

by Taylor Kingston

The games and note variations in *15 Contenders for the World Title* were converted to algebraic notation using ChessBase, with the analysis engine Rybka 3 UCI running in the background. During this process much of the book's analysis came to be compared to Rybka's. On the whole, Najdorf's judgment was upheld much more often than not, but like a football referee overruled by instant replay, even an all-time great GM will sometimes be proven wrong by the relentlessly objective scrutiny of a lidless silicon eye.

We present here the corrections, additions and enhancements thus revealed that we consider significant: not minor half-pawn differences, but cases where an important tactical shot was missed, where a resource that could have changed a loss to a draw or win was overlooked, where a good move was called bad (or vice versa), or where a position was misevaluated. Also some cases where there was no mistake, but an especially interesting variation, or a much stronger one, was not pointed out.


In some cases we also checked Najdorf and Rybka against Bronstein's *Zurich International Chess Tournament 1953* and Euwe's *Schach-Elite im Kampf*. Sometimes the Russian or Dutch GM saw something Najdorf did not, but it was surprising how often Rybka found something all three had missed. That we found instances where Bronstein and/or Euwe were correct should not be taken as meaning their analysis is superior. There are undoubtedly instances where Najdorf was right and they were wrong, but these would be discovered only by systematically examining the Bronstein and Euwe books, something beyond our scope here.

Numbers given with some variations represent Rybka's evaluation of the position, e.g. +3.50 for a position where Rybka considers White better by 3½ pawns (or the equivalent), or -3.50 for one favoring Black to the same extent. These numbers may vary some from one machine to another, or with the length of time allowed for analysis, but are generally valid and reliable.


The one area where analysis engines are sometimes suspect is the endgame. In such cases we consulted Dr. Stephen B. Dowd, a published study composer and endgame expert, for whose help we are most grateful.

We do not claim the list below is comprehensive; not every variation of every game was examined. Nor do we claim it is inerrant; though today's engines are very strong, they can miss things beyond their analytical horizon. The interested reader is encouraged to examine further on his own.

*Game 1, Taimanov-Bronstein: At White's 14<sup>th</sup> move,*




Najdorf (and Euwe) gives 14.e5 dxe5 15.♟xe5 ♟xd5 (Bronstein prefers 15...♟xe5=) 16.♟xg6 ♞e6 as winning for Black:




However, this would lose to 17.♟xd5!, when if 17...♞xe2 18.♞xe2! and Black must give back the queen to avoid mate: 18...♞d8 19.♟dxg6+ ♜xg6 19.♟xe7+- . Correct after 16.♟xg6? (better 16.♟xf7±) is 16...♟xc3! 17.♟xe7+ ♟xe7 18.bxc3 ♞e6 with some advantage for Black.

*Game 2, Najdorf-Reshevsky: At White's 20<sup>th</sup>,*




the note reads "Not 20.♟xc5 because of 20...♟e4 21.♞d4 ♟b3 22.♟d6 ♟xd4 23.♟xc7 ♟xe2+ 24.♞f1 ♟c3 winning." However, White need not play 22.♟d6?; instead he has 22.♞e5!,




and after 22...♞xe5 23.♟xe5 ♟xa2 24.♟xa7 he remains a pawn up with good prospects. Euwe makes the same error, while Bronstein does not examine 20.♟xc5.

*Game 5, Szabó-Geller: At this point in variation (c) of the note to White's 17<sup>th</sup>,*




22.exf3, while not at all bad, perhaps does not deserve the exclamation mark given it. White can gain an equal if not greater advantage by 22.♟xf3 ♞xc5 23.♞xc5 ♜xc5 24.♞xc5 ♟xc5 25.♟c6 ♞b8 (if 25...b4 26.♞c1 ♟a6 27.♟b5 ♟b8 28.♞c4) 26.♞c1 ♟a6 27.♟xb5,




when White's passed a-pawn spells Black's doom.

*Game 6, Euwe-Kotov: The note to Black's 24<sup>th</sup> overlooks a move that may overturn its verdict.*




Rather than 32.♟f2 as in the note, better is 32.♞g1!, when about the only winning try for Black is 32...♞g3+ 33.♞f1 ♟xh3+ 34.♞xh3 ♜xh3+ 35.♞e1 ♞h1+ 36.♞f1 ♟g3+ 37.♞e2 ♞e4+ 38.♟e3 ♟xd5 39.♞a3,




leading to an unclear position where Black has four pawns for a rook and can force a draw at will, but there is no win on the horizon.

*Game 7, Stahlberg-Boleslavsky: In the final note, Black appears to have more choice than Najdorf believed, and what he considered the one saving move might not have saved Black. The crucial position comes after 49.h5 ♟e6 50.♟g3:*




Pronouncing 50...h6 the only move to hold the draw, Najdorf examined only 51.h5+ and 51.f5, disregarding 51.bxb7!? d4 (not 51...c5?! 52.h5+ g7 53.e4+ g8 54.f5 d2 55.bxa4 52.g7, when White can still try to win. Much safer is 50...b5!, retaining an important pawn but still leaving White no way to break through, e.g. 51.h5+ g7 52.f5+ g8=.

*Game 9, Geller-Euwe:* In the final note, Najdorf's disclaimer about human fallibility might seem a cop-out, but Rybka corroborates his reluctance to pronounce any final verdict on the position after Black's 23<sup>rd</sup> move.




Bondarevsky's find 24.d5!! is indeed White's only playable move, after which his continuation 24...dxd5 25.d1 e2+ 26.f1 is virtually forced.




Now there are two main branches, (a) Euwe's 26...gxh6, and (b) Bondarevsky's 26...a2:

(a) Euwe gave 26...gxh6 27.e4 d5 bxd5 28.e4 g7 as winning for Black, but as Najdorf noted White can improve with 27.bxh6! g7 28.d2,




a position Rybka evaluates as virtually even and for which it reaches no conclusion. Black can force a draw with 28...c6 29.f2 g2 f2+ 30.g1 d5, or try 28...f2 29.bxd2 with the faintest chances (-0.01).  
(b) After 26...a2 27.d2



the position is almost, but not quite, a forced draw. Dubious then is 27...f2 28.d4! (threatening 29.bh5+), viz. 28...e5 29.f4 f3+ 30.g1 f4 31.f4 f4 32.bh5+ f8 33.fxd5 and White's extra rook should win. Therefore necessary is 27...c4+, when (b1) if 28.f2


(b1a) a draw by repetition might be reached by 28...b6+ 29.f3 d5+ 30.e2 c4+ etc., or

(b1b) Black could try for more with the long, more or less forced line 29...a3+! 30.g2 d5+ 31.e4 c6 (if 31...e6 32.bh5+ g6 33.bh7+ g7 34.e1 f5! 35.dh6) 32.bh5+ (32.bh7? a4) 32...g6 33.bh7+ g7 34.e1 a4 35.fg4 (if 35.dh6 dxe4+ 36.fhxe4 e4 37.bxg7+ e6+, showing the difference between this line and 31...e6) 35...f5 36.d3 (forced) 36...xc3 37.bxg6+ e7 38.fg5+ e8 39.fg6+ d8 40.fg5+ c8 41.f1 c1 dxe4+ 42.fxe4 a2+ 43.fg1 c2 44.fxc2 cxc2,



reaching a wildly imbalanced position on which Rybka can reach no clear verdict (about -0.21).

(b2) Or, White could try for more with 28.fxc4 bxc4+ 29.f1 e6+ 30.f1,




hoping to make his extra piece count before Black's pawns do.


The only definite things one can say about the position after 23...c2 are that (1) Bondarevsky's 24.d5!! was best and absolutely necessary, (2) Euwe's claim that Black then still had a forced win was

mistaken, and (3) most of the attempts to avoid a draw create variations that are double-edged and razor-sharp, with little or no margin for error by either side.


*Game 19, Euwe-Smyslov:* In the note to Black's 26<sup>th</sup> move, in the variation 26...a6+ 27.f1 d4 28.fxd4+ f6



Najdorf gives both 29.fxb8 and 29.f4 as good for White, considering the latter the better move. This is incorrect. After 29.fxb8! fxd4 30.fxa6 fxa6 31.f1,




White is up a pawn with good winning chances, whereas after 29.f4! fbc8,




he has only a choice between forcing a draw by 30.f7 b7 31.fxf6+ g8 32.f6+ h8 etc., or 30.f6 d6 entering an unclear two-pawns-up exchange-down ending.

Further on, at move 37, it is worth noting that in time pressure Black missed an immediate win.




Smyslov played 37...f3, missing the decisive 37...d3!, after which White cannot adequately defend f2, viz. 38.d2 and Black can either increase the pressure with the unanswerable 38...c5, or liquidate to a won ending with 38...f2! 39.f2 h1+ 40.fh1 f2+ 41.fg2 fg4. This went unnoticed by Najdorf, Bronstein and Euwe.

*Game 21, Boleslavsky-Kotov:* Both notes at move 15 have errors. At White's 15<sup>th</sup> move,




the note says 15.a×b3 (in lieu of the text 15.d×e6) would have been very good, but in fact after 15.a×b3 ♘×d5 16.♙×e7 ♘×c3 17.b×c3 ♗×e7 White has simply lost a pawn for little if any compensation.

Far more serious is the mistake at Black's 15<sup>th</sup>. After 15.d×e6 ♙×f3, contrary to Najdorf's recommendation of 16.♗×f3, best by far is 16.e×f7+!, since after 16...♖h8,




rather than Najdorf's 17.♗×f3, White has 17.♖×d8! winning, viz. 17...♙×e2 18.♖×a8 ♖×a8 19.♖×e2 ♙f8 (if 19...♖f8 20.♖×e7) 20.♙×f6 g×f6 21.♙e8+-. Both Bronstein and Euwe give the correct line.

*Game 26, Bronstein-Averbakh:* In the note to White's 21<sup>st</sup> move, variation (a) goes wrong on the last move. After 21.h3 d4 22.e×d4 ♗f4 23.g3 ♘×g3 24.f×g3,




rather than the mere win of a pawn by 24...♗×f3 as given, Black has the immediately decisive 24...♖×e1+! 25.♖×e1 ♗×g3+ 26.♖f1 ♙×f3, and mate can be prevented only at ruinous material loss.

*Game 29, Petrosian-Taimanov:* The note to White's 21<sup>st</sup> move goes quickly astray in its analysis of the line 21.♖c3 ♗×d4.




Rather than 22.♙a1, which allows 22...♗d8 with equality, White does much better with 22.♖f3! ♗×b2 23.♗×f7+ ♖h8 24.♗×b7 ♖d8 (if 24...♖e8 25.♗×c6) 25.♗×a7, with a rook and three pawns for bishop and knight.

*Game 30, Averbakh-Gligoric:* 26.♗b3 is not the terrible error Najdorf makes it out to be; in fact Rybka considers it the best move on the board. After Black's reply 26...♘f6,




Rybka, Bronstein and Euwe agree that with 27.♖bd1! (rather than 27.f×g6?!) White would still have enjoyed a definite advantage (about +0.85).

*Game 31, Szabó-Bronstein:* In a game as wild as this, it's not surprising to find a number of errors both on the board and in the notes. At move 31,




the strongest move goes unmentioned, i.e. 31.♗f4!, with these main possibilities. (a) 31...b×c3 32.♗×f7+ ♖h8 33.♖f4 ♘f6 34.♙×e4+-; (b) 31...f6 32.♗h6 ♖×e7 33.♖×d7 ♗×d7 34.♙×f6 ♖g7 35.♘c5+-, or (c) 31.♗f4 ♖×e7 32.♙×b4 ♖ae8 33.♙×e7 ♖×e7 34.♗d6+-.


This is only a minor analytical omission, since the move actually played, 31.♙×b4, also wins. However, the note at White's 33<sup>rd</sup> move has more serious errors, of both omission and commission.



Firstly, 33.♖×d7, which is claimed to win brilliantly, does not. After 33.♖×d7 ♖×d7 34.♗h6 ♖d4 35.♗f4,




rather than 35...♗d7 as given, Black has 35...♗c4! when there is no win in sight, viz. 36.b3 ♗d5 37.♗f6 ♖d8, or 36.♗f6 ♖ad8 37.♖f4 ♖8d6 38.♗e7 ♙c6 39.♗×a7 ♗d5 40.♖h2 (if 40.♙×d4 ♗×d4+ 41.♗×d4 ♖×d4 42.♖f1 f5+) 40...f5 41.♙×d4 ♗×d4,




reaching a highly imbalanced position in which no clear win for either side can be calculated.

What *does* clearly win at move 33 is 33.♗g5! (recommended by Bronstein),



viz. (a) 33...f6 34.♖×d7!! f×g5 35.♖×e7 with a murderous windmill: 35...♙d5 36.♖g7+ ♖h8 37.♖×a7+ etc; or (b) 33...♖ae8 34.♖×d7! ♗×d7 35.♗f6 ♖e5 36.♙×e5 ♖×e5 37.♗×e5+-; or (c) 33...♖e6 34.♗h6 ♘e5 35.♖d6!! ♗c4 (if 35...♖×d6 36.♙×e5 also) 36.♙×e5 ♖×e5 37.♖×g6+! f×g6 38.♗×g6+ ♖h8 39.♗f6+ ♖h7 40.♗×e5+-.


Finally, at Black's 37<sup>th</sup> move, just after White missed a forced mate,




rather than 37...f6? as in the game, Black might still have salvaged a draw with 37...f5!, e.g. 37...f5 38.b×c3 ♖f7! (only move) 39.♖d6 ♗g8 and White cannot break in.

The key difference between 37...f6? and 37...f5! is seen in the continuation 38.♖d6. In


the former case, after 38.♖d6 ♖g7 39.♜h8+ ♜f7,



White has the decisive 40.♖xf6+! ♜xf6 41.♖f4+ ♜e7 42.♜xg7+, whereas with the pawn on f5,




the f-file is safely closed against ♖h4-f4+, and after 42.♖f6+ ♜xf6 43.♜xe8 ♖c8!




White has won the black queen but at too high a price. Bronstein and Euwe also overlook this, neither commenting at all on 37...f6.

*Game 37, Keres-Boleslavsky:* A minor improvement in the note to Black's 8<sup>th</sup> move: after 8...♖xf6 9.♖xh4 ♖e4,




while the given 10.♜d4 is not bad, far stronger is 10.♖xe4! ♜xh4 11.♜d4 ♜e7 (11...♖g8?? 12.♖xd6+) 12.0-0-0! (no need to hurry in taking the rook, though also good is 12.♖xd6+ ♜xd6 13.♜xh8) 12...f6 (more or less forced; if 12...♖g8/♖h7 13.♖f6+) 13.♖xf6+ ♜d8 14.♖d5, and White is up two pawns with the far better position.

*Game 38, Reshevsky-Stahlberg:* The note at Black's 24<sup>th</sup> has two errors. After 24...♖f6,




White need not play 25.♖b5 as given; instead he has the forcing and decisive 25.♖xe6! fxe6 26.♖b5 (threatening 27.♖c7 winning the queen), when best play runs something like 26...♖d8 27.♖f4 ♖b7 28.♖h3 ♖f6 29.♖e5 ♖f5 (if 29...♜f7 30.♖d6+) 30.♖xf5 exf5 31.♖d1 ♜h7 32.♖d5 ♜g8 33.♖c7 b5 (or 33...♖xc7 34.d8♜+ ♖xd8 35.♜e8+ etc.) 34.♖xb5 ♖xb5 35.♖xa6 ♖xe5 36.♜d1,




a position Rybka rates at about +4.83.

Conversely, if White does play 25.♖b5?!,




then rather than Najdorf's 25...♖fd8, Black has 25...♖xd7!, with the likely continuation 26.♖xa5 ♜c8! 27.♖b5 ♖xc3 28.bxc3 a6 29.♜d1 ♖xb5 30.♖f4 ♖c6 31.♖xb8 ♖xg2 32.♜xg2 ♜xb8,




when the winning chances are Black's.

A probably winning chance for White goes unmentioned at move 25.




Rather than the text move 25.♖xb5, stronger was 25.♜d1!, with the probable continuation 25...♖f6 26.♖c5 (intending 27.♖c7) 26...♖xc3 27.bxc3 ♖b3 28.♖c7 ♜xa3 29.♖a7 ♜b2 30.♖g5 ♜xc3 31.d8♜ ♖fxd8 32.♖xd8,




and White is a rook up and winning.

The note at Black's 29<sup>th</sup> move overlooks a key move. After 29...♖f5,




not 30.♖xd8?, but 30.♖d6! ♖c8 31.♖d5, and White retains a definite advantage (about +1.10).

*Game 39, Bronstein-Euwe:* Complications again lead to several analytical errors. In the note to White's 15<sup>th</sup> move, variation (a),




20.gxf3 does not deserve the “?” given it; after 20.gxf3 ♖e5 21.♖xd4 cxd4




the supposed threat of ...♖g5+ and ...♖h5 is handled by 22.♖fe1 with equality.

In that same note, in the variation 19...♜e5 20.♖xd4 cxd4 21.gxf3 ♖h8 22.♜e4 ♜g5+ 23.♜h1 ♖xh7,




not 24.♖g1?? as given, allowing mate in three, but 24.♜xd4+! forcing a draw, viz. 24...f6 25.♜d6 ♖d8 (25...♜e8?? 26.♖g1+-; 25...♜e5?! 26.♖g1+ ♜h8 27.♜xe5 fx5 28.♖g5±) 26.♜e7+ ♜g6 27.♜xd8 ♖xh2+ 28.♜xh2 ♜h4+ 29.♜g1 ♜g5+ etc., draw.

In the note to White's 25<sup>th</sup> move, in the line 25.♜d4 ♖xd5 26.fxe5+,




The recommended 26...♜xe5, rather than the “!” given it, deserves “??”, since it loses to 27.♖xf5+! ♜xf5 (or 27...gxf5 28.♜h6+) 28.♜f2+ ♜e6 29.♜xc5+- . Correct instead is 26...♜e6 with an even game.

The note at Black's 26<sup>th</sup> condemns 26...♜g7 because of 27.♜g5,




with the supposed threats 28.♖xf5 and 28.e6+. However, those are handled by 27...♜e6!, preventing 28.e6+, and if 28.♖xf5?! (slightly better may be 28.♖ac1 ♜b6 29.♖xf5 h6 30.♖xf7+ ♜xf7), then 28...♜c2! and Black wins back his material,




viz. 29.♖f6 (if 29.♖ff1 ♜xb2) 29...♖d1+ 30.♖f1 ♖xf1+ 31.♖xf1 ♜xb2, and any advantage extant is Black's.

In the note to White's 31<sup>st</sup> move, after 31.♖xf5 gxf5 32.♜g8 33.♜xf7+ ♜d8 34.♜g8+ ♖e8 35.♜g5+ ♜d7 36.♜g7+ ♜d8 Najdorf then gives 37.♜b2,




but that allows Black to shut down the checks with 37...♜ee5!, when White cannot take the queen (38.♖xc3?? ♖d1+), and Black can consolidate his material advantage. Instead White must play 37.♜a1 or continue to check by 37.♜g5+ etc.

*Game 41, Taimanov-Averbakh:* The note at move 29 concludes that in this position, White has the better game:




In fact play is completely even after 33...g3!. White then has only two moves that prevent mate: (a) 34.♜a1 ♜d2 (or 34...♜d3) and White cannot defend the e-pawn (35.♜a3?? ♜d1#) and so must take perpetual check by 35.♜a8+ ♜g7 36.♜a1+ ♜f7 37.♜a7+ etc.), or (b) 34.♜g5+ ♜f7 35.♜xg3 ♜d1+ 36.♜h2 (or 36.♜f2 ♜d2+ etc.) 36...♜xh5+ 37.♜h3 ♜g6 with a completely even position.

Toward the end of the game, after 31.f4,




it is hard to see how White can win against 31...♖f7, a move considered by neither Najdorf, Bronstein, nor Euwe. Rybka puts the position at about +0.22, virtually even, as opposed to +1.70 after the text move 31...exf4.

*Game 43, Averbakh-Najdorf:* At move 17 we corrected a typo in the original. In this position,




Najdorf wrote “No puedo tomar 17...C o TxP por 18.CxP5AD,” meaning “I cannot capture 17...♜xd5 or 17...♜xb2 because of 18.♜xc5.” Since 18.♜xc5 is an obvious blunder, we took the liberty of changing it to 18.♜xc4.

*Game 48, Kotov-Keres:* The complications arising from Keres' pawn sacrifice lead to some subtle but definite analytical errors in the middle game and endgame. 19...♜e6-f5 does not deserve the “?” given it;




it is about as good as any other move at that point, and is not to blame for the loss of Black's advantage. That comes a few moves later, after 20.♖b2 ♖d7+ 21.♜e2 ♖c8 22.♖b3,




when Black makes three poor moves in a row: 22...♜g4+?! (better 22...♜d3+) 23.♜f3 ♜xf3+? (better 23...♜e6) 24.♜xf3 ♖dc7? (better 22...♖d2), changing the evaluation from -0.70 to +0.66, more than a whole pawn's worth.

Further on, at move 29,




White lessened his winning chances with 29.♜a5; instead much more pressure could have been applied with 29.♖a8+ ♜h7 30.a4 ♖c2 31.a5, pushing the passed pawn.

At move 43, a minor point:




the problem-like 43.♖d6!, while very good, is not strictly speaking the only saving move; White can also play 43.a5, which transposes to the game after 43...♖a2 44.♖d6.


Finally, in the note to Black's 43<sup>rd</sup> move, in the line 43...f5 44.♖d7+ ♖f8 45.♗f6 ♖c6 46.♗xh5 ♖h6 47.♗g7 ♖xh2 48.♖g1,



Black can play 48...♖xh2, because even though White wins a piece by 49.♗e6+ ♖e8 50.♖xh4,




after 50...♖f3! 51.♖d5 ♖e7 52.♖xe5 ♖xg3+ 53.♖f2 ♖f3+ 54.♖g2 ♖d6 55.♖e2 ♖a3




and ...♖x4, White's last pawn goes.


*Game 49, Geller-Smyslov:* The supposedly winning variation given at move 31 may not be as strong as supposed.




After 31...♖d5 32.♗d3 ♖x3 33.♖x3 ♗xb3 34.♖f3 ♖h7 35.♖g3 ♖f7 36.♖d8 ♗xc4 37.♖f6 ♖x6 38.♖xf6 e5 39.♖g7+ ♖h8 40.♖x7 e4,




rather than 41.♖f2 as given, Rybka prefers 41.g3, preventing 41...f4, when best play seems to go 41...e3 42.♖e7 e2 43.♖e8+ ♖h7 44.f7! ♗x7 45.♖xe2,



and no clear win is apparent. Instead of 31...♖d5 Rybka greatly prefers Smyslov's actual move 31...♖g5,




considering it the best on the board, and finding a winning line which Smyslov did not: 32.g3 h5! — instead of 32...♖h7 — when a likely continuation is 33.♖f2 h4 34.♖e3 (not 34.♖xh4?? ♖d2) 34...h3 35.h3 35.♖xg3 ♖xg3+ 36.h3 36.♖g3 ♖d2+ 37.♖e1 [if 37.♖g1 ♖b2 38.♗a4 ♗xc4+-, or 37.♖f3 ♗xb3 38.♗xb3 ♖c2+-] 37...♖g2 38.g4 [if 38.♖f3 ♖g1+ 39.♖d2 ♗xc4 40.♗xc4 ♗xc4+ 41.♖c2 ♖g2+ 42.♖d1 ♗xa3] 38...f3 35...♖b7!,



when the combined threats to c4 and down the d- and h-files are more than White can handle, viz. 36.♗a2 ♖d1, or 36.♗a4 ♖h7 37.♖h4 ♖xe3+ 38.♖xe3 ♖xh4 39.gxh4 ♗xc4+, or 36.a4 ♗a6! — virtual *Zugzwang* — 37.♖e1 ♗xb3 38.♗xb3 ♖d3 39.♖f3 ♖xf3+ 40.♖xf3 ♗xc4+-.


Another winning opportunity was missed at move 34,



where instead of 34...♖g7, Black had 34...♖g7!, which by preventing ♖f7+ allows


Black a decisive incursion on the d-file, viz. (a) 35.♖h4 ♖d2+ 36.♖e1 ♖xh4 37.♖xh4 ♗xb3 38.♗xb3 ♖c2+-, or (b) 35.♖e1 ♗xb3 36.♗xb3 ♖d3 37.♖e2 (37.♖f3?? ♖d1+ 38.♖f2 ♗xc4+-) 37...♖xc3+-, or (c) 35.♖h4 ♖g5! 36.♖e8 (if 36.♖xg5+ h3 37.♖h5 ♗xb3 38.♗xb3 ♖g6 39.♖h8 ♗xc4+-) 36...♖d2+ 37.♗e2 (if 37.♖f1?? ♖d8) 37...♗xb3+-.

*Game 51, Reshevsky-Kotov:* The note at move 26 overlooks the strongest possibility.




Far better than the text 26.♗b5 was 26.♖f3!, with many threats including 27.♗c4, 27.e5 and 27.♗b5. Further material loss is then inevitable, e.g. 26...♖a4 27.♗b5 ♖b4 28.♖d1 ♖ab8 29.♗xe8! ♖xb7 30.♗xf7+.


*Game 53, Gligoric-Stahlberg:* The note to Black's 14<sup>th</sup> move goes astray in one variation. In the line 14...♗e5 15.♗f4 ♗xf3+ 16.♗xf3 ♗e7 17.♗a4 ♗d5 18.♖xd5 ♖xd5 19.♗b6,



Black's best choice is not 19...♖f5, but cutting his losses by 19...♖b5 20.♗xa8 ♖xb2. After 19...♖f5,




pausing to save the bishop by the given 20.♗g3 leads to a severe weakening of the white queenside pawns after 20...♖b5 21.♗xa8 ♖xb2; much stronger is 20.♗xa8 ♖xf4 21.♗b6,




when the black QB cannot be saved, and the best Black has is 21...♙d8 22.♜xc8 ♖c4 23.♜d6 ♖xc2, when White has both an extra piece and sound pawns.


*Game 57, Szabó-Petrosian:* The truly decisive mistake in this game goes unnoticed.




Here, Najdorf wrongly labels 25.♜xc4 the critical error, but it actually occurs a few moves later, after 25.♜xc4 ♜c7 26.♜a4 ♖c8 27.♖d4 ♜e8,



where the text move 28.e4?? deserves the question marks. Instead with 28.♜d1! White can hold, viz. 28...♜d6 29.♜ab6




when if 29...♖b8/♖d8?? 30.♜d5!+-; therefore either (a) 29...♖xb6 30.♜xb6 ♜xc1 31.♜xc8 ♜xc8 32.g3, or (b) 29...♜xc4 30.♜xc8 ♜xc8 31.♜a4 ♜a5 32.♖xc6 ♜xc6 33.♜xc6 ♜xc6 34.♖d7,



in either case reaching a position where instead of being down a piece, White has ♖+♗ vs. ♙+♜, and the game is more or less even. Also good is 28.♜f1, viz. 28...♜d6 29.♜ab6 ♖xb6 30.♜xb6 ♜xc1 31.♜xc8 ♜xc8 32.♖a4=.


*Game 58, Euwe-Najdorf:* This complicated game has several analytical errors by Najdorf where, interestingly, he is often too pessimistic and hard on himself. In the note to

Black's 17<sup>th</sup> move, in the line 17...♙a1 18.♜xg6+ ♜g7 19.♜xf8 ♙c3+ 20.♜f1 ♜xf8 21.gxf5 ♜xf5 22.♖g1, Black is not lost, if instead of the given 22...♜h8 he plays 22...♖f8! threatening 23...♜xf2#:




Since now if 23.f4? exf3 24.♜e6+ ♜h8 25.♜xf8 ♜h3+ 26.♜f2 ♜h2+ 27.♜xf3?? ♜e5+ 28.♜e4 ♜xh4+ Black is winning, or if 23.♜e2 ♜h8! 24.♙e4 ♜d4! 25.exd4 ♙xe4 26.♜xe4 ♜h3+ 27.♖g2 ♙xd4 with advantage to Black, White is more or less forced into the drawing line 23.♜e6+ ♜h8 24.♜xf8 ♜h3+ 25.♖g2 (not 25.♜e2?? ♜f3+ 26.♜f1 ♜xd1+) 25...♜h1+ 26.♖g1 ♜h3+ etc.

At Black's 18<sup>th</sup> move, the note seems to say that after 18...gxf5 19.♜h5,




to be followed by 20.♖g1, White is winning. But Rybka reaches no such conclusion, viz. 19...♙a1 and if 20.♜g6+ ♜g7 21.♜xf8 ♖xf8 22.♖g1 ♜h8 23.♜f7+ ♜h7 24.♜g5+ etc. draws, or 20.♖g1 ♜e5 21.♙xb7 ♖ab8 22.♙d5∞. Black can also try for more with 19...♜e5!.

In the note to Black's 23<sup>rd</sup> move, note (c) has several errors. After 24.♜a1 ♜h7 25.♖g1,




not 25...♙xd5?? as given, but 25...♖g8! which draws, viz. 26.♖xg8 ♖xg8 27.♜e4 ♙xd5 28.♜f6+ ♜h8 29.♜6h5+ ♜h7 30.♜f6+ ♜h8 31.♜6h5+ etc.

And in the line 24.♜a1 ♜f6! 25.♙xb7 (better 25.♜c1, unpinning the ♜c3) 25...♜xb7,




not the given 26.♖g1?? which loses the h-pawn and the game, for example 26...♖g8 27.♜c1 (or 27.♖xg8+ ♖xg8 28.♜c1 ♜xh4) 27...♖xg1+ 28.♜xg1 ♖g8+ 29.♜f1 ♜xh4. Better 26.♜c1, though even then White is worse after 26...♜xd6.

Most importantly, a likely saving move goes unmentioned. Najdorf considered 23...♖ae8 the losing move,




but after the game continuation 24.♜ce2 ♖g8 25.h5 ♖g5 26.♜g3 ♖xg3 27.fxg3, instead of the text 27...♖xe3 (the actual losing move), Black had 27...♜a5!,




after which Rybka can find no win for White, viz. (a) 28.♜a1+ ♜h7 29.g4 ♜g5 (29...♜xg4?? 30.♖g1+-) 30.♙xb7 ♜xb7 31.♜b1+ ♜g8 32.♜d3 ♜f6 followed soon by ...♜xd6=; (b) 28.♙xb7 ♜xb7 29.♖h4 ♜a5 30.♜e2 ♜c6=; (c) 28.♖h4 ♙xd5 29.♜xd5 (not 29.cxd5? ♜c4) 29...♜xd5 30.♜xd5 ♜b7 followed soon by ...♜xd6=.

*Game 59, Stahlberg-Taimanov:* The note at White's 10<sup>th</sup> move had to be reconstructed partly by inference, since the original edition's discussion of Goldenov-Borisenko left out the move 9.b4. We wonder if other typos might still be present, as there are some otherwise hard-to-explain errors. In the line 5.♜c2 c5 6.♙g2 ♜c6 7.dxc5 ♙xc5 8.a3 ♖c8 9.b4 ♙e7 10.♙b2 ♜b8 11.♜bd2 ♙xc4 12.♜xc4,




Black must play 12...b5, not 12...d5?? as given, since the latter allows the pinned knight to escape with 13.♜a4+ followed by ♜c4-e5.

In the variation 10.b5 ♙xb5 11.cxb5 ♜b4 12.♜b2 ♜c2+ 13.♜d1,




we wonder if the much stronger 13...d4 was intended rather than 13...e4. And even after the latter move,



White is by no means forced to play the egregious 14.xc2?? as given; far better is 14.e3, defending f2.


In the actual game, Taimanov could have shortened matters considerably here,



by (instead of 28...f5) playing 28...bxa3! 29.xa7 (of course not 29.bxa3?? xa4) 29...axb2 30.b8+ gh7 31.f4 xf4 32.gxf4 and White's resignation is in order.


*Game 61, Kotov-Bronstein:* Another very complicated game with significant errors both on the board and in the notes.

The note at White's 28<sup>th</sup> move makes a good recommendation in 28.b4, but then goes awry after 28...h5 (not at all best) 29.cxd6 cxd6 30.d4,




by giving now 30...f6?, which simply loses to 31.xd6. Better instead is 30...a6, though Black then is still in considerable trouble.

The note at White's 34<sup>th</sup> move likewise goes astray after several moves: 34.xb7 dxg3 35.fxg3 ex3+ 36.ex3 f1+ 37.g2




and now rather than the given move 37...g7, Black should play Euwe's 37...ab8!, a likely continuation being 38.c6 f8 39.a2 (not 39.a4?? b2+) 39...xc6 40.dxc6 ex6 with a probably winning advantage for Black. The reason this is preferable to 37...g7 (which was considered winning by both Najdorf and Bronstein),




is that they both overlooked a saving sacrifice for White, 38.h6+! gxh6 39.b2, when the h-file is again blocked and Black's advantage, if any, is minimal.

In the tradition of "long analysis, wrong analysis" the note at White's 38<sup>th</sup> move errs badly toward the end. After 38.c7 xh6 39.a7 d8 40.ab1 f8 41.f3 d7 42.b8 dx8 43.axb8 xxb8 44.xd7 xb6+ 45.g2 e3




not 46.c6?? which leads to utter ruin via 46...d2+ 47.g1 a2, but 46.c2, when White is still worse but has much more hope of holding out.

While Black's 43<sup>rd</sup>, 44<sup>th</sup>, and 45<sup>th</sup> moves are not best, they do not really deserve the question marks given them, as Black can still win after each. Overlooked at move 43 is the best move, which is not Najdorf's recommended 43...g7 but 43...g6!:




(a) 44.f7 xf7 45.g2 xd5-+;  
(b) 44.f3? xf3! 45.f3 xe4 46.f2 (if 46.f7 e3+ 47.g2 e4-+) 46...c2+ 47.g1 d1+ 48.f2 e4 49.h2 d2+ 50.g1 e3+ 51.f1 d3+ 52.e1 xg3+-+;  
(c) 44.b4 f6 45.f3 (if 45.a4 d1 46.a1 h5 – threatening 47...g4 and mate shortly – 47.b2 f3 48.f3 xf3 and 49...xe4-+) 45...xf3 46.f3 xe4 47.g2 f5 48.a3 g4 winning the knight, since if 49.h4 f2+ 50.h1 dxg3+ 51.xg3 e1+ (not 51...xg3?? 52.f5+) 52.g2 xb4-+.

Even after all the missed chances, Najdorf (and Euwe) overlooked one last winning opportunity late in the game. As Bronstein notes, at move 54,




he could have won with 54...d3!, a likely line then being 55.e1 (if 55.e3 d2+, or 55.h8 g4 56.ch7 xc2+ 57.e3 c3+ 58.e2 f3+ 59.d2 f4+ 60.d1 g3 etc.) 55...d2+ 56.f1 f4+ 57.g1 xe4,




and White is lost.

After missing 54...d3, and continuing 54...g4 55.e3, Bronstein claims that Black still had one last chance,




55...g5!?, but play becomes very problematic. After 56.e2 (better than Bronstein's 56.cg7+) a plausible continuation is 56...f4 57.d1 (if 57.d4 f3+ 58.d2 xe4 59.dxd6+ dx5),


Sample main variations then:



and either (a) 57...♘g8 58.♞cf7+ ♜xe4  
59.♞h8 ♜c4+ 60.♞e1 ♜b4+ 61.♞e2 ♜b8  
62.♞f1 ∞,




or (b) 57...♜h3 58.♞d2 (if 58.♞cf7+ ♜xf7!!  
59.♞xh3 g×h3 60.♞f1 ♜g5 61.♞g1 ♜xe4 -+ )  
58...g3 59.♞cg7 (if 59.♞cf7+ ♜xf7! 60.♞xh3  
g2 -+ ) 59...g2 60.♞h8 g1♜ 61.♞f8+! (not  
61.♞xg1?? ♜h2+) 61...♜xe4 62.♞xg1 ♞d4!  
(not 62...♜h2+? 63.♞f2 ♜xg1?? 64.♜c3+ ♞d4  
65.♜e2+ winning the queen) 63.♞f2 ♜g4,




in both cases reaching positions where Black  
is better but a clear win is very hard to find.

Going back several moves,




White needed to play 53.♞f3 or 53.♞a3  
(rather than 53.♞ac7) to avoid all this.


*Game 65, Bronstein-Geller:* The “great  
attack” that would supposedly ensue from the  
acceptance of White’s pawn sac 14.g4,



may not have worked out as well. After the  
note line 14...♜xg4 15.♜g3 h5 16.f4 ♜b6+  
17.♜h1 ♜xb2 18.h3 ♜f6 19.e5,




Rybka sees Black coming out fine with  
19...h4!, best play then running something like  
20.♜d3 (20.♜xh4?? ♜d5 21.♜h5 ♜xc3 -+ )  
20...♜h5 21.♞b1 ♜g3+ 22.♞g1 ♞xc3!  
23.♞xb2 ♞xd3 24.cxd3 ♜xf1 25.♞xf1 b6,




when Black is two sound pawns up and in no  
danger of attack. It is perhaps significant that  
Bronstein’s novelty 14.g4 has seldom if ever  
been tried again in high-level play.


*Game 68, Najdorf-Stahlberg:* The note at  
move 12 overlooks a surprising shot. The  
variation 12.dxe5 ♜xe5 13.♞xd5 cxd5  
14.♜xd5 ♜xf3+ 15.gxf3 ♞e6 16.♜e5 ♜b4+  
17.♜c3 ♞ac8



is said, after 18.♜xb4 ♞xc1+, to give  
“complicated play, probably a draw.”  
However, White can improve with 18.♜f6+!!




and either (a) 18...♜h8 19.♜xb4 ♞xc1+  
20.♜e2 and now if 20...♞xh1?? 21.♜xf8#, or  
(b) 18...gxf6 19.♞g1+ ♞g4 (again, if 19...♜h8  
20.♜xb4 ♞xc1+ 21.♜e2 ♞xg1 22.♜xf8+)  
20.♞xg4+ ♜xg4 21.fxg4 ♞xc3 22.♞xc3,




and White has a winning endgame. To avoid  
this, Black must play, say, 17...♜e7 or  
17...♞fc8, rather than 17...♞ac8.

In the note to White’s 48<sup>th</sup> move, after  
48.♞b8,




48...♜a4 deserves “??” rather than the “!”  
given it. Instead of the note’s 49.♞b5, White  
has 49.♞g8! winning,




viz. 49...♜xb2 (other moves are no better)  
50.♞xg7+ ♜d8 51.♞g8+ ♜e7 52.e5 c3 (if  
52...fxe5+ 53.fxe5 ♞d7 54.f6 and mate soon)  
53.♞g7+ ♜d8 54.♞xc7 ♜xc7 55.♜xc3+- .  
Rather than 48...♜a4, Black must play  
48...♜b3, with good drawing chances.


*Game 71, Euwe-Averbakh:* In the note at  
White’s 39<sup>th</sup> move, in the sub-variation  
39.♞d2 ♜b1+ 40.♜e3 a3 41.♜xd5,




Black must not play the move given, 41... c3,  
as that would allow White good drawing  
chances, viz. 42.♜xc3 ♜xc3 43.♞xa3 b2 (or  
43...♜d1+ 44.♞d2 b2 45.♜c2) 44.♞xb2  
♜d1+ 45.♜e4 ♜xb2,



and Black’s winning chances are very slim.  
Correct instead is 41...b2!,




viz. 42. ♖xb2 axb2 43. h3 c3 44. ♔d3 ♕f7  
45. h4 g6 46. h5 g×h5 47. g×h5 ♕f8 48. f6 (if  
48. ♖c7 ♖a3-+) 48...h6,




and White is in *Zugzwang*.

*Game74, Kotov-Taimanov*: Najdorf may have been distracted while writing the note at Black's 25<sup>th</sup> move. As originally written it has some typos, repetitions, and 30. ♖×f7 captures a pawn no longer there, but we reproduced it verbatim. More to the point, it misses the strongest line. After 25...♖b7,




rather than the note's 26. ♖g4 (a good but very distant second-best move), White has 26. ♖×h6+!,




which forces mate in short order, *e.g.*  
26...g×h6 (if 26...♕h8 27. ♖h5 g6 28. ♖e5+  
etc.) 27. ♖g4+ ♖g7 28. ♖×h6 ♕f8 29. ♖×g7+  
♕e7 30. ♖g5+ ♕d7 31. ♖f5+ ♕c7 32. ♖e7+  
♕b8 33. ♖×e8+ ♕c7 34. ♖c8+ ♕d6 35. ♖d7#. Neither Bronstein nor Euwe consider the 25...♖b7 variation.


Najdorf, Kotov, Taimanov and Bronstein all missed an amazing opportunity for Black at move 27.



Rather than the text move 27...♖b3, Black could have forced a draw, or with luck even gotten a win, by bringing his long inactive knight to sudden sacrificial life with 27...♖×c4!!.




If then 28. d×c4 (other moves are no better) 28...♖a1+ 29. ♕g2 ♖×c4!




and Black threatens 30...♖f1+ 31. ♕f3 ♖e2#. White has only the choice between 30. g4 ♖f1+ 31. ♕g3 ♖g1+ 32. ♖g2 ♖×b5 when Black has three connected passed pawns and a lot of counterplay, or forcing a draw with 30. ♖×h6+ g×h6 31. ♖g4+ ♖g7 32. ♖c8+ ♖f8 33. ♖g4+ etc. A remarkable resource missed by four of the greatest players of all time. It would not be fair to say Euwe also missed it, since he hardly annotated the game at all.


To avoid this, White would have had to vary the move before.



Instead of the text 27. ♖f4, there were two main alternatives, one safe, the other risky. Safe, but giving up most or all of White's advantage, was 27. ♕g2 ♖d7! 28. ♖f4 ♖b7,




when both Black's knight and queen get back into the game and the position is pretty much even. Very interesting but risky was 27. ♖×h6+!? g×h6 28. ♖×h6 ♖×h6 29. ♖×h6 ♖b3 30. ♖h7+ ♕h8 31. ♖f5+ ♕g8 32. ♖×e6 f×e6 33. ♖×e6+,




when Rybka gives White an edge (about +1.00) but whether he can win with his passed, connected but as yet unadvanced kingside pawns is unclear.

Finally, at move 35,




Najdorf is wrong to call 35...♖d2 a serious error; it is, relatively speaking, by far the best (or least bad) move on the board (+3.70 to +11.42 for 35...♖×f4 or +21.12 for 35...♖c2). The really serious error came the move before,




when Black played 34...♖b1?? (+3.86) rather than 34...♖c2 (+1.58) or 34...♖×c4 (+1.69), either of which offered more resistance and some small hope.

*Game 75, Geller-Gligoric*: At move 47, in the note variation 47. ♖h3!? ♖×c2 48. ♖×c2 ♖×c2 49. ♖×f3,




no further analysis is given and the implication is that White stands better. Rybka disagrees, giving as a likely continuation 49...♖c4 50. ♖b3 g4 (probably better than

50...♖xe4+ 51.♗xe4 ♜xe4 52.♞b5 g4  
53.♞b7 ♜f8 54.♞b3) 51.♞b4 ♜xb4 52.♗xb4  
g3 53.♞g1 f3,




when Black stands better (at least -1.50) and White will have to play very carefully to avoid losing.

*Game 76, Smyslov-Bronstein:* Several important tactical errors here. At move 14, Najdorf (and Euwe too) overlooks a shot that could have made the game a miniature:




Instead of the text move 14...♞f2, Black had 14...♞a3! which wins in all variations, viz. 15...♞xb2 16.♞a3 ♞xa3, or 15...♞xa3 ♗xh4 16.♞e1 ♗xf2+ 17.♜h1 ♞de5 18.♞e2 ♗h4+ 19.♜g1 ♗h2+ 20.♜f1 f5 21.♞xf8 ♞xf8 22.♞f2 ♞xf2 23.♜xf2 ♞d3+ 24.♜f1 fxe4+. Bronstein, in his book, tells how he was prepared to play 14...♞a3 but made a calculation error that caused him to change his mind.

The three-move note at White's 27<sup>th</sup> is wrong on every move. If, instead of 18.♞a3 White had played 18.d3,




the recommended 18...♞e3+ would lose immediately to the elementary tactic 19.♞xe3 dxe3 20.♞xe5. If White continues after 18...♞e3+ with the given 19.♜h1?!,




then not 19...h5?, which again is met by 19...♞xe3, but 19...♗g5!, which wins. Surprisingly, Bronstein errs in similar fashion in his book.

Most importantly, at Black's 26<sup>th</sup> move,




while the recommended 26...♞xf6 is probably best, the text move 26...♗xf6 deserves neither of the question marks given it. Followed up correctly, it is still fully adequate to win. The crucial mistake, unremarked by Najdorf, comes next move,




when instead of 27...f5?!, Black (as both Bronstein and Euwe show) could have clinched it with 27...♞ae8!, with such likely continuations as (a) 28.♜g2 f4; (b) 28.♗xg3 ♗xa1+ 29.♞f1 f4 30.♗h3 (or 30.♗h4 h6) 30...♞d4+ 31.♜h1 h6-+, (c) 28.♞h3 f4 29.♜g2 fxe3 30.♞xg3 exd2 31.♗f1 (not 31.♗xd2?? ♗xa1) 31...♗c3 32.♞d1 ♞e1-+; (d) 28.♗d1 f4 29.♞g4 ♗d4+ 30.♜g2 ♞e2+ 31.♞xe2 dxe2 32.♗e1 ♗e4+ 33.♜f2 h5-+.


*Game 77, Keres-Reshevsky:* At move 12, contrary to the note,



the text move 12...♞e4 is not the only playable move. After 12...h5g5 13.exf6 (if 13.h5g5 ♞e4), not 13...♗xf6 as in the note, but 13...♞xg2!,




and if then 14.♞h2 (the only way White retains an attack) 14...♗xf6 15.♞xg2 g×h4




and with three extra pawns, the safer king, and the ruined structure of White's remaining pawns, Black has ample compensation for the piece.


The position at White's 16<sup>th</sup> is incredibly complicated, and a complete analysis could almost make a small book by itself. We'll limit ourselves here to the most important improvements and additions. Najdorf is probably correct to recommend 16.f4 as best,



but he (and also Bronstein) goes awry in a critical variation (d2 in the game notes). After 16...♜h7 (best) 17.♞h3! ♗b7, the recommended 18.♞a2 ♗e4+ 19.♞e2 fails to produce the promised strong attack after 19...♗g6!.




when the attack is stalled and the game is virtually even. Instead of 18.♞a2, White must play 18.♗e2!,




preventing 18...♗e4+. This move, which neither Najdorf nor Bronstein consider, appears to be the line that actually could have let Keres win brilliantly, though perhaps not a miniature as Najdorf thought possible. To examine the major lines stemming from it:

a) 18...♞d7 leads to loss of the knight:



19. Bxa1 Bxd8 20. exf6 Bg8 21. Qg5+! Qg6 (21...hxg5?? 22. Wh5#) 22. Qxf7 Qxf7 23. f5 Qxf6 (if 23...exf5 24. We7+, or 23...e5 24. Wh5+) 24. Qxe6+ Qg7 25. Bxd8+-;

b) 18... Qc6 leaves Black's king vulnerable:  
19. exf6 Qg6 (if 19... Bg8 20. Qg5+ Qg6 21. Qe4+-) 20. f5+!




and:

b1) 20... exf5 21. Bg3+ Qxf6 22. Qf4 Qe5 23. Qd5+ Qe6 24. 0-0-0 f6 25. Qf4+ Qe7 26. Qg6+ Qe6 (if 26... Qe8 27. Wh5) 27. Qxe5 fxe5 28. Bg6+ Bf6 29. Bxf6+ Qxf6 30. Bd6+ Qf7 31. Bxh6 Qg8 32. Qe5+- (+16.15);


b2) 20... Qxf6 21. fxe6 fxe6 22. Qf4 Bae8 23. Qe4 Qg7 (if 23... Bg8 24. Qh5+ Qe7 25. Wh7+ Qf8 26. Bf3+ Qf7 27. Bxf7#) 24. Bg3+ Qh8 25. Qg6+ Qg8 26. Qxf8+ Qxf8 27. Qf4+ Qe7 28. Bg7+ and mate shortly.

c) 18... Qa6 also leads to a quick kingside attack:



19. exf6 Bg8 20. Qg5+ Qg6 (if 20... Qh8 21. Wh5 Bg6 22. 0-0-0 Qc7 [or 22... Bxf6 23. Bd7] 23. Bxd8+ Bxd8 24. Bxd8+ Qxd8 25. Qxf7+-) 21. h5+ Qxf6 22. Qe5+ Qe7 23. Qe4 (threatening 24. Qd6+ Qe8 25. Qf6#) 23... Qc7 24. Qf6+ Qf8 25. 0-0-0 and nothing can be done against 26. Bxd8+.

d) Leading to the greatest complications is 18... Bg8 19. exf6:




d1) 19... Qxg2 20. Qg5+! Bxg5 21. hxg5 Qxe2+ 22. Qxe2 Qc6 (worse is 22... hxg5?? 23. Bxd8+-) 23. Bxh1+-.


d2) 19... Qd7 20. Qg5+! Qg6 21. Qe4 threatening 22. Bg3+, 22. 0-0-0, 22. Qg4+ and other moves, all of which win.

d3) 19... Bg6 20. Qg5+! hxg5 (if 20... Qh8 21. Bxd8+ Bg8 22. Wh5 and mate shortly) 21. hxg5 Qd7 22. Wh5+ Qg8 23. 0-0-0 Qxf6 (or 23... Bxd8 24. Bxh3 Qf8 25. Wh8+ Bg8 26. Qxg8+ Qxg8 27. Bdh1 Qxf6 28. gxf6 and mate soon) 24. gxf6 Qc7 (if 24... Bxf6 25. Bxd8+) 25. Wh4 Qf8 26. Bg3 Bxg3 27. Qxg3 and mate shortly.

d4) 19... Bxg2 leads to the black king being flushed out and chased:




20. Qg5+! – yet again! – 20... Qg6 (not 20... hxg5?? 21. Wh5+ Qg8 22. Bxd8#) 21. h5+ Qf5 22. Qe5+ Qg4 23. Qf3 Qd7 24. Qe3 Bg8 25. 0-0-0 and:




(d4a) 25... Bg3 26. Qe2 Bxf3 27. Bxd7 Qa8 28. B7d3 Qxf4 29. Bxf3+ Qxf3 30. Bf1+-.

(d4b) 25... Qxf6 26. Bg1 Bxg1+ 27. Qxg1+




and the king-hunt eventually leads to mate, e.g. 27... Qxf4 28. Qe3+ Qg4 29. Qe5+ Qf5 30. Qxf7 Qxf7 31. Qf2+ Qe5 (if 31... Qg5 32. Bg3+ Qg4 33. Qxf7) 32. Wh2+ Qe4 33. Qe2+ Qf5 34. Bf3+ Qg5 35. Qe5+ Qh4 36. Wh2+ Qg5 37. Qf4+ Qxh5 38. Bxh3+ Qg6 39. Qxh6+ Qf5 40. Bf3+ Qg4 41. Bf4+ Qg3 42. Wh4+ Qg2 43. Bf2+ Qg1 44. Wh2#.

The note at White's 27<sup>th</sup> move is correct to fault the text move 27. f4 and recommend 27. g4.




but the latter move does not lead to winning chances for White. Rather than continuing 27... Qxe6 28. Bxe6 Bxe6 as given, Black can gain equality or even force a draw with 27... f5! 28. g5 (or 28. gxf5 Qxh4=) 28... Qb7!,




and the black queen will invade on one wing or the other, e.g. 29. Qd8 Qh1+ 30. Qb2 Bfe7 and White has nothing better than perpetual check by 31. Bg6+ etc., or 29. Qf4 Qa6 30. Qb2 (else 30... Qxa3) 30... Qb5+ 31. Qa2 Qc4+ 32. Qb2 Qb5+ 33. Qc1 Qf1+ 34. Qc2 (34. Qd1?? Qe1+-) 34... Qc4 and the king can never get away from the checks.

Game 78, Bronstein-Keres: The note at Black's twelfth move can be improved. After 12... e5 13. Qxe5 Qxe5 14. Qxf7+ Qd7 15. Bae1 Qd4+ 16. Qh1,




the note says both 16... Bxe8 and 16... Qe8 should be met by 17. Qd5. However, after 16... Qe8,




best is 17. Qf4! (threatening both 18. Qxb8 and 18. Qb5+-), and if 17... Qxc3 18. Bxc3 Ba8 19. Qh3+ Qc6 20. Qf6+ Qb5 21. Qg2 and the mating net can be avoided only at ruinous material cost.

And after 16... Bxe8,




most effective is 17. Qe6+ Qc7 18. Qb5#.


The note at Black's 19<sup>th</sup> move errs in the line 19...♖xd3:



In that case 20.♖c5 ♖b5 21.♖d6 does not win a piece as claimed,




since Black has 21...♗c6!, when if 22.♖xe7? ♗fe8 23.♖d6 ♗xg2+ 24.♗g2 ♗bd8 25.♖e5 ♗d5 regaining the piece with advantage, and the best White has is 22.♖xe6 ♗xg2+ 23.♗xg2 ♗fe8, with a more or less even position. Instead, White wins much as in the actual game with 20.♖f6+!,




giving Black the unhappy choice of 20...♗xf6 21.♖xb8+- or 20...♗f7 21.♗ad1+-.

*Game 80, Taimanov-Geller:* While ultimately it would probably not have made a difference, it bears mentioning that at move 36, Black, instead of 36...♗g8?, could have put up better resistance with 36...♗e7.




White must then content himself with winning a pawn, e.g. 37.♗a7 ♖c8 38.♖g4 ♖b8 (else 39.♖f6) 39.♗xa6 ♗b3 40.♖e3,




and though technically lost, Black has better chances of holding on than in the game continuation, which lost quickly.

*Game 81, Najdorf-Kotov:* At Black's 35<sup>th</sup> move,




the suggested 35...♗e6 is actually no better than the text move 35...♖f4+. Black cannot defend both his ♖b6 and e-pawn, viz. 36.f3! (Bronstein's 36.g3 is unnecessarily slow) 36...♖f4+ 37.♗f2 ♖d3+ 38.♗g1 ♖d5 39.♖xd5 ♗xd5 40.fxe4+ fxe4




41.♖xe4! ♗xe4 42.♗e2+ ♗d4 43.♗ed2+-.

*Game 84, Szabó-Euwe:* In the note variation 7.e4,




the line 7...cxd4 8.cxd4 ♗b4 9.e5 ♖e4 10.♖c2, originally read “7...♗b4 8.e5 ♖e4 9.♖c2.” The moves 7...cxd4 8.♖xd4 were added to make the variation legal.

*Game 85, Stahlberg-Szabó:* At White's 12<sup>th</sup> move, note variation b1 misses a lethal tactical shot. After 12.h3 exd5 13.exd5 ♗f5 14.g4 c4 15.♗xc4 ♖ac5 16.♖a3 ♗d3 17.♗xc5 ♖xc5 18.♖xc5 ♗c8 19.♖b5,




instead of the note's 19...a6, Black has 19...♗xc4!, when if 20.♖xc4 ♗xc3+ 21.bxc3 ♖e2+,




and to avoid mate White has to play 22.♖e3, losing his queen.

*Game 88, Geller-Najdorf:* In the note at Black's 33<sup>rd</sup> move, 33...a4 turns out to be a much worse gamble than Najdorf thought.




As Bronstein points out, 34.♖g4! provides an immediate refutation, viz. 34...♖f2 (else 35.f6 g6 36.♖xh4+-) 35.f6 ♖g3+ 36.♖xg3 hxxg3+ 37.♗xg3 axb3 38.♗xa7 ♗xa7 39.cxb3,




with a very easily won ending for White. Also good is 34.f6!, which essentially transposes after 34...♖f2 35.♖g4 etc.

Even accepting Najdorf's main note line of 33...a4 34.♖d4 (much better is 34.♖f2, contrary to the note),




White has a quick win with 35.♗f1! ♖b2 (else 34.c3 traps the queen) 36.f6 g6 37.♖d2 ♖h7 38.♖g5+-.

The next note is perhaps correct to recommend 34.♖g4, but that move is not nearly so decisive as indicated. After 34...♗d8 35.♗a4 ♗a8 36.b4,




not 36...♖xc2?? as given (about +5.48), but 36...♖b8!, and while Black is worse (about +0.65), there is no clear win in sight.

*Game 93, Taimanov-Keres:* The note at Black's 23<sup>rd</sup> move is only half-right:




If it were White's move, 24.♖g3, attacking both the g-pawn and the ♖c7, would be a serious threat, but 24.♖xg7+ would not: after 24...♗xg7 25.♖g3+ ♖g5! 26.♖xc7 ♖xd2,




White would find himself down a piece.

The concluding note was corrected:




In its original form it had 40...♖b1+ 41.♗f2 here; clearly 40...♖b2+ 41.♗g1 was omitted.


*Game 96, Averbakh-Kotov:* The note at Black's 43<sup>rd</sup> move has two errors. After 44.♗e3,



there is no reason for Black to play 44...♗e7; instead 44...fxe3 is obviously best. However, if 44...♗e7 is played, then after 45.♗xf4 exf4 46.♗xf4,




not 46...♖h4+?; that allows White to get out of serious danger by 47.♗g3 ♖hxf4 48.♖xf4! ♖xf4 ♗xf4,




and White may well draw or even win the ending.

Instead, 46...♗f6+! wins,




viz. 47.♗g3 ♖g8+ 48.♗f2 ♖h2+ 49.♗e3 ♖xd2 ♗xd2, and Black is a clear piece up.


*Game 98, Euwe-Stahlberg:* Euwe's beautiful combination might not have worked out so well had Black played differently at move 20.




The text move, 20...♖c8, made it impossible to capture White's b-pawn after 21.a5 ♗a8 22.♗a4, because if 22...♗xb3 White had 23.♗b6!,



attacking the rook. If instead Black had played 20...♖f8!?, then after 21.a5 ♗a8




White has little choice but to defend the b-pawn with 22.♖b1, and after, say, 22...♖b8 23.♗a4 ♖b5,




the position is by no means clearly favorable to White as in the game continuation; Rybka considers it virtually even.


The long variation at Black's 26<sup>th</sup> move can be tweaked. After 26...♗xg2 27.♗xg2 ♖xc6 28.♖c1! ♖e6



rather than the note's good but slow 29.b4, White can win in a hurry with 29.♖c8+! ♗f8 30.♖d1,




when if 30...♖d6 31.♖xd6 exd6 32.♖a8 ♗b5 33.a6 the knight has to give itself up, while on other moves the bishop is lost and Black can't grab enough pawns to compensate, e.g. 30...♖xe2 31.♖dd8 ♗g7 32.♖xf8




and 32...♖a2 33.♖g8+ ♖h6 (33...♜f6?? 34.♖c6+) 34.♖ge8 ♖xa5 35.♖a8 ♖c7 36.♖xa5 ♖xe8+–, or 32...♖b2 33.♖g8+ ♖h6 34.♖c4 ♖xb3 35.♖h4+ ♜g5 36.♖xh7 ♖a3 37.♖xf7+–.

*Game 100, Kotov-Szabó:* The note at White's 30<sup>th</sup> goes wrong on the last move. After 30.♖xa5 ♖xa5 31.♜xa5 ♖h1+ 32.♖c1, Black must not play 32...♜xg2,




which would allow a draw by 33.♜xc7 gxf3 (33...♜xf3?? 34.♖xd6+–) 34.♖xd6 ♖h4 35.♖d8+ ♖h7 36.♖e7+ ♜g8 37.♖e6+ etc.

Instead, the winning move is 32...gxf3!,




when if 33.♜xc7? fxg2 34.♖xd6 g1♜ etc. winning; therefore 33.gxf3 ♜xf3 34.♖c3 (not 34.♜xc7?? ♜xe4+) 34...♜h1,



and White will not be able to stop the f-pawn without fatal material loss.


*Game 102, Smyslov-Petrosian:* Smyslov's handling of the endgame was less than optimal, as he seemed most concerned with making enough checks to reach time control rather than finding the best move. This is most apparent perhaps at move 30,



where his 30.♜c8+ threw away most or all of White's advantage, according to Rybka. By coincidence or design, the same position was reached in a correspondence game, Herzel-


Dzhesiuk, which according to Tim Harding was played on board 90 of a 100-board team match between German and Soviet players begun in 1957. White improved on Smyslov's play, and Rybka largely agrees with his continuation:

30.♜f8+ ♖h7 31.d5




With the queen on f8, the bishop is defended, so White has time to advance the pawn.


31...♖a5 32.♜f5+ ♖h8




33.♖b4 (even better is 33.d6, since if 33...♜xa3? 34.♜c8+ ♖h7 d7+–) 33...♜d1 34.h4 ♜d2+ 35.♜g3 ♜e1+ 36.♜g4 ♜d2 37.g3 ♜d3



38.d6 g6 39.♜f8+ ♖h7 40.♜f7+ ♖h8




41.♖xa5! ♜xd6 42.♖b4 ♜d2




43.♖f8 1-0.

As pointed out in our footnote to the game, Petrosian's much-praised 46...♜e5 should not have worked.




Instead of 47.♜xd3+?, as actually played, Smyslov had 47.♜d6! which wins in all variations, for example:

(a) 47...h5+ 48.♖h4




Now we see the main point of 47.♜d6: the white h-pawn is defended. After 48...♜e1+ 49.♜xh5 Black has no more useful checks, and cannot stop the pawn from queening. The relatively best try is 49...♖e5 50.d8♜ g6+ 51.♜xg6+ (better than 51.♜g5 ♖f7+) 51...♖xg6 52.♖f6 ♖f4+ 53.♜g4 and White will win easily.

(b) 47...♜a5 48.♜g3 (better than the immediate 48.d8♜ ♖e5+ 49.♜g3 ♖f7) 48...♖c5




49.♖f6! (better than 49.d8♜ ♖b7) 49...♖xd7 (if 49...gxf6 50.♜e7+ ♜g6 51.d8♜ and mate shortly) 50.♜xd7 ♜g6 51.♜xg7+ ♜f5




52.♜f7! and Black must give up his queen to forestall mate.

(c) 47...♜xc3 48.d8♜ ♖e5+ 49.♜h3 ♖f7




50. ♖d4+-.

*Game 103, Keres-Najdorf:* In the note variation at White's 20<sup>th</sup> move, after 20. ♖g4 h5 21. ♖g5,




Najdorf's recommended 21... ♗d6 is incorrect. Better instead 21... ♖f6 or 21... ♗xg5, because after 21... ♗d6 22. ♖c3! restores White to at least equality.




If then 22... ♖f5, as Najdorf envisioned, the queen avoids the planned trap by 23. ♗h4 ♖f6 24. ♖e4! – showing the drawback of having the queen on d6 – and if 24... ♖xh4? 25. ♖xd6 ♖d8 26. ♖xf5+- . Or if 22... ♖e6 23. ♖d5=, or 22... ♖f6 23. ♗h6 and Black has nothing better than repeating moves with 23... ♖g7. Finally if 22... ♖xc4 23. ♖e4 ♖f7 24. ♖ad1 ♗e6 25. ♗h4 and White's kingside pressure compensates for the pawn minus.

In the note to White's 25<sup>th</sup> move, after 25. ♖xa7 ♖e6 26. ♖e7 ♖f7,




27. ♖d6?, as given in the note, is not at all forced. Instead 27. ♖ea1! maintains equality,




viz. if 27... ♖f8 simply 28. ♖xf8=, or if 27... ♖e8 28. ♖1a3=, or 27... ♖d4 28. ♖a8=.

*Game 104, Reshevsky-Taimanov:* 31...g5 does not deserve the “well played” given it.




It was actually a blunder, and Reshevsky could have capitalized with 32. ♖a4! ♗d8 (if 32... ♗a7 to keep aiming at the d-pawn, then 33. ♗e7 ♖g7 [not 33... ♖8d7?? 34. ♖c5!, or 33... ♖6d7 34. ♗xg5+] 34. ♖xg5 ♗xd4 35. ♖xf6+ ♗xf6 36. ♗xb7+- ) 33. ♖xg5, winning the pawn cleanly with a much better position.

While the note at White's 36<sup>th</sup> move is correct to fault 36. ♖d2? and recommend 36. ♖a4!, two of its lines can be improved significantly. After 36. ♖a4 ♗a8,




not the slow 37. ♖d2 but 37. ♗c7! threatening 38. ♖c6, winning the bishop. Black is then virtually in *Zugzwang*, e.g. if 38... ♖a6 39. ♖c6 ♗c8 40. ♗b6+- , or 37...c3 38. ♖g2! and either 38...c2 39. ♖xc2, or 38... ♖a6 39. ♖e6+! ♖xe6 40. ♖xe6 ♗g8 41. e7 etc.

In that note's variation 36. ♖a4 ♗a8 37. ♖d2 ♖h7,




much stronger than 38. ♖a5 is first 38. ♗c7!, preventing 38... ♗b8 and making the threat of ♖d2-a5-c6, winning the queen, far more effective.

Finally, in analysis of the final position, the line 41.f3 ♗e2+ 42. ♖g3 ♖h7 does not win for Black as implied.




White can immediately force a draw by 43. ♖f6+ ♖xf6 44. ♖f8+ ♖h7 45. ♗f5+ ♖g8 46. ♖xh6




forcing Black into perpetual check with 46... ♗e1+ 47. ♖g2 ♗e2+ etc., draw.

*Game 110, Geller-Szabó:* The note at Black's 12<sup>th</sup> move can be improved in a couple of places. In the sub-variation 12...bxa3 13. ♖xa3 ♖e8 14. ♖d6 ♖e6,




far stronger than 15. ♖g5 is 15. ♖xf7!, when if 15... ♖xf7 16. ♖g5+ ♖g8 17. ♖xe6 ♗e8 18. ♖c7+- , or if 15... ♗e8 16. ♖g5 ♖c6 17. ♗f3 (threatening 18. ♗xd5! ♖xd5 19. ♖xh7#) 17... ♖e4 18. ♖xe4 ♗xf7 19. ♗xf7+ ♖xf7 20. ♖d6+ ♖xd6 (if 20... ♖g8 21. ♖ac1 ♖xc1 22. ♖xc1 and the ♖c8 is lost) 21. ♖xd6+- .

In the variation 12... ♖e4 13. axb4 ♖xb4 14. ♖xa7 ♖xa7 15. ♖xa7 ♖b7 16. ♖b2 ♖b8 17. ♖b5 ♖c8 18. ♖e5 ♖xe5 19. dxe5 ♖c3,




White can improve on 20. ♖xc3 by 20. ♗h5! g6 (if 20... ♖e4 21. e6) 21. ♗h4 ♖xb5 22. ♗xb4 ♖c7 23. ♖4+- .


At White's 31<sup>st</sup> move, while Najdorf is correct to fault 31.f5?, his supposedly winning line may actually not win. After 31. ♖d4 g6 32. e6 does not deserve the “!” given it,



because instead of 32...fxe6? Black can play 32...♖xe6!?,




and after 33.f5 ♖c6 White has only a small advantage (about +0.63 per Rybka), while if 33.♖xc3 Black can grab pawns and force complications, viz. 33...♖xe3+ 34.♖h1 b4 35.axb4 axb4 36.♖c8+ (or 36.♖c4 ♖e1+ 37.♖h2 [if 37.♖f1 b3=] 37...♖xh4+ 38.♖g1 ♖e1+ etc., draw) 36...♖h7 37.♖c4 ♖e1+ 38.♖f1 ♖xh4+ 39.♖g1 ♖e7,




and again it will be hard for White to win.


Instead, White can have a much easier time of it after 31.♖d4 g6,



by (instead 32.e6) first playing 32.♖h2!,




removing the king from the dangers of ...♖c1+. Black now can do nothing useful, and is practically in *Zugzwang*, reduced to waiting moves, which allows White leisurely to mobilize his kingside pawn majority, against which Black can do little. An illustrative continuation is 32...a4 33.e4 ♖g4 34.g3! (preventing both ...♖xh4+ and ...♖xf4+)




34...♖e2 35.♖e3 ♖c3 36.f5! gxf5 37.exf5 ♖d1 38.♖b6 ♖b2 39.♖xb5 ♖xd3 40.♖xd3+-.


*Game 111, Kotov-Euwe:* In the note to Black's 14<sup>th</sup> move, the line 14...♖b8 15.♖b3 c6 16.e4 ♖5f6 17.♖f4,




the moves 17...e5? 18.♖xe5!! ♖xe5 19.♖c4!! do not deserve so much punctuation.



Instead of 19...♖fd7??, which does lose, matters are far less clear after 19...♖fg4!? 20.h3 g5!? 21.♖xg5 (21.♖xe5 ♖xe5 22.♖xg4 ♖d6 is likewise unclear, perhaps slightly better for Black) 21...♖xc4




22.♖d8+ ♖xd8 23.♖xd8 ♖xd8 24.hxg4,




reaching an unclear position where, with a rook and two minor pieces for queen and pawn, Black seems in no danger of losing with reasonable caution.

*Game 112, Boleslavsky-Stahlberg:* In note (b) to move 5, after 5.♖g4 ♖f8 6.♖f3 cxd4 7.♖xd4 ♖a5 8.♖d2 ♖c6 9.a3 f5 (Bogatirchuk-Botvinnik Moscow 1927),




it is unclear why Black is considered better. Rybka sees White better after 10.♖xc6! fxg4 (not 10...bxc6?? 11.♖xb4+) 11.♖xa5 ♖xa5 12.h3 gxh3 13.♖xh3,




probably because of Black's more or less permanently bad bishop.

*Game 113, Stahlberg-Kotov:* Both Stahlberg and Najdorf missed a shot at move 34:




Stronger than the text move 34.♖e6+ was 34.♖xe4! fxe4 35.♖e6+ ♖xe6 36.dxe6 ♖e5 37.♖xe4,




when with a rook and three pawns for bishop and knight, and a vulnerable black king, White has turned the tables and stands better. Oddly, Najdorf's note at move 35 reached this same position by transposition, but he did not recognize that the same opportunity had occurred the move before in the actual game.

To avoid all this, on the move before, rather than 33...♖e8,




Black should have played 33...♖e7 or 33...♖f8, eliminating the possibility of the ♜e6+ fork.

The second variation in the note at move 45 can be improved at two points. After 45.♖f1,




best is not 45...♖f3 but the quiet 45...♖g7!, the point of which is to remove the king from a potential check from d6. If then 46.♖xd6?? ♖f3+ , so White is reduced to waiting moves, while Black becomes active. An illustrative line is 46.b4 ♜e5 47.♖h4 (if 47.♖e3 ♖g4 48.♖g1 ♖h3 forcing 49.♜xe4 fxe4 50.♖xe4 ♖h2+ 51.♖f1 ♖h1+ -+) 47...♖xh4 48.gxh4 ♜xh4 49.bxc5 dxc5 reaching a position more favorable to Black than in the game,




viz. 50.♜d7+ ♖f6 51.♖xb7 ♜h2 52.♜xa7 e3 53.fxe3 ♜xc2 -+.

Further on in the note line, after 45...♖f3 46.♖xf3 exf3 47.♖g1,




much better than Najdorf's 47...♜h3 is 47...♜e8!,




viz. (a) 48.♜d3 ♖g5 49.♜f1 f4 50.gxf4+ (if 50.g4 ♜e2! 51.♜xe2 fxe2 52.♜e1 f3 -+) 50...♖xf4 51.♜c1 ♜g8+ 52.♖f1 ♜g2 53.♜c2 ♜xf2 54.♜xf2 ♖e3+ , or (b) 48.g4 ♜e2 49.♜xf5+ ♖g5 50.♜f1 ♖f4 51.♜d3 (if 51.♜c8 ♜xf2+! 52.♜xf2 ♖g3 forcing 53.♜xf3+ ♖xf3 -+) 51...♖xg4! 52.♜xe2 fxe2 53.♜e1 ♖f3 -+.

#### Game 114, Euwe-Geller:


Euwe, Geller, and Najdorf all overlooked an amazing saving resource for White in this game at move 56.




Instead of 56.♜f1? as played, White could have drawn with 56.♜f7!!.




There are only two ways to defend against the deadly threat of 57.♜xb7+ and mate quickly: first 56...♖g1+ 57.♖f3



and then either (a) 57...♖xg7 58.♜xg7 ♜d2 59.♜xh7 ♜xb4 60.h4 ♜xa5 (not 60...♜xc5? 61.♜d7+),




reaching a position Rybka considers drawn, or (b) definitely forcing the draw by perpetual check with 57...♖f1+ 58.♖g3 ♜f4+ 59.♖h4 ♖f2+ 60.♖g4 h5+:




Bronstein and Euwe both reached this point in their books, but reached no definite conclusion. Rybka, however, sees that 61.♖xh5 ♖xe2+ 62.♖h4 ♖e1+ 63.♖h5 ♖e2+ etc. is drawn.

Next move, after 56...♖c1-d2, Euwe did play 57.♜f7,




but too late; with the black queen now on d2 Geller had 57...♖xe2+ and a forced win.

The drawing chance was possible because Geller, on the move before,




had played 55...♜f4-e3? allowing the rook access to f7. Instead, Black could have kept control with 55...h5, 55...♖a7, or best of all 55...♖d2!, when play might continue 56.♜f2 (if 56.♖xh7 d3! -+) 56...♖e3 (threatening 57...♖e4+ -+)




57.♜c4 (or 57.♖g4 ♜c7 58.♖f3 ♖d2 59.♖f5 h6 60.♖e6 h5 61.♖f5 ♖xb4 and if now 62.♖xh5?? ♜g8+ -+) 57...♖e6 (threatening both ...♖xc4 and ...♜g8) 58.♖xf4 ♖xe2+ 59.♜f2 ♖xc4 -+.


*Game 115, Szabó-Smyslov:* The note at move 27 is correct to fault 27.♜xc4, but it misses the best line.




Rather than 27.b3, best is 27.exf6 ♖xf6 (if 27...gxf6? then 28.♗xc4 bxc4 29.♝xc4+ ♔g7 30.♝xc7) 28.♗e5 ♜e8 29..♙xf6 gxf6 30.♗5g4,



when not only will White win the f-pawn, but have good attacking prospects against the exposed black king. This is considerably more advantageous than Najdorf's suggested line 27.b3 ♗e5 28.♗e5 ♝xd1+ 29.♞xd1 fxe5 30.bxc4,




because here, rather than 30...bxc4?! 31.♝xc4+ ♗e6 32.♗g4 as given, Black can improve with 30...♝e6! and White's advantage (if any) is very small,




e.g. 31.♙g3 ♞e8, or 31.cxb5 ♗xb5, or 31.c5? ♗a6.


*Game 117, Petrosian-Reshevsky:* It bears mentioning that in the note to White's 27<sup>th</sup> move, the sub-variation 27.♗h3 e5 28.♗xe5 ♙xe5 29.♝xe5 ♞fe8 is perhaps not as strong for Black as Najdorf thought.




He says Black wins here with no further analysis, apparently believing White must lose a rook, or queen for rook. However, matters are not so clear after 30.♝c7!:



If then 30...♞xe1? 31.♝xd8+ with advantage for White; therefore Black must enter the long forced line 30...♗f6 31.♞xe8+ ♝xe8




32.♗f2 (forced; not 32.♙xb7?? ♗g4+ 33.♝h1 ♞d1+ and mate shortly, or 32.♝f4 ♗g4+ 33.♝h1 ♞d1+ 34.♗g1 ♝h8! 35.♙xb7 ♗xb7 36.♝f3 ♗d6! -+) 32...♙xg2 33.♙h6 ♞d7 34.♝f4 ♞f7 35.♝xg2 ♗e4 36.♞e1 ♞xf4 37.♙xf4 ♝b5 38.♞xe4 ♝xb2,




when Black stands better but has no immediate win.

*Game 119, Taimanov-Gligoric:* The note at Black's 16<sup>th</sup> move is correct to fault 16...♝b8,




but it's interesting to note that besides the given line 17.♝a4 exd4 18.♗a6+, White can actually force a draw by 17.♗e5! ♗xe5 18.♞xe5! ♝xe5 19.♝b3 -




threatening both 20.♝xb7\* and 20.dxe5 and thus forcing Black's reply – 15...♝e7, and now White has perpetual check: 20.♗a6+ ♝a8 21.♗c7+ etc.

*Game 120, Gligoric-Najdorf:* Several improvements are possible in the long note at the end of the game. In line (a), the sub-variation 28...♝xb4 29.♗xe4 fxe4 30.♝xa6 ♙d8 31.♙h6 ♞f7,




while the move given, 32.♞c1, is good enough to win, far stronger is 32.♝c8!, viz. 32...♝xa5 33.♝e6 ♙e7 (if 33...♝c7 34.♝e8+) 34.♞xf6 ♗d8 35.♞xg6+ hxg6 36.♝xg6+ etc.

In the same line, the sub-variation 28...♝xb4 29.♗xe4 fxe4 30.♝xa6 ♙d8 31.♙h6 ♞e8 32.♝a7,




not the disastrous 32...♞e7?? but 32...♙e7!, when Black has some slight hope.

In the main line of note (c), after 28...♗xg3! 29.♝xg3 f4+ 30.♙xf4 exf4+ 31.♞xf4 f5 32.♝e6+ ♝g7 33.♗c4 ♝c7,




White should avoid 34.♗e3 in favor of 34.♗b6, 34.♝e1 or 34.♝e3. The reason is that after 34.♗e3?,




White's queen is hemmed in, and rather than 34...♙g5? as given, Black wins with 34...♞f6!

forcing 35. ♖xf5+ ♜xf5 36. ♖e1 or ♖e2, and Black is up a bishop for two pawns.

*Game 121, Bronstein-Petrosian:* It appears that White missed a chance to win a pawn. At move 22,




instead of 22. ♖b5, there was the long but forcing line 22. ♖e4 fxe5 (if 22...b6?? 23. ♖d6+ 23. ♖xc5 exf4 (not 23...b6?? 24. ♖b7+ ♖b8 25. ♖a6+) 24. ♖e4 ♖c6 25. ♖xd8+ ♖xd8 26. ♖xc6 ♖xc6 27. ♖xe6+ ♖xe6 28. ♖e6 ♖d7 29. ♖bc5 ♖f7 30. ♖f1 b6 31. ♖d3,




and after taking the f-pawn White will be a pawn up with reasonable winning chances.

*Game 122, Reshevsky-Averbakh:* In the note at move 35, in the variation 36. ♖xc5 g5 37. ♖xf8 gxh4 38. ♖h6 ♖xf8 39. ♖f5,




White does not yet have a forced mate as claimed; Black can prevent it by 39...♖e8, though then he is still clearly lost after 40. ♖ed4 followed by 41. ♖f4 or 41. ♖xb5.

It is odd that at move 36 Najdorf, having just pointed out the move before how White threatened 36. ♖xc5, does not still see it as the strongest move.




The move actually played, 36. ♖xf6, could have been strongly met by 36...♖e7!, an illustrative continuation being 37. ♖ff4 ♖ad8 38. ♖h3 ♖xd5 39. exd5 ♖xd5 40. ♖xb5 ♖xd2


41. ♖xd2 ♖xd2 42. ♖xe8 ♖xe8 43. ♖e4 ♖d6 44. ♖c3 ♖xb2,



when Black's bishops and passed pawn amply compensate for the exchange. Instead, after 36. ♖xc5!,




Black must simply submit to losing the pawn by 36...♖g7, since if 36...♖xc5?? 37. ♖h6+–, or if 36...g5 then 37. ♖xf6!,




when a likely line is 37...gxh4 38. ♖g5+ ♖g6 39. ♖f5 ♖a6 40. ♖xf8+ ♖xf8 41. ♖e7+ ♖h7 42. ♖xe5 ♖af6 43. ♖xg6 ♖xg6 44. ♖xf8 ♖xf8 45. ♖f4+ ♖h7 46. d6 ♖e8 47. ♖h5+ ♖g8 48. ♖xb5 etc., winning. After 36. ♖xc5 ♖g7 White is in much better shape than he would have been after 36. ♖xf6?! ♖e7!.

*Game 123, Keres-Szabó:* It is worth noting that at move 22, Keres could have avoided loss of a second pawn.




Instead of the immediate 22. ♖xe4, he had a finessing *Zwischenzug* in 22. ♖h5! g6 23. ♖xe4.



If now 23...♖xb2?? 24. ♖e5 (threatening mate) 24...gxh5 25. ♖xb2, and of course if 23...gxh5?? 24. ♖xc2. That leaves mainly


23...♖c6 24. ♖f4 when unlike the game White keeps his b-pawn, or 23...♖f2 24. ♖e3 ♖c7 25. ♖b3 ♖c6 26. ♖f4, and again White keeps the pawn.

The note variation at move 27 is perhaps not as dangerous for White as thought. After 27. ♖g4 ♖xg2,




rather than risk loss with 28. ♖xg2?!, White can force a draw with 28. ♖h6+! and either (a) 28...♖h8 (if 28...♖xh6?! 29. ♖xg2 Black has three for the piece, rather than four as in the note line) 29. ♖xf7+ ♖g8 30. ♖h6+ ♖h8 31. ♖f7+ etc., or (b) 28...♖f8 29. ♖b4+ ♖e7 30. ♖d1 ♖d2 31. ♖xd2 ♖xf3+ 32. ♖h2 gxh6 33. ♖d8+ ♖g7 34. ♖xe7 ♖f2+ 35. ♖h1 ♖f1+ etc.


*Game 124, Smyslov-Euwe:* In the sacrificial variation of the note to move 11, Rybka thinks that Black can wriggle out of his difficulties. After 11. ♖xc6 bxc6 12. ♖xc6 ♖f5 13. ♖f3 ♖c8 14. ♖c3, Rybka sees 14...h5! as a key move,



both supporting ♖f5-g4 and allowing ♖h8-h6. Best play then goes something like either (a) 15. ♖a4 ♖g4 16. ♖e4 ♖b6 17. ♖fe1 ♖h6 18. ♖xg7 ♖d6 (not 18...♖xg7?? 19. ♖xe7#) 19. ♖c3 e6:




or (b) 15. ♖fd1 ♖g4 16. ♖e4 ♖h6 17. ♖a4 ♖b6 18. ♖d2 ♖d6 19. ♖xd6 ♖xd6:




in either case with Black having decent chances to disentangle his position and make his extra piece count.


In the note to move 16, after 16...c5 17.♖ad1 ♕d6 18.♖x6 ♖x6 19.♗xc5,



Rybka sees 19...♗xc5 20.♗xb7+ not as “complicated play” but suicide for Black, viz. 20...♗d8 21.♗xb6+ ♗xb6 22.♗a8+ ♖c7 23.♗xh8 ♗b4 (23...♗xb2?? 24.♗xh7) 24.♖f1 ♗d3 25.♖d1 ♖d7 26.b3+- :




Instead, better is 19...♖c6!,




when White has compensation for the exchange, but certainly not a winning advantage.

The note at move 19 contains a blunder. After 19...g5 20.♗h3+ ♖b8 21.♖ad1 ♖xd1 22.♖xd1,




not 22...♗g7?? as given, but 22...f5!, when an illustrative continuation is 23.♗c5 ♗g7 (not 23...♗xc5?? 24.♗b4! ♗xb4 25.♗xe5+ ♗d6 26.♗xh8+ ♗c8 27.♗xh7+-) 24.♗e3 ♖d8 25.♖xd8+ ♗xd8 26.♗e6 ♗e7 27.♗xg7 ♗xg7 28.♗xb6 axb6 29.♗xb6 with a roughly even game.

Both variations in the note to Black’s 24<sup>th</sup> move can be greatly improved. In the line 24...♗c7 25.♗xf8 ♖xf8,




rather than 26.♗xh6 which merely restores material equality, White can play 26.♗c5!,




threatening both 27.♖d7 and 27.♗e6, forcing 26...♖d8 27.♖xd8 ♗xd8 28.♗xe5+ ♖a8 29.♗g7 ♗e7 30.♗xh6 and White is up a pawn with the better game to boot.

In the other line of that note, after 24...♗f6 25.♗c3 ♗g7 26.♗c5 ♖d8,




there are four moves far better than the given 27.♖xd8, which yields only a relatively small advantage (+1.39). The four best (with their Rybka evaluations) are:

(a) 27.♗d7+ (+5.61),




when if 27...♖a8 28.♗xf6, or if 27...♖xd7 28.♖xd7 and Black still cannot answer all the further threats such as 28.f4 and 28.♖xg7 ♗xg7 29.♗xe5+.

(b) 27.♖d7 (+4.52),




viz. 27...♖e8 (of course if 27...♖xd7?? 28.♗xd7+) 28.♖xb7+ ♖a8




and White can choose from at least a dozen winning continuations, e.g. (b1) 29.♗g2+-, (b2) 29.♖b8+ ♖xb8 30.♗d7+-, (b3) 29.♗a5 ♖e7 30.♗c7 ♖xc7 31.♖xc7+-, to mention only three.

(c) 27.♗xe5+ (+4.67),




27...♗xe5 28.♖xd8+-.

(d) 27.♗xe5+ (+5.03),




27...♗xe5 28.♗xe5+ ♗xe5 29.♖xd8+-.

While Smyslov did miss the best move (29.♗g2) at move 29, his 29.♗c5 does not deserve the “?” given it. It was two later moves that really prolonged the game. One came here, at move 30:




where instead of 30.♖xg7, more quickly decisive was 30.♖c7!, viz. 30...♖c8 31.♗xe5 ♖xc7 (if 31...♗xe5?? 32.♗xc6+) 32.♗xf6 ♗xf6 33.♗f8+ ♖b7 34.♗xf6 ♗xc4 35.♗e6 ♗b6 (not 35...♗xb2?? 36.♗b3+) 36.♗g2+-.

Then further on, at move 39, as Bronstein points out,




rather than 39.♔g2, Smyslov could have forced resignation with 39.a6+ ♖xa6 40.♖b4+- . Rybka also finds the quickly decisive 39.♔e5 ♗d7 (if 39...♗e7 40.a6+ ♗c8 41.♖xa7 ♗xe5 42.♖b7+ ♗d8 43.a7 and 44.a8♖) 40.♖b4+ ♗b6 41.axb6+- .


*Game 126, Kotov-Boleslavsky:* At move 39, it goes unnoticed that Black missed a chance to wrap up the game much earlier than he did.



Instead of 39...♗d4!?, he had 39...♗d4! which is virtually decisive.




If then 40.♗d3? ♗g2 41.♗e2 ♗f3+-, or 40.♖f2/♖b2? ♗f5+-, or 40.♗d2 c4 41.bxc4 ♗xc4 42.♖f2 ♖a8+-, leaving only 40.♗e4 ♗a8 41.♖xa8 ♖xa8 42.♗d1 ♖xa2,




and White must either lose the h-pawn as well (if 43.h3?? ♖a1+), or play 43.♗e2 ♖xe2 44.♖xe2 ♗xe2 45.♖xe2 creating an elementary king-and-pawn ending easily won for Black.

This is especially important since after 39...♗d4!? White could have greatly improved his chances with 40.♖f2! (instead of 40.♗e2?),




when Black is still better but has a much harder time finding a win (about -0.50 per Rybka).

*Game 127, Boleslavsky-Geller:* The note at Black's 7<sup>th</sup> move, in the line 7...♗xd4 8.♗xd4 ♗xf3 9.♗b5+ ♗d7 10.0-0 10...♗h5 11.♗d5 ♗b6+ 12.♖f2 ♗g6 13.♗e3,




correctly gives a question mark to 13...♗xe3?, but fails to mention that after 13...♗c7! the game is more or less even.

The note at move 14 makes a surprisingly big mistake. After 14.♗xb5 ♖b8 15.♗c3 ♗xf3!! 16.♗xf3 ♗xe4 17.♗xe4,




the move given, 17...♗xb2, does not lead to a clear win after 18.♖f2!. However, Black does have a quick forced win with 17...♖xb2+! 18.♖a1/♖c1 ♖b1+! 19.♖xb1 ♗b8+,




and all White can do is fling pieces onto the b-file to postpone mate for a few moves.

The note at move 18 can be improved at two points. After 18.♗b3




18...♖b8 is too slow; Black must play 18...a5 immediately. This is seen after the note's further moves 19.♗e2 a5,




where Najdorf overlooks the strong forcing line 20.g5! ♗h5 (not 20...♗e8? 21.♖a7 ♖d8 22.♖xa5+-) 21.f4 ♗c4 22.♗xc4 bxc4 23.♖a7! ♖d8 24.♖xa5 ♖xa5 25.♗xa5 ♗xf4 26.♖d2±.

At move 23, while Najdorf's recommendation 23.♗e2 is probably best, the text move 23.a3 is probably not the decisive error he believes it to be. After 23.a3 bxa3+,




neither Rybka nor Bronstein see any winning advantage for Black if White plays 24.♖a2 or ♖a1, either of which eliminates the *petite combinaison* beginning with 24...♗xf3. As Bronstein explains it, Boleslavsky played 24.♖a3? because he hallucinated that after 24...♗xf3 25.♗xf3 ♖c3+,




he could defend everything with 26.♖d3, which is of course illegal.

An interesting resource goes unmentioned at move 27 for White.




Instead of 27.e5 ♗g4 as actually played, Rybka indicates that White can get back to equality with 27.g5!? ♗xe4 28.♗g2 ♖f4 29.♗xe4 ♖xe4 30.♖he1 ♖xe1 31.♖xe1,




when whether Black defends his e-pawn with 31...e6, ♖e6, or ♖f8 (but not 31...e5? 32.♖d1!), White continues 32.♖a1 and 33.♖xa7 when material is technically even. Black may be able to get two passed pawns, but according to Dowd they would not get far, and in any event White's drawing chances would be much greater than in the actual game.

*Game 129, Euwe-Keres:* The final note is incorrect to claim that White can win a pawn. After 27.♖xd6 ♖xd6 28.♖xa7




not 28...♖d1+, but 28...♖d7! and White cannot hold the pawn after either (a) 29.♖e3 ♖d1+ 30.♖f1 ♖c4 31.♖e1 ♖xf1 32.♖xf1 ♖c2 33.♖e5 ♖d1 34.♖e1 ♖xe1 35.♖xe1 ♖xb2, or (b) 29.♖a5 ♖d2! (instead of the note's 29...♖c7) 30.♖xd2 (not 30.♖xb5?? ♖c1+ 31.♖f1 ♖h3+ ) 30...♖xd2 31.h4 (31.b4?? ♖d1+ 32.♖f1 ♖h3+ ) 31...♖xb2.

If instead White tries 28.♖xb5,




then after 28...♖d1+ 29.♖f1 ♖c1 (threatening ...♖h3 and ...♖d1+ ) about the best White has is perpetual check by 30.♖xe6 fxe6 31.♖b7+ ♖g8 32.♖e7 ♖d1 33.♖xe6+ ♖g7 34.♖e7+ ♖g8 35.♖e8+ etc.

White's winning chances probably disappeared earlier, back at move 22,



with 22.a3?!. Bronstein recommends 22.b3, while Rybka prefers 22.h4 or h3.


*Game 132, Petrosian-Gligoric:* An interesting shot goes unmentioned at moves 17 and 18.



While the text 17...cxb7 is quite good, also very strong is 17...♖xf4!, with two main continuations:

(a) 17... exf4 18.♖d4 bxc6 19.♖g1+ ♖h8 (if 19...♖f7? 20.♖xf4 c5 21.♖e3 and 22.♖xh4 in most lines.) 20.dxc6 ♖b4 21.♖xf4 ♖xc6 22.♖h6 ♖f7 23.♖c4 ♖xd4 24.♖xf7 ♖g4 (threatening 25.♖g7#) 25.fxg4+- .  
(b) 17...♖xe4 18.♖xe4 ♖xf4 19.♖e3 ♖f7 20.cxb7 ♖xb7 21.♖g1+ ♖h8 22.♖h3 ♖c8 23.♖e6 ♖xe6 24.dxe6 ♖f8 25.♖h6 ♖g8 26.♖g5 ♖xg5 27.♖xg5 ♖xg5 28.♖xg5 ♖xg5 29.♖xg5+- .


After 17.cxb7 ♖xb7, 18.♖xf4! is not only strong but by far best, much better than the text 18.♖g3.



Illustrative lines:


(a) 18...exf4 19.♖d4 ♖e8 20.♖g1+ ♖f7 21.♖xf4+ ♖f6 22.♖h6 ♖h8 23.♖h3 ♖c5 (if 23...♖c8 24.♖h5+ ♖f8 25.♖e6 ♖xe6 26.dxe6 ♖e7 27.♖h6+ ♖g7 28.♖xg7+ ♖xg7 29.♖d5+- ) 24.e5 ♖xe5 25.♖xe5 dxe5 26.♖e6+ ♖xe6 (or 26...♖e7 27.♖g7+) 27.dxe6+ ♖e7 28.♖h4+ ♖xe6 29.♖xd8+- .  
(b) 18...♖xe4 19.♖xe4 ♖xf4 20.♖e3 ♖f7 etc. as in line (b) above. This powerful, decisive blow went unnoticed by Petrosian, Gligoric, Najdorf, Bronstein, and Euwe.

At the doubly crucial 37<sup>th</sup> move, for White,




Najdorf's recommendation of 37.b3 is certainly better than the text 37.♖e2, but it is just one of at least a dozen moves that are good enough to win, with 37.a3, ♖h2, and ♖e1 considered best by Rybka.


After 37.♖e2? ♖xe4! is indeed best for Black, but White has a resource that may at least hold the draw.




Rather than the automatic recapture 38.fxe4, best is 38.h5!. Rybka then gives best play as proceeding 38...♖f5 39.♖h3!:




This shows the point of the preceding moves: the dangerous black bishop now must either let itself be deflected, or in some lines exchanged. Now either (a) 39...♖xh3?! 40.fxe4 ♖xe4 41.♖e1 ♖xd5 42.b3 ♖f5 43.♖b2 f3 44.♖d1 f2 (not 44...♖a8?! 45.♖d8+ ♖xd8 46.♖xa5 fxe2? 47.♖xe5+ ♖g8 48.♖xe2) 45.♖f1,




reaching a position that admittedly looks very awkward for White, but Rybka rates as even; or (b) 39...♖ea4 40.♖c3 (not 40.♖xf5?! ♖xa2) 40...♖xc2+ 41.♖xc2 ♖b4 42.b3,



likewise considered even. A third alternative, (c) the speculative 39...♖xa2!,




is answered by 40.♖c3! (not 40.♖a2?? ♗a8+ 41.♖b1 ♖a4++) 41...♖xb2+ (not 41...♖a5? 42.♙xf5) 42.♖xb2 ♖b4+ 43.♖a1 ♙xh3,




reaching a position Rybka sees as slightly in White's favor (+0.59). In any event, these variations confirm that 37...♖xe4! was Black's best try; it is just not ultimately as much in Black's favor as Najdorf thought. Again, along with Najdorf, neither Bronstein nor Euwe considered 38.h5! in their analyses, looking only at 38.fxe4.

*Game 134, Taimanov-Petrosian:* While the note at move 23 is correct to fault 23...c4?!, the variation given does not save Black. After 24.♖h3 g6 25.♗h6 ♖a6! 26.♖g3 ♖c8 27.h4 ♖a7 28.h5 ♖g7,




White actually has several ways to force a win, for example (a) 29.♙d6 – threatening 30.♖xa4! ♖xa4 31.♙xa4 ♗xa4 32.hxg6 hxg6 33.♖xg6 and wins – 29...♙d7 30.hxg6 ♖xg6 (for 30...hxg6 31.♖h3 ♖f7 32.♙c5 see (b)) 31.♖xg6+ hxg6 32.♖f2 ♗f7 33.e6! ♙xe6 34.♙e5 ♗h7 35.♗g5




and there is no defense to the many threats, e.g. 36.♗d8+, 36.♖h1, 36.♙xa4 etc. Or (b) 29.hxg6 hxg6 30.♙c5 ♙d7 31.♖h3 ♖f7 32.♗g5 ♖c8 33.♖h6 ♖e7 34.♙d1 ♖e6 35.♙f3 ♙c6 36.♖b1 ♗d8 37.♖b6 etc. In the note variation, improvements for Black before move 28 may well be possible (for example 27...♖a7? seems especially bad); we leave that research to interested readers.

*Game 135, Gligoric-Averbakh:* It bears mentioning that the note variation at move 22 might do worse than just accomplish nothing for White. After 22.♙xa6?!,




rather than the automatic 22...bxa6, Black may try 22...♗c5!?, preventing 23.♖xd4 and threatening 23...♖b3+, thus forcing 23.♙xb7+ ♖xb7 when Black has a piece for two pawns and winning chances.

*Game 136, Bronstein-Szabó:* Najdorf's notes from move 37 on give a somewhat misleading impression, perhaps too favorable to Bronstein and unfair to Szabó. First, at move 37, White is not threatening to win. Even giving him the extra move (i.e. omitting 37...♙b8), after 38.♙b7 ♖d6 39.♙c6




White is not winning; Black simply plays 39...♗c8 and White has nothing better than 40.♙b5 (not 40.♗xa7?? ♗xc6+) 40...♗a8+ 41.♖g1 ♖xb5 42.axb5 ♗f3 43.♗xa7 ♗d1+ 44.♖g2 ♗d5+,




and White must allow either perpetual check or 45...♗xb5=.

The note at Black's 38<sup>th</sup> move is wrong to criticize 38...♖d6. It was not the losing move; that came later. Furthermore, the line given as correct is not: after 38...♖e7 39.♙b7 ♖d5 40.♙xa7 ♙xa7 41.♗xa7 ♗a4,




rather than 42.a6 allowing perpetual check, White retains his pawn and winning chances with 42.♙a6!, so that if 42...♗e4+ 43.♖g1 ♗e1+ 44.♙f1, and of course if 42...♗xa5?? ♙d3+.

The real losing move, on which neither Najdorf, Bronstein nor Euwe comment, came after 48.♙h5,




when Black played 48...♗g8?!. Instead it appears 43...♗c6+! would have held, viz. 44.♖g1 ♗c8 45.♙g4 f5 46.♙e2 ♖h7 and Black can make waiting moves indefinitely, while White has no clear way to break through, and if one exists, it will be very hard to find.

*Game 137, Reshevsky-Euwe:* The note at move 16 gives the impression that in the event of 16...♙e6, the Wexler-Shocron continuation is more or less forced. It is not at all, and can be improved at several points. First, after 16...♙e6 17.♙d3 ♖fd8 18.c4,




18...♖xe4? is a definite mistake and entirely unnecessary. Black can maintain approximate equality with any of several reasonable moves, such as 18...♗d6, ♖d7, or ♖e8.

Further on, after 18...♖xe4? 9.♙xe4 ♗xe4 20.♙g5 ♗xc4,




21.♖ac1? is another mistake; White should play the immediate 21.♙xd8 ♖xd8 22.♗c7 and 22.♗xb7, ending up with the exchange for a pawn.

The reason 21.♖ac1? is such a mistake




is that rather than 21...♖d5? as given, Black can play 21...♞d3!, and whether White trades queens or not, Black comes out two pawns ahead after the dust settles.

*Game 138, Keres-Stahlberg:* The note at Black's 31<sup>st</sup> move indicates that White can force a draw, implying that if Black avoids perpetual check by 32.♞fxf5 gxf5 33.♞xh5+ ♖g6 34.♞g5+ ♖h6, he will be in trouble after 35.♖f3.




However, Rybka says that then after 35...♖h7 Black is in no real danger and even has some advantage (at least -1.25). Best play then probably goes something like 36.♞xf5 ♖e8 37.♖h2 ♞g7, and it would seem that Black's extra rook would eventually tell.

*Game 140, Geller-Kotov:* The note at move 22 is probably right to call 22...♞d3 more effective than the text move 22...♖g5, but does not follow it up in the most effective fashion. In the variation 22...♞d3 23.♖a1,




best is not 23...c5; Black gets only a relatively small advantage if White replies 24.♖h1 instead of the note's 24.♞b1??. Correct is 23...♖g5! forcing White to give up the exchange with 24.♞xd3 ♞xd3, since he loses even more with 24.♞e2 ♞f4 25.♞f2 ♞h3+.

And in the note's other variation, 22...♞d3 23.♖b1 c4 24.♖h1 ♖c5 25.♞e2? (better 25.h3),




rather than 25...♞e6, best is 25...♞f4, when again White must meekly give up the exchange, since if 26.♞ef2 ♞d1!!




27.♞xd1 ♖xf2 28.♞g1 ♞h3! 29.gxh3 ♖xf3+ 30.♞g2 ♞xe4 31.♖g1 ♞c6-+.

*Game 142, Boleslavsky-Keres:* The position at White's 18<sup>th</sup> move is surprisingly unclear and complicated, and the note there contains several errors. In Najdorf's main variation, beginning 18.♞f5 ♞f6 (not best; see below) 19.♞g5,




no mention is made of what are probably the two best moves for Black, (a) 19...g6 20.♞h6+ (if 20.♞xf7 ♞e8! 21.♞7h6+ ♖f8 22.♞e4 gxf5 23.♞xf5 ∞) 20...♖g7=, and (b) 19...♞e3!? 20.fxe3 (if 20.♞xe3 ♞xg5) 20...d3 21.♞xd3 ♞xg5 22.e4 ♞f6 23.♞e3 ♞c6=.

In variation (b) of that note, after 18.♞f5 ♞f6 19.♞g5 ♞b4 20.♞xh7 ♞e5,




the note's recommended 21.♞g5 is refuted by 21...♞e8! (instead of 21...♞xc2??) 22.♞e4 ♞xe4 23.♞xe4 ♞c2 24.♖g4 ♖c6, and Black stands slightly better. Instead, White wins with 21.♖h5!




viz. 21...♞xc2 22.♞xe5 ♖xe5 23.♞h6+ gxh6 24.♖xe5 ♖xh7 25.♖f5+ ♖g8 26.♖xc2+-.

After 18.♞f5 Rybka considers Black's best move to be 18...♞b4:




Najdorf suggests 19.♖d3 "with extremely complicated play," but Rybka (like Keres)

does not shun complications, and says that then Black will stand better after 19...♞xe1 20.♞h6+ ♖f8 21.♞xe1 (not 21.♖xh7?? ♞xf2+ 22.♖xf2 ♞f6 23.♖h8+ ♖e7 24.♖xg7 ♖xc2+-) 21...♞e8,




evaluated at about -1.35. Instead, White should simply move the attacked rook (see previous diagram): 19.♞d1 ♞e8 20.♖d3 ♞f6 21.♞3xd4 ♞ac8




with a wide-open position about even, or perhaps slightly in Black's favor.

*Game 145, Szabó-Gligoric:* In the note at move 39, Najdorf says that 39.♞xe5 dxe5 40.♞xe5 is inadequate because of 40...a5.




However, White then has 41.♞f1! followed by 42.bxa5, which would make it very hard for Black to draw.

The note at move 67 has a very definite mistake. After 67.♞b2 ♞h3 68.b5 ♞xh4 69.b6?? is a major blunder,




allowing Black to win by 69...♞h1+! (rather than the note's 69...♞e4+), viz. 70.♖d2 ♞h2+ 71.♖c3 ♞xb2 72.♖xb2 ♖d6 73.b7 ♖c7 74.♖c3 h4 75.♖d3 h3 76.♖e2 h2,




and Black queens. Instead of 69.b6??, White should play, say, 69.♖f1 or 69.♗b3, drawing easily.

*Game 149, Taimanov-Szabó:* Najdorf's notes to this complicated game are on the whole commendably sound. A minor exception comes in the note to White's 43<sup>rd</sup> move, in the sub-variation 43.♖d7 e3 44.♗g3 e2 45.♗e1 ♖g4 46.♖f7 ♖x4 47.♖h1 ♖d5 48.♗x2 ♗c2 49.♖f2:




The move given, 49...♖d1+, leads to only a relatively small advantage for Black. Instead, immediately winning is 49...♗c1+! 50.♗e1 ♖d3,



when major material loss is unavoidable.


While the note to White's 43<sup>rd</sup>, taken as a whole, seems to imply that 43.♖d7 loses, Rybka finds a drawing line Najdorf did not consider (nor did Bronstein or Euwe), 43.♖d7 e3 44.♗x2 ♖e4 45.♗f3!:




Illustrative lines: (a) 45... ♖d5 46.♗xh6! ♖x4 47.♗e3 ♗c1+ 48.♖f2 ♗c2+ 49.♖g1 ♗c1+ etc.; (b) 45...♗c3 46.♗d2 ♗f3 47.gxf3 ♖b1+ 48.♖f2 ♖c2 49.e7 ♖x2+ 50.♖f1 ♖d1+ 51.♖f2 ♖d2+ etc.; (c) 45...♖c6 46.♗xh6 ♖x4 47.♖x4 ♖x4 48.♗e3 ♗c1+ 49.♖f2 ♗c2+ 50.♖e1 ♖x6 51.♗x6 ♖x6 52.♗a6 ♖x2 53.h4 ♗h2 54.♗b6 ♗x4

55.♗x5 with a theoretical draw, according to the Nalimov tablebase.


Najdorf is quite correct to point out that at White's 48<sup>th</sup> move,




the text 48.♖d7 should have lost to 48...♖f4!, and his analysis of that line is sound. However, he gives no alternate recommendation. Bronstein does, concluding that 48.e8 ♖x8 49.♗x3 e1 ♖+ 50.♗x1 ♖x1+ 51.♖h2 would draw. However, Rybka questions that, seeing that after 48.e8 ♖x8 49.♗x3,



Black can improve with 49...♖e4!, when the mutually forced continuation is 50.♗f3 ♗c1+ 51.♖h2 ♖b1 52.♗f2 ♗h1+ 53.♖g3 e1 ♖ 54.♗x1 ♖x1+ 55.♖g4 ♖d2:




If now 56.♖g3?? ♗g1 57.♗f2 ♖e3+ 58.♗f3 ♖g5+ 59.♖f2 ♖xg2+ 60.♖e3 ♗e1+ 61.♖d3 ♖x3+ and mate. Therefore White is forced into 56.♖e5 ♖xg2+ 57.♗g3 ♖a8,




reaching a position Rybka rates at about – 1.75, with likely winning chances for Black, and which certainly cannot be considered drawn.

*Game 151, Bronstein-Stahlberg:* In the note to move 21, after 21...♖xg2? 22.♗g1,




the follow-up move given, 23.♖f6, would be correct after 22...♖h2, but in the event of 22...♖e2,




it would be a serious mistake, viz. 23.♖f6?? ♖x1+! etc. Instead White wins with 23.♗xh7+! ♖xh7 24.♗g1+ etc.


In the note to move 28, variation (b3), after 28.♗x5 ♗x5 29.♖x5 ♖h4 30.g3 ♖x5 31.e6 ♗e7 32.g4 ♖h4 33.♗c1,




the move given, 33...f×g4, is a serious mistake and not at all forced. Instead, Black holds with 33...g6!, when if 34.gxf5 ♖g5 35.♗f1 gxf5



36.♗f5 ♖g1+ 37.♖c2 ♖g6 and Black gets back the pawn. Instead White must find 36.♖d4!,




(threatening 37.♗g1), leading to 36...♗g7 37.♗e1 ♖e7 38.♖e5,




when White will take the f-pawn and retain winning chances, but not the easy win 33...fxg4?? would allow.


At Black's 51<sup>st</sup> move,




the text move 51...Bb7 does not really deserve the “!” given it. By far Black's best move at that point, and one which eluded Bronstein as well as Najdorf, was 51...a3!:



Only two moves then are at all reasonable: (a) 52.b3 Bxe6 53.Bxh3 Bb2+ 54.Bxb2+ axb2 55.Bxb2 Bg6,




with a clearly won endgame for Black, or (b) 52.Bxa3 g4! 53.Bd6 Bb7 54.Bb3 Bxb3+ 55.Bxb3 h2 56.Bxh2 Bxe6+:



Queen endings are notoriously difficult, but according to the Nalimov tablebase this position is won for Black even if the black a-pawn is removed. Presumably it is all the more won with the a-pawn present.


By the same token, the later text move 53...a3 does not deserve the “?” Najdorf gives it, as after 54.Bxa3 g4! (instead of 54...Bxe6 as actually played), Black has entered variation (b) above.

*Game 152, Reshevsky-Boleslavsky:* White need not play into the losing line given in the note to move 20. After 20...Bxf8 Bxf8,




not 21.Qxb7?, but 21.Bd2! and White is no worse than equal after the likely continuation 21...c4 22.Qxc4 Bb4 (if 22...Qxc4 23.Bc2) 23.Bxd3 Qxe1 24.Bd7 Qe8 25.Bd5 Qf6 26.Qxf7+ Bf8 27.Bc7.

*Game 153, Keres-Kotov:* The note at Black's 18<sup>th</sup> move can be significantly improved. After 18...Qxg2 19.Qxd8 Ba8,




White gets only a small advantage (about +1.03) from the suggested 20.b4; much better is 20.Qdxf7!, putting White up the exchange and a pawn (about +2.90).


Both variations in the note to move 20 can be improved. In line (a), after 20...Bxf6 21.e4,




Black need not play into the losing line given; rather than 21...Qxe4, he has 21...Qxb3 22.axb3 Bxd1+ 23.Bxd1 e5,



reaching a position where Black can resist for some time. In line (b), after 20...Qxg2 21.Qxe7 Bxe8 22.Qxc5 Qf3,




the continuation given, beginning with 23.Bb2, leads only to a small advantage (about +1.01), whereas with 23.Bd3! or 23.Bd2! bxc5 24.Bd7 Ba8 25.Bd2




White is clearly winning (about +2.82).


The note at move 30, giving 30.Bcb2 a “?” and recommending 30.f4, is open to question.



Rybka rates 30.Bcb2 the best move on the board, and sees no winning chances for White after 30.f4 Qe4, and, for example, 31.Bg2 Qf6,




when White cannot avoid exchanging bishops, in which case Najdorf's suggested plan of Bb1-b5-a5 to attack Black's a-pawn is rendered pointless. Likewise the futility of the alternate plan of advancing the white a-pawn is seen in the line 32.Qxf6 Bxf6 33.Bb5 Bf5 34.Bf3 h5 35.a4 Bc7 36.a5 Qc5,




and White cannot both get the pawn to a6 and a rook to b7.


The note at move 45 has several serious mistakes. After 45.fxe5,



Black must not play 45...♖xa2?; correct instead is 45...♕f2!=. After the further moves 45...♖xa2 46.e6,




Black is already lost; relatively best is 46...♖a1+. The note's recommended move, 46...♖c4,




is given a “!” when in fact it deserves “??” since then instead of the note's 47.e7? White wins with 47.♖1e2!, and Black can stop the pawn from queening only at the cost of his bishop, e.g. 47...♖a1+ 48.♖c2 ♖a2+ 49.♖b1 ♖xe2 50.♖xe2 ♕f6 51.e7 etc.

*Game 154, Smyslov-Geller:* In the note to Black's 28<sup>th</sup> move, variation (b) is flawed. 29.♖cd2, though not best, does not deserve a “?” since after 29...♖xd2 30.♖xd2 ♖b3,




White need not play 31.♖d1?? losing the ♖f6 to 31...♕e7. Instead 31.♖d3! saves the knight, viz. 31...♕e7 32.♖d7 ♕xc4 33.♖d1 ♕e6 34.♖b6=.

*Game 157, Boleslavsky-Bronstein:* The note to move 17 errs in opposing 17.♕c3 and proposing 17...♖e5 in reply.




In that case Black gets into serious trouble after 18.♖b2! forcing 18...♖fd7 (since if 18...♖ed7?? 19.♖xf6+) 19.f4 exf3 20.gxf3 and now Black has only unpleasant choices,




viz. (a) 20...♖f7? 21.♖f6+; (b) 20...a6 21.f4 and the knight cannot move and will be captured at leisure; (c) 20...♖f8 21.e4 with initiative; (d) 20...♖b8 21.f4 ♖f7 22.e4 fxe4 (not 22...♖xe4? 23.♕f3) 23.♕g4 ♖f8 (else 24.♕xd7 and 25.♖f6+) with a considerable positional superiority for White and good attacking prospects.


*Game 160, Szabó-Najdorf:* The note at move 16 is perhaps overly optimistic about the winning potential of the line 16...dxe4 17.♖d2 (17.♖b1 is worth considering) ♕g4 18.♖h1 ♖e6.



Variation (b) can be improved after 19.f3 exf3 20.gxf3 ♕h3,




where instead of 21.♖e1, White does better with 21.♖f2!?, and if 21...♖xe3 22.d5 ♖xd2 23.♖xd2 ♖d6 24.♕a3 ♖dd8 25.♖e1,




when White's bishop pair and passed pawn compensate for the pawn minus. Rybka rates this position virtually even.

Even if in this line White does play 21.♖e1, then after 21...♖ae8,




he need not play the given, losing move 22.♕e4?; much better is 22.♖f2!, and after 22...♖xe3 23.♕e4 ♖xe1+ 24.♖xe1 Black's advantage is relatively small and White still has counter-chances.

*Game 164, Taimanov-Stahlberg:* The note at move 33 is correct to fault 33.♖h5 and recommend 33.♖c5, but does not mention the strongest continuation.




Taimanov could have spared himself a lot of time and trouble with 33.♖xa6!, forcing 33...♖a8 34.♖c7 ♖xa3 35.♖d8+ ♖g7 36.♖e8+ ♖h6 37.♖f6 ♖a8 (else 38.♖h8+-) 38.♖xa8 ♖xa8 39.♖d5,




reaching the winning knight ending sooner and with a better position than in the game (the black knight cannot move). Bronstein missed this too, while Euwe did not annotate this game.

*Game 167, Reshevsky-Geller:* The notes for this game are especially accurate. We would only make one addition, to the note at White's 50<sup>th</sup> move. After 50.♖f3 ♖h5,




while the move given, 51.g3, probably wins, far quicker and more certain is 51.g4+! ♖h6 (of course not 51...fxg4+?? 52.♖xe4, while if 51...♖xh4?? 52.♖a7 and Black must give up his rook to avoid a quick mate) 52.g5+ ♖g6 53.h5+ ♖f7 (53...♖xh5?? 54.♖a6 and mate soon) 54.g6+ ♖g7 55.♖a7+ ♖g8 56.h6 etc., winning easily.

*Game 169, Smyslov-Reshevsky:* It bears mentioning that Black's 49<sup>th</sup> move was a serious mistake.




Rather than 49...♖xe6??, the egregiousness of which goes unremarked by Najdorf, Bronstein and Euwe, Black's best chance was 49...♖d8, when after 50.♖xb6 ♖d6 51.♖f3 ♖xf5 (not 51...a4 52.♖h5 axb3?? 53.♖xd6!) 52.♖h5 White should still win, but his advantage is much less than in the game (about +1.46 compared to +5.36 after the text move).


*Game 171, Kotov-Gligoric:* Two serious errors here. At Black's 27<sup>th</sup> move,




27...♖ab8 may deserve criticism, but the recommended move, 27...b4, is considerably worse. Since White is two pawns ahead, 27...b4? gives him the opportunity for a very effective counter-sacrifice overlooked by both Najdorf and Bronstein:



28.♖xc5! dxc5 29.♖xc5, and now if (a) 29...♖fc8 30.♖d4 ♖d6 31.♖d2 ♖f8 32.♖e3 ♖ae8 (or 32...♖xd4 33.♖xd4+ ♖f6 34.e5 ♖h6 35.e6+ ♖f6 36.♖b1+-) 33.c5 ♖e7 34.♖c4,




and the passed pawns eventually steamroll everything in their path, or if (b) 29...♖g6 (or some such move) 30.♖xb4




and the four connected, passed pawns (not to mention Black's precarious king position) are more than ample compensation for the piece, while if (c) 29...a5 simply 30.♖xf8 and the material imbalance of a rook and four pawns (passed and connected) for bishop and knight is very much in White's favor.

Relatively best for Black at move 27 seems to be 27...bxc4,




when after 28.♖xc4 a5 Black will have attacking chances on the queenside, and 29.♖xc5?! is no longer so effective, viz. 29...dxc5 30.♖xc5 ♖ac8 31.♖d4 (not 31.♖xf8?? ♖xc4+-),




and Black can either keep playing with 31...♖h5, or force a draw by 31...♖xd4! 32.♖xd4 ♖xd4 33.♖d1 ♖e5 34.d6 ♖g8 35.♖d2 ♖g1+ 36.♖d1 ♖g2 37.♖d2 ♖g1+ etc.

In the analytical variation from the final position, after 41...♖g5 42.f4 ♖g3,




White must not play the given move 43.♖h2 (better 43.f5), as then instead of merely drawing with 43...♖e3, Black can win with 43...♖h2+ 44.♖xh2 ♖g1! 45.♖h3 ♖a1! 46.♖c1 ♖e3




47.♖xd7 ♖xc1+ 48.♖d3 ♖c3+ 49.♖e2 ♖c2+ 50.♖xe3 ♖xh2 51.e5 ♖xa2 52.exd6 ♖g2+-.

*Game 172, Boleslavsky-Taimanov:* Contrary to the note at move 14, Rybka does not think Black wins after 14...e5 15.♖xf5 e4.




White has the surprising 16.♖g5!, and while after 16...g6 17.♖xf6! ♖xf6 18.♖xf6 ♖f7 (if 18...e3? 19.♖e4 exf2+ 20.♖xf2 ♖f7 21.♖b2+-) 19.♖e4 Black has ♖-vs-♖+♖+2♖,




Black's rook and bishop are out of play and White's position is quite threatening, e.g. 19...d6 20.♖b2 ♖e7 21.f4 etc. Rybka rates this about +1.75.


In the note the White's 34<sup>th</sup> move, variation (a) misses the best continuation. After 34.g4 a3 35.g5+ ♖e5,



the line given, 36.g6 ♖e6 37.g7 c4 38.♖d1 is unlikely to win, because with 38...♖f4! 39.h4 cxb3 40.♖xb3 ♖xb3 41.axb3 a2 42.g8 ♖a1♖,




there arises a queen ending at least as difficult as in the actual game. Instead, White can avoid this with 36.♔e2!,




preventing 36...c4, and if 36...♔e6 37.♔c4, preventing a sacrifice on b3.

Further on, the note at move 49 is wrong to fault 49.♖f6+.




It is as good or better than the recommended 49.h5, though the proof in some variations is so torturous that it's hardly surprising Najdorf did not find it. White's winning opportunities were missed later, for example at move 52,




where instead of 52.♖e5+ White could have won with 52.h6 or 52.♖d5+, viz. 52.♖d5+ ♖g4 53.h6 ♖c2 (if 53...♖a7+ 54.♖f7, showing the key difference between this line and 52.♖e5+) 54.♖e6+ ♖h4 55.♖f6+ ♖h3 56.h7 ♖g2+ 57.♖g6 ♖b7+ 58.♖h6 ♖b8 59.♖f6 and wins.


Then at move 55,




instead of 55.♖f7?!, 55.♖e7! wins, and at move 57,



not 57.♖e6+?!, but 57.♖f8!+-, viz. (a) 57...♖h5 58.h7 ♖d4 59.♖e6! ♖c5+ 60.♖e8 ♖c3 (if 60...♖d4 61.♖h3+ ♖g6 62.h8♖)




61.♖h3+!! ♖xh3 62.h8♖+ ♖g4 63.♖xh3+ ♖xh3 64.a4+-; or (b) 57...♖f5+58.♖g7 ♖h3 59.h7 ♖g4+ 60.♖h6 ♖f4+ 61.♖g6 ♖g4+ 62.♖g5 ♖e6+ 63.♖f6 ♖e8+ (if 63...♖g4+ 64.♖h6+-) 64.♖h6 ♖e3+ 65.♖g7 ♖g3+ 66.♖f7 ♖c7+ 67.♖g6 ♖g3+ 68.♖h5 ♖g4+ 69.♖h6,




and Black is *finally* out of checks.

In between, it goes unmentioned that at Black's 55<sup>th</sup> move,




Taimanov should have played 55...♖d3, immediately observing the h7-square, instead of instead of first interpolating 55...♖d7+, which after 56.♖e7 ♖d3 allows 57.♖f8! as discussed above.

*Game 173, Stahlberg-Najdorf:* The drawing line in the note to move 16 is not obligatory. After 16.♔c7 ♔xf1 17.♔xf1 ♔ac8 18.♔b5 ♔a8,




White need not repeat moves with 20.♔c7; instead he can try for more by 20.a6!? with good winning chances, e.g. 19...♔df6 (if 19...♔fb8 20.a7 ♔b7 21.♔a6, or 19...♔hf6 20.a7 ♔b6 21.b4! cxb4 22.♖c6!) 20.a7 ♔e8 21.b4 ♔c7




22.♖a4 (also worth considering is 22.♔xd6!? ♖xd6 23.bxc5) 22...cxb4 23.♔xb4 ♔xb5 24.♔xb5 ♔f6 25.♔d2 ♔h6 26.♔c6+-.

The note at move 29 is likewise not obligatory. After If 29.♔f5 ♔xh6 30.♖xh6 ♖f6,




White is not required to play into the losing line beginning with 31.♖h5; much better is 31.♖xf6+ ♔xf6 32.♔g5 fxg3 33.hxg3 which Rybka rates slightly in White's favor, at about +0.45, compared to the -2.20 of the needlessly losing note line.


*Game 175, Szabó-Averbakh:* Black's prospects in the note variation at move 17 are even better than Najdorf thought. In line (a), after 18.♖d3,



much better than the note's 18...f6 is 18...♔xh2! and either 19.♖xh2 ♖xf2+- or 19.♖f1 ♔xd7 20.♖xd7 ♖b5+ and 21...♖xg5+- . Line (b2) can be improved, after 19.♖d3 ♔xh2+ 20.♖f1,




by 20...♖c7 (about -1.75) instead of 20...♔e5 (about -0.80 ), the key variation being 21.♖h3 ♔xd7 22.♔xd7 ♖xd7 23.♖xh2?? ♖d1#. Finally, in line (b3), after 19.♖a3 ♔xh2+ 20.♖f1,




rather than 21...♖b5+ (about -1.15), best is 21...♗e5 (threatening 22...♗g4) at about -2.33.

*Game 178, Najdorf-Boleslavsky:* The note at move 27 is correct to recommend 27.g4!, but then goes astray. After 27.g4 ♗h6 28.♖a5 ♗xg4 29.♗d5,




rather than 29...♖d5 as given, Black can improve with 29...♖d3! when the d-pawn falls and White has a much harder time winning. Instead of 28.♖a5?!, much better is the simpler parenthetical alternative Najdorf gives, 28.h3!,




when if 28...♖d3 29.♖a5! ♗d4 30.♗d4 ♖d4 31.b4!+-.


*Game 179, Taimanov-Kotov:* The variation 26...c5 is not the mistake Najdorf's note leads one to believe, in fact it is Rybka's #1 choice and good for Black. The reason is that after 26...c5! 27.b5,



Najdorf's 27...c4 is not at all forced, and is in fact a serious mistake. Instead Black has the subtly dangerous "creeping move" 27...♖f6!,




which makes 28...c4 a real threat (since now if 29.♖c4 dxc4 ♗c4+ the black queen is not pinned), and also creates a veiled threat to the ♖c3, which is seen for example after 28.dxc5 ♖a4! 29.♖a4 ♖xc3. White in fact is virtually forced to sacrifice by 28.♗b6 ♗xb6 29.dxc5 ♗a5 30.♗d4,




hoping that his passed pawns will compensate for the eventual loss of a rook (after ...♗xc3), though Rybka thinks not (about -0.94). Interestingly, Bronstein and Euwe also recommended 27.b5? and overlooked 27...♖f6!. All this indicates that White's positional advantage was not nearly so great as supposed, and he needed to vary earlier to avoid the damage 26...c5! might have done.

Further on, the note at move 38 has a serious error. After 38...♖h7 39.♖g5 ♖e6 40.♖c1 ♖a6?,




rather than having "no way to break through," White does exactly that with 41.♗b5!, when if 41...cxb5?? 42.♖c7 and wins. Instead of 40...♖a6? Black should play, say, 40...♖a7 or 40...♖d6, or better yet on the previous move leave the queen on d6 and play 39...♗g8 intending 40...♗f6 with a stubbornly resistant position and good drawing chances.

*Game 180, Gligoric-Geller:* The note at move 31 is probably correct to recommend 31.♗e3 over 31.♖h2, but overlooks the probably strongest move.




Unmentioned is 31.♖c8!. If left unmolested then White will simply advance the a-pawn, while if 31...♗xg3 32.♖xg3 ♖xg3+ 33.♗xg3 h4 34.♖h3!,




and Black has no good way to avoid an exchange of queens, e.g. 34...♖g5 35.♗e1 h×g3 36.♖xg3 ♖xg3+ 37.♖xg3 and White has all the winning chances with his passed a-pawn.


Further on, it goes unmentioned that at move 32,



Black should have played 32...♖xg4 rather than 32...h×g4. The reason becomes apparent after 33.♖h5 ♗g5 34.♖c8 ♖f7,




when instead of 35.♖g1? White could have played 35.♖g2!, retaining the king as a defender of the g-pawn, so that if, as in the game, 35...♖g7, White can play 36.♖xg4 ♗e3 (if 36...♗f6 37.♖c8+) 37.♖f5 ♖xf5 38.♖xf5,




and Black cannot play 38...♖xg3.

It bears mentioning that at move 40,




rather than 40.♗e1, White would have had better chances with 40.♗xg4, e.g. 40...♖a2 41.♗h6+ ♖f8 42.♗f5 ♖c2 43.♖h8+ ♖f7 44.♖h7+ ♖g8 (or 44...♖g6 45.♖h6+) 45.♖d7 ♗f6 46.♗d6±.

*Game 183, Keres-Bronstein:* The note at move 12 has two questionable moves. The sub-variation 12...♗d4 13.♗d4 13...♖h4+ 14.♖d1 ♗f2+ 15.♖c2 ♗xd4 16.♗e1



is said to win for White, but after 16...♖g3! Rybka sees at best only a very small advantage, less than half a pawn.


In the line with 14.♖d1 (instead of 14.0-0-0) 14...♗h4+ 15.♖f1,




rather than the small advantage (about -0.66) gained by 15...♖f6, Rybka much prefers 15...♗g3!, giving White an unhappy choice between losing the exchange by 16.♗f3 ♖h2+ 17.♖xh2 ♗xh2, or 16.hxg4 16...♖xg4 17..♖c1 ♖xe2+ 18..♖xe2 ♖xb2! (else 19.♖h3) 19.♖xb2 (if now 19.♖h3?? ♗xh3--+, or 19.♖xb2 ♗xf4+) 19...♗c3, when Black has the queen and two pawns for three minor pieces, plus the better pawn structure and a safer king.

*Game 185, Geller-Taimanov:* This was a very difficult game, not only for the players, but for analysts as well. Najdorf (not to mention Bronstein and Euwe) commits several errors of omission and commission, but without computer assistance this is quite understandable, the complications are so great.

To begin, the variation given at move four is said to be winning for White, but Rybka finds no clear verdict. In the ending position, after 12.a6,




Rybka gives best play as 12...♖ge7! (the only playable move) 13.axb7 ♖xb7 14.♖a5 ♗c8 15.♖xc6+ ♖xc6 16.♖xc6 ♗d7 17.♖a5 ♗xa4 18.♖xa4 ♖c8,




when though White has an extra piece, Black has considerable compensation with his passed pawns and active bishops. Rybka rates the position only slightly in White's favor, about +0.30.


The position at Black's 17<sup>th</sup> move is one of the most complex in the entire tournament. Najdorf himself admitted that he found it practically impossible to calculate.




He was correct that the main alternative to the text move 17...♖d5 was 17...♖e3 (which Rybka considers best), but his analysis errs at several points in the welter of complications that follow. First, in variation (a1), after 17...♖e3 18.♖ad1 ♗c8 19.♖d3 ♖c4 20..♖c5,




the move given, 20...♖h6, is a mistake that would let White back into the game. Best instead is either 20...♖d8! 21.♖xe3 ♖xe3 22.♖xe3 ♖f8,



(about -1.20), or 20...♖g4! 21.♗f7+ ♖h8 22.♗xc4 ♖e2 23.♖e1 (if 23.♖f7 ♖xc5 24.♖xc5 ♖f8 25.♖g1 ♖xf7 26.♗xf7 ♖xd3 27.♖xd3 ♗g4 (-1.50)) 23...♖xd3 24.♗xd3 ♖xc5 25.♖xc5,




rated about -1.24. Najdorf's line 20...♖h6 21.♖f6+ ♖h8! 22.♖xe8 ♗xe8 23.♖f8+ ♗xf8 24.♖xf8 ♖xf8 reached a position he considered favorable to Black,




but the vulnerability of Black's back rank leads Rybka to consider it practically a forced draw, viz. 25.♖f3 ♖d8 (25...♖g8?! 26.♖f6!) 26.h3 ♖e3 27.♖xe3 ♖xe3 28.♗f3! ♖d1+ (if 28...♖c4? 29.♗xb7 and all Black's queenside pawns go) 29.♖h2 ♖f1+ etc., draw.


In the 20...♖c5 sub-variation of (a1),




rather than 21.♖f6+?, White should play 21.♖g3!, and after the forced 21...♖e7 (not 21...g6? 22.♖g6+!) 22.♖f6+ ♖xf6 23.exf6 ♗d7 24.♖xg7+ ♗xg7 25.fxg7, he has some drawing chances. The line Najdorf gives as winning for White, 21.♖f6+ gxf6 22.♖g3+ ♖h8 23.♗h6, fails at two points: after 22.♖g3+,



Black still wins with 22...♖g4! 23.♖xg4 (or 23.exf6 ♖e5!) 23...♖h8! 24.♖xc4 ♖e5,




and Black remains a full piece up. And even at the end of Najdorf's line, after 23.♗h6, Black is not lost, but draws with 23...♖g4!,




when White is forced to take perpetual check with 24.♖xf6+ ♖g8 25.♖g5+ etc.


Line (a2b) has several errors. In the sub-variation 17...♙e3 18.♞ad1 ♖c8 20.♗f7+ ♖h8 21.♞xe3 ♙xd1 22.♞g3,



far better than the given continuation 22...♞g8 is 22...♙g4!, which puts a quick end to White's attack, since if 23.h3 ♖d7!-+. If, however, Black does play 22...♞g8!,




best then is not 23..♙e7? as given (about - 3.42), but 23.♙g5!?, which leads to a long forced line: 23...♞f8 24.♖g1! ♙e2 (not 24...♞xf7? 25.♙xf7+ ♖g8 26.♙h6+ etc, drawing) 25.e6 h6 26.♙xf8 ♖xf8 27.e7 ♖xf7 28.♙xf7+ ♖h7 29.♙d8 ♙xb5 30.♙e6 ♙e8 (if 30...♞g8? 31.♙f8+ ♖h8 32.♙g6+ ♖h7 33.♙f8+ etc. draw) 31.♞xg7+ ♖h8,




when Black can probably still win (about - 1.67), but he has a much harder time than after 22...♙g4.

The main line of (a2b) can be improved after 21...♖f5 22.♖xf5 ♙xe3 23.♞xe3,




by 23...♙c4 (-3.57) instead of 23...♞xe5 (- 2.63), though both moves win.

Line (b) has two rather major errors. First, after 18.♞f3 ♙c4 19.♞g3 ♖h8 20.♞d1,




the given move 20...g6 is far from best (about -1.03) compared to either 20...♖c8! (-2.27) or better still, 20...♙d5!, when about the best White has is 21.e6 ♙xe6 22.♞xd5 ♖e8 23.♖xe8+ ♞axe8 24.♞d7 ♙h6 25.♙c5 ♞xe4,




and White is crushed (-4.94).

Further on, in line (b2), after 18.♞f3 ♙c4 19.♞g3 ♖h8 20.♞d1 g6 21.♞xd8 g×h5 22.♙e7! ♙g5 23.♙f6+ ♖g8 24.♞d7! ♙f4 25.♞g7+ ♖f8 26.♞xh7,




Black must avoid 26...♙xg3?, which allows White to draw, in favor of 26...♙xe5! 27.♙xe5 ♙xe5, which wins. The drawing line becomes apparent after 26...♙xg3? 27.♙g5 ♙e6,




when instead of Najdorf's 28.♞h8+?!, White saves himself with either 28.h×g3! or 28.♙g7+!, e.g. 28.♙g7+ ♖g8 29.♙f6! ♖f8 (anything else allows mate next move) 30.♙g7+ etc.

The note at Black's 30<sup>th</sup> move goes awry after 30...♙g6 31.♙b4 ♞xe5 32.d×e5 ♖e6,




when the given move 33.♙d6? is not at all forced, and White can instead play 33.♙xa5 b×a5 34.♙a3 ♖xe5 35.♞xa5 with drawing chances.


Najdorf considers Black to be lost after move 31, but that may not be correct. Even after 31...c6?, Rybka finds at least two points at which Black might still have salvaged a draw. At move 34,



instead of 34...♞xe5, Black could improve with 34...♞e6!, threatening 35...♙d5+ 36.♖h2 ♞xg5 37.♞xg5 ♞xe3-+. Best play then proceeds 35.♙xa5 (if 35.♞e1 to prevent 35...♞xg5, then 35...♙d5+ 36.♖h2 ♙c4 37.♞xe6 ♙xe6 38.b×c6 ♞xg5 39.c7 ♞xh5+ 40.♖g3 ♞g5+ 41.♖f3 ♞g8=) 35...♞xg5! 36.♞xg5 ♞xe3




37.b×c6 (if 37.♙d2 ♞d3 38.♙f4 ♙d5+ 39.♖h2 ♖xf6) 37...b×a5 38.♞xa5 ♖xf6 39.♞xa7 ♙d5+ 40.♖h2 ♙xc6 41.♞xh7,




when Black should be able to handle the scattered pawns and draw.

Then at move 35,




instead of 35...♙e6, there was 35...♞e8!?, when to have any chance to win White must go for broke with 36.g6+ h×g6 37.h×g6+ ♖xg6 38.♞xe8 c×b5 39.♙xa5 b×a5 40.♞e5

♖xf6,




when Black still stands worse but has much better drawing chances than in the actual game.

Finally, after 36...♖xa5,




Taimanov, probably in severe time pressure, made the automatic recapture 36...bxa5?, and after 37.bxc6 he was definitely lost. Instead, with the *Zwischenschach* 36...♖d5+! 37.♖h2 bxa5,




he could have avoided losing his c-pawn and retained some drawing chances.


*Game 186, Kotov-Najdorf:* Perhaps upset at failing to win this game, Najdorf is too hard on himself in his note to move 23.




While the alternative line Najdorf gives (23...♖xc3) would have won, so would the text move 23...dxc5 if followed up properly. It is in fact Rybka's #1 choice. The mistake came a move later, after 23...dxc5 24...♖xc5,




when instead of 24...♖d8, the strongest line was 24...♖xc3! 25.bxc3 ♖xd5



26.♖d4 — best; if 26.♖xf8? ♖xd2 27.♖xd2 ♖xc1+, or 26.♖xd5+ ♖xd5 27.♖f1 ♖c8— and now 26...♖b5 reaches a position from which Black can gradually squeeze White into submission:




There are two main lines: (a) 27.♖f1 ♖xd4 28.cxd4 ♖a3 (intending 29...♖g3+) 29.♖f2 (if 29.♖b2 ♖a4 30.♖d1 [not 30.♖e2?? ♖a2—+] 30...♖d8 31.♖b3 ♖xb3 32.♖xb3 ♖b4 33.♖a5 ♖bxd4—) 29...♖c8 30.♖e2 ♖f3 31.♖g2 ♖b3,




a near-Zugzwang position which Rybka evaluates at about -5.80. Black can win in any of several ways, e.g. 32.♖f2 ♖c2 33.h5 ♖e3 etc.

And (from preceding diagram): (b) 27.♖b2 ♖fa8 28.♖h2 ♖xd4 29.cxd4 e3 30.♖g2 ♖f3 31.♖e2 ♖h5 32.♖g1 e2!




(also good are 32...♖1a3 and 32...♖h4+) 33.♖xe2 (much worse is 33.♖xe2?? ♖h4+ 34.♖h3 ♖h1+ 35.♖xh1 ♖xh3+ 36.♖g1 ♖a1+ 37.♖f2 ♖h4+ 38.♖g3 [if 38.♖e3 ♖a3+ 39.♖d2 ♖a2+] 38...♖h2+ 39.♖g2 ♖xf4+) 33...♖1a3 34.♖g2 ♖g4+ 35.♖h1 ♖xh4+ 36.♖h2 ♖xf4+




37.♖f3 ♖xd4+ and mate in 16 moves at most.

*Game 188, Stahlberg-Averbakh:* At Black's 34<sup>th</sup> move,




Najdorf's criticism of Averbakh's 34...♖d8 seems excessive. While a few other moves — 34...e5, 34...f5, or 34...a3 — may have been marginally better, the text move does not by itself lose the game and hardly deserves the “??” given it. Only when combined with later *Zeitnot*-induced less-than-best moves, such as 37...♖d8?! (instead of 37...♖b5!?) and 39...♖b4?! (instead of 39...♖d7!?), does 34...♖d8 begin to look like a mistake, and even so, Black could probably still have drawn if at move 40,




instead of the dreadful 40...♖e4 (the real “??” move), he had played 40...♖b6!, as recommended by both Euwe and Bronstein, when after 41.♖xe6 ♖xe6 42.♖xe6 ♖xb2 Rybka rates the game as virtually even (+0.23).

*Game 195, Gligoric-Keres:* It goes unmentioned that Keres missed a winning chance at move 33.




As both Bronstein and Euwe point out, Black could have decided matters before adjournment with 33...♖e4! (instead of 33...♖f7). Best play then runs something like 34.♖xf5 (if 34.♖xe4?? ♖xg2+ —) 34...♖f7!

(not 34...♖xg2+? 35.♗xg2 ♖xh5 36.♘d6+) 35.g4 exf5 36.♖xf5 ♖e8!




37.♖f8 (relatively best; if 37.g5 ♖xa4! 38.♖xg6 ♖c2+ and mate shortly) 37...♖xf8 38.♖xd5+ (not 38.♖xg6?? ♖xf4+ 39.♖h1 ♖f1+ 40.♖h2 ♖f2+ 41.♖h1 ♘g3#) 38...♖c6 39.♖xe4 ♖a3




and White's pawns are not enough for the rook.

*Game 196, Bronstein-Reshevsky:* In the note to Black's 26<sup>th</sup> move, the line 26...cxb3 27.♙e4 ♖c5 28.♙a3,




rather than 28...♖xc3?, Black should play 28...♖c4! 29.♙xe7 b2!,




and after either 30.♖b2 ♖xe4, or 30.♖b1 ♘xe7, or 30.♖a2 ♘xe5 31.♘xe5 (not 31.♖a8?? ♖xa8 32.♙a8 b1♖++) 31...♘xg3 32.fxg3 ♖xe4 33.♖xe4 ♖xc3 34.♘f3 ♘f5, Black is no worse than equal.

In the note at Black's 40<sup>th</sup> move, after 40...♘d3 retaining the pawn plus with good winning chances, for example 41.c5 ♖b5 42.♙d5 ♖b2+,




rather than 43.♖g1?, which loses, White must play 43.♖h1, with some drawing chances. The reason is that after 43...♖e2 44.♖c7 g5 45.♖xf7+ ♖g6,




with the king on h1 White can save his bishop with 46.♙g1, whereas with the king on g1 he loses after either 46.c6 ♖xe3 47.c7 ♖e1+ 48.♖g2 ♖e2+ 49.♖h1 ♖c2, or 46.♖xf6+ ♖xf6 47.♙d4+ ♖e7 etc.

*Game 197, Reshevsky-Gligoric:* In the note at Black's 23<sup>rd</sup> move, in the sub-variation 23...♘fxd5 24.♘xd5 ♘xd5,




the move given as winning, 25.♙xg7, actually is a mistake that lands White in trouble after 25...♙xd3 26.♖xd3 (if 26.exd3 ♖xg7) 26...♘b4 27.♖d2 (or 27.♖c3 ♘xa2 28.♖b2 ♘xc1 29.♙h6 f6 30.♖xc1+) 27...♖xg7 and Black is a clear pawn up. Instead White must play 25.♙a6 ♘b4 26.♖c3 ♙xb2 27.♖xb2 d5 28.♖f4 ♘a6 29.♘xc5 ♘xc5 30.♖xc5 with a roughly even game.

Najdorf (and also Euwe) fails to mention a winning line Reshevsky missed at move 31.




Rather than 31.♖d2 as played, 31.♖h8+! would have settled matters, e.g. 31.♖h8+ ♖f7 32.♖xh7+ ♙g7 33.♙xg7 ♘xg7 34.♖c3 d5 35.♘g2+- as pointed out by Bronstein.


*Game 200, Geller-Petrosian:* Mistakes pervade the note to Black's 25<sup>th</sup> move. In the first place,



the text move 25...e4 does not deserve a "!" and the alternative deemed inferior, 25...♙e4, is probably Black's best move. After 26.♘f3, Najdorf fails to examine the best reply, 26...♘c5!,




when if 27.fxe5? ♘d3 28.♖e2 ♘xc1 29.♖xc1 ♙xf3 30.♖xf3 dxe5 and Black is probably winning. Relatively best for White seems to be something like 27.♘g5 ♖g6 28.♘e4 fxe4 29.♖c2 ♘d3 30.♖e2 ♖f8 31.fxe5 ♖xf1+ 32.♖xf1 dxe5,




when Black is clearly better, and if he cannot win he certainly is in no danger of losing.

Looking at the lines Najdorf does examine, in a sub-variation of line (a), after 25...♙e4 26.♘f3 exf4 27.exf4 ♖xc4 28.♘g5 ♖d5 29.♖xc4 ♖xc4 30.♖c1 ♘d3 31.♖c8+ ♘f8 32.♖c7 ♖g6 33.h4,




Black should not play 33...h5? allowing 34.♖d4!+-, but 33...h6! which should draw, viz. 34.h5 ♖d1+ 35.♖f1 (not 35.♖h2?? ♖xh5+-) 35...♖xh5 36.♖c4+ ♖h8 37.♖f7 ♖d1+ 38.♖h2 ♖h5+ etc.

Najdorf seems to believe the end position of variation (a) is good for White,




but after 32...♖e3 Rybka rates it even.

Line (b) has several oversights. In its sub-variation 26...♖xc4 27.♟g5 ♜d5 28.♞xc4 ♜xc4 29.♞c1 ♜xb5 30.♞c8+ ♟f8 31.♟xe4,




not 31...fxc4?? 32.fxc5+- as given, but 31...♜d7!, when after, say, 32.♞xf8+ ♜xf8 33.♟g3 Black has at worst only a slight disadvantage.

In the main line of variation (b), after 26...♖xc4 27.♟g5 ♜d5 28.♞xc4 ♜xc4 29.♞c1 ♜d3 30.fxc5 dxc5 31.♞c8+ ♟f8 32.♟xe5,



rather than 32...♞g6 Black can improve with 32...♜xb5=. And even with 32...♞g6 33.♟xe4 as given,



Black is by no means obliged to lose with 33...♜xe4?, but can play the *Zwischenschach* 33...♜b1+! 34.♜f1 ♜xe4, when White cannot play 35.♜a2+ as in the given line and Black has some drawing chances.


**Game 202, Boleslavsky-Szabó:** A minor improvement: in the note to move 26, after 26.♞a1,



rather than Najdorf's somewhat roundabout 26...♞b1 27.a4 ♞a2, it appears Black can win more directly and easily with 26...♞e6, e.g. 27.♞xe6 ♜xe6 and 28...♞c2.


**Game 204, Euwe-Boleslavsky:** While there was nothing wrong with the simple way

Boleslavsky forced the win here, a strong line pointed out by Euwe at move 40 is worth noting.




Instead of 40...♞d8, best by far was 40...♞b2! (threatening 41...♞e2 and 42...♜xg3), when White has no good defense, e.g. 41.♞f1 ♞xf1 42.♜xf1 ♞h4! 43.♞b3 (if 43.gxh4 ♜h2 and mate shortly) 43...♞xg3 44.♜a5 ♞f2+ 45.♜g1 ♞f3+- (about -5.06), or 41.♞xc4 dxc4 42.♟a4 ♜b4! (about -9.68).

**Game 207, Petrosian-Smyslov:** Two improvements are possible in second variation of the note to White's 9<sup>th</sup> move. After 9.a3 ♞xc3+ 10.bxc3 0-0 11.♜xb7 ♜a5 12.♜b2 ♞ab8 13.♞xb8 ♞xb8,




rather than 14.♜c1?, which loses badly, White can resist with 14.♜d2!?, viz. 13...♟e4 15.♜c1 ♞b3 16.♟d2 ♞xc3 17.♜b2,



and if 17...g6 18.♞e2 ♟xf2 19.♜xf2 ♞c2 20.♜b1 ♞xd2 White is down only a pawn, or if 17...♟xf2 18.♞c1 (not 18.♜xf2? ♞c2) 18...♞xc1+ 19.♜xc1 ♟xh1 20.♜xc6 ♜xa3, White will probably win the cornered knight, with drawing chances in either case.

The importance of 14.♜d2 is seen further on in the note, after 14.♜c1 ♞b3 15.♟d2 ♞xc3 16.♜d1,



when rather than 16...♞c2?! which leads only to the relatively small advantage of two minor pieces for a rook, Black has the crushing 16...♞c2!, viz. 17.♜e2 (or 17.♜c1 ♞a4 18.♜b1 ♞c2 19.♜d1 ♟e4+-) 17...♟e4 18.f3 ♟xd2 19.♜xd2 ♞xe3+ 20.♞e2 ♞d3+-.