc2! does not deserve the “?” given it in the note to Black’s 30th. It is as good or better than the text move, and after the supposed refutation 31.♙g5,



Black handles the mate threat easily with 31...♙c6+ and 32...♙b7, retaining a winning position.

Position XLIX, Tartakower-Falk: This being the master’s farewell, we can forgive Tartakower for not pointing out that Black actually had a won game. Even after allowing the mate threat to be set up,




Black had 2...♙xd3! 3.♙xd3 ♘xc7, ending the threat and remaining with the

substantial material advantage of rook and two knights for the queen.

Corrected Diagram

The diagram for Romih-Tartakower, p. 243, is unfortunately incorrect. Here is the corrected diagram:



We apologize for any inconvenience.

What Is a Mistake?

The following is a slightly abridged version of an essay that first appeared in the Wiener Schachzeitung, then later in Tartakower's book Die Hypermoderne Schachpartie (1925). Translation from German by GM Karsten Müller and Taylor Kingston.

How is it possible that some games are lost by a small mistake (perhaps not even a real mistake, merely a supposed one), while on the other hand, a completely wrong plan or undeniable mistake may incur no disadvantage, and in the dark labyrinth of practical play may even allow error to triumph?

What went wrong here? It seems clear that the secret of losing lies not in the mistakes, but more in the good moves.

Some aphorisms:

Every mistake contains something right.

Often a second mistake comes without the first.

Only a strong player can (and may!) make mistakes.

The mistakes are often very hard to find.

One learns in chess only by making mistakes.

The mistakes are there to be made.

Pessimistic outlook: You lose only by making strong moves, and win by mistakes.

Metaphysical outlook: There are no mistakes, only unforeseen events.

Positive outlook: Sacrifices are usually proof that mistakes were committed first.

To become a winner is not difficult – but to stay a winner is very hard.

A chess game is usually a fairy tale of 1001 mistakes.

There are flattering moves, noisy moves, and groaning moves. The last are the most dangerous.

The existence of chess is justified only by mistakes.

The one absolute rule in chess is – the exceptions.

The variation kills.

The whole game of chess might be built upon only one single mistake.

An often applicable postulate in chess is: How do I become unenergetic?

The second best move is often the only right one.

The final culmination of chess theory is – the wrong move.

Tragedy of errors – tragedy of passions!

In chess there are also “Hippocratic moves.”

With mistakes one can construct splendid arguments; with mistakes one can build a system.

In chess there is only one mistake: Overestimating your opponent. Everything else is either bad luck or weakness.

There are mistaken victories and glorious losses.

The question mark of the annotator often is the only mistake.

I err – therefore I exist!

The worst mistakes are the avoidable ones.

On Possible Sources of Error in Tartakower's Work


by Taylor Kingston

*"You are lacking in solidity,"
Señor Capablanca said to me.
"That is my saving grace," I
replied. — an exchange between
Capablanca and Tartakower
after their game at London 1922*

The reader who has at least glanced through all of the above analytical errors probably finds himself asking: How could there be so many? Having before this edited two books by Emanuel Lasker — *Common Sense in Chess* and *Lasker's Manual of Chess* — and finding several dozen significant errors in each, I was already well aware that even a World Champion's analysis could be fallible, and so was not surprised to find mistakes in Tartakower's.

What was surprising, however, was the sheer number of Tartakower's mistakes, and the elementary nature of some. To make a quantitative comparison, in their original English editions the page count for the two volumes of Tartakower's *Best Games* is only about 28% longer than Lasker's *Manual*, but our error appendix for Tartakower is five times longer. In other words, Tartakower's per-page error rate was about *four times higher* than Lasker's. (And this is without taking into account that much of *Lasker's Manual* is expository text rather than chess analysis.)


Furthermore, there are errors that would embarrass a club player, let alone a world-class GM. For example, in Game 71 of Volume 1, Tartakower- Crépeaux, it's said that in this position White wins a piece,



because the queen both gives check and attacks the ♖c4. Yet even a below-

average player can see that 11...b5 easily takes care of both problems.


Or in Game 71 of Volume 2, Tartakower-Romih, it's said that here,



White threatens to win the queen with 21.♖f7 ♖e6 22.♘f5, yet obviously after 21.♖f7 the queen can escape by 21...♗g5.

In mitigation, it must be noted that some of the errors are rather deeply hidden, revealed only when computer analysis has reached considerable depth. An example is Tartakower-Johner, 5th match game 1906 (Vol. 1 Game 5). In other cases, key moves were overlooked because they are so unusual or surprising. An example is Spielmann-Tartakower, Copenhagen 1923 (Vol. 1 Position V), where the saving moves in two variations are hard-to-find rook sacrifices. The computer's brute-force search inevitably reveals them, but to a human player they are anything but obvious.

In further mitigation, the vast majority of the errors (probably 90% or more) are in analysis variations, not in actual game moves. And we should also note that some improvements we found were not crucial; for example this analysis variation from Marshall-Tartakower, Liège 1930 (Vol. 1 Game 101),




where Tartakower's recommended 22...♗b2, winning two pawns, is good; it's just not nearly as good as 22...♖x d4+! 23.♘x d4 ♗x d4+ 24.♗e1


♗x b2 etc., which nets pawns plus far more, viz. 25.♖d1 ♘c3+ winning the queen.

Still, mitigate as we might, there remain too many mistakes to dismiss them all casually. So one is left wondering how anyone among the top 10 players of his time, and the top 100 of all time, someone who produced truly brilliant chess masterpieces, could make such egregious and frequent mistakes, and not in the heat of battle, but when analyzing coolly at leisure. Tartakower being long dead, we cannot be certain, but we can offer some informed speculation.

For one thing, in his annotations Tartakower is not just an analyst, but a raconteur, a story-teller. He wants to turn the game into a ripping good yarn, perhaps even an epic morality play demonstrating the inevitable triumph of chessic virtue. This sometimes led to the fallacy of *analysis by result*, the notion that everything the winner did must have been right. An example is the aforementioned Romih game, where Tartakower is so eager to establish the validity of his two piece sacrifices that he overlooks a key move,



30...♗d6!, that would have refuted them. Another example is Schlechter-Tartakower, Vienna 1917 (Vo1. 1 Game 31), where Tartakower gave his own 49th move, 49...♗e5,




a "!" when in fact it deserved "?", failing to see that White could then draw by

50.bxa6 ♖h2+ 51.♔d3 ♖xc2 52.♔xc2 ♖xe4 53.♗e6 ♖e3 54.♔d1 ♖f2.


It is curious that in such games, by making it seem that his own play was near-perfect, he goes against one of his own famous precepts, that “the winner of chess game is he who makes the next-to-last mistake.”

A potential cause of such oversights is vanity. Any “best games” collection is by definition an exercise in image enhancement, and certainly Tartakower was entitled to a high self-regard, but that can sometimes blind one to facts. Historically, few chess masters have been consistently capable of the stern self-criticism objective analysis can require (Botvinnik, Fischer, and Carlos Torre come to mind as exceptions). Two instances where it seems likely vanity overrode objectivity are Tartakower’s famous endgames against Michell at Marienbad 1925 (Vol. 1 Position IX) and Grünfeld at Semmering 1926 (Vol. 1 Game 66). These were both featured in *My System*, where Nimzovitch praised them lavishly and declared Tartakower “the third best endgame artist of all living masters.” He may well have been, but these value of these two games as examples is sharply lessened by the fact that in both, Tartakower’s opponents missed a draw. One strongly suspects that Nimzovitch’s flattery contributed to Tartakower’s failure to see this.

Curiously, another recurring type of error is the reverse of this, and also runs against the grain of a Tartakower precept. In his essay “What Is a Mistake?” in *Die Hypermoderne Schachpartie*, he wrote “In chess there is only one mistake: Overestimating your opponent.” Yet cases abound here where he makes mountains of molehills, and phantoms are portrayed as dangerous threats. See for example Tartakower-Johner, 1st match game 1906 (Vol.1 Game 4), where in this position,



he cautions against 26.♗e5, because of 26...♗e4. Yet 26.♗e5 is by far the strongest move on the board, and if in reply 26...♗e4 then 27.♗d6! is crushing. Another such is from Tartakower-Spielmann, Ostend 1907 (Vol. 1 Game 10), where in this position Tartakower claims “Black can adequately defend himself.”



In fact Black is quite lost, viz., 17.♗g5 ♗f6 18.♗h6, or 17.♖g1 ♗e5 18.♖g8 etc.

Why would the consummate optimist so overrate his opponent’s chances? Perhaps again a touch of vanity was involved; if one’s adversary poses such serious threats, then one’s ultimate triumph is all the more praiseworthy. But that is offhand speculation on which I hang no pitons.

By far the most plausible explanation for Tartakower’s analytical errors, and the one that covers the most cases, is quite simple: haste. I spoke above about “analyzing coolly at leisure,” but that is probably not how Tartakower usually worked. In a 1956 *Chess Review* article, his friend Hans Kmoch described his work habits as a writer:

He soon became famous as a writer on chess. His capacity in this field, partly thanks to his constitution, was almost incredible. He could sit and write for forty-eight hours almost without interruption. In the cold winter season of 1919-20, when Vienna was suffering from a severe shortage of fuel, I asked him once how he could do any writing when his room was without heat. “I just keep the window open,” he answered. Another time, during the Baden-Baden tournament in 1925, Tartakower had some

writing to do and kept at it until the porter knocked on his door at 8:00 a.m. to say that breakfast was being served. Tartakower was due to play the black pieces against Rubinstein at 9:00 that same morning. He won.

Tartakower was also quite a multi-tasker. In a recent e-mail to this writer, GM Hans Ree commented:

He was often working for many media at the same time. The Dutch chess writer E. Straat saw him defending a difficult ending against Euwe while working on a Russian translation of a German expressionist poem.


Tartakower took this multi-tasking to great lengths, sometimes even annotating a game while playing it. In a recent item in *Chess Notes*, British master Leonard Barden said:

I witnessed Tartakower making notes during at least one game, at one or more of the Southsea tournaments of 1949, 1950 and 1951, where we both participated. His game against Ravn at Southsea, 1951, which is in his *Best Games* collection, sticks in my mind.

On one occasion I was curious enough to creep up behind him to see exactly what he was doing. There was a dense sheet of variations and quite small writing, and I think he had some difficulty in reading his own material, pushing his spectacles back on his forehead, screwing up his eyes, and peering closely.

In such instances Tartakower was obviously working, in a sense, in the dark, not actually moving the pieces on the board as he analyzed. Unlike, say, Alekhine or Koltanowski, Tartakower was not noted as a blindfold player. One cannot help but wonder if faulty *sans voir* visualization explains such elementary gaffes as his failure to see

that in this position (from the final note to Vol. 1, Position V):



Black has a mate in two, something he (and the vast majority of experienced players) would see easily during actual play.

So it's impossible to think that these circumstances — working hastily, at great length, sometimes without sight of the board and on several things at once — could have produced anything close to optimal results.

Ree also noted that Tartakower's books were based a great deal on articles written for newspapers and magazines. For his game collection, Tartakower may simply have taken these newspaper and magazine write-ups (which, being written to a deadline, would necessarily be somewhat superficial) and put them in the book without further analysis or revision.

And why so much work, so fast? Part of it was just Tartakower's natural disposition; Kmoch depicts him as man of great energy and fortitude, someone whom today we'd call a workaholic. But there is another reason, and there we touch on Tartakower's tragic flaw: his gambling addiction. As roulette was for Janowski, as horse-racing was for George Treysman, so were card games for Tartakower: a money-sucking compulsion from which he could not free himself. Kmoch writes:

He was a very hard worker and achieved success. The money he earned was enough for a decent living, but he worked always for the gamblers. He found them everywhere, and fed them everything he had. When he was plagued by debts, he worked harder than ever; it was unthinkable for him not to pay

every cent he owed, even to crooks.

This is the exact opposite of, say, Botvinnik's situation. Botvinnik, already meticulous and disciplined by nature, insulated by his political position and without debtors breathing down his neck, could rest secure in his state stipend and truly analyze coolly and at leisure. But Tartakower, like Alice and the Red Queen in *Through the Looking Glass*, had to run as fast as he could just to stay in one place. And unlike Botvinnik or Lasker, both of whom took years-long breaks from tournament chess, Tartakower had to keep on playing. Considering all this, perhaps the surprising thing about Tartakower's work is that there are not *more* errors.

One suspects, however, that even had Tartakower been untroubled by debts and deadlines, there would still be a certain wildness, or at least an air of improvisation, to his work. Like Mikhail Tal, he was too much of a gambler, too fond of deliberate eccentricity, too fond of playing the man rather than the board, too interested in trying something just to see what would happen, ever to accept fully the strictures of precise objective soundness.

And perhaps we should be grateful for this. Tartakower's style, both as a player and annotator, reminds me somehow of a comic-book super-hero of my youth, Green Lantern, whose power-ring was charged by a special substance in the lantern that contained a yellow impurity. This made it ineffective against anything yellow in color; yet, if the impurity was removed, the ring lost all power. Similarly, Tartakower's play had a "lack of solidity" (as Capablanca put it), that made him powerless against certain opponents (he never defeated Lasker, Capablanca or Botvinnik, and had a poor record against Alekhine) yet perhaps, as he retorted to Capablanca, that very lack was his saving grace.

In this vein, we conclude with a quote from an article by Lajos Steiner in the September 1938 issue of *Chess Review*:

Probably no-one can play more strongly than Tartakower. There are better players, more perfect masters. Tartakower has faults,

and the greatest of them is that he does not care to avoid getting into difficult positions. Sometimes his ability enables him to extricate himself safely, other times he is left without recourse. Nobody can handle such positions more cleverly, no matter how they may have happened to come about. If he would put forth such efforts in more suitable positions, he would hardly know his superior. But either he cannot succeed in eliminating this fault (it is very difficult to eliminate fundamental faults) or he does not care to — which amounts to the same thing in the end.